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ABSTRACT 
In this study, I demonstrate how Swinburne develops an aesthetic that involves re­
examining the contradictions and ambiguities arising in the tension between the 
celebration of the creative power of the·i�agination and the consideration of the material 
limitations that constrict the applications of the imagination's power. He finds artistic 
integrity and productivity in the failure of the imagination to aUow one to transcend the 
material world, because he determines that such failure allows one to discover many 
previously undetected possibilities for imaginative expression still inherent in the 
material world. Swinburne accomplishes this by privileging the fantasy component of 
art while recognizing fantasy as artifice, artifice in which failure is always already 
immanent. By emphasizing the artificiality, the fantastic quality, of art, he modifies 
conventional perceptions of �rt as well as conventional modes of conveying and 
interpreting "meaning" in art. In t�is waY., Swinburne presages the explorations of the 
negative dialectic as well as the reconfigurations of material limitations that Theodor 
Adorno undertakes in the Aesthetic Theory. 
In my first three chapters, I establish how Swinburne's creative reconsideration of 
the biography and works of William Blake allows him to explore the qualities of aesthetic 
particularity and individualized perspective made possible by the revaluation of artifice . 
. Swinburne "misreads" or transforms Blake into an idealized artist who pioneers an 
aesthetic that depends on the very failures of actual, complete representatfon to occur 
within ideological conventions in order to modify radically, if not exceed, those 
conventions. In chapters four and five, I demonstrate how this aesthetic of failure is 
manifest in the process of serial identifications Swinburne uses in his depictions of the 
ix 
various "Ladies of Pain" in his Poems and Ballads, First Series. Swinburne applies this 
process of recasting failure as an ae�thetically productive process of serial identifications 
to his explorations ofltalia� revolutionary politics and the carefully crafted images of 
Giuseppe Mazzini in Songs before Sunrise, as I demonstrate in chapter six. Finally, in 
chapter seven, I investigate Swinburne's use of the polis as a trope exemplifying 
constructive struggle within failure through a compa_rison of his two major Greek 
tragedies, A ta/anta in Calydon and Erechtheus. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Re-Examining Imagination, Reason, Subjectivity: 
Introducing Sw_inburne �etween Blake and Adorno 
I" • • • 
"An enjoyment which wants lpttcia! language t� ckscribe it, being so unlike all others . . .  
crams and crowds me with old and new verses, half-remembered and half-m<Jde, which 
new ones will �ardly c�me straight afterwards .... "-Algernon Charles Swinburne 
This study situates Swinburne, as an artist articulating a complex but critically 
important aesthetic theory, as representing a kind of aesthetic median between Blake's 
visionary celebration of the Romantic imagination and Adamo's exploration of the 
ambiguities and contradictions the imagination simultaneously discovers and constructs 
within art. Like Blake before him and Adorno after him, Swinburne realized that the 
study of the power as well as the limitations of the imagination necessitates re-evaluation 
not only of the problems post-enlightenment reason poses to the creation and 
contemplation of art, but also ;to the constructions of selfho�d-the ego, or the subject 
position-within an individual artwork, or a body of work by an individual artist. 
Swinburne looked to Blake's poetry to find a theory of the imagination that could 
overcome the dualisms between the material world and immaterial "spirit," reason and 
nature, the human and the divine. However, Swinburne "misread" Blake1 as defending 
the spiritual against the material rather than erasing the divide between the two, 
"reserving always the absolute assurance and certain faith that things do exist of which 
the flesh"-and all things material-"can take no account, but only the spirit" (Blake 96). 
Thus Swinburne reads into Blake's.poetry a perpetuation of the kind of dualism Blake 
1 The standard claim in modem Swinburne criticism is that he "creatively misread" Blake's works. See 
particularly David Riede, Swinburne: A Study of Romantic Mythmaking; Ian Fletcher, Swinbume; and 
Jerome McGaillly Swinburne: An Experiment in Criticism. Also, Harold Bloom discusses Swinburne's 
misreading of "Blake's contraries" in Blake's Apocalypse: A Study in Poetic Argument (Garden City: 
Doubleday, 1963). 
2 
purported to transcend. Because he misreads Blake as perpetuating such dualis� 
Swinburne questions and, in some instances, rejects altogether the idea of there being a 
transcendent immaterial or "spiritual" realm which one could aspire to reach. 
Consequently, Swinburne abandons the quest to find an alternative to a materialist world 
view and instead dedicates himself to finding new ways to portray and aestheticize the 
materialist view. In the prefatory note to his essay on William Blake, Swinburne praises 
the Enlightenment philosopher Denis Diderot, a "hard-headed materialist," for being a 
fierce and fervent "antagonist of all religions bui1_t on creeds and propped by sacraments" 
(Blake viii). What Swinburne cal1s Diderot's "opposition to the God of man's making 
and man's worshipping" (Blake vii) informs Swinburne's approach to the aesthetic. 
Swinburne begins to consider the transcendent spiritual realm-a mythopoeic place in 
which "the whole soul of man [meets] with the whole soul of the cosmos," overcoming 
"the utter disjunction between nature and man" (Riede, Study 5-6)-as being of artists' 
own making; and he becomes skeptical of those who claim that aesthetic experience can 
allow one to validate his/her belief in the objective existence of that "transcendent" 
realm. If overcoming or transcending the disjunction between nature and man, material 
and "spirit," is no longer an option, then, one is left to explore the creative possibilities of 
the unsurpassable disjunction. In this kind of exploration, Swinburne revises the 
conventional dualisms of disjunction, presenting them as more dialectical structures in 
which the conventions of opposition are cha11enged to expose how those conventions 
contain elements of the unconventional, the exceptional-that which exceeds the very 
convention. 
3 
Similar to Adorno in Aesthetic Theory, Swinburne sees in art the necessity of 
experimentation which "takes shape as .the testing of possibilities," understanding that 
such experimentation takes place at t�e boundaries of convention and must unearth a 
"conscious[ness] of something that was always present in it" (Adorno, Theory 37-38). 
Furthermore, Swinburne's dialectical structures seem to coptain a strain of what we can 
now identify as Adomian negativity, in that Swinburne "highlights unavoidable tensions" 
·between conventional oppositions instead of attempting to resolve such tensions, as weU 
as "refuses to_ affirm any underlying identity" between or "final synthesis of' disparate 
elements to fit.an established convention (Zuidervaart 48). Swinburne's dialectical 
structures, like Adorno's, are enacted as "ensemble[s] of analyses of models" or 
conventions themselves (Adorno, Negative 29). When Swinburne transforms a 
dichotomy into dialectic, he provides various fantasies of synthesizing the two opposing 
ideas, ostensibly giving hope for such reconciliation, but always with the awareness that 
the reconciliation never happens. 
Swinburne is actually more interested in creating multiple fantasies to use as 
mediating terms between opposites, knowing that the mediation always fails. The 
ensemble of the various analyses of the equally various failures at mediation then allows 
· Swinburne to interrogate, via the negative dialectic, the conventional limitations of the 
material world. He creates a.plenitude of artifices set up to fail with the distinct intent to 
analyze all the reasons that the failure was always already immanent within the artifice 
itself. The artifice is consciously con_cocted to (re)produce the failure of fantasy to 
implement synthesis, reconciliation, or satisfaction; because fantasy does not have the 
kind of"experiential authority" that conventions, with their limitations, produce, it allows 
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Swinburne a "radically decentered and mobile experience" of reading, in which 
conventional "experiential authority must become shifting, mobile, and decentered" 
(Nicholsen 13 1). By shifting and decentering conventional limitations, then, Swinburne 
aims to produce "inexhaustible aesthetic meaning" (Menke 66) without giving into what 
Adorno would call the "transcendental delusion. "2 
Imaginative Vision: More than Meets the Eye 
In the August 7, 1 808 issue of The Examiner. a reviewer identified simply as 
"R.H." accused Blake of creating "insipid" and "absurd" art which merely reinforced the 
"utter impossibility of representing Spirit to the eye," rather than surmounting it.3 
Reading this particular review irivoked considerable ire in Swinburne, who believed that 
"R.H." overlooked the key to surmounting this "impossibility": the human imagination. 
This is not to suggest that Swinburne, like the Blake critics preceding him, thought that 
the material could be transcended in order to reach the spiritual . Rather, Swinburne was 
frustrated at their. apparent inabil ity to rework or modify the traditional dualism. Through 
his reading of Blake, Swinburne became convinced that the imagination did have the 
power to transform the material world by reworking the traditionally imposed division 
between the material and the immaterial, or the body and the spirit. Yet, despite his scorn 
for most of Blake's contemporaneous critics, Swinburne remains just as obstinately 
limited by the customary dualisms that Blake wished to traverse. Unlike those critics, 
though, Swinburne was able to refocus his perception of the dichotomy between material 
2 See Negative Dialectics 180-83. 
3 Quoted by Swinburne, Blake 58-59, italics in original. Swinburne does not identify "R.H.," but the 
review was written by Robert Hunt, brother of Leigh Hunt. Leigh Hunt was primary editor and publisher 
of The Examiner from 1808-1822. 
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and "spirit." Rather than agree with claims that Blake futilely endeavored "by bad 
drawings to represent immateriality" in material forms, 4 Swinburne re-reads 
"immateriality" as indicating that which exceeds the common comprehension of 
materiality. He felt that Blake's peers neglected to imagine themselves able to see that 
which is not ordinarily seen, or to look beyond what is immediately, appreciably obvious. 
Especially in _the case of the &aminer reviewers Swinburne cites, there lacks the 
necessary acknowledgment -of one o(the foremost principles of Blake's aesthetic. To 
"see" the world aesthetically is -not the same as "seeing" the world through one' s two 
eyes. As Blake says in Milton, "The Eye of Man _[ is] a little narrow orb closd up & dark" 
(Plate 5 :  2 1); thus one must use his/her imagination to "see." 
Blake equates the imagination-the creative impulse-with the divine, albeit not 
quite the same version of God or divinity upheld by Judeo-Christian tradition. As Blake 
declares in The Ma"iage of Heaven and Hell, "men forgot that Al l deities reside in the 
human breast" (38), insinuating that "God" is a figurative incarnation of the multiple, 
seemingly limitless possibilities of what the individual has yet to realize in the material 
world. God also signifies mythic "Poetic Genius," or the ability to perceive what the 
ideological screen ecl ipses· and/or distorts. Such "poetic genius" grants an inexhaustible 
vision from which al l human perception "merely deriv[es]" (Blake, Marriage 39). 
Perhaps the most telling statement about the power and importance of the human 
imagination, though, and the one that arguably best figures Blake's influence on 
Swinburne, comes from Blake's "Laocoon": 
The Eternal Body of Man is The IMAGINATION 
4 "Mr. Blake's Exhibition," The Examiner 90 {17 Sep. 1809). Quoted by Swinburne, Blake 60. 
6 
God himself 
that is 
The Divine Body 
It manifests itself in his Works of Art (In Eternity All is Vision) 
All that we See is VISION from Generated Organs gone as soon as come 
· Permanent in The Imagination; considered as Nothing by the NATIJRAL 
MAN 
Here Blake separates artistic vision from the ordinary vision while also devising an 
interesting pair of paradoxes. The first paradox-imagination as the "eternal body of 
man"--explores the imagination's boundaries. The imagination, as a human faculty, is 
embodied in the (hu)man who uses it; yet the imagination is simultaneously "eternal," as 
it exceeds the boundaries of material shape, thus able _to take one beyond the limits of his 
or her "generated organs." Moreover, by its very excessi_ve character, the imagination is 
never really limited to being expressed only in specific conventions and tropes. Rather, 
the imagination is the means by which old conventions can be dismantled and new tropes 
can be devised. 
The second, and perhaps more critically important, paradox involves the 
relationship of''Natural Man" to the imagination. Swinburne seems to read the "Natura) 
Man" as the opposite of socially constructed man, discounting ( considering as "nothing") 
that which he perceives with his eyes-though, typically, in Blake, the "Natural Man" is 
read as negatively antithetical to the eternal "imaginative" man, as "Natural Man" is fully 
enclosed in "the medium of the fallen physical world," thus so "inundated by the 'flood 
of the five senses'" (Dimock 163) that he lacks an opportunity to contemplate the limits 
of those senses. As Ian Fletcher has noted, though, "failure to grasp that, for Blake, 
nature and imagination were antithetical, lies at the heart of Swinburne's fruitful 
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misunderstanding of Blake" ·(Swinburne 49). Swi�bume "misunderst�mds" Blake' s 
"Natural Man'' as a man who recognizes that his eyes can deceive him, as human vision 
comes with inexorable physical l imitations. Swinburne's ''Natural Man" also recognizes 
that he employs a different mode of seeing than social ly constructed man, because his 
imagination, synaesthetical ly fusing man and nature,5 has no physical restrictions. He is 
. able to see imaginatively past material "thingishness," instead perceiving the nothingness 
of what any given "thing" represents. In a typical reading of Blake, this "nothingness" 
would be "Natural Man' s" failure to recognize imagination. In the Swinbumian reading, 
however, this is the nothingness ofDesire: Blake's  "Natural Man," for Swinburne, uses 
the imagination to distinguish how a �aterial thing is really like what Zizek would call 
'"the place-holder of the lack,' the point of the signifier' s non-sense" (Lacan 53). The 
imagination gives one insight into "non-sense"- meaning, not only that which cannot be 
comprehended via empirical sense perception, but also that which exceeds the normal 
means of representation. Moreover, with insight into "non-sense," one can apprehend 
how material things only temporari ly provide the fantasy of satisfying human desire, 
rather than providing any actual, definite satisfaction. The imagination does what Zizek 
labels "dream-work": it retranslates "things" into "words" (Lacan 5 1 ) and finds new 
ways to describe common things, in an attempt to reveal an aspect of a thing that has not 
yet been revealed. Yet the final "retranslated" product-the work of art, the product of 
the imagination-still "contains at least one ingredient that functions as a stopgap, as a 
filler holding the place of what is necessarily lacking in it" (Lacan 52). The lack cannot 
be filled, nor can it be transcended. 
5 See Riede, Study 35. 
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Swinburne was fascinated by this particular problematic element of the Blakean 
· imagination. On one hand, Swinburne notes that "Blake himself regarded [his] works . . .  
as containing the sum of his achieved ambitions andfulfilled desires: as in effect inspired 
matter, of imaginative truth and eternal import" (Blake 1 84, italics mine); on the other, he 
was troubled by "the strange diversities and discords which intervene" (Blake 1 94). 
Swinburne persistently noticed that the discord of dissatisfaction is always there, as 
desire is never really fulfilled, not even imaginatively. Rather than giving into frustration 
caused by what he perceived as an apparent failure of the Blakean imagination to act as a 
productive aesthetic force, though, Swinburne chose to explore this failure, to generate an 
aesthetic that uses such failure as an integral part of aesthetic productivity. Like the later 
Romantics who also inspired him, Swinburne chose to create "a re-enactment of . . .  
devastating experience, [as] · a means of criticising, [or] of containing" it (Butler 12), 6 as 
well as a means of manipulating the devastating frustration of unfulfilled desire. In this 
way, Swinburne strives to uncover "the aesthetic desirability of an explosion of meaning" 
brought about through manipulating one's own frustration, with the intent to process 
imaginatively not only human perception and its failures, but also the very modes of 
perceiving failure (Buckler 235). He realizes that desire cannot be satisfied with material 
things and that the imagination cannot really transcend the material world. However, he 
also realizes that, by acknowledging and the� stretching the limitations and shortcomings 
of the role of imaginative art in the material world, he can reassess the role the 
6 The "devastating experience" Marilyn Butler actually refers to is the French Revolutio� an event 
Swinburne himself finds very fascinating. However, I feel it applies here as well. 
imagination. plays in what Adorno would later describe as the "unsolved antagonism[s]" 
between "art" and "reality" (Theory 6). 
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Thus Swinburne's complicated study of the imagination and its paradoxical 
quality can be read as· a significant precursor to the ideas Theodor Adorno presents in his 
Aesthetic Theory. Like Swinburne before him, Adorno recognizes the limitations of the 
imagination, stating, "[I]magination is escape, .but not exclusively so," acknowledging 
that what appears or professes to transcend material "reality" is actually always still 
grounded in it (Theory 9). The antagonism, in part, results from the imagination not 
recognizing· its dependence on reality. In this antagonism, there is an aspect of"violence 
done to the material'' (Theory 50), .since the material aspect of imaginative art is the 
ground from which the imagination can proceed. In other words, .the material world is 
always the basis for the art which pretends to transcend or refute it; an artwork may be, as 
Adorno indicates, "labor on a reality resisting the artist" (Theory 9), but resistance should 
not be read as total separation from reality. In the separation fantasy, "[s]omething is 
excised from the living, from the body of language, from tones, from visual experience" 
(Theory 50), instead of transcending it. This can be deciphered as an imagined violation 
of the principles constituting material reality, but, like all fantasies, it is subject to 
revealing its own "radical falsity."7 As Adorno indicates, the art which advocates such a 
fantasy merely reinforces the social, material reality it claims to oppose; it becomes 
another "vehicle of ideology'' (Theory 225-26), defining the material world by what it is 
not, re-establishing the conventional limits of comprehension. Therefore, the artist must 
employ the imagination to enact another kind of violence on the material, one that allows 
7 This is Zizek's tenn. See Plague of Fantasies 20. 
IO 
for an exploration of ideology from within. S/he must fracture the margins of reality that 
s/he cannot escape. As Zizek says, art is fragmentary "since it always relies on the 
distance towards fantasy" (Plague 1 9). One retains the fantasy of transcending the 
material world, but there is a great (figurative) distance between the artist and the 
realization of his/her fantasy, considering that one's fantasy is quite separate from one's 
lived experience. Art can try to approximate the ostensible experience of living one's 
fantasy, but the approximation can never be complete; thus it is always fragmented. 
I believe that Swinburne's tex�s indicate that he, too, viewed the world as a 
fragmented arena. He seemed to have become disillusioned by Blake's "almost 
overriding attention to and desire for wholeness and unity" (Labbe 35) as figured in 
Blake's hope for human reconciliation with the natural world. Swinburne admired 
Blake's attempt "to readjust all questions [of faith or principle] by the light of art and law 
of imagination" (Blake 94) that would allow the "Natural Man" to re-emerge; yet he was 
troubled by how Blake's portrayal of nature, often acting as "an obscure material force" 
(Blake 1 1 8) mimicking the activity of human domination and subjugation, did not always 
lend itself so easily to his (Swinburne's) rereading of it. At one point, Swinburne laments 
that Blake "never found or felt out any way to the debateable [sic] land where simple and 
tender pleasures become complex and cruel'' (Blake 145); meaning, he feels that Blake 
never found an imaginative way for the "pleasures" associated with an undifferentiated, 
enchanted nature to transcend the socially conventional concept of nature in which they 
are repressed. ''Nature" always remains disenchanted despite any fantasies of recouping 
it. The concept of nature cannot be reformed to exclude the complexities and cruelties of 
the violence of human domination. Swinburne, like Adorno, recognizes that art both 
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works with and oppresses the fantasy of nature before its disenchantment: as Adorno 
would put it, "[t]his is the ritual of domination that lives on in p_lay" (Theory 50). As part 
of this aesthetic "play," Swinbume, influenced by the works of the Marquis de Sade, . . . 
presents a version of nature reduced ·simply to the rituals and patterns of domination and 
violence. However, Swinburne cannot fully accept Sade's view of debased nature any 
more than he c�n fully accept what he sees as Blake's affirmative m�stification of it. The 
Sadean view of nature, with its emphases on destruction and degradation, and its reliance 
on violent dynamism that in the end proves monotonous rather than invigorating­
becoming in itself a static universal concept that subsumes any kind of particularity­
imparts only "a dreary beauty, inhuman if not unearthly in its desolation" that leaves one 
in a state of "splendid oppression."8 · Again, this becomes the oppression of the "ritual of 
domination." However, Swinburne's  manipulation of this  "play" through performing 
constant, kaleidoscopic, constellative rearrangements of the various fragments or 
fractured elements of the ideological constructs of nature and the material world allow 
him, as well as his reader, to "see" art-and "see through'' art-in diverse and 
unanticipated ways. Swinburne comes quite close to achieving an Adomian "expression 
in which what is menacing in the domination of nature is wed with a longing for the 
vanquished, a longing stirred by domination" but never satisfied by it (Theory 52). And, 
because the expression fails to satisfy, Swinburne's portrayal of nature oscil1ates between 
the Blakean and Sadean versions, demonstrating an uneasy ambivalence that he revisits 
again and again in his poetry, as the failure of his own ambivalent impasse intrigues him. 
8 Tius is taken from the "Dedicatory Epistle" tbat prefaces Swinburne's Collected Poems. These 
statements appear in Swinburne's self-critical analysis of his presentation of nature throughout his body of 
poetry. (See vol. I .  xxii-xxiii.) 
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Despite all of this, S�inburne is always brought back to Blake' s exhortation in A 
Vision of the Last Judgment: "I question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye anymore 
than I would Question a Window Concerning a Sight I look thro [sic] it & not with it" 
(566). The imagination, for Swinburne, allows one to adopt a kaleidoscopic view of the 
material world, yet he must be careful to see through the view and not just with it. To see 
with this view is to not see beyond the artificiality of this position; it is important to 
. recognize this perspective as artifice that cannot be transcended (that is, one cannot see 
through it to see a "transcendent reality"). Like Adorno, Swinburne believes·that art "is 
not obliged to erase the traces of . . .  its artificiality" (Adorno, Theory 1 89); but, more akin 
to the spirit of Blake, Swinburne wants to implement �his in an aesthetic that serves a� "a 
positive program" that privileges artifice, "not a negative prescription" for quelling it 
(McGann, Swinburne 50). 
The Importance of the Irrational: No Good Reason 
Swinburne's assiduous play with the concept of domination suggests that he held 
an attitude toward Enlightenment reason and its detrimental effect on the imagination 
similar to that later espoused by Horkheimer and Adorno: "Enlightenment has always 
taken the basic principle of myth to be . . .  the projection onto nature of the subjective,, 
(6). In his poetry, Swinburne submits his own treatment of mythology, both Judeo­
Christian and pagan, as a critique of reason. One .of the best examples of Swinburne 
voicing his misgivings about reason in his work can be found in "At El�usis." The 
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speaker of this poem, Demeter cast as a version of"Mother Naturet9 sarcastically and 
accusatorily dismisses the bourgeois men who "sit in the market-houses" and explain the 
world in their own "words I Made: sweet with wisdom as the rare wine is / Thickened 
with honey" (2-5), constructing a view of nat�re that reflects their own image(s) rather 
than hers. Yet this is obviously meant to be ironic, in that Demeter's credibility as a 
speaker is always already undermined. Despite her protestations of transcendent divinity, 
Demeter later. admits she is "woman-muffled in wan flesh" (line 14 1  ); she reveals that 
she is more social ( wo )man than natural ( wo )man or nature it/her self. In the end, 
Swinburne's Demeter is a product of the material world, snared in the iron cage of 
reason: she is what Horkheimer an_d Adorno might identify as a "consciously contrived 
adaptation to nature [which] brings nature under . . .  control," a signifier of society's 
. . 
"nagging consciousness of its own impotence against physical nature" and the attempt to 
gain power over nature through rationalization (57). Like nearly all of Swinburne's 
"natural'' poetic personae, Demeter is a myth reconstructed, cast in the Enlightened 
scene, only to be deconstructed. Meanwhile, though, the process of re/deconstructing 
myth becomes the process of imagining a variant version of Enlightenment reason. 
Swinburne suggests that Blake's texts demonstrate how one can use reason, in 
spite of its intent to regard "[t]he world as a gigantic analytic judgment" (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 27), to appraise itself critically, including appraising its limitations and faiHngs. 
He remarks that Blake purposely created works that one can only "apprehend and enjoy" 
by "i"ational perception" (Blake 35, emphasis mine), a perception that one adopts when 
one realizes s/he perceives the world according to a false absolute. The kind of 
9 In the poem, Demeter calls herself "the mother and the mate of (all) things" (line 27). 
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"irrational" perception that is  self-aware of the falsity of absolute judgment or knowledge 
opposes the "Reason [whic.h] is -the bound or outward circumference ofEnergy" (Blake, 
Marriage 34). Still, it depends on reason to give it credence; one must be fully 
entrenched in reason before one can imagine him/herself perceiving irrationally, or 
perceiving reason negatively. This strange relationship between the rational and the 
irrational is well represented in aesthetic experience, in which the ambiguity of the 
"nonrational" is "immediately complemented by the rationality contained" in art's 
mimetic function; "for without rationality," art "would degenerate into a bearing . . .  
comparable to mimicry," an ·empty and unperceptive form "which would not be adequate 
to ·genuine aesthetic experience" (Gebauer and Wulf 290). As Adorno points out, art 
represents the dualism of truth: it aims _to liberate itself "from the mythic, cultic, 
ritualized context"-or "magic"-- "out of which it emerged" (Jay, Adorno 1 57) while 
also convicting current social reality "of its [own] irrationality and absurdity" (Adorno, 
Theory 54). Art, by questioning and obscuring the boundaries that separate it from 
reason, can provide an irrational perception which destroys the totalizing fantasy of the 
existence of inherent, summative princip�es upon which conventional aesthetic theory is 
founded. Aesthetics may imitate society's adoption of absolute positions or rules, but it 
also must accept its own failure to fulfill any such absolutes. In other words, one must 
first employ the false claim of"foundations-grounding" reason before one can question 
and ultimately refuse to accept "the presumption of satisfying absolute claims to meaning 
and grouhding" (Menke 236-37). To perceive irrational ly is to perceive the instabil ity of 
the position one assumes when s/he is in the act of perceiving at the same time s/he 
perceives the world around her/him. 
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I believe Swinburne gleaned this idea in .part -from The Book of Los. Though 
Swinburne,s account of Los is a mere three pages, consisting mostly paraphrases of the 
poem mixed with sparse commentary, the little bit of commentary Swinburne does offer 
is quite informative, as it is indicative of how he reads Blake,s poetry as a whole. 
Swinburne begins his discussion of the poem by commenting, somewhat wearily, that in 
Los the "old themes of d_elusion and perversion are one� again rehandled" (Blake 256). 
However, it is Swinburne,s specific use of the word perversion that I find remarkable, as 
Swinburne is very interested in perversions-as in any kind of diversions from intention 
or convention-of all kinds. In Swinburne,s usage, "perversion" is reason without 
motivation; in this case, we.have the blindly, thoughtlessly compulsive repetition, rather 
than the inspired or evocative (re)application, of the "gigantic analytic judgment." 
Swinburne claims that the poem "celebrates . . .  the advent of the iron laws and ages" of 
Reason, but only to bring about "the final fruit of reason debased" (Blake 1 57-58). 
Swinburne admired Blake's attempt to invalidate the methods that supposedly validate 
the world by vitiating those very methods. 
Blake's poem imagines the moment in which "contemplative thoughts first arose" 
and the "Mind labour'd / Organizing itself' (Los II: 40, 49-50): the moment in which the 
subjective is projected onto nature. The creation myth becomes the myth of 
Enlightenment; here the "natural" or pre-Enlightenment energy is bound, the "Eternal" is 
substantiated only as material form-a kind of material form like that Horkheimer and 
Adorno would say is "secularized as the space whose measure the self must take" ( 46). 
At the poem's end, "a Form / Was completed, a Human Illusion / In darkness and deep 
clouds involvd" (Los IV: 56-58). All Blake's Prophetic Books treat the project of 
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Enlightenment as "human illusion,,-repeated attempts to shed light into darkness, 
unravel mysteries by the power of.the mind. But, as the poetry indicates, the light is 
synthetic; moreover, it tries to synthesize disparate elements by offering repetitively the 
same explanations for--shedding the· same "light,, on-everything in the world. Reason 
might be every man 's "spectrous power,,,10  but it is a peculiarly singular power, in that 
the mind monotonously labors to organize itself in the same patterns. As Swinburne 
astutely discerns, Blake's Prophetic Books are various retellings of the same mythology 
of the implementation of the iron cage of reason. Swinburne diverges from Blake, 
though, in that Swinburne underscores the inevitable failure of fully escaping that cage. 
Subjective Differentiation: E(r)go Imagination 
As illustrated above, the relationship between nature and reason that Swinburne 
reads into Blake's poetry is mediated by the self. In Swinburne's Blakean aesthetic, the 
individual ego is prolific, portrayed as an expansive internal force that shapes the external 
world. Swinburne employs a process of reading backwards, or reading the Prophetic 
Books back into the Songs of Innocence and Experience, as part of his exploration of the 
Blakean ego. Though he claims to find "relief' in reading the So ngs in that they lack "all 
the Titanic apparatus" of Blake's individualized and individualizing "prophecy," 
Swinburne concurrently praises the So ngs as the most lucid presentation of Blake's 
personal "mysticism," articulated in "the 'voice of the bard"' invoking "earth and man 
[to] obtain deliverance" (Blake 1 1 4, 1 1 6). In this call for the return to innocence, the 
individual must (re)construct his/her own innocence at the beckoning of the voice of 
10  lbis is from Blake's description of his "Everymant Albion� see the Preface to Jerusalem (line 5). 
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experience. Concluding that subjective "experience must do the work of innocence" 
(Blake 1 24) and thus concluding that a pure, objective state of innocence cannot exist, 
Swinburne achieves a reading of Blake that seems more aligned with modem 
interpretations than nineteenth-century ones. Swinburne acknowledges that Blake 
intends the reader to believe that "the strong simplicity of eye and hand proper to the pure 
and single of heart" in which childl ike "inspiration shal l do the work of innocence" i s  
possible (Blake 1 17), but Swinburne doubts this very possibil ity. Instead, Swinburne 
adopts what modem critics like David Wagenknecht recognize as "a peculiarly controlled 
and distanced identification" with the concept of innocence, in which the innocence 
avai lable to the subject is "almost a parody of the real {platonic)" idea(I) of innocence 
Blake attempts to convey (3 1 8). The Songs, read as discourse of and about the "spl it 
subject" revealed as "a 'rem[a]inder' of the organic wholeness" innocence represents 
(Wagenknecht 337, brackets in original), become emblems of creative transformations of 
notions of nature and seltbood which diverge from Blakean intentions of reclaiming 
wholeness. In the Swinburnian and modem readings of Blake, the self becomes a 
dynamic principle which, paradoxical ly, accepts that it is "composed of irreconci lable 
bits and pieces" (Punter, "Blake" 228) which statically remain in arrangements of 
disunion. These readings identify the kind of passive acceptance of disharmony that 
Blake found problematic, yet they also identify the problematic procedures of the subject 
willing the irreconcilable into arguably artificial states of harmony. 
Swinburne repeatedly compares the Songs ' discourse of spl it subjectivity to 
Urizen's attempt to (re)construct the tacitly innocent pre-Urizenic world by the power of 
his own will-all the whi le knowing that not only did Urizen will the pre-Urizenic world 
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away irrevocably, but also that the idea of the pre-Urizenic world exists only i n  the 
context ofUrizenic will. The idea of a pre-Urizenic world, akin to the Songs ' idea of 
innocence, "allows him to protect the image of a consciousness not psychologically 
divided against itself because [it is] not constrained by those material divisions" (Guest 
and Barrell 257). Blake's-Book of Urizen attests to the performative flat of the individual 
(Urizen) which makes a world out of summative nothingness: Urizen "self-balanc'd 
stretch'd o'er the void," and a "wide world of solid obstruction" appears (Urizen III : 1 8, 
23). Blake describes this newly formed Nature, Urizen' s "vast world" or "dark globe,"­
as like "a human heart strugling [sic] and beating" (Urizen III: 36--38). Blake's use of a 
simile here is particularly significant, as the simile compares the material world to 
something that is already separated from nature as well as the divine or eternal: man. The 
human "heart" struggles to establish its identity in difference to all that surrounds it, 
expanding to encompass otherness yet always contracting back when the difference or 
"contrariety'' cannot be overcome. Similarly, Urizen's identity establishes itself in · 
difference to the eternal void, or Desire. He is  recurrently identified as a ·contrasting 
constituent in the material world of "solid obstruction" to Desire he has created; yet, he 
cannot surpass that obstruction to his desire, even though "the universe of the poem is 
totally mental'' (Mitchell, "Poetic" 93). The world is his own expanded projection, but he 
concurrently withdraws from it, leaving his world and his "self' in disunity with each 
other. As W.J.T. Mitchell has noted, this "paradoxical process of contraction and 
expansion, unification and fragmentation" is a constant in the Blakean/Urizenic universe, 
and "[e]ach re-enactment of this central pattern involves the same impulse to retreat into 
the self, or confine the other" ("Poetic" 93). 
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However, Blake held fast to the idea that this dualistic process must inevitably 
end in a mode of unification, never intending unity to be understood as a fantasy which i s  
the very "cause of desire and the focus of resistance" to the desired synthesis itself 
(Wagenknecht 323). In his preface to Milton, Blake suggests that "if we are but just & 
true to our own Imaginations,':' then we will succeed in bui lding "Jerusalem / In Englands 
[sic] green & pleasant Land."_1 1  Blake's promised land represents a resolution via 
imagination of man and nature, se1f and ·other, which never takes place. Imagining 
unification is not the same as bringing it to evident fruition. Every process of unification, 
even imaginary, leads only to more fragmentation; as Swinburne notes in his reading of 
Milton,' the individual always remains like "the Satan of Blake . . .  divided, inconsistent, a 
mystery and error to himself' (Blake 266). Swinburne recognizes the imaginative 
pretense of unity such as Blake's celebrated unified contrarieties, the "Twofold form 
Hermaphroditic" of Milton (I: Plate 19, line 32), as an artificial solution which only 
speaks to the impossibil ity of unifying self and other. Consequently, Swinburne reads the 
unification figured in the hermaphroditic form as a "fruitful feud" between contraries 
forced to become "the waste wedlock of a sterile kiss."1 2 Swinburne embraces the 
"fruitfu1" feud of the compelling differentiation of the self from all kinds of otherness in 
ways that Blake could not, especially as Swinburne found Blake's fantasies of dispell ing 
otherness frustrating. Therefore, rather than anticipating an impossible unity of self and 
other, Swinburne looks at the possible roles the imagination can take in the violence of 
disunity-again, the imagination' s cruelty-rather than its capabilities for producing 
1 1  See Blake, Collected Works 95-96. 
12 "Hermaphroditus,"' lines 18-19. 
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assimilation fantasies. Swinburne creates visual images of the anticipated unity l ike his 
hermaphrodite as "a means for that aesthetic dist�ncing that traditional fantasy no longer 
achieves" (Adorno, Theory 22), to demonstrate the actual distance between illusory 
. fulfillment and actual fulfillment. These images are abstract, existing only in the 
imaginative play within language, and are "not offered as an interpretation of experience, 
but as a pure state" (Altieri 39) in which that very distance between the iUusory and the 
actual is signified as itself aesthetically important. 
As Swinburne's work illustrates, the modes by which an individual artist can 
portray and negotiate this distanct: are numerous and ever-changing. The kind of "play" 
Swinburne advocates requires him to rethink constantly the frustration (or "devastating 
experience") of illusory fulfillment, and through this "play" he establishes various fluid, 
serialized subject-positions within his poems. As Swinburne notes in the preface to his 
Collected Works, "[I]t is unnecessary to emphasize or obtrude the personal note, . . .  but it 
is necessary to make it felt and keep it perceptible if the poem is to have life in it or even 
a right to live" (xx). He wants to create a subject-position while oscillating between the 
assertion of an expansive Urizenic ego and the need to negate it as the "selfhood which 
must be put off' (Milton II, Plate 40: 36). In Swinburne's works, the subject emerges 
repeatedly in/against the "otherness" of the poem itself · The work of art is set up as the 
"'absolute non-subject' whose very presence involves aphanisis, the erasure of the 
subject"; yet the subject is very much established in this dynamic inasmuch as the "object 
which is the subject' s  absolute otherness . . .  is closer to the subject than anything the 
subject can set against itself' (Zizek, Metastases 33). This is especialJy compl icated in 
Swinburne' s  dramatic monologues, since Swinburne-as-subject is abstracted not only by 
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the otherness of the poem itself but also the otherness of the narrator-especially as he 
often chooses a female narrator, further demonstrating the "otherness" of subjectivity. 
However, Swinburne walks a fin_e line between positing the subject/ego as the crucial 
catalyst for "progressive subjective differentiation" or "the heightening and expansion of 
the sphere of aesthetic stimuli" and as a weak entity allowing "the reification of these 
[individualized] reactions" (Adorno, Theory 239). 
Adorno points out that in such "ego-weakness," the ego resigns itself to the false 
conclusion that it is the same as _the object; thus the countermeasure of ego-strength must 
be used to confront the subject/object, or self/other, division th�t the false conclusion 
represses. 13  Furthermore, the false conclusion also represses desire: the selrs desire to 
have his/her de_sire recognized by/in the other as well as the reality of that wish never 
really being fulfilled. 14 Though he finds aesthetics which sidestep issues of desire and 
. thus amount to little more than "castrated hedonism, desire without desire" to be faulty, 
Adorno also finds fault with Freud's supposition that artworks are "indeed, even though 
sublimated, little more than plenipotentiaries of sensual impulses, which they at best 
make unrecognizable through a sort of dreamwork" (Theory 1 1 ) because he wants to 
recoup that longing for a sensual or libidinal plenitude. Adorno winds up proposing the 
idea of"aesthetic sublimation" in which the subject creates the artwork as an other from 
which s/he receives a limit to that plenitude (Theory 1 7). Rather than the subject 
projecting his/her ego to create an artwork, au Urizen, the subject creates a work to which 
his/her ego conforms. Ultimately, the ego remains repressed, wounded by the false 
13 See Negative Dialectics 150 and Aesthetic Theory 9� 
14 Adorno remarks tltat Freud ts tl1eory of art is merely tl1e fantasy of."wish fulfillmene' See Aesthetic 
Theory 8-10. 
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conclusion of dualism, unable to negate fully the false pleasure of illusory wish 
fulfillment. 
The treatment of the .ego in art reveals where Swinburne' s aesthetic and Adorno's  
do not always so easily converge. The Swinburnian ego rails against its own repression. 
Swinburne and Adorno both present the ego in a constant dialectical state, but 
Swinburne's vested interest in the overtly sexual dimensions of perversity, the "'failures' 
of the symbolic" to incorporate desire more fully (Borch-Jacobsen 1 5 1 ), is not shared by 
Adorno. Adorno states in the Aesthetic Theory that art is irrevocably separated from 
pornography (12); however, Swinburne recognized that pornographic discourse was an 
important aesthetic tool allowing the subject to "lay claim to a pleasure that was never 
meant" (Ferguson, "Justine" 1 2 1) to be claimed through fantasy, and yet use that fantasy 
to see him/herself as object, consequently revaluating (yet again) the subject/object, 
self/other dualism. 1 5  Here, then, Swinburne seems more aligned with the thought of 
Herbert Marcuse, particularly Marcuse' s attempt in Eros and Civilization to explain the 
ego' s role in the libidinal circuit in ways Adorno could not, or refused to do. Like 
Marcuse, Swinburne, while maintaining acute awareness of fantasy' s  fundamental 
inability to fulfill desire, finds fantasy an integral part of the "artistic imagination" which 
links "perversions with the images of integral freedom" rather than repression and 
"gratification" (Marcuse 50). Marcuse believes that fantasy "is 'protected from cultural 
alterations"' because ideology never completely limits the pleasure principle ( 14- 1 5). 
1 5  See Ziuk, Lacan l 09-1 l .  
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Fantasy brings with it the trace memory 16  of the libidinal plenitude that exceeds 
repressive limitation; as a result, with every fantasy, the boundaries or limits separating 
self and otherness are shifted. Individual subjects must continually reset and renegotiate 
the limits ideology places on them. Swinburne takes advantage of these moments of 
eruption of fantasy into reality to create a virtual position-a figurative site representing 
the gap or lack left by the eruption-in which he creates a moment in which to untie the 
"imaginary structure" of fantasy from the '"repressed' process of its structuration" 
(Zizek, Lacan 52) in the material world. Still, as Swinburne so famously and 
enigmatically states in "Anactoria," a poem specifically situated in the netherspace of 
fantasy erupting into reality, even when �he trace memories of gratification surface, the 
subject is left ·only with a series of "metaphors of me," indicating that the self or ego is 
always mediated, even in fantas�es of pleasurable immediacy, and even in discourses 
which allow the subject to reassess the very processes of mediation. 
1 6  "The memory of gratification is at tbe origin of all thinking, and the impulse to recapture past 
gratification is t11e hidden driving power behind the process·of thought" (Marcuse 3 1). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Obscuring the Romantic· Vision: Swinburne's William Blake 
"A fundamental problem attendant upon Romanticism . . . is how to weave the spells of 
language without becoming helplessly enchanted hy them, how. to work competently with 
the sad incompetence of human speech. " -L.J. Swingle 
"Blake would track the human soul hack into c"O:os, and beyond. " -Arthur Symons 
Swinburne's essay on William Blake has been called "the greatest manifesto for 
aestheticism in English" (McGann, Swinburne 50), as it details Swinburne' s struggle with 
the emphases placed on materialism and objectivity in mid-Victorian culture which, he 
believed, stifled the creation and practice of specifically aesthetic principles. Swinburne 
understands the overarching theme of Blake' s work to be the individual ' s  "oppress[ion] 
by the mystery of material existence" _(Blake 1 9). He read Blake's work to find evidence 
that another literary mind shared his belief that the conventional understanding of 
material world deems it oppressive, as it upholds the very limited and ossifying 
conceptual frameworks upon which comprehension of and interaction with the material 
world depends. Because Swinburne is so interested in reviewing and redefining the 
processes of conceptualization, he seems to prefigure s�me of the work Theodor Adorno 
presents in the Negative Dialectic; specifically, Adamo's contention that an individual 
subject interprets the material world via ideological concepts which act as lenses 
determining how those moments should be seen and thus comprehended. Yet all 
concepts also "refer to non-conceptualities," the promise that, within materiality, one can 
stil l  find a way to look at the world without those ossifying lenses; that one may find the 
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tools to pry those lenses away and "unseal the nonconceptual" (Negative 1 0- 12), or what 
Swinburne calls the "mystery of material exi stence." 
The mystery; though, is rendered dormant by a "desperate" ideological need for 
"objectivity and conceptuality"; like the individual subject subordinated to society-at­
large, the possibil ities for rethinking materiality become "unknowable and incapacitated" 
(Negative 10). These mysterious possibil ities resist complete suppression. They always 
manage to exceed the ideological limits, and these possibilities, which can never 
completely be expunged, haunt conventional methods of comprehending the world. The 
nonconceptual becomes a liberating influence because, as it haunts ideological concepts, 
it suggests "that there always remains something outside" (Negative 27}-yet that 
"something," exasperatingly enough, cannot be "seen" through conventional means. 
Thus Swinburne, positioning himself as Blake' s rightful successor, expresses within the 
essay an aesthetic that aims to explore the mysterious possibilities obscured by the 
conventional means of comprehending material existence. As his readings of Blake' s 
Prophetic Books indicate, Swinburne admires the "overflow of lyrical invention" that he 
finds in Blake's texts, which he calls "the divine babble which sometimes takes the place 
of earthly speech or sense," conveying emotion which is "vague" because it has a quality 
not "reducible" to ordinary language (Blake 195). Swinburne aspires to employ an 
aesthetic language that will display a particularly performative quality, evoking 
sensations seemingly irreducible to words as a way of gesturing toward the "mysterious 
possibilities" that cannot otherwise be represented. Roger Lewis calls this Swinburne' s  
decadent move to  "transform the material world into what it is not, into language " (1 1 1 , 
emphases mine). But I would amend this, offering that this is Swinburne's aesthetic 
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move to transform the representation of the material world to demonstrate what it is not 
yet, but couid be, via a careful linguistic performance which attempts �o posit the 
supposed antithesis between .the material world and lan�age as a relationship actually 
"beyond contradiction" (Adorno, Negative l 46). The mysteries of the material world 
might be, as Adorno points out, "congeal� in . . .  the words we use [which] re�ain 
concepts" (Negative 52); but, in Blake, S�inburne finds a way, if not io retrieve them 
fully, at )east to detect them. · While reading Blake, he tells us, we maf find "mere music, 
chains of ringing _names, scattered jewels of sound without a thread, t�rturous networks 
· of harmonies without a clue," simultaneously presented with "words that are strained · 
wellnigh in sunder by strong significance and earnest passion . . .  deal[ing] greatly with 
great things, that strike deep and hold fast" (Swinburne, Blake 194). Moreover, . 
Swinburne instructs us to read Blake in the same way he perceives Blake to compose: to 
"fall with renewed might of wi11 to [one's]purpose" to exceed ordinary linguistic 
boundaries, so that the "grand . lyrical gift becomes an - instrument" for expression that is 
"not sonorous merely," but, more importantly, becomes "vocal and articulate" in its very 
sonorous boom of multiplicity (1 94). If the reader holds fast to this vociferous, 
cacophonous process of reading, then s/he will be rewarded with a glimpse into "the main 
gist of the whole fitful and high-strung tune," the momentary articulation of the otherwise 
inarticulable connection between "the strange diversities and discords which intervene" 
( 194). 
Swinburne declares that this approach requires a "degree of symbolism" that is 
"excessive"; but, that very excess is essential "to the strength of expression and directness 
of dramatic vision, peculiar to Blake" (Blake 195}-and now revised to become a 
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dramatic aesthetic vision peculiar to Swinburne. At one point, Swinburne seems to worry 
that, as the ready acceptance of excess is found in "[t]he confusion, the clamour, the jar 
of words that half su�ce and thoughts that half exi st," which can induce "obscure play of 
licence and torturous growth of fancy" (Blake 1 85), the linguistic sign may not seem to 
represent anything associated with .co�ventional mat�rial reality at all (Borch-Jacobsen 
135). But the individual, a "fleshly and mutable house of life" (Swinburne, Blake 19), 
constantly produces his or her own, ever-changing association with material reality 
through words. The individual forms a supposedly immaterial "medium or state of 
existence" which seems separate from the material world; but, it is actually "inevitable" 
in and "inexpl icable, insuperable'' from the material world (Swinburne, Blake 40), as this 
"state" is formed through the individual expressing his/her feel ing of being "other" than 
the world, and then constantly repositioning his/her "otherness." Swinburne capital izes 
on this sense ofindividual "otherness" which plays on and fashions an aesthetic to 
express it. His approach to the aesthetic suggests it is perhaps only in an individually­
created and individually-interpreted relationship to reality that. the linguistic sign can sti ll 
"express the inexpressible." 1 In his "greatest manifesto," then, Swinburne articulates his 
aesthetic theory by critiquing, and thus re-inventing, the works of Blake to develop and 
employ this kind of purposefully aestheticized critical language. 
Many critics, in both Swinburne' s time and our own, have disparaged his essay on 
Blake as sheer egotism or even critical naivete on Swinburne' s part, specifically 
condemning its numerous lengthy paragraphs of minutely-detailed description and the 
extensive footnotes in which Swinburne speciously attributes his excurses ( digressions 
1 This is based on Adorno, Negative Dialectics 108-10. 
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into purely private interests which relate mostly to Swinburne's artistry and merely 
tangentially to Blake's) to unnamed critics and philosophers. A more careful 
consideration of the essay, though, reveals that even in his most superfluous moments 
Swinburne executes a distinctive linguistic quality like that which Adorno found and 
admired in Brecht: "a linguistic quality that . . .  is itself a form of expression that is 
eloquent only as determinate negation of that expr�ssion" (Theory 32). Adorno felt that 
conventional expressions only distort their own meaning; however, when that very 
limited mode of expression carries within it the_ implied possibility that a future mode of 
expression witt convey the meaning without distortion, -it is negated. More simply, it is 
cryptographic expression which simultaneously gestures ·at what it means, what it does 
not "mean," and what it could possibly "mean." Swinburne's cryptographic treatment of 
the conventions of the literary criticism of his era, oscillating between deference and 
disregard, demonstrate his earliest experiments in aesthetic negativity. This quality gives 
his essay what Christoph Menke notes is the crucial attribute of aesthetic negativity : a 
"paradoxical character [which] gives expression to the opposing tendencies involved at 
the effort at-and the subversion of-understanding" (73). These recurrent oscillations 
produce an aesthetically negative hesitation between "the two poles of superabundant 
meaning" in the essay (Menke 73). These moments of hesitation create gaps between 
what Swinburne conjectures that Blake's poetry may "mean" and what he claims it may 
not "mean," and, in tum, these gaps are the spaces which allow moments of hesitation in 
the reader's own process of deciphering what Swinburne's essay "means." In these 
hesitative -moments, the reader can move from reading with the perspective Swinburne 
provides to reading with a perspective they can invent themselves. 
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In this way, Swinburne' s excessive descriptions subvert the reader' s expectations 
about the modes one should employ when reading and critiquing Blake's work. 
Swinburne discusses his predecessors' work, incorporating their readings in his claims to 
further �heir conventional modes of critique; but Swinburne employs previous critics ' 
works and methods only superficially, and only to stage his reversal of their respective 
approaches. The personal and digressive fo_otnotes are purposefully placed to oppose the 
more traditional, "objective" interpretations of Blake's poetry and thus subvert those 
conventional modes of understanding. Furthermore, the sections in the essay which seem 
to indicate Swinburne getting overly caught up in the rapture of his own descriptive 
abil ities should instead be recognized as sectio�s in which Swinburne again purposefully 
produces moments of hesitation in his text. Moments in which Swinburne seems 
flagrantly to express his sense of "self,�' his pervasive textual ego, can be read as 
negative-especial ly considering that the expression of textual identity here, as with all 
other expressions, is decisively cryptographic. Because Swinburne, stating an aesthetic 
theory, wants to present the voice of the artist (encompassing past, · present, and future 
artists), the textual expression of "Swinburne" can be read as a determinate negation of 
Swinburne-enunciating-Swinburne, and thus enunciating a conceptual artist signified as 
"Blake." Swinburne's excessive display of his own talents is one "pole of superabundant 
meaning" and Blake's poetical excess is the other; Swinburne purposefully places us, the 
readers, between the two poles to continually explore the flux of this "between space." It 
is not by coincidence that it is often difficult to tell where "Blake" ends and "Swinburne" 
begins in the essay. 
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Moreover, when reading the Blake essay, one must be aware that Swinburne uses 
his predecessors' critical endeavors only to counteract them. For example, when 
comparing Blake's early lyrics t9 the later Prophetic Books, Swinburne remarks, "So 
beautiful indeed is [Blake's] structure and choice of language that its author's . . .  later 
vagaries and erratic indulgences in the most lax or bombastic habits of speech become 
hopelessly inexplicable" (Blake I 0). Yet this remark, an obligatory echo of previous 
Blake criticism, functions in a manner whkh negates its original critical purpose; for 
Swinburne spends 125 pages explicating the "inexplicable" Prophetic Books, and a 
significant portion of the other l 8� pages explicating the Prophetic Books amid the 
discussions of the "Lyrical Poems" he initially presents as the Prophetic Books' 
conceptual opposites. The same goes for Swinburne's ostensible deference to the work 
of Alexander Gilchrist, Blake's critical biographer. In one of the personal digressions 
Swinburne appends to his essay,2 Swinburne claims, 
What has been written in the text is of course based upon the assumptio n 
that Mr. Gilchrist has given an account of the matter as full and as fair as it 
was assuredly his desire to make it. As junior counsel (so to speak) on  
behalf of Blake, I have followed the lead of his biographer; for me in fact 
2 Swinburne appends this note when he mentions two business associates of Blake's, Cromek and Stothard, 
whose dealings with Blake are generally described as dishonest. It seems that Gilchrist's presentation of 
these men's troubled relationship to Blake was considered inflammatory and erroneous by some readers, 
who claimed that there was no substantial proof of many biographical details Gilchrist imparts as fact. It is 
particularly interesting that Swinburne discusses this relatively minor event in a footnote 1that spans the 
bottoms of three pages, right after stating in tl1e body of his essay, "IO)f this we need not wish to speak at 
much length" (Blake 4 7). · Again, one could argue that Swinburne meant tl1e footnote to serve to express 
solidarity (identification) with Gilchrist's work on Blake only to negate that solidarity. Several times in the 
footnote Swinburne attests to Gilchrist's excellent treatment of such details, to tl1e point that it becomes 
obvious that Swinburne attests too much. · 
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nothing remained but to revise and restate with such clearness and brevity 
the case as laid down by him. (47-48nl ,  emphases mine) 
This footnote is remarkable because Swinburne's particular word choices indicate the 
"negative" way his statement is intended to be read. Swinburne states that he merely 
. assumes for the sake of argument that Gilchrist;s account is correct, all the while calling 
that correctness into question by aligning Gilchrist's account with Gilchrist's "desire" to 
make it so, thus making the reader question Gilchrist's objectivity in the matter. 
Furthermore, Swinburne names himself counsel to Blake, not Gilchrist, thus intimating 
that in no way should this statement be read as anything but a reversal of Gilchrist's 
presentation; for Swinburne employs a distinctively negative mode to "revise and restate 
. . .  the case" for Blake-and for a revolutionary aesthetic on the margins of dominant 
ideology-made too ideologically palatable by Gilchrist. 
Consequently, instead of presenting a critical reassessment of the historical, 
biographical Blake, as he initially claimed was his intent, Swinburne conjures an 
impression of an idealized artist who projects the epitome of aesthetic negativity and calls 
him "Blake." Swinburne's rediscovered Blake is a paradoxical figure of Romantic and 
post-Romantic artistry who becomes a curious, if not somewhat unstable, compound of 
nearly every artist Swinburne made into his idols and named as his influences in the 
1 850s and 1 860s: Charles Baudelaire, Percy Bysshe Shelley, Theophile Gautier, Dante 
Gabriel Rossetti, the Marquis de Sade. In this way, "Blake" is like Swinburne's version 
of Blake' s Albion, the Eternal Man, made Eternal Artist: a form larger than life, 
imaginatively refashioned to illustrate how his revaluated Romanticism could be the key 
to generating and advancing an internal ly produced aesthetic theory. It is important to 
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note that every individual artist Swinburne names as part of, or a Blakean emanation of, 
the Eternal Artist, produced work that self-consciously employed, if only affectively t� 
distort and even collapse, the power ofvisuality and imagery in regards to the aesthetic. 
As Arthur Symons later declared, the "fundamental truth" of Blake's art is that it was 
intended as "a record of vision which has not been thoroughly mastered as vision" 
(William 139). Swinburne' s essay, then, exhibits th_e continuum of work toward that 
mastery. The biographical Wil l iam Blake, in Swinburne's essay, is not the master 
craftsman but the relevant Journeyman apprenticed to the greater aesthetic visionary (The 
Eternal Artist). It is Swinburne, able to ascertain that greater Artist arid Artistry, who 
aims to emerge at the end of the essay as the master craftsman. 
The official date o.f publication for Swinburne' s William Blake: A Critical &say 
is 1 868, but the majority of the manuscript was written well before then. Most 
Swinburne scholars agree that Swinburne began writing the first version of the 
manuscript in 1 862,3 finishing it the following year while visiting Paris with Whistler. 
Alexander Gilchrist died in 1 862, leaving the manuscript of his study, _the Life of Blake, 
unfinished. SwinbuJTie had been asked by his friend Will iam Michael Rossetti, who along 
with his brother Dante Gabriel had .been corresponding with Gilchrist's widow, to write a 
sort of epilogue �bout Blake's Prophetic Books to "complete" Gilchrist' s book for 
publication. Swinburne declined, stating in a letter to William Michael that he meant to 
make "a distinct small commentary of a running kind" on Blake' s work himself, "as full 
3 Swinburne's correspondence indicates that the project was at least in the planning stages then (Lafourcade 
193-94). Henderson is a bit more specific. citing "October 1862" particularly (58). 
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and satisfactory as it could well be made,t'4 thus implying that he found Gilchrist 's  study 
lacking. Furthermore, as Gilchrist had been just as frequent a visitor to Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti 's home in 1 860-1 86 1  as Swinburne, it is entirely likely that Swinburne had heard 
Gilchrist and Rossetti discussing Gilchrist's project in great detail . 5 Perhaps Swinburne's 
recollection of those discussions convinced him that he wanted no part of the Gilchrist 
project himself. In Swinburne's  Blake, deviating from his usual double-speak, 
Swinburne does speci�cally declare that he believes Gilchrist "passed perhaps too 
l ightly" over some biographical detail s  ( 14) and that Gilchrist's discussion of The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell is "insufficient" ( 1 86).6 However, especially in his 
explications of Blake' s Prophetic Books, it becomes implicitly clear that Swinburne felt 
compelled to pen a "full and satisfactory" treatise on Blake himself because Swinburne 
was not able to see his "Blake" in Gilchrist's text. In other words, Swinburne had to 
rewrite the Blake biography in order to make the historical Blake more like the figure of 
"Blake" that he saw in his mind's eye. 
4 Letter from Swinburne to YJ .M. Rossetti, 6 Oct. 1862 (Letters I :  60). This letter is quoted in nearly every 
major critical assessment of Swinburne's Blake essay appearing to date. 
s According to Oswald Doughty, Gilchrist and Rossetti had cemented a close friendship, in part based on 
their mutual interest in Blake, the year before Gilchrist's death. As a result, Gilchrist asked Rossetti to edit 
his manuscript, and Rossett� 's involvement with the project was so intense that he became more like a 
collaborating author than an editor (Doughty 273, 281 ). 
6 Swinburne's correspondence with W.M. Rossetti suggests that. the comments Swinburne makes here are 
meant to be read straight-forwardly. A reading of Doughty's biography as well as Gilchrist's Life suggests 
that the many criticisms Swinburne heaped on Gilchrist perhaps should have been given to Rossetti. 
Doughty relates that Rossetti commenced his work on Gilchrist's book "in a shockingly unscholarly way, 
omitting, transposing, altering and inserting at his own sweet will . . .  " (281). Perhaps Swinburne was not 
fully aware of Rossetti 's extended hand in t11e parts of the book attributed to Gilchrist alone; or, as 
Swinburne was very much Rossetti 's devotee at this time, perhaps he either willfully chose to ignore 
Rossetti's handiwork or was afraid to criticize his idol. According to Swinburne's most recent biographer, 
however, Swinburne actually told William Rossetti that the Gilchrist book "would be a waste of time" for 
him to try to fix ( qtd. by Rooksby, Life 79). 
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Blake, Nature, and Reason 
Swinburne's Blake is the forefather of aesthetic dissonance. By introducing his 
essay lamenting that Blake lived and died- in relative obscurity, unappreciated and 
undervalued in a society in which he was "beautifully unfit" to live (Blake 1 ), Swinburne 
carefully emphasizes the importance of Blake's obscurity from the beginning in order to 
set up the continuing theme of social "unfit"-ness .as correlative to aesthetic beauty. 
William Blake's art makes apparent his -disdain for conventional social rules and 
obligations. This appealed to a growing sense of discontent in the young Swinburne who, 
according to Thomas Connolly, already imagined himself very much like the Shelley of 
the notorious &say on Christianity,1 rejecting the epistemological assumptions and 
"orthodox belief' that merely obscured his artistic visiGn "llr outworn and derived 
principles and dogmas" (34). The subversive possibilities fo_r Blake's aesthetic, though, 
were more applicable than Shelley's; Swinburne points out, "Shelley in his time gave 
enough of perplexity and offence . . . [but] was less made up of mist and fire than Blake" 
(Blake 3). Swinburne indicates here that .the tension of the dialectic between two 
<?Pposite poles, here represented by "mist" and "fire," is better represented in Blake's 
work. Swinburne thus works with a definition of "beauty" much like that established by 
Adorno: "[B]eauty is the result not of a simple equilibrium per se, but rather of the 
tension that results" from the dissonance between the two poles- that dialectic always 
7 Biographer Jean Overton Fuller agrees, stating that the adolescent Swinburne "was fond of comparing 
himself with Shelley, his predecessor at Eton," especially as Shelley had been known as "Mad Shelley" and 
Swinburne was thus christened "Mad Swinburne" by his schoolmates (26). Swinburne perpetuated the 
comparison throughout most of his adulthood. especially in correspondence with his friends. Swinburne's 
vast attachment to Shelley might have in part resulted from his mother specifically forbidding Swinburne 
from reading many of the works of the Romantic poets "until he was grown up." See Henderson, especially 
p.8. 
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generates (Theory 46). Blake embodies such beautiful tension because "[i]n a time of 
critical reason and definite division, he was possessed by a fervour and fury of belief' 
(Swinburne, Blake 4);8 in other words, because Blake opposed rational epistemology with 
his "innate and irrational perception,, (Blake 35), his artworks, to borrow one of 
Swinburne's best phrases, demarcate his "intervals of revolt.,, 
Swinburne also identifies in Blake the supposition that any kind of moment of 
harmonious resolution achieved in an artwork alway .already contains the catalyst for the 
inevitable rebellious interval in which the tension will be renewed. As Adorno reminds 
us, denying tension under the guise of harmony will inevitably become "something 
disturbing, false, and effectively dissonant" (Theory 46). Previous criticism of 
Swinburne's essay on Blake· interrogates its supposed claims for the aesthetic possibilities 
of achieving harmony, averring that Swinburne aspires to present either the achievement 
of "spiritual harmony with the universal essence'' or the other-worldly divine achieved 
through an inclusive transcendence of the material world (Connolly 37), or a 
"harmonious fusion" of man and nature which recreates the prelapsarian condition 
(Riede, Study 34). But these approaches ultimately fail to comprehend that Swinburne 
discusses harmony while drawing on the implicit assumption that "harmony" is really 
effective dissonance. 
One must consider Swinburne's embrace of dissidence-which-precludes­
dissonance, then, when elaborating his version of the Blakean aesthetic creed:9 
8 This actually marks the second time in four pages tbat Swinburne comments on Blake's opposition to 
conventional reason. Two pages earlier, Swinburne remarks -ibat "all the medicines of reason and 
experience must have been spent in pure waste" on Blake (2). 
9 It is important to note here that Swinburne specifically refers to it as a "creed." 
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[A]s long as a man believes in all things he may do any thing; scepticism 
(not sin) is alone damnable, being the one thing purely barren and 
negative; do what you will with your body, as long as you refuse it leave 
to disprove or deny the life eternally inherent in your soul . . . . . The body 
shall . not deny, and the spirit shall not restrain; the one sh�ll not prescribe 
doubt through reasoning; the other shall not preach salvation through 
abstinence. (Blake 96) 
Swinburne recalls his earlier descriptions of Blake' s opposition to "critical reason" to 
reinforce his main point that the ideology promoted by a rational, methodological culture 
that values materialism and empirical objectivity over all else leaves no room for the 
"spirit" to satisfy immanent human needs and desires. He uses the terminology of 
enlightened reason against itself to demonstrate its insufficiency. Skepticism is a product 
of the iron cage of reason; rational skepticism causes us to disbelieve in that which we 
cannot materially (re)produce or factually prove. Yet Swinburne redefines skepticism to 
mean the refusal to believe in the very "innate and irrational perception" that allows us to 
"apprehend and enjoy" that which does not easily subject itself to rational ization or 
uphold the tenets of reason, such as art (Blake 35). Swinburne, like Blake before him, 
recognized that "unreflective enlightened thinking . . .  always tends to convert into 
skepticism, in order to make enough room for the existing order" (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 93). So Swinburne, drawing upon though revising the Romantics' previous 
expositions on reflection, implies that his �rand of aesthetic reflection will oppose such 
skepticism. This resembles the kind of self-reflection Coleridge prescribes for "men of 
commanding genius" in chapter two of the Biographia Literaria: those who interpret the 
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world around them as a series of self .. impressions that they analyze as such, "with a 
satisfying degree of clearness, distinctness, and individuality" ( 449). However, this does 
not mean one simply materializes one' s own perceptions to perpetuate illusions of 
typically rational (empirical) clarity or distinction. Rather, Swinburne's adaptation of the 
Coleridgean formula is used .to explain a process of aesthetic signification enacted to 
defer conventional determinations of"meaning," which are "barren and negative"-and 
not negative in the sense of aesthetic negativity. The aesthetically negative requires 
"truth [to take] the shape of folly"-what Swinburne would define as the innate, 
irrational perception that man can do anything-"when, amid untruth"-meaning the 
"damnable skepticism" of empirical reason-"human beings refuse to surrender" 
(Zuidervaart 21 1) what they hold as the truth eternally inherent in the soul. Swinburne 
carefully differentiates between the empirically negative and the aesthetical ly negative 
here not only to reclaim the word -negative for his own purposes, but also, more 
importantly, to enforce the aesthetic creed meant to reclaim the truth, in its actual 
dissonant form, that can only be achieved through an art that counteracts all rational 
paradigms. These paradigms "prescribe doubt" in what reason tells us does not and 
cannot exist, what is not and cannot be possible. 
Swinburne sees Blake acknowledging something quite close to the Adomian 
precept that "what is true in art is something nonexistent," that "[ w ]hat does not exist 
becomes incumbent on art in that other for which . . .  reason, which reduced it to material, 
uses the word nature" (Theory 1 3 1 ,  italics in original). Art, when it attempts to 
reproduce the image of nature, really produces an image of what nature is not. Actual 
"nature" itself is the shadow, or penumbra, haunting the artwork's boundaries or margins. 
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The aesthetic prod�ction ·of"nature," then, actually displays and maximizes the 
dissonance in "nature," specifically. the division between the impulses housed in the 
"natural" body and the social imperative preventing the body from engaging in any 
"unnatural" impulses. Initially, Swinburne invokes Blake to embody a Romanticized 
need to recognize "nature in disunion with itself' (H�rkheimer and Adorno 39) and 
consequently meet that need by reliving a trace memory of organic nature apart from.the 
bourgeois appropriation ofit. . As Horkheimer and Adorno have pointed out, "[t]he 
bourgeois ideal of naturalness intends not amorphous nature, but the virtuous mean" (3 1 ), 
whereas the Romantic ideal of the natural, though also serving as a "touchstone of 
stability and order," asserts the possibility of an ecological integrity which the "inner, 
spiritual" self can emulate (McGann, Romantic 67-68). However, Swinburne seems to 
work through his initial idealization of Blake enough to indicate tacitly that his 
romanticized notion of a fully organic, prelapsarian nature. is a convenient, retrospective 
trope used to denote dissatisfaction with the present, invoking nostalgia for a utopian past 
that never really existed. 10 Swinburne is particularly affected by the "historically 
transformed" concept of nature Adorno attributes to the ni�eteenth century, in which the 
"artifactitious domain" of"cultural landscape" regulates and eventually displaces 
"natural beauty" (Theory 64). Yet this displaced nature is Swinburne's object of 
nostalgia, fragmented "from its historical context, from its continuity" and conceptualized 
as a "mythic, eternal, timeless" entity (Zizek, Lacan 1 1 2), thus removed from any 
historical dilemma. 
10 I have based my obse1Vation, in part, on Orrin Wang's Fantastic Modernity ( 10). 
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This marks a point at which Swinburne and Adorno do not closely correlate. If 
Swinburne was working here in a distinctly Adornian mode, then he would have to 
acknowledge more clearly the "historical forces that [shift] the relationship between the 
whole and the parts" (Nicholsen 49-50); meaning, he wou.ld have to articulate-via his 
prevail ing treatment of the trope of nature-his own subjective mediation between the 
historical transformation and ever-changing reception of the trope and the particular 
qualities of the trope that seem ahistorically .immanent. For Adorno, meditation on any 
"mythic, eternal, timeless," ahistorical ly-immanent qualities of a trope always requires 
continual reference to historical change. The dissonance experienced in the subject's 
process of making, discerning, and critiquing meaning is always historically contingent. 
Conversely, in a Lacanian/Zizekian position, the subject must become "decentered" from 
historical contingencies in order to embrace the "eternal, timeless, mythic" dissonance of 
the aesthetic. The trope of nature becomes an ahistorically subjective fetish. As Zizek 
explains, by means of the nostalgic trope of a nature "other" than the dominated one, "we 
encounter this 'bizarre category of the objectively subjective' : what the fetish objectifies" 
as the subject's "true belief' (Plague 120). Through such a trope, the subject creates 
his/her own "social reality" only tangential ly relative to his/her "participation in social 
exchange" (Plague 120) or historical transformation. In this way, Swinburne's treatment 
of the trope of nature seems more akin to a Zizekian rather than an Adomian rendering. 
Nonetheless, Swinburne ascribes a peculiarly "double character" (Adorno, Theory 7 1 )  to 
nature, in that the nostalgic, mystified version is anxiously held in suspension within the 
culturally dominated version. And because Swinburne's work does exhibit the socio­
historical components of the "natural" landscape, often implicitly portraying how 
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"natural and historical elements interact in a . . .  kaleidoscopically changing fashion" 
(Theory 71), the correlation between Swinburne and Adorno here, though perhaps 
uncomfortable and far from perfect, can still plausibly be made. 
Swinburne finds the tension between nostalgically-organic and bourgeois nature 
best exemplified in Blake's "To Tirzah," which S�inburne considers the clearest and 
most earnest illustration of Blake' s aesthetic creed: 
'Tirzah' . . .  represents the mere separate and human nature, mother of the 
perishing body and daughter of the 'religion' which occupies itself with 
laying down laws of the flesh; which, while pretending- ( and that in all 
good faith) to despise the body and bring it into subjection as with control 
of bit and bridle, does implicitly overrate its power upon the soul . . .  and 
thus falls foul of fact on all sides by assuming that spirit and flesh are 
twain . . . .  (Blake 12 1)  
In  the third stanza of"To Tirzah," Blake portrays the Earth, "Thou Mother of my Mortal 
part," in its materiality as the oppressor, "mould[ing] my Heart" with "cruelty," "And 
with false self-decieving [sic] tears, I Didst bind my Nostrils Eyes & Ears" (Blake, 
"Tirzah" 9-12). Here Earth (nature)--read by Swinburne as a separate, human, perishing 
body-is always already disenchanted, already subjected to the domination of rational 
man. "What men want to learn from nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it 
and other men," Horkheimer and Adorno observe (4); likewise, Swinburne's Blake 
presents us with "nat�re" that reflects the lesson of domination already learned. 
Swinburne regards "Tirzah;' as asserting that man is already bound, not by nature "itself," 
but by dominant social conventions of what has been deemed "natural ." Very aware of 
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the problem of domination, Swinburne seems to use the obvious appeal of Romantic 
claims for organicism and a return to a pure, unadulterated natural state only to negate 
them. To believe in a return to _an unsubjugated nature, ·says Swinburne, is to be .misled 
by "the sweet poison offalse faith"; such false faith creates the fantasy that art can 
transform or even rejuvenate the "barren branch and deadly leaf' that dominated nature 
has become (Blake 120). In fact, Swinburne applauds Blake for making a "direct . . . 
appeal against any rule . . . based on reference to the mere sexual and external nature of 
man" or the world (Blake 122). This should not be read as an outright rejection of 
Romanticism on Swinburne's part, but a way for Swinburne to use Romanticism as a way 
to free himself from its very limitations. 1 1 
It is particularly relevant that the portrayal of domination is put in bodily terms­
and especial ly in terms of the female body-since one of the most exigent elements of 
this essay is Swinburne's conflation of body and nature. The physical body is a 
complicated symbol for Swinburne, predominantly signifying sexual activity and 
gratification. Sexual gratification in the Swinburnian canon signifies the fulfil lment of 
immanent human desires, though a fulfillment that the material world has yet to offer: 
i.e., Swinburne's statement that one cannot achieve the "salvation" of fulfilled desire by 
abstaining from physical pleasure. Yet the very concretized materiality of the 
gratifying/gratified body poses a significant problem for Swinburne, so much so that he 
needed to re-imagine the concept of the body as his friend Stephane Mallarme re­
imagined his concept of literature itself, as "an unlocatable--perhaps even unheard and 
1 1  My reading here is based on Stephen Bronner's reading of Adomo's Negative Dialectics. Bronner 
explains, "It is not a matter of rejecting concepts in the manner of irrationalism, but of using them to 
comprehend a freedom beyond concepts" ( online ). 
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unseen-performance devoid of any semiotic or epistemological authority," a 
"nonpresentness constitutive of human attention and expression" (Bersani 25-26). 
Swinburne is .especiaHy fascinated by Blake' s "mythologic figures," which are not 
concretely physical but are instead "savage abstractions" "created of fire and cloud" 
(Blake 1 89). They "slowly . . .  grow .into something of shape, [ and] assume some foggy 
feature and indefinite colour," but, in this emergent indistinction, "the fluctuating noise 
condenses into music," so that the material itself signifies-performs the making of 
meaning-differently (Blake · 190). 
"[C]onstraining the abstract to do [the] service" of representing the traditionaHy 
more concrete (Blake 190), Swinburne not only deconstructs the materiality of the 
gratified/gratifying body, but also makes the site of that deconstruction function as a 
place-holder representing what, to borrow from Zizek, could be caHed the "ecstatic 
dimension [which] is thus properly unrepresentable" (Plague 176). The body of 
"nature," almost always feminized by Swinburne as well as Blake, is already dominated 
by the very human, very socially-mandated "bit and bridle" of abstinence so that it 
signifies what it is no longer: "the enigmatic image of irresistibility and powerlessness. 
In this way, she reflects for doniination the pure lie that posits the subjection instead of 
the redemption of nature" ·(Horkheimer and Adorno 72); or, for that matter, the 
redemption of the immanent yet obscured possibilities stilJ to be found in the material 
world. One cannot resist the trace memory of nature as it was before its subjection to 
ascetic 1imitations 12  that stiU underlie the bourgeois concept of nature, because that trace 
1 2  This statement is very loosely based on Horkheimer and Adomo's assertion that "eloquent discourse," 
such as literary discourse, is intertwined with trace memories (78). 
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memory suggests that the "properly unrepresentable" gratification is still somehow 
possible. Yet the powerlessness of a fully subjected nature reinforces the illusion of 
stability of the "abstract power of the [individual] subject" (Horkheimer and Adorno 90) 
who wants to believe that s/he is the locus and agent of all possible fulfillment. By 
admitting that the potential for fulfillment is only immanent in "nature" as it was 
before/outside of the iron cage of reason and only as it exists outside its current 
conception(s), one also admit_s that ra!ional man can only fail to fulfill his own desires. 
Therefore, Swinburne had to make sense of an aesthetic dependency on depictions of the 
physical body and its many desirous acts by treating both human bodies and the 
conceptualized "body" of nature as "virtual bodies" that represent little more than the 
vagaries of otherwise unrepresentable Desire. 13 
One of the best examples of the virtual character of the Swinburnian body can be 
found in the extensive footnote Swinburne appends to his explication of Blake's "The 
Everlasting Gospel," which turns into an occasion to discuss Jerusalem at length. 
Swinburne begins by quoting in its entirety the section of Blake's poem in which the 
speaker questions Jesus Christ's chastity. By doing so, Swinburne plays with the notion 
of the body of Christ as the ultimate virtual body, a notion he will revisit in many of his 
Poems and Ballads as well as Songs before Sunrise 's notorious "Before a Crucifix." 
Jesus, simultaneously human and divine, serves as the lone example of spirit and flesh 
that are not assumed twain, even by the status quo. Yet even Jesus fails to elucidate fully 
13  Here I am spinning on Martin Danahay's revaluaµon of Dante Gabriel Rossetti 's "fleshly" aesthetic. See 
Danahay, "Dante Gabriel Rossetti 's Virtual Bodies," especially pp. 380-81, 386-87. 
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the virtual synthesis ofHis ·own body as well as other bodies. · Swinburne points out that 
Jesus/God is 
[t]he creator by division . . .  ; literally in the deepest sense 'the God of this 
world,' who 'does not know the garment from the man' ; cannot see 
beyond the two halves whic� he has made by violence of separation; 
would have the body perishable, yet the qualities of the bodily life 
permanent: thus inverting order and reversing fact. (Blake 15 5n 1) 
By "inverting order and reversing fact," the figure of Jesus merely reinforces the 
epistemology of reason: the privileged way of knowing the world is through repression 
and denial of the body and the sexuality it represents. Swinburne demonstrates his 
understanding that any human desire in connection with fleshl iness or physicality is 
rationalized away, made to disappear through the social regulations ( or what Zizek calls 
the "public Law") which repress desire only by effectively sustaining it. In Jesus, "God 
is man, and man God," says Swinburne, but even when made flesh, God cannot 
"partak[e] of the 'generative nature,' cannot partake of qualities which exist only by right 
of that nature" (Blake 1 54). In short, God is thus never really represented through man 
The representation -of God in/as man is incomplete, unfulfilling; it is a fantasy of 
fulfilled desire, of unity between man and God that would preclude any dissonance. 
However, Swinburne then says, "God must needs be (not more than man, but assuredly) 
more than the qualities of man" (Blake 1 54, emphases mine). He reads Blake' s 
"Everlasting Gospel" to mean that God-as-Jesus should not be more than his physical 
body; in other words, God in material form should be read as actively exploring that 
materiality rather than actively pursuing ways to transcend it. And Jesus' s active 
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exploration of the possibil ities of the material world-and, specifically in Blake's 
"Gospel," desire and - its physical manifestations-reveals more qualities of and 
possibi lities in the material world than are typical ly evident. Consequently, Swinburne 
real izes a kind of Zizekian "dialectical reversal also always involves a kind of 
anamorphotic shift of perspective: what we (mis)perceived as the obstacle (the 
Prohibition), the condition of impossibility, i s  actually a positive condition of possibil ity 
(of our desiring)"; moreover, that the tensjon between the failure to achieve fulfillment 
and the elusive -yet ever-looming conditions of its possibility is "the inherent condition" 
of the individual subject's position -(Zizek, Plague 11). Thus Swinburne reads Blake's 
Jesus as the symbol of bodily .prohibitions that impl icitly represents the positive, virtual 
possibi lities of moving beyond those prohibitions only by fail ing to expose explicitly its 
virtual quality. Inasmuch as "what is true in art is something nonexi stent" (Adorno, 
Theory 1 3 1 ), the aestheticized body of Blake's Jesus demonstrates to Swinburne how the 
failure to exist within social, rational paradigms attests to the body's "true" virtual 
quality. Consequently, Swinburne suggests that only through the kind of"holy 
insurrection" Blake creates in Jerusalem, a heretical "divine revolt against divine law" 
_ which Swinburne calls "the radical significance of Christianity" (Blake 1 56), can the 
rationalized, concretized body be negated and the virtual, dynamic quality of the body be 
recuperated. 
Moreover, Swinburne considers Jerusalem Blake's  tale of "perverted humanity" 
(Blake 289). Perversion in this case, though, is not the wanton disavowal of existing laws 
or even the misapplication of them. Rather, it is the post-Enlightenment condition, 
occurring as "reason supplants faith, and law, moral or religious, grows out of reason" 
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(Blake 289). Jerusalem becomes "the symbol of imaginative liberty" (Blake 289) that 
reason leads one to obfuscate; or, to borrow the phrase Horkheimer and Adorno use to 
describe the works of the Marquis de Sade, Blake's Jerosalem portrays the possibility of 
"the bourgeois .individual. freed from [reason's] tutelage" (86). This is the freedom won 
by the "holy insurrection," which is "strenuous battle against the God of nature" 
(Swinburne, Blake 1 51.), very much like the Promethean battle of Blake's Los, the 
"Eternal Prophet," who bound "the vast Spine of Urizen," 14  the creator god, so he (Los) 
could wield the powers of creation himself. The power must be forcefully taken from the 
God "who must have the organ of destruction and division, by which alone he lives and 
has ability to beget, cut off from him" (Swinburne, Blake 1 57). In perhaps one of the 
most shocking passages of his essay, then, Swinburne advocates the castration of God. 15  
Bearing in mind, though, that Swinburne probably considered, at least in this 
context, the phallus "an imaginary form of the body" as well as "the signifier of power" 
(Borch-Jacobsen 21 6), I believe that Swinburne uses this statement emphatically to 
pronounce his alignment with the Sadean practice of"attacking civil ization with its own 
weapons" (Horkheimer and Adorno 94)-in this case, religion and rationality. 
Swinburne wants to dismantle the concept of "God" as prohibition as well as the concept 
of a concrete (rather than a virtual) body, and here Sade provides an expedient means of 
14 See William Blake, "The Book of Los," especially Chap. I: 27-32 and Chap. IV: 4 1-47. Oddly, 
Swinburne has very little to say about Los, though Los is perhaps tl1e best exemplar of"holy insurrection'' 
Blake's poetry offers. In tl1e Blake essay. Swinburne devotes a mere four and a half pages to the "Song of 
Los," in which he fails to discuss the character of Los at all. He does say, though, that in Los "(t]he old 
themes of delusion and perversion are once again rehandled" (Blake 256). Furthennore, in his discussion 
of Jerusalem. Swinburne declares that "no man [should] attempt to define tbe post or expound the office" 
ofUrizen's "terrible sons and daughters": "These . . .  let us leave to tl1e discretion of Los, who has enough 
on his hands among them all" (Blake 286). 
15 Swinburne does not link this pronouncement witl1 any particular Blake text. but it seems he is thinking of 
the episode in the frrst chapter of The Book of Ahania. in which Fuzon tluows the "howling" "Globe of 
wrath" at Urizen, a globe tl1at divides Urizen 's "cold loins" (see lines 1 -34). 
I 
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doing so. Affixed to this shocking pronouncement is a footnote in which Swinburne asks 
his reader to compare his excursus on Jerusalem to "a lay sermon by a modern pagan 
philosopher of more material tendencies," which he provides (Blake 1 57n l). Swinburne, 
· of course, does not name his favored "modern pagan philosopher," but the "lay sermon" 
is a patchwork of paraphrased passages from Justine and Juliette as well as Philosophy in 
the Bedroom. 16 
Swinburne's initial aesthetic interest in Sade concerns Sade' s portrayal of nature 
as "ceaseless flux and action" (Juliette 1 7 1 ). 1 7  The Sadean version of nature at first 
seemed a quick and fitting resolution to Swinburne's quest to construct a version of 
nature "as something besides a completely mystified retroactive construction or a 
completely transparent, originary form of knowledge" (Wang 10). Swinburne wanted to 
apply a Sadean version of nature as a never-ending libidinous circuit as a means to 
circumvent the "signifier of power," or the law which grows out of reason, altogether; if 
the "natural law'' of relentlessly pursuing individual pleasure is introduced into the 
dominant ideology, then in its relentlessly continual circuit the intrusion of perverse 
pleasure interrupts and _displaces the dominant ideology just as continually. Moreover, 
Sadean nature, modeled as a continuous circuit or cycle, suggests that all these pleasures 
are momentary, fragmentary, and incomplete. One is never permanently or concretely 
16 Georges Laf ourcade has specifically traced the Sadean material in this particular footnote to particular 
passages in these works. _See Swinburne: A literary Biography, pp. 103-04, as well as the second volume 
ofLafourcade's French-language study, la Jeunesse de Swinburne (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1928) 355-56. 
1 7  It is absolutely crucial to note here that I am specifically referring to his aesthetic, and not his prurient, 
interest in Sade. Swinburne's nwnerous non-critical responses to Sade's work, mostly explicit letters to 
close friends containing pornographic tales loosely copying and often parodying Sade's "wooden" writing 
style, demonstrates a ·decided-and one could even argue practiced-sexual, emotiona� and intellectual 
immaturity vastly different from the critical adroitness, poise, and mental dexterity displayed in 
Swinburne's poetry and critical prose. 
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. . satisfied; for,. after-the last stage in which one experiences pleasure, one must return to 
the initial stage of seeking pleasure, or seeking t� satisfy a decisively unsatisfiable desire. 
The process ends where it begins, since it depends on the individual failing to satisfy 
desire with any finality. -And Swinburne found the inevitable failure built into this model 
very appealing. 
The "sermon" begins wit� Swinburne-as-Sade proclaiming that ''Nature" is 
synonymous with "crime." As she "lives and breathes by": crime, she is the fount of 
desirous possibil ity, the ultimate antithesis to the obstacle that is Prohibition: 
Nature forbid that thing or this? Nay, . . .  no criminal will come up to the 
measure ofh_er crimes, no destruction s�em to her destructive enough. 
We, when we would do evil, can disorganise a little matter, shed a little 
blood, quench a little breath at the door, of a perishable body; this we can 
do, and call it crime. Unnatural is it? Good friend, it is by criminal things 
and deeds unnatural that nature works and moves and has her being; what 
subsides through inert virtue, she quickens through active crime; . . .  she 
uses the dust of man to strike her light upon; she feeds with fresh blood 
the innumerable insatiable mouths suckled at her mi lkless breast; . . .  she 
stabs and poisons, crushes and corrodes, yet cannot live and sin fast 
enough for the cruelty of her great desire . . . .  [H]er desire is continually 
toward evil; that she may see the end_ of things which she hath made . . .  
and with all her forces she labours in desire of death. (Blake 1 57-58nl ,  
emphases mine) 
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Swinburne carefully distinguishes between the "perishable body" we usually 
acknowledge and the usually unacknowledged virtual body signified here by nature. 
Nature, though personified, is not a limited being; like the libido itself, nature "has no 
extraneous temporal and spatial limitations" (Marcuse 49). "[S]he takes the pain of the 
whole world to sharpen the sense of vital pleasure in her limitless veins" (Swinburne, 
Blake 1 57nl) :  her "limitless" desire, her pleasure, is encompasses the whole world, and 
thus her "veins"-normally suggesting a supposed physical presence-are metaphorical, 
virtual. Swinburne represents Nature in a virtual body which functions only as a place­
holder for the otherwise unrepresentable "polymorphous perversity" associated with 
expressing that desire (Marcuse 49). 
By appending this discussion specifically to the sentence in which he calls for the 
castration of God, Swinburne implicitly asks us to associate this criminally desirous 
virtual body of nature with the body of the Blakean Christ who did not come to "save 'the 
world"' from evil, but to liberate what religion and rationality have mistakenly deemed 
evil: "that imperishable body or complement of the soul which if a man 'keep under and 
bring into [ material] subjection' he transgresses against himself' (Blake 1 59). Swinburne 
intends his reader to recall that Jesus was crucified as a criminal alongside other criminals 
and thus equivocate Christlike criminality with the criminal desire of nature. Ifwe read 
this passage as suggesting nature's criminal disposition is the same as Jesus's-the 
consequence of a life of"divine rebellion and 'spiritual war"' raged against "barren 
physical qualities and temporal virtues" (Swinburne, Blake 1 69}-then we can also read 
this passage as exhibiting a negative dialectic of criminality. By this I mean to suggest 
that Swinburne uses the concept of"criminality" only to move beyond it. The pursuit of 
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pleasure, nature's "desire," here becomes a transgressive activity, as it transgresses 
reason, or more specifically the way reason has dominated and conceptualized nature. 
This transgression is fashion�d by a desire that is not universal izab)e. 18 The criminal ity 
or evil here, then, is Nature's refusal to be universal ized. Arguably Sade creates a 
universalized principle of"natural law" in his wo�ks (i.e., when the "natural law'' of 
perpetually seeking pleasure becomes the ecstasy of monotony, the monotony becomes 
its universalizing concept); .that is not to say, though, that Swinburne uses it in the same 
way. Swinburne, sensing dissonance in the obligation · to adhere to Sade's unifying, 
monotonous natural Jaw, chooses to explore the constellation of particulars in this 
"natural law" to .reveal its plenitude. 1 9  
Swinburne renovates Sade's "natural law" via the persistent convention of a 
personified "Mother Nature" specifically� if paradoxicalJy, to demonstrate its 
transgressive unpredictabi lity. He appears to treat such conventions as always containing 
"an external and heterogenous element" serving to "remind [conventions] of their own 
boundaries" (Adorno, Theory 204). Swinburne's Sadean Mother Nature has "eyes . . .  
sick of seeing and her ears are heavy with hearing" the same sights and sounds over and 
over; she is "burnt up" by the monotonous "lust of creation . . .  and rent in twain with 
travail until she [can] bring forth change" in her environment (Blake 1 57n l). In other 
words, she is bound by the limitations of the physicality she explores; but, as there are 
always elements within universalizing physical conventions themselves that tend toward 
18 This is a loose paraphrase borrowed from Zizek 's chapter, "Superego by Default," in Metastases of 
Enjoyment 68-69. 
19 My observation is based on Adomo's section subtitled "Dialectics not a Standpoint" in Negative 
Dialectics, particularly the following statement: "What we differentiate will appear divergent, dissonant, 
negative for just as long as the structure of our consciousness obliges it to strive for unity" (5). 
5 1  
particularity and dissonance, she can exploit those elements to "bring forth change." This 
change is predicated upon the tension between conventional boundaries and that which 
does not fit, or exceeds, those boundaries-which I would re-identify as the tension 
between nature's concretized, feminized "body" and its virtual quality here. This, in turn, 
produces a kind _of"fissure" within a universalized concept, or the monotony of the 
Sadean natural law, in whi�h the convention collapses (Adorno, Theory 204). 
Th� criminal "evil" of this version of "divine rebel lion" against a "barren" 
concept of physicality (Swinburne, Blake 169) is staged at the point of th�s fissure. This 
fissure also represents tension between the "vital pleasure" in nature's "l imitless veins" 
(Blake 1 57n I )  and the conceptualized or conventional body which is supposed to signify 
the jouissance-though the body itself is foreign to the jouissance, or ultimate 
enjoyment, it cannot fully contain or represent.�0 Jouissance exceeds the boundaries of 
the universal izing convention that is foreign to the particularities comprising that 
enjoyment. Swinburne did not quite find the jouissance he sought in Sade's works 
themselves, resignedly admitting that Sade "worship[ped] the phal lus as those first 
ascetics worshipped the cross" (Swinburne, Letters I: 57); Sade, by attributing a quality 
of absolutism to nature and its overarching "law," reestablishes the very signifier of 
unifying power he claims to transgress. I think Swinburne was critically and aesthetically 
disappointed by finding Sade's texts reluctant to divulge and to explore particularity with 
any adequacy. Swinburne finds that he must imagine the possibil ity of"thwart[ing] 
nature," or the conventions of natural law-meaning, imagine the sites of fissure between 
20 See Zizek, Metastases 1 1 .  
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what the "natural law'' contains and what exceeds it in order to collapse or transgress the 
conventions altogether: 
Could but a man do this; could he cross the courses of the stars, and put 
back the times of the sea; could he change the ways of the world and find 
out the house of life only to destroy it; . . .  could he draw down the sun to 
consume the earth, and bid the moon shed poison or fire upon the air; 
could he kill the fruit in the seed and _corrode the child's mouth with the 
mother's milk . . .  .- (Blake 1 57nl )  
Swinburne realizes that ultimately one could not fully commit these acts, but the 
emergence of the imaginative possibilities of such acts in discourse is itself transgressive. 
This transgression is the kernel of truth anchoring the use of all such conventions and 
tropes: the particular element buried within, negative in that it defies recognition or 
identification, requiring a special "gift of spiritual sight" to recognize and to set into 
motion (Swinburne, Blake 1 1 6). 
In another negative play on conventional troping, Swinburne metaphorically 
represents the transgressive attributes of the domination of nature in his descriptions of 
the sexual relationship between man and woman. The previously quoted "sermon" 
features variations of assertions functioning merely to emphasize the female attributes of 
"nature" opposed to civilized society, always referred to as "man," the general-which-is­
male. Swinburne-as-Sade pointedly reverses the courtly notion of "Nature" as a "fair 
lady" deserving one's admiration and worship. This paradigm provides Nature "with all 
the features that constitute so-called 'femininity"' defined only "in regard to her 
(potential) relationship to man, as an object of his desire" (Zizek, Metastases 108) but 
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fails to acknowledge the limitations inherent in that paradigm. Swinburne's "sermon" 
may suggest a certain admiration for nature's cruelty, but it also focuses primarily on 
nature's own desire, rather than man's desire for nature; pointi�g out that there really is 
nothing innocent about the traditional- portrayals of the relationship of man to nature, as 
this relationship is little more than a stand-in for the "contractual exchange" of bourgeois 
marriage, man commanding woman to serve as the object of his desire (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 72). Moreover,- Swinburne goes further and indicates that this symbolic 
exchange should not be misunderstood as a relationship proper, since relationship implies 
reciprocation that is not present here. "Behold, the ages of men are dead at her feet" 
(Swinburne, Blake 1 51n1 ), and the men themselves do not actively engage with her; they 
are figuratively "dead" to her as well. As previously mentioned, she "brings forth 
change" in the "lust of creation"; but, this is self-lust, and, using this lust, she needs only 
"the dust of man to strike her light upon" (Swinburne, Blake 1 57n 1 ). Anticipating the 
famous Lacanian proposition that sexual rapport (or intercourse) is impossible,21 
Swinburne proposes that the "criminal'' power or "evil" of nature is really her ability to 
(re)create herself despite the impossibility of (without) sexual generation; "she quickens 
through active crime" of self-generation-again, she subverts or transgresses convention. 
Nature's body is more than "the mere 'sexual' shell which only exists" to represent the 
"division" of sexual and creative labor (Blake 1 59-60). 
This is quite unlike Sade's nature or, for that matter, any of Sade's female 
characters, who cannot transgress the "mere sexual shells" of their existence. Though 
21 Lacan makes this pronouncement in Le Seminaire X¥: Encore (trans. Bruce Fink, ed. Jacques-Alain 
Miller [New York: Norton, 1 999)). 
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Sade's women are divorced from the biological imperative to propagate the species-
divorced from the "repressive organization of sexuality,, which subjugates pleasure 
"under the function of procreation,, (Marcuse 40)-they are still delimited by their 
physiology. The Sadean woman is the gaping hole of lack that can never be permanently 
or actually sated. She is (the symptom of) man,s pathological pleasure, the object of 
fantasies which prevent the disclosure of desire as a "lack of being,, (Zizek, Lacan 65-66; 
Borch-Jacobsen 200). Repeatedly in Sade's texts, women are told by men, and thus they 
internalize themselves, that they exist merely to fulfill sexual pleasure.22 Moreover, Sade 
cannot avoid encasing nature in a feminized sexual_ shell because his version of nature 
remains very much like the woman in the bourgeois marriage contract: Sade embodies 
nature in the same kind of female or feminized tropes .his masculine characters command 
to embody their own motives and opportunities for the relentless pursuit of pleasure and 
perversity. Sadean nature is perhaps best figured in the character of Juliette 's sorceress 
Madame Durand, the embodiment of the commanding law of nature, whose power and 
authority proves to be illusory, imaginary, artificial. �ven Durand's individuality is 
called into question, for she disappears as soon as she is introduced, leaving almost no 
trace that she had ever existed. 
Swinburne conceptually moves his version of nature beyond the trope of the 
Sadean woman, because Swinburne's feminine nature is the ultimate display of the 
22 For example, in Juliette. Madame de Clairwil tells Juliette, "Woman has one innate virtue, it is 
whorishness; to fuck, that and that alone is what we were created for'' (492). Likewise, as Frances 
Ferguson points out, Justine is primarily a female body to be repeatedly used by others for their own 
pleasure ("Justine" 1 10). Arguably Juliette details women pleasuring themselves as well as others. 'That 
being sai� since the overriding plot of the novel begins wit11 Noirceuil tutoring Juliette how to pleasure 
him and ends with Juliette returning to Noirceuil to give him pleasure, it seems that the text remains 
entrenched in sexual essentialism. 
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individuality-the particularity-that bourgeois man denies to woman. In Sade's texts, as 
Horkheimer and Adorno notice, a female character. is always a universal signifier, "a 
representative of her sex," and thus "male logic sees her wholly as standing for nature, as 
\ 
the substrate of never-ending subsumption notionally, and of never-ending subjection in 
reality" {l l l ). Swinburne's revision of the Sadean woman demonstrates his aspirations 
to create a literary art superior to Sade's, in that Swinburne's women, not only "Nature" 
as depicted here but also the many "ladies of pain" peopling the Poems and Ballads, are 
only universalized as an aesthetic principium indivi£!uationis: the Swinburnian woman is 
a universal trope only "in terms of its own meaning not [being] lodged beyond the 
particular individuals who bear it" (Adorno, Theory 200). 
By the time he completed the Blake manuscript, Swinburne recanted his initial 
idolatrous worship of Sade and his work,23 but he still managed to use the faults he saw in 
Sade's approach to his own benefit. Swinburne lambasted Sade as "a Christian ascetic 
bent on earning the salvation of the soul through the mortification of the flesh,"24 but still 
found Sade useful as an example of how to transform such Christian duaiism into a 
negative dialectic useful for his aesthetic purposes. Julian Baird proposes that Swinburne 
regarded Sade as a symbol for "emancipation from [the] crippling moral laws" and the 
Christian concept of the physical body and its limitations (5 I ), though I would qualify 
this by adding that this statement only pertains if one perceives that Sade provided the 
23 Swinburne is quite famous for pronouncing himself a fervent discipline of the "divine Marquis" as a 
young man-before he actually read any of Sade's work. In fact, Swinburne did not read any of Sade until 
he was halfway through his work on William Blake; and after reading Justine, a bitterly disappointed 
Swinburne wrote to his friend Richard Monckton Milnes (later Lord Houghton) tbat he "wep(t] . . .  over a 
shattered idol" (qtd. by Rooksby, Life 76). Despite that fact, Sade continued to permeate Swinburne's 
thought and speech over the next several years, but Swinburne presented himself less as Sade's disciple and 
more as Sade's critic. 
24 Letter from Swinburne to Richard Monckton Milnes (Letters 1 :57). 
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means for Swinburne to investigate methods of Christian asceticism in order to move 
beyond those conventional ascetic concepts. Furthermore, Baird declares that, for 
Swinburne, Sade "is part of the natural order" (5 1 ), the very concept Swinburne proves is 
always already invalid. Consequently, it is tempting to hypothesize that Swinburne 
associated Sade with the universalized trope of the Sadean woman he found inadequate. 
Horkheimer and Adorno assert that the "emotion which corresponds to the practice of 
oppression" of the revered fair lady "is contempt, not reverence" ( 1 1 1  ); and, as his vast 
disappointment at Sade's boorish and maladroit artistry led Swinburne finally to 
pronounce to his friends, "I drop my apostrophe to M. de Sade" (qtd. by Rooksby, Life 
76), it seems Swinburne came to resent Sade for creating an aestheticized subject­
position for himself in which he (Sade) failed to develop his own particularity and, 
consequently, was not able truly to divorce himself from rational, bourgeois, and 
religious concretizing universals. 2-5 
Because he felt that Sade failed - to rebel enough against the traditions and 
conventions of Christianity, Swinburne uses Sade only in a footnote to the "holy 
insurrection" which is the "radical signi�cance" of an unconventional faith. Thus 
Swinburne turns back to Blake. "Divine rebellion," or "radical Christianity," must be 
comprised of a set of particulars that present the universal only in conste11ation which 
"illuminates a specific side" or· aspect of a given concept (Adorno, Negative 1 62); 
meaning, what one refers to as "divine rebell ion" has many individual, particular 
qualities-all of which will not be evident or available simultaneously, and some of 
25 lnte�ngly, Horkheimer and Adorno come to tile same conclusion about Sade, saying, "(T]he 
individualism which Sade proclaimed in combating the laws ends in the absolute rule of the generality. the 
republic" ( 1 17). Swinburne himself had conflicting ideas about the efficacy and idealism of republicanism. 
which I will discuss furtber in my explication of the Songs before Sunrise in Chapter 5. 
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which will not seem synchronous with other qualities. Moreover, each individual will 
comprehend the relationships between the particular qualities differently, identifying 
constellative patterns unique to his/her individual perspective. In .this way, no particular 
quality gets subsumed by an overarching universal whole, although particularities 
typically get subsumed by the universal because specificity is "a matter of indifference or 
a burden" to universalizing practices (Negative 162). Sade merely refurbished the 
· conventional, universalized, and universalizing Christian classifications (i.e. , spirit/flesh, 
good/evil, asceticism/eroticism). Swinburne cl�ims that Blake, though, creates 
a faith of his own, made out of art for art 's sake, and worked by means of 
art . . . . In a rough and rapid way he chose to mass and sum up under some 
one or two types, comprehensible at first sight to few besides himself, the 
main elements of opposition which he con�eived to exist. (Blake 1 0 1 )  
Even though Blake uses "some one or two types" as universal throughout his canon, they 
all contain the "elements of opposition" to universality, the particulars, which direct one 
to understand any sort of universal only as it is figured in particular, individual 
instances-in this case, the particular, individual works of art. And artistic particularities 
should be understood as exceeding any and all social, and thus universal, use. 26 
Swinburne says, once art becomes "useful to men in general (say, by furthering their 
moral work or improving their moral nature), she is no longer of any human use or value" 
(Blake 92, italics his). Blake's unconventional faith in particularity, then, extends to art 
26 This is not exactly a typical dialectic of synthesizing praxes between antitheses, though; rather, this kind 
of dialectic works only "on the level of analysis" (Skjerdal online). constantly seeking to re-analyze and 
disrupt-rather than transcend-lite fonnation of universalizing concepts. 
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an aesthetic value that opposes conventional use-value which, according to Horkheimer 
and Adorno, makes an artwork into a fetish ( I  58). 
Swinburne recognizes that when art is forced to prescribe and uphold the status 
quo it also becomes the "site of a special power that must either be contained or 
exploited" (Mitchell, Jcono/ogy 15 1  ), and thus presages the Adornian dictum to recognize 
the "fetish character" of an artwork only to "critically dissolve it" (Theory 1 83). He 
wants to reach the point of what Zizek calls ."troppofisso, " or "the very moment of 'non­
dialectical excess, ' of ' exaggeration,' when 'one particular moment stands for all' 
(Plague 91)  and yet the excess still stains the very moment. Swinburne finds this 
moment in the fifth chapter of Blake's Ahania, in which Ahania, separated from the 
"status quo" as figured in the creator god Urizen, exceeds the limits of the Urizenic 
world. In the "[o]ne final glimpse . . .  of Ahania" offered before she dissolves, she at first 
seems "impotent therefore and a shadow"; but, as Ahania, intimates "great suggestions of 
something more than our.analytic ingenuities can well unravel" (Swinburne, Blake 
254}-something that can only be expressed in a fissure between Ahania and Urizen. 
The lamenting voice of Ahania, 
Weeping upon the Void ! 
. . .  Distant in solitary night, 
Her voice was heard, but no form 
Had she; but her tears from clouds 
Eternal fell round the Tree. 
And the voice cried: 'Ah, _Urizen ! Love! 
Flower of morning! I weep on the verge 
Of Nonentity-how wide the Abyss 
Between Ahania and thee ! ['] (Blake, Ahania V: 1-1 1)  
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Just as all discourse exceeds itself, suggesting absence in its attempt to satiate absence, 
Ahania's discourse, forged on. the "verge of the abyss," gestures at the abyssal excess that 
escapes all kinds of discourse. In similar vein, Swinburne's own aesthetic discourse 
gestures toward the inaccessible excess of particularity in the same moment it tries, and 
significantly fails, to render it accessible. 
This "special power' of particularity must be neither contained nor exploited­
neither unfairly universalized nor incorporated into an ideological gesture that imposes 
the power of false (social) consciousness upon the artwork-but explored in its own 
right. Swinburne claims that Blake's work is able to circumvent the long-armed, 
usurping grasp of dominant ideology because Blake's "impulsive instinct of form" 
represents "the exquisite d�sire of just and perfect work" (Blake I 09), a quality that must 
be sensed, not deduced, by the reader. Consequently, Blake's aesthetic, requiring what 
· the early Marx might have called a sensuous consciousness, 27 "deconstructs the 
opposition between the practical and the aesthetic" by refusing to "purge the specificity 
27 In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Marx distinguishes between the "sensuous 
consciousness" of the bourgeois. capitalist "fetish-worshipper" and "that of the (ancient) Greek," who was 
able to apprehend "the hwnan feeling for nature, tl1e hwnan sense of nature. and tl1erefore also the natural 
sense of man" in a way tl1at rational, modem man cannot. TI1e ancient Greek. then. would not 
conceptualize a vast divide between thought and sensuous reality tl1e way the rational, modem man does 
(Tucker 98, 120). This is comparable to Swinburne's assertion that Blake promoted "an equal reverence 
for spirit and flesh." or the immaterial and tl1e material, "as tl1e two sides or halves of a completed creature" 
(Blake 96). 
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of things," and thus refusing to "stri[p] their sensuous content to a pure ideality of form" 
(Eagleton 204-05). In short, one might say that the Blakean aesthetic faith is faith in the 
representative "truth" of the specific. 
Furthermore, by invoking the catch-phrase of the aestheticist movement that 
Swinburne was pioneering (I 'art pour I 'art) and its ensuing proposition that art itself, 
rather than any moral, ideological or political commitment, is the foremost concern of 
aesthetics, Swinburne again invokes his Romantic predecessors. For many Victorian 
readers, the "basic doctrine ·which Romantic poets continually present for reader 
consumption" --or, at least, what particular Victorian readers of the Romantics 
continually present-"is that they are innocent of moral or doctrinal commitments" while 
speaking their "universal truths" (McGann, Romantic 66). Swinburne seems suspicious 
of his contemporaries' suggestions of Romantic non-commitment, though, in a rather 
puzzling footnote affixed to this section on art and use-value. In this footnote, Swinburne 
remarks that h� is "not . . .  aware that the written work of . . .  Shelley did ever tend to alter 
the material face of things," although he "may have desired that it should" and his 
"unwritten work may have done so" (Blake 93n l ).28 �ut the key term here is the 
"unwritten work" : not Shelley's  specific political intentions manifest in his written 
words, per se, but the "unwritten work" of Shelley's ideas as they become manifest in 
every individual reader with an equally individualized, particularized, and particularizing 
perspective. Each reader will approach one of Shelley's texts to derive meaning from it 
by forming a constellative pattern between the textual elements, and that pattern in 
28 To be fair, Swinburne pairs Shelley with Dante in this particular quote; however, for purposes of 
discussion here, I have chosen only to focus on Shelley here, considering Swinburne's great interest in and 
identification with him. 
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unique to -each individual reader. Consequently, the written text itself may not alter the 
material world, but the written text can affect the ways in which a reader understands, 
organizes, and thus reacts to, the material world. 
In other words, the written work leads the reader to shape or affect "the before 
unapprehended· relations of things" (Shelley 482). And, in turn, Shelley 
says that poetry "strips the veil of familiarity from the world," "lifts the 
veil from the hidden beauty of the world, and makes familiar objects be as 
if they were not familiar'' [505, 487]. Furthermore, all this is deemed 
"revolutionary." Poetry's work of defamiliarization . . .  lead[s] to "social 
renovation . . . .  " (Kaufman, "Legislators" 723) 
The "commitment" Swinburne reads in Shelley and Blake is a commitment to a kind of 
aesthe�ic "play impulse" intervening between sensuousness (affect, emotion, pleasure) 
and reason (the conventions in which one organizes and understands the world), in which 
the very interaction between the sensual and the rational becomes a "vehicle of 
liberation" from social constraint (Marcuse 1 86-87). This play impulse is interpreted 
within ·dominant ideology as "an ' irresponsible' aestheticism . . . of ornament, luxury, 
holiday"-an uncanny and unwelcome intrusion "in[to] an otherwise repressive world" 
that the aesthetic dimension cannot infiltrate (Marcuse 188). It does not externally seem 
to revolutionize morality or politics across the board� but, affecting how the individual 
perceives the world around him/her, the play impulse enacts a shift in perspective which 
initiates an imaginative reconsideration of that which exceeds ideological conventions. 
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Thus a commitment to exploring excess can potentially "alter the material face of things," 
or at least one's consideration of the materiality of artistic "things."29 
Swinburne saw the problematic relationship of Romantic particularity to the 
conventions and expectations of the status quo echoed in the works of Gautier and 
Baudelaire, which he read rather intensely during this period. Gautier and Baudelaire, 
progenitors of French decadence, define the individual artist as embodying the ultimate 
paradox: "a hatred for modem civilization and a love of the refinements modem 
civilization made possible" (Carter 6). This is similar to Shelley portraying the poet, in 
the "Defence," as both legislator and a prophet (Shelley 482)--meaning one who ushers 
in a new order as the public Law that allows for the necessary "refinements," yet has 
enough vision to recognize the "hateful" social l imitations that must be broken. 
Swinburne envisages all these qualities in what he calls Blake's "lust of paradox" (Blake 
37), which I believe is the utmost characteristic of Swinburne's ideal ultimate artist, a 
figure representing a constellation of particular, desirable aesthetic tendencies. Viewed 
from one angle, the artist is Blake; from another angle, it is Gautier; from yet another 
perspective, the artist is Baudelaire. And Swinburne, I think, aspires to present himself as 
another figuration of this constellative ideal. 
29 Many critics would disagree with me here, at least in part. For example, in his careful study of Shelleyan 
Ideas in Victorian Poetry, Roland Duerksen observes that Swinburne was among the Victorians interested 
"almost exclusively by [Shelley's) aesthetics, symbolism, and poetic technique," thus failing to produce 
"any work appreciably informed by Shelley's sociological ideas." Duerksen also notes, though, that 
Swinburne's letters reveal that Swinburne was in fact in '"general agreement with Shelley's social views" 
(150). This suggests to me that it is feasible that Swinburne's essay on Blake is also "infonned by" 
Shelley's ideas, though Swinburne does not necessarily always agree with them wholeheartedly. As with 
his treatment of all his favorite authors and artists, Swinburne's appropriations of Shelleyan ideas are 
revaluative and imaginative in nature. 
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Particularity is the key to emancipating art (and the artist) from its "commodity 
character," meaning its supposed cultural and social use-value-i .e., to propose and 
reinforce certain modes of conduct or uphold prevailing religious and moral principles. 
Swinburne bel ieves that, by avoiding universalization in his art, he heeds Baudelaire's 
warning that "the aim of a work of art [ should] never be uti1ity or morality" because 
"what is useful is ugly."30 He also seems to recognize the potential danger of avoiding all 
universality and u�il ity by emphasizing only the _particular, though. Adorno specifically 
notes that the process of "[p ]rogressive subjective differentiation, the heightening and 
expansion of the sphere of aesthetic stimuli, [makes] these stimuli manipulable" by the 
very status quo the differentiation is supposed to subvert (Theory 239); similarly, 
Swinburne notes that Blake's readers tend to approach his work to force the 
comprehension of"identity . . .  [between] things which never can become identical," or 
fully harmonized, universalized (Blake 99). Swinburne also claims that Blake stands 
apart from other poets because, "where others dealt by inductive rule and law, Blake dealt 
by assumptive preaching and intuition" by finding "form of his own for the body of [his] 
thought" (Blake 149, italics mine). As di scussed earlier, the body ofBlakean thought 
here is virtual rather than material, thus apparently eliding the conventional reliance on 
empiricist materiality. Yet the prerequisite dependence on subjectivity-the subject­
position-problematizes this. The question of dominant ideology remains, as the status 
quo always "offers [the] position for the subject" (Eagleton 2). This seems to suggest 
that "Blake," and successively Swinburne, falls into the Romantic trap McGann terms 
30 This is Anne Walder's translation of Baudelaire's statement "JI n y a  de vraiment beau que ce qui ne peut 
servir a rien ... . Tout ce qui est utile est laid" (IO). 
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"The Consciousness Industry," in which the individual creates a self-revelatory aesthetic 
ostensibly "free of cultural contamination," all the while refusing to see that such 
freedom from "the ruins of history and culture" is all a "grand illusion" (Romantic 91). 
However, I choose to read this as indicative of how Swinburne portends the decadent 
dilemma as specified by Adorno, who points out that even 
the most fleeting individual reactions [are] bound up with the reification of 
these reactions . . . .  [T]o this extent the watchword ! 'art pour / 'art was the 
mask of its opposite. What is true in the uproar over decadence is that 
subjective differentiation has an aspect of ego-weakness, an aspect shared 
with the mentality of the culture industry' s customers and something the 
culture industry knew how to exploit. (Theory 239) 
"Ego-weakness'' refers to how the individual, in all her/his rebell ion against the status 
quo, actually identifies �ith that which s/he tries to di�er her/himself from. In the 
decadent's denunciative reaction to the status quo, s/he actually makes the status quo her/ 
his own, thus producing an illusion of autonomy and autodetermination. 3 1  Therefore, I 
contend that Swinburne revaluates Romanticism, as well as the "decadence" of such 
poets as Gautier and Baudelaire, to develop an aesthetic theory based on particularity and 
subjectivity that will not be fel led by, but instead productively contend with, the "ego­
weakness" that threatens the very subjectivity on which the aesthetic depends. 
I believe Swinburne finds the inspiration for this revaluation in Blake' s Book of 
The/, although, like all his discussions of the Prophetic Books, Swinburne's reading of 
The/ relies heavily on his earl ier readings of Blake's other works. Swinburne interprets 
31 See Borch-Jacobsen 3 1 .  
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The/, via the lens of"The Everl�sting Gospel," as a metaphor for how British 
Romanticism formulated a response to the underlying dominant ideology which anchors 
the Roma�tic subject-position by exploiting the anxiety that ideology creates and then 
conceals. Blake scholar Heather Glen describes this as an anxiety that can only be 
"marked" by a prophet or artist: the potential for "disclosing the hidden logic of a whole 
society in a way which transcends rational analysis, creating something which becomes 
independent of--and capable of questioning . . .  anything its creator may consciously 
have intended" (95). Glen's definition of the artist recalls Shelley's definition of the poet 
and his/her function as well as corresponds to Swinburne' s  reticence to admit full 
awareness of the effects art may have on "the material face of things." More importantly, 
though, this is the "secret" of aesthetic creation .revealed: that the individual 's role, even 
in an aesthetic that relies ·on subjective particularity, must be understood as limited. The 
artist must acknowledge that the artwork, because it must surpass the artist's intentions 
and assume an autonomous existence beyond the artist's reach, contains an element that 
"remains alien" to him/her; that art maintains the penumbra of otherness "that the subject 
can never fully participate in . . .  and still retain the sense of self' (Nicholsen 175). 
Likewise, in the "confusion, clamour, the jar of words that half suffice and thoughts that 
half exist" presented and evoked in art (Swinburne; Blake 1 85), there will always be 
something that "remains alien" to the reader, even in the process of reading 
constellatively. A limited creator-a limited subject-could ensure that "ego-weakness" 
does not become as important a factor when the artwork achieves autonomy from the 
creator's conscious intentions. 
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This is part and parcel to Swinburne, s shocking suggestion, mentioned earlier, 
that the ultimate creator should be castrated. "Playing Prometheus," says Swinburne, the 
poet "bring[s] from extreme heaven the immediate fire in the hollow of his reed or pen" 
(Blake 149)--in ot.her words, stealing the phallic symbol of creative power. Moreover, 
the gods created fire for their pleasure; Prometheus separated the gods from their 
creation. Thus Swinburne applies the image of castrating God to suggest the separation 
of artist/subject from the artwork that Swinburne claims is essential. Interestingly, 
Swinburne correlates .the castration of God with the crucifixion, as he claims such "death 
or sacrifice" represents "not merely . . .  the redemption of man," but "the union of divine 
crucified man with the creative governing power' that paradoxically only transpires in 
. the loss of power, control, and stability (Blake 1 56). The crucifixion, the sacrifice, itself 
is a symbolic gesture or symbolic creation, like a work of art itself. One is not redeemed 
by any kind of actual transcendence or achievement of unity. Rather, this is the 
confrontation of the subject with that which remains "alien" to her/him, the subject 
realizing what s/he is capable of creating and what the creative power cannot attain, 
simultaneously. In this case, the confrontation is realized by the subject's encounter with 
the crucified body, which is ostensibly available to the subject through the ritual Christian 
sacrifice but never actually, practically attainable or tangible. Art is capable of this 
paradox because, as Adorno would .say, "as the negation of practical life, it is itself 
praxis" (Theory 24 1 ). Swinburne presents us with an anxious praxis between the 
"rational society" that initiates the irrational when it sanctions redemption of"the bodily 
man" by sacrificing the body itself-exposing the material, rational body as virtual and 
thus irrational. 
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Swinburne sees the character of Thel as a site of such praxis. Whereas "To 
Tirzah" demonstrates a "vision of t�e creator divided against his own creation" 
(Swinburne, Blake 1 50), The/ utiliz�s that vision to generate praxis between creator and 
autonomous creation. In Blake's poem, Thel discovers that 
[t]he secret of creation is sacrifice; the very act of growth is a sacrament: 
and through this eternal generation in which one life is given for another 
· and shed into new veins of existence, each thing is redeemed from 
perpetual death by perpetual change. This secret once made evident to 
Thel, her fear is in a measure removed . . . .  (Blake 20 I )  
Thel's  contradictory relationship to "Mother Nature" is central to the poem. In sum, Thel 
moves from fearing death as an end to accepting death as a new beginning. Thel fears 
death because it represents a return to the nature she is estranged from: " . . .  therefore did I 
weep, I And I complained in the mild air, because I fade away, / And lay me down in thy 
cold bed, and leave my shining lot" (The/ III: 1 1 - 13). However, when "the matron Clay" 
bids Thel to "enter [her] house" (The/ III : 14- 1 6), Thel seems to go willingly. This, says 
Swinburne, represents how "[t]he forces of material nature," even under the yoke of 
human domination, can "give way" to the immaterial (Blake 20 I ). Swinburne does not 
specifically discuss the problems inherent this rather drastic turn of events (Thel' s fear of 
death and nature giving way to acceptance) coming too quickly; nor does he discuss the 
reversal of this acceptance which occurs in the following· chapter of the poem, in which 
Thel flees "Mother Nature" -except to say that Thel experiences "affright" at "the 
sudden nakedness of natural -life," the "great questions of physical life" (Blake 201 -02). 
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Thus, at first, Swinburne _seems to provide a resolution for Blake's poem and the 
character of Thel that Blake's poem itself does not provide. What Swinburne calls Thel's 
"affiight" is actually Thel' s inability to resolve the conflict between fear and acceptance, 
dominated versus unadulterated nature. The poem may be "an inspired exposition of 
material things" demonstrating how "the strong imagination . . .  wrestles with the great 
questions of physical life in hopes that "perchance it will yield up the heart of its 
mystery" (Swinburne, Blake 202), but also how the "perchance" fulfillment of that hope 
never really ·occurs. Despite the many words offered by both Blake and Swinburne, still 
"no word spoken upon earth or under could explain the marvel of the flesh," or offer 
fulfillment in "the infinite beauty and delight of it, the infinite subtlety and danger; its 
prodigalities and powers" (Blake 20 1 ). This is the foundation of the all-important proviso 
of artifice central to Swinburne's aesthetic. True to the Swinburnian "lust of paradox," 
artifice here is the means by which, in order to preserve the self and/or the subject­
position so aesthetically crucial, one goes to great lengths to lose it. 32 Thel demonstrates 
how human "estrangement from nature . . .  is realized in the process of the abandonment 
to nature" (Horkheimer and Adorno 48) that she accomplishes in her inability to 
surrender herself to "the matron Clay." Since she not only makes herself an artificial 
sacrifice to the "matron Clay" but also runs back to the vales of Har, Thel does �ot really 
sacrifice herself to. nature; consequently, "the secret of creation" is artificial sacrifice. 
That being said, we cannot accept the aesthetic rapport between sacrifice and 
artifice without considering its deceitful quality more fully. According to Horkheimer 
and Adorno, sacrifice is "the magical pattern of rational exchange, a device of men by 
32 See Horkheimer and Adorno 48-49. 
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which the gods"-or, -in our specific case here, natur�"may be mastered: the gods are 
overthrown by the very. system by which they are honored" (49). By this token, one 
could read Thel' s sacrific� as yet another event in which reason has dominated nature. 
Swinburne conspicuously fails to comment on the poem's ending, in which The) seems 
overwhelmed by the "forces of material nature," and her senses are still constrained by 
reason. The) encounters several small but significant barriers preventing her from fully 
embracing the sensuous consciousness that would allow her to perceive the "exquisite 
desire of just and perfect work." Rather than sensing "the secrets of the land unknown" 
(The/ IV:2) that Mother Nature offers her in death, The) deductively tries to rationalize 
what the symbolic landscape surrounding her "means." She thinks she hears warnings of 
her own demise, interprets the glances of others towards her as murderous, and finally 
assumes herself as the victim in an impending rape scene (The/ IV: 1 1-20).33 At the 
poein' s end, "The Virgin started from her seat, & with a shriek / Fled back unhinderd 
[sic] till she came into the vales of Har," the place she was before she accepted Mother 
Nature's invitation (The/ IV:21 -22). Thel, Swinburne's proclaimed aesthetic exemplar, is 
thus left in a "no-progress" state in which fulfi 1 1ment cannot take place, in which her 
sacrifice "implies recollection of something that was not a primal component of the 
individual but originated instead in the history of domination" itself (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 5 1  ). In her attempt to circumvent domination, The) becomes complicit in it. 
33 Specifically, in Chapter IV; line 20, Thel asks, "Why a little curtain of flesh on the bed of our desire?", 
intimating tl1at her long-protected virginity is in jeopardy. 111el. though in nature's realm, still clings to the 
manmade dictwns prohibiting sexual activity and sexual pleasure, especially for women; consequently, 
The) interprets all sexual contact between 111c:111 and woman as tl1e dominating man forcing the act upon the 
dominated woman (i.e., rape). 11lis. again, reinforces the "always already dominated" status of nature. 
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If Swinburne had discussed Thel ' ·s breakdown thoroughly, he would have had to 
contend more explicitly with the "decadent" ego.weakness it insinuates.. Swinburne is  
relatively dismissive of The/ 's final chapter because in  this chapter Blake disappoints 
him, as Blake arguably fails here to deal effectively and aesthetically with the "trickery 
which elevates the frail individual to the status of vehicle of divine substance, [ which] 
has always been apparent in the ego" (Horkheimer and Adorno 5 1  ). In other words, 
Blake reveals the trickery ·but does not use the trickery to any aesthetic advantage. The 
closest Swinburne comes to admitting The/' s basic problem is in the conclusion to his 
discussion of the poem: 
Throughout this book his extreme andfeminine tenderness of faith speaks 
more softly and shows a simpler face than elsewhere. One might almost 
say that The/ had overmuch of this gracious and delicate beauty; that the 
intense faith and compassion which thus animate all matter gives a touch 
of almost dubious and effeminate sweetness to the thought and style. (202, 
emphases mine) 
Swinburne's repeated emphasis on the "femininity" of Blake's poem presents an impl icit 
recognition that not only did Blake fail to live up to his own agenda of transgressing 
"mere ' sexual ' shells," but also that Thel' s  particularity is inevitably elided by the 
ideological universals of"femininity" Blake ·himself found problematic. Swinburne's  use 
of sexist language here is problematic, too-but I believe it . is purposefully problematic, 
suggesting that the poem leads one to read it in divisive ways to indicate more deeply the 
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failure to transgress the status quo.34 Furthermore, any autonomy or auto-determination 
that Thel achieves here is also artificial. On the surface, it may look like her decision to 
return to Har is made autonomously, but" does she really have a choice? The "lal)d 
unknown," that which is other than the status quo, is not accessible to her. Her return to 
Har further establishes her assumption into the status quo, rendering the substantiality of 
Thel' s subject-position ou�side of dominant ideology, in a virtual space that is neither Har 
nor other-than-Har, "but a semblance and an illusion" (Horkheimer and Adorno 51  ). 
Considering the problems presented in the final chapter of The/, then, 'it almost 
seems incongruous that Swinburne duly claims Thel as the emblem of the artist clued into 
the "secret of creation." It is important to note that Swinburne tempers his criticism of 
Blake, quoted above, by recanting that such criticism perhaps is not "justly" proffered, 
since "there is a.firm hod)' of significance i_n the poem" (202, italics mine). I believe that 
this, too, is just as much a play on the subtext of the given language as the previously­
quoted sentences, especially considering that Blake's poem, for all its celebration of 
nature's "material forces," is not populated with "firm bodies" at all, but the semblances 
of material bodies. Thel herself is described an apparition without substance; introduced 
in the second stanza of the poem's first chapter, 
. . . Thel is like a watry [sic] bow. and like a parting cloud. 
Like a reflection in a glass. like shadows in the water. 
34 Notably, Swinburne does not utilize the same sexist language when discussing the other female 
characters in Blake's texts. For instance, he derides Bromio� from The Daughters of Albion, for 
subjugating Oothoo� "born for rebellion and freedom" (Blake 229). Furthennore, be compares Bromion's 
defiling of Oothoon to the way women generally are defiled by men in society: "That is, woman has 
become subject to oppression of customs; suffers violence at the hands of marriage laws and other such 
condemnable things . . . .  [E]rror, fear, submission to custom in law, is that which 'defiles' a womann (Blake 
230nl). 
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Like dreams of infants. like a smile upon an infants face. 
Like the doves voice, like transient day, like music in the air. 
(Blake, Thel I: 8- 1 1 )  
Thel is always "like" something that cannot be  substantively represented. Thus, twice 
removed from the material world, Thel is a mise en abyme of abstraction, a reflection of 
already-reflected concepts which, to begin with, d� not even have physical or concrete 
qualities that could easily cast a reflection. 
Moreover, even the exquisitely detailed descriptions of the physicality of the 
"body'' of nature· throughout the poem give way to the ephemera Thel discovers nature 
really is. As a result, the "firm body of significance in the poem" is significant because it 
is an artifice offering "firm" representation of what is actually abstract. "The secret of 
artistic creation" Thel offers ·is that art is illusion qua illusion, virtuality at its utmost. 
Thel represents aesthetic artifice, or "[t]he transformation of sacrifice into subjectivity 
[that] occurs under the sign of the artifice that was already a feature of sacrifice" 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 56). The sacrifice, as we have seen, was always artificial .  Thel 
did not give her life for another or "shed [herself] into new veins of existence"; Thel went 
through the motions of death without really surrendering herself to it (Swinburne, Blake 
201 ). Rather, Thel ' s  sacrificial ritual was an assertion of her own selfbood, position 
herself as other than the "beauty of the vales of Har" in which "we live not for ourselves" 
(Blake, Thel III: 1 0). And _deceit is always already part of the position of subjectivity in 
the aesthetic (Horkheimer and Adorno 56). 
Ideology always offers the position for the subject; however, i� Swinburne's 
Blakean aesthetic, the subject illusorily positions herself outside of ideology-all the 
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while knowing the position is artificial: Swinburne even notes that conventional ideology 
is still " constraining the mute rebellious flesh" (Blake 202). But, despite that constraint, 
the artist/subject manages to create a virtual, anomalous aesthetic space within an actual, 
normative space, and it is the art_ist-subject's very consciousness of the virtuality, the 
artifice, of that space that prevents his/her act of separation from being completely 
subsumed into the fold of the norm. The) must be understood as knowing her sacrifice is 
as artificial as the dominated nature to whom she "sacrifices" herself; as already 
understanding herself, on some level, as a virtual body making a virtual sacrifice which is 
deceitfully presented as an actual exchange. Consequently, I feel Swinburne glosses over 
the final chapter of Blake's The/ because it does not fit this paradigm. Swinburne 
suggests that Blake should never have presented Thel's return to Har because she never 
really left it. Thel's death-her sacrifice-is virtual; it is symbolic, not actual. Nature, 
always already dominated, cannot allow for an escape from the status quo because nature 
has been made into a pawn of the status quo. Blake's "matron Clay" is the norm, not the 
exception, but Thel makes her serve as the virtual, anomalous space that locates the 
conscious illusion of exception. Because Swinburne recognizes Blake's poem is "an 
inspired exposition of material things'; in tension with the abstractions of "spirit" (Blake 
202), his analysis of The Book of The/ reveals his supposition that the poem's aesthetic 
"truth" is finalized in Chapter III with the deliberately artificial resolution that refuses to 
resolve the poem's tension, making Chapter IV an unnecessary and undesirable ending to 
the poem. 
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·CHAPTER THREE 
Swinburne Remediating Blake: 
Imagination, Perception, and Transforming Ego-Weakness 
"[C]onsciousness of limits drives Swinburne to haunt boundary lines. His verse was 
remarkably rich in boundaries-in images, poetic forms, and prosodic devices which can 
suggest a point of limits. " -Jerome McGann 
"The speaking gesture of almost every line . . .  is not so much the gesture of a person 
speaking but rather, in its intention, the epiphany of language. " -Theodor Adorno 
"[/ am J the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Blake . . . .  " 
-Algernon Charles Swinburne 
As Swinburne establishes in his reading of The/, the artist aware of the secret of 
creation is also aware of his/her own virtuality, the artifice that serves as one's subject­
position, and accordingly, the limitations of the aesthetic subject and his/her subject 
position. Swinburne, for all his great admiration of and respect for the poetry of Shelley, 
. does not exactly share Shelley's belief that the imaginative production of poetry is "the 
creation of actions according to the unchanging fonns of human nature, as existing in the 
mind of the Creator''-an expansive, unlimited mind responsible for "the act of primal 
creation" which all other mind share in and thus repeat ( qtd. in Abrams 282). For that 
reason, Swinburne wants to refigure Romanticism through his reading of Blake, and 
present Blake as achieving an ironic distance from the Romanticized ego contemplatus; 1 
1 In chapter four of the Biographia, Coleridge refers to the ego contemplatus as the "personal identity under 
the fonn in which [the mind] imagined itself previously to have existed," signified with the use of personal 
pronouns such as "I" and "me" ( 468-69n I). In many Romantic poems, the contemplative "I" establishes its 
identity imaginatively in symbiotic relationship to a kind of immanent "trace memory" of prelapsarian 
nature. Perceiving Blake's Romanticism as much more· subversive, Swinburne believes that the speaking 
subjects in Blake's poem-anxiously and virtually situated "I"� wants to demonstrate the impossibility 
of that relationship. 
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though this irony, as Anne Mel1or points out, this irony is itself a Romantic gesture. 
Blake, 
[h ]aving ironically acknowledged the fictiveness of his own patternings of 
human experience, . . .  engages in the creative process of l ife by eagerly 
constructing new forms, new myths. And these new fictions and self­
concepts bear with them the seeds of their own destruction . . . .  The 
resultant artistic mode that alone can properly be called romantic irony 
must therefore be a form or structure that simultaneously creates and de­
creates itself. (Mellor 5) 
This irony allows Blake, and consequently Swinburne, to "deconstruct the mystifications 
of self' (Mel 1or 5), or the ego-weakness which threatens any aesthetic highly dependent 
on subjective particularity. Rather than projecting an ego with the mythic, omnipotent 
creative power of God-in which a particular subjective differentiation, a "fleeting 
individual reaction" accompanying the formation of aesthetic constellatives (Adorno, 
Theory 239), masquerades as a universal, touchstone aesthetic principle-Swinburne 
wants to demonstrate more accurately how the artist, "contriv[ing] to divert and infuse 
this overflowing fervour of mind," often destabil izes the very work, the very process of 
creation, into which s/he ·funnels her/his "fervour" (Swinburne, Blake 85). Myth, like 
"[f]antastic art, . . .  presents something nonexistent as existing," and produces the illusory 
"presentation of the nonempirical as if it were empirical" (Adorno, Theory 1 9), but myth 
does not acknowledge its fictive properties. Swinburne finds in Blake' s Prophetic Books 
a new mythology which represents the fictive properties of myth itself. Consequently, he 
embarks on a mission of exploiting the instabilities of myth to explicate the critical 
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tension incarnate in the artifice that paradoxically determines and threatens the Romantic 
subject position. 
To do this, Swinburne revaluates what he calls the "old'' aesthetic "war . . . not 
between facts and fancies, reason and romance, poetry and good sense, but simply 
between the imagination which apprehends the spirit of a thing and the understanding 
which dissects the body of a fact-this strife which can never be decided or ended" 
(Blake 91). This is more than a dismissal of fact and reason from the equation in favor of 
., spirit and imagination, though. Swinburne also takes on the Coleridgean opposition 
between imagination and fancy. He does rely on Coleridge's dismissal of the "fixities 
and definites" of fancy, since such "fixities and definites" too much resemble the end 
results of dissective reason, as well as the recognition that the esemplastic power of the 
imagination "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to re-create" (Coleridge 5 1 6). 
However, unlike the Coleridgean version, the Swinburnian imagination does not 
"struggl[e] to idealize and to unify" (Coleridge 5 1 6). Swinburne's work shows how that 
idealization and unification merely obfuscates the tension, or effective dissonance, 
fundamental to this aesthetic dedicated to enacting the necessary encounter with the 
"clamorous kingdoms of speech and dream" where the "ruling forces of supreme discord 
preside" (Swinburne, Blake 1 9 1 ). 
In these clamorous, dissonant myths, there are no fixed or definite principles, nor 
are there struggles for idealization and unification that are not already acknowledged as 
artifice. The old aesthetic war, says Swinburne, pits imagination against reason, all the 
while misrecognizing the parties in conflict. The aesthetic conflict is re�dly b�tween 
imagination and understanding, as the very heart of the aesthetic is the contentious 
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traversal of conventional understanding (mimesis, even)-the identification of a given 
object or concept with another, socially established object or concept. As Swinburne 
himself acknowledges, one must, like Bla�e, have "the sense to see that the one thing 
utterly futile to attempt [is] a reconciliation between the two sides of life and thought 
which have no community of work or aim imaginable" (Blake 97). In other words, one 
cannot and should not attempt to forge a relationship between conventional ( or 
ideologically-driven) understanding and aesthetic imagination, since the "[a]esthetic . . .  
does not consist in establishing relationships between signifying elements, but in the 
reenactment of the process" by which they are momentarily, constellatively 
"interconnected in such a way as to gain meaning" (Menke 49); but this is "meaning" is 
an "immediate expression," a "nonidentifying cognition" in which the imagination does 
not process information by relating it to already-established concepts (Gebauer and Wulf 
285-86). The momentary, constellative process of the aesthetic imagination creates a 
myth of ego strength and stability, a myth in which the phenomenal representation of the 
belief in the noumenal appears possible. This myth functions only to reveal its own 
transience and subsequently its own failure to explicate truly the "patterns of human 
experience." 
Swinburne gestures back to Blake's Songs of Innocence and Experience to 
establish the function of the myths of aesthetic understanding in the Prophetic Books. 
These poems evidence the aesthetic issue at hand: "Experience must do the work of 
innocence as soon as conscience begins to take the place of instinct, reflection of 
perception; but the moment experience begins upon this work, men raise against her the 
conventional clamour of envy and stupidity" (Swinburne, Blake 124). "Experience" here, 
78 
or ideology, is the mimetic catalyst forcing the individual subject to become "an 
expression of difference in relation to nature" (Gebauer and Wulf 282). The subject, who 
experiences his/her surroundings reflected via experience instead of via unmediated 
perception, thus becomes subject to a profound loss of immediacy. The Songs of 
Innocence are best sung by the "Infant Joy," who is "but two days old" and thus unaware 
of his inevitable transformation into "The School Boy" of the Songs of Experience whose 
indoctrination into experience "drives all joy away."2 In Innocence, Blake presents 
personas "who have or who deserve the gift of spiritual sight," whereas the personas in 
Experience find only "what things there are for them to see" (Swinburne, Blake 1 16, · 
italics mine). The Songs of Experience thus serve as bleak illustrations of the 
predominantly material existence one has when that "spiritual" immediacy is lost. Blake 
himself even remarks that the "Dress" of the individual who has lost that immediacy "is 
forged lron."3 It is as if the power of the imagination dissipates in experience, leaving the 
subject to resort to mere fancy with which to contemplate the fixed and definite 
properties of the things s/he sees. 
Nonetheless, considering S�inburne was aware that Coleridge himself declared 
that such fancy "is indeed no other than a mode of Memory emancipated from the order 
of time and space" (Coleridge 5 1 6), or dominant ideology, Swinburne seems to read the 
Songs of Experience to find the trace memory of spiritual innocence in the fixities of 
materialism. Such a trace memory, what Horkheimer and Adorno call the "remembrance 
of nature," meaning an unadulterated, unsubjected nature, "in whose fulfillment the 
2 See William Blake, "Infant Joy," lines 1-6 and "The School Boy," lines 6-10. 
3 This is from l�e 5 of" A Divine Image." See Complete Poetry and Prose 800. 
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unacknowledged truth of culture lies hidden" ( 40), is also mythic in that it is artifice. It is 
an idea of a pre-mimetic perception in which imagination exists in its purest form, before 
it was differentiated into dichotomies, i .e., imagination vs. fancy, spirit vs. form. 4 This 
goes "[a]gainst aH articulate authority" (Swinburne, Blake 1 1 5). Speaking . 
metaphorica1ly of this purest imagination, Swinburne says, "If the 'Songs oflnnocence' 
have the shape and smell of leaves or buds," then the Songs of Experience "have in them 
the light and sound of fire or the sea" (Blake 1 1 6). And "a fresher savour and a larger 
breath strikes one" who "enters" the Songs of Experience, having intuited "the gift of 
spiritual sight," or innocence, to see "what things there are . . .  to see when that gift [ of 
innocence] has been given" (Blake 1 1 6). This virtual trace memory of "[i]nnocence, the 
quality of beasts and children, has the keenest eyes; and such eyes alone can discern and 
interpret the actual mysteries of experience" (Blake 1 1 6). The myth of innocence 
becomes the site where the individual positions her/himself to enact the illusion of 
revaluating experience as if s/he has regained her/his lost sense of immediacy. In other 
words, what s/he recalls in her/his reversion to myth is itself a mythic gesture 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 70), and thus another model of the use of aesthetic artifice. 
Swinburne tests this model in his reading of"The Crystal Cabinet," calling the 
poem "an example of the somewhat jarring and confused mixture" of artificial, mythic 
perception and "actual 'vision"' {1 75). 
The 'cabinet' is either passionate or poetic vision-a spiritual gift, which 
may soon and easily become a spiritual bondage. . . .  [H]is prison built by 
his love or his art, with a view open beyond of exquisite limited 
4 My reading here is based on Horkheimer and Adomo's discussion of mana (39-42). 
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loveliness, soft quiet and light of dew and moon, and a whole fresh world 
to rest in or look into, but intangible and simply reflective; until you try at 
too much and attempt to turn spiritual to physical reality-'to seize the 
inmost form' with 'hands of flame' . . .  to translate eternal existence into 
temporal . . .  ; when at once the whole framework . . .  breaks up and leaves 
you stranded or cast out, feeble and sightless . . . .  (Swinburne, Blake 175-
76) 
Swinburne seems to read this poem as a reinforcement of the particularly artificial quality 
of aesthetic vision. The subtext here could be paraphrased accordingly: "If you do not 
recognize your aesthetic subject position as artifice, you will be�ome imprisoned in an art 
that is nothing but a solipsistic prison." Particularly notable is Swinburne's emphasis on 
the limited nature of Blake's "poetic vision." This sight is guided-illuminated-only by 
light that is always already reflected: the moon reflects second-hand light from the sun, 
and the dew is a reflective surface that reflects the already doubly-reflected light from the 
moon. This is the same mise en abyme signified by Thel, with the same result: the 
significance of art is that it is illusion qua illusion. To accept the illusory vision as real is 
�ramatically to increase one's compulsory obligation to the "iron dress" of human 
experience, or the mimetic "bondage" purportedly eluded via art. If one does not fully 
acknowledge that the artifice of perceptual immediacy must always fail to actually 
(materially) be realized, then one is perpetually imprisoned in the same kind of "deep 
romantic chasm"5 of ego-weakness as Coleridge's Kubla Khan. 
5 "Kubla Khan," lines 13-14. 
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The intrusion of"actual 'vision"' into the "deep romantic chasm" is best 
illustrated in the third stanza of Blake's poem, in which the speaker looks into the cabinet 
of art and reports, 
Another England there I saw 
Another London with its Tower 
Another Thames & other Hills 
And another pleasant Surrey Bower. . . . ("Cabinet" 5-8) 
Blake very carefully uses the pronoun "f' to signify the very subjectivity of the speaker's  
perception ( as it would be quite a different poem if the contents of the cabinet were 
reported in a more objective manner, i.e., "There was another England there . . .  ") and 
Swinburne was very aware of this. Swinburne's reading of"The Crystal Cabinet" seems 
informed, to some extent, by nineteenth-century theories concerning the relationship 
between vision and subjectivity as explored by such major thinkers as Goethe and 
Schopenhauer. 6 As Jonathan Crary explains in Techniques of the Observer, 
Schopenhauer "repeatedly demonstrated how 'what occurs within the brain, ' within the 
subject, is wrongly apprehended as occurring outside the brain in the world" (75). 
Schopenhauer's discoveries were related to Goethe's experiments concerning the 
visualization of color; Goethe was particularly interested that one can still "see" color 
even when one's eyes are closed. This observed "stain" of color left on the retina, even 
when the retina no longer directly reflects the images of the outside world, suggests that 
6 Swinburne's letters indicate he had an interest in the works of Schopenhauer; see especially volume 2, p. 
300 and volume 3, p. 166, of the collected Letters. References to Goethe are not as common; however, in a 
letter Swinburne wrote to Lady Trevelyan, dated 15 Mar. 1 865, he mentions having read George Henry 
Lewes's Life of Goethe (London: Routledge, 1 864) and subsequently attempting to apply Goethe's ideas to 
his reading of poetry (Letters 1 :  1 15-17). 
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vision has some particularly subjective conditions. In turn, Swinburne's  treatment of 
vision in his aesthetic shares some similarities to these nineteenth-century studies of the 
subjectivity of vision. Swinburne establishes an aesthetic vision that dispenses with 
and/or radically overtakes the mimetic element of art, only in the very end to reinforce 
the inescapability of mimesis. Even if one refuses to recognize ( or closes one' s eyes to) 
the reflection as such, the reflective element still stains one's attempt at refusal. After all, 
the alternate England that the speaking poet of Blake's "Crystal Cabinet" sees is actually 
the reflected image of reality, or the status quo, that still haunts or "stains" any and all 
efforts to evade imaginatively that reality altogether. 
The "threefold" nature of the cab1_net's contents7 further suggests tension between 
aesthetic and "actual" vision. The Romantic artist of Blake's poem assumes a given 
object exists independently of one's perception (that is, even when one is not looking at 
it, it is stil l  there), but he ascertains its supposedly objective, independent existence only 
subjectively when its image is reflected upon the retina. Arguably, then, perception is 
always "second-hand" because it depends on reflection. Then the artist uses his 
imagination to reflect further upon the already-reflected image; in the "Preface to 1 8 15," 
Wordsworth describes this as the "operations of the mind upon objects" that serve to re­
create and re-compose them ( 483). The Blakean-Swinburnian Romantic ironist, though, 
. . 
breaks through this "conceptual enclosure, where [artistic] vision is still theorized from 
the standpoint of a subject placed at the center of the world" (Bryson, "Gaze" 87). 
Again, "Kub la Khan" is a good example of the poet whose mind is "naturally the mirror 
7 "O what a smile a threefold Smile / Filled me that like a flame I burnd / I bent to kiss the lovely Maid / 
And found a Threefold Kiss returnd" (lines 17-20). 
of the fairest and most interesting properties of nature" (Wordsworth 455): a mirror 
which turns on itself in Swinburne's revaluation of Romanticism. Kubla Khan never 
escapes his solipsistic "pleasure-dome." 
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Furthermore, although Coleridge portrays the artist-speaker of"Kubla Khan" as 
able to perceive the inmost, eternal "form" that underlies externality and gives it 
meaning, 8 it is imp�rtant that Coleridge presents that moment of pure, unadulterated 
perception as a dream. Kub la Khan's supposed aesthetic prowess cannot be given in a 
first-hand account. It is doubly reflected, as the speaker of Coleridge's poem recalls his 
dream "vision" of Kub la Khan's "vision," thus casting doubt on the neo-Platonic belief 
"that there exists a deeper, timeless order'' or absolute form "behind the surface confusion 
and randomness" of the temporal, material world (Tamas I I ). Blake's speaker " . . .  
strove to sieze [sic] the inmost Form / With ardor fierce & hands of flame / But burst the 
Crystal Cabinet" (lines 2 1 -23). H� realizes the inmost, absolute form ostensibly held in 
the cabinet is a delusion. His cabinet must burst because artworks cannot completely seal 
themselves off from the external world. The "inmost Form" is really an imaginative 
reworking of the external, material form. Even though the work of art places any 
elements borrowed from external, material reality into a "fully changed context" 
(Adorno, Theory 5), the "stain" of reality that persists in the aesthetic realm presents the 
poet with a limit experience. 9 
As Swinburne himself notices, the speaker in Blake's poem "having had the 
larger vision, . . .  lost [his] hold of it by too great pressure of impatience or desire" (Blake 
8 As suggested by the last two lines of the poe� in which the speaker imagines that he "on honey-dew hath 
fed, I And drunk the milk of Paradise," and thus holds the key to higher, immanent aesthetic perception. 
9 Adorno even relates these "immanent problems offonn" with a limit experience in which "(t]he moment 
a limit is posited, it is overstepped and that against which the limit was established is absorbed" (Theory 6). 
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176, emphasis mine). The poet cannot sustain the'"larger vision" of immanence since not 
only is it artifice, but it is also unable to satisfy his desire for immanence. The cabinet, 
the work of art, does not really, nor even adequately, signify any achievement of 
immanence, as a desire for. such "cannot really have any object at all, if [such] desire is to 
remain what it is: the pure negativity of a subject who desires himself in his objects" 
(Borch-Jacobsen 199, italics in original). The aesthetic vision cannot represent anything 
but the eventual failure to visualize what lies beyond the horizons of reality. 
In this compelling account of"The Crystal Cabinet," Swinburne establishes the 
outline of the mythos of the limit experience and aesthetic failure, then, that he sees more 
overtly established in the Prophetic Books, specifically The First Book of Urizen, The 
Book of Ahania, and Jerusalem. In the mythic "clamorous kingdoms of speech and 
dream" (Swinburne, Blake 19 1)  of the prophecies, more than in the lyrical poems, 
Swinburne relishes finding "more overflow of lyrical invention, [and] more of the divine 
babble which sometimes takes the place of earthly speech or sense" (Blake 1 95). For in 
his study of the Prophetic Books, unlike his study ofBlake' s other poems, Swinburne 
finds clearer examples of how the practice of aesthetic artifice becomes a conscious play 
of and with the particularities of language itself. David Riede has already established 
that Swinburne reads the Blakean canon as "the inevitable result of a radical division in 
society between two perpetually conflicting cultures: the analytic, scientific culture of 
Urizenic . . .  repression and the imaginative, artistic culture of creative freedom" (Study 
1 6). However, I want to push Riede's thesis further to suggest that Swinburne reads the 
Blakean canon as radical division within language, not' only a division between language 
as it is used socially and as it is used aesthetically, but also as language is used in 
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aesthetic practice: a division between Janguage that builds mythic forms and practices 
and language that is "in contradistinction to mythic song," stained with "the possibility of 
retaining in the memory the disaster that has occurred" (Horkheimer and Adorno 78)--in 
sum, what Adorno, in Aesthetic Theory, calls the "catastrophe of meaning" (22). 
Swinburne had learned from reading Baudelaire that the displacement of 
established Romantic conventions in favor of abstraction and indeterminateness allows a 
given symbol or image in an artwork to function as a "cipher" signifying the "aesthetic 
distancing" from reality that the "traditional fantasy" of the Romantic ego contemplatus 
"no longer achieves" (Adorno, Theory 20-2 1). Swinburne compares the power of 
Baudelaire's art, a "murmur of revelation" in which the poet subtly suggests imaginings 
which cannot be overtly stated, thus knowing "at once the limit and the licence of his art" 
(Blake 9lnl), to Blake's, noticing that both poets use an ideogrammatic kind of visual 
imagery in their verbal works. For Swinburne, this ideogram or cipher functions "not as 
a pictorial likeness or impression, but as a synchronic structure in some metaphorical" or 
aesthetic "space-'that which' (in Pound's words) 'presents an intellectual and emotional 
complex in an instant of time"' (Mitchell, Jcono/ogy 25). Swinburne's Blakean ideogram 
is a synchronic structure in which one presumes to connect "earthly speech or sense" with 
"divine babble." Swinburne seems to perceive "earthly speech or sense" similarly to how 
Lacan, in "The Agency of the Letter," describes the effect of the great divide between 
signifier and signified: because the signifier always lacks veracity, the given signifier 
"carr[ies] a purely animal Dissension, destined for the usual oblivion of natural mists, to 
the unbridled power of ideological warfare, . . .  a torment to the Gods" (Ecrits 1 52, 
emphasis mine). What makes "sense," rationally, only does so in its distance and 
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dissention from the immediacy of sensation; in other words, the "natural mists" of a 
distinctly sensuous ("animal") consciousness are obliterated by a rationalist ideology in 
the formation of conventional meaning. "Earthly speech" is always metaphorical, as it is 
a substitution of sense for sensuality; it reduces sensuality and emotion to "a reducible 
and amenable quality" (Swinburne, Blake 195). Thus it always contains the tension 
between signifier and signified-the reducing signifier and the reduced signified­
subjugated though this tension might be. 
Swinburne portrays Blake as waging a crucial "ideological warfare" within 
language by implementing intricate yet dense symbolic images that focus on this 
underlying tension, introducing a dissonance that intentionally problematizes the 
conventional methods of signification. The crucial element to this problematic is "divine 
babble," the "non-sense" from which the "sense" made via metaphorical earthly speech 
emerges (Lacan, Ecrits 158), embodied in Blake's tormented creator-god, Urizen. This 
"non-sense," signifiable only by its very failure really to be acknowledged in earthly 
speech, is like a primordial soup of significance. It is a condition of "meaning-full" 
(im)possibility, a trace memory of complete, immediate "meaning" as it might have 
existed prior to reason's dominance. The "catastrophe of meaning" mentioned earlier is 
an important component of this trace memory. It is the imaginary event in which the 
signifier' s immediate access to an "undiminished plenitude" of available signified 
"meanings" was irretrievably lost, in which literal speech gives way to mediating 
metaphorical speech, and in which "appearance becomes abstract" (Adorno, Theory 22). 
However, with any kind of disastrous, cataclysmic event such as this loss of immediacy 
comes deluge, overflow, excess-in this case, that for which metaphorical "earthly 
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speech" cannot account. The abstractions of metaphorical speech contain nonfigurative, 
non-representational facets that subtly suggest that which exceeds the metaphor, that 
which the metaphor elides: "the floating final impression of power', of possibi lities that 
will always remain "formless" (Swinburne, Blake 252). Through the ideogrammic visual 
image, Swinburne hopes to recover the abstractions so that art can communicate the 
possibilities of that unfigurable excess, and he hopes Blake' s works provide an adequate 
prototype for that recovery. 
Even Swinbur:ne is at first skeptical about the feasibility of this plan. Upon an 
initial reading of The Book of Urizen, Swinburne remarks the poem is "more shapeless 
and chaotic . . .  than any other of these prose poems," as it is full of"[c]louds ofblood, 
shadows of horror, worlds without form and void, [that] rise and mingle and wane in 
indefinite ways, with no special purpose or appreciable result" (Blake 248) . However, I 
think this is a statement more of praise than criticism. The very indefiniteness suggested 
is the means of showing constellation: Urizen's world(s) is/are without unity, consisting 
only as a multiplex of individualized moments in which patterns of temporary "meaning­
making'' are established in order to facil itate engagement with those world(s), as there is 
no definitive framework underlying the poem. They lack definite form because their 
appearance is abstract, with no concrete, objective referents to give them a framework of 
stability and support. 
Swinburne describes Urizen as "warring with" the abstracted, amorphous "shapes 
of the wilderness" he forms around him, attempting but failing to establish such a 
framework because he is  always "at variance" with those shapes (Blake 248-49). 
Furthermore, Swinburne notes that Urizen' s "unprolific" failure is mirrored in the painful 
88 
formation ofUrizen' s  physical form: the "twisted forms" of his bones, covered by flesh 
more like "flames" which are themselves "tortured elemental shapes that plunge and 
writhe and moan" (Blake 249-50). We, the readers, "recoil in fear" from the horrific 
sight of"the dawn of human creation and division" (Blake 250). The "shadows of 
horror" which haunt the poem are "phantasm[ s] of a lost remote antiquity" (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 78), or the trace memory of the immediacy of perception-what Swinburne, 
borrowing from Blake's poem, calls the "all-flexible senses" (Blake 249)--supposedly 
existing before the catastrophe of meaning. Adorno tells us, "In the image of catastrophe, 
an image that is not a copy of the event but a cipher of its potential, the magical trace of 
art's most distant pre-history reappears under a total spell, as if art wanted to prevent the 
catastrophe by conjuring up its image" (Theory 33). The potential is limitless, although 
the language in which it can be expressed is quite limited. So, an ideogrammatic 
aesthetic trope or device allowing for multiple constellative perceptions is the closest 
Blake/Swinburne can come to approximating the "eternal form" of potential. The end 
result is always the same, though; the trace memory of the catastrophe of meaning is 
always conjured. It serves as a reminder that no constellation will reveal the 
"ungraspable, fugitive moment" in which "the Apocalypse of desire has already taken 
place" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 6). The imaginary event of"meaning-full" immediacy that 
would satisfy our desire is such a "distant pre-history" that, even in aesthetic space, "it is 
we who, catastrophically, always come too late to receive it" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 6). 
Swinburne himself remarks that Urizen is "at war with Time" (Blake 249), although 
Urizen himself invents the time (history) 10 that serves as the principle that mediates 
perception. 
At first, though, Blake presents Urizen as a dynamic, amorphous immediacy 
carrying the promise of apocalypse in the first two chapters of the poem. But _even this 
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presentation is problematized since the catastrophe of meaning has always already taken 
place, as evidenced in the poem's first stanza: 
Lo, a shadow of horror is risen 
In Etemityl Unknown, unprolificl 
Self-closd, all-repelling: what Demon 
Hath form'd this abominable void 
This soul-shuddering vacuum?-Some said 
"It is Urizen," But unknown, abstracted . . . .  (Blake, Urizen I :  1 -6) 
Even in his primordial state, Urizen is already "abstracted." Furthermore, he is "self­
closd," indicating that the immediacy of Eternity is an illusion, already mediated through 
Urizen' s perception, that threatens to collapse on itself. Urizen, even before assuming a 
bodily shape, is already subject to the "demand for manifestation" 1 1 of metaphoric, 
earthly speech. This suggests· two things: first, that Blake pointedly demonstrates that 
aesthetic language is metaphoric language that conveys the idea of a pre-abstracted 
"Eternity'' ( or eternal form) only by demonstrating the impossibility of conveying the 
idea; secondly, that aesthetic language is metaphoric language interpreted negatively. 
Aesthetic negativity "cannot be understood as the severing of al l connections between 
10 In Chapter IV[bJ� Urizen is "forging chains new & new / Numb'ring with links. hours� days & years" 
(17-18). 
n See Borch-Jacobsen 13 1. 
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letter and [conventional] meaning"; consequently, aesthetic language can only be 
interpreted negatively "vis-a-vis the meaning ascribed to it" by conventional modes of 
interpretation "in its connection with this meaning" (Menke 23) as well as how this 
meaning fails to "ring true." The negative interpretation requires "render[ing] visible the 
'ex-timate,' [ extimite] inherent decentrement of the field of signification" (Zizek, 
Metastases 29). Swinburne realized that Urizen must be presented as a subject squarely 
positioned in the field of conventional signification before the conventions can be 
challenged and he can "manifes[t] himself in language" by negating that conventionally 
comprehended "reality'' (Barch-Jacobsen 191  ). He also realized that Urizen' s 
subjectification, described by Blake as Urizen becoming (realizing himself as) an 
"abominable void," reveals the vacuum of his solipsism in which he must "confront the 
nullity of [his] narcissistic pretensions" (Zizek, Lacan 64). 
To arrive at this moment of revelation, though, one must first understand Urizenic 
narcissism as resembling that which Marcuse. designates "primary narcissism," which 
"engulfs the 'environment,' integrating the narcissistic ego with the objective world" 
( 168). This is more than the kind of "autoeroticism" Swinburne conjures in his earlier 
descriptions of the Sadean self-generative Nature. The cruelly creative impulses of 
Sadean nature do not "denot[ e] a fundamental relatedness to reality" the way Urizen' s do. 
Still, Urizen assumes a material body that fails to function as "the source and reservoir 
for a new libidinal cathexis of the objective world-transforming this [ material] world 
into a new mode of being" (Marcuse 1 69). This is definitely a "new mode ofbeing," 
compared to Urizen's prior state of complete immanence and immediacy; �owever, this 
is a negative, divisive transformation of"being." 
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The significance of the Urizenic problem, says Swinburne, lies in the bifurcation 
of"the material body of nature" (Blake 250)-an important observation that Swinburne 
makes and yet does not fully elaborate. I believe Swinburne's text suggests we should 
read this bifurcated material body of nature as not only the body Urizen fashions for 
himself but also the body of a "mother nature," Enitharmon, who both is and is not 
Urizen' s own creation. 12 Urizen creates the world "from his sorrows" (Swinburne, Blake 
250), as a sacrificial gift of himself to himself, or the nature that must be," like Marcuse 
would suggest, "'given' to the ego as somethin_g that had to be fought, conquered and 
even violated" as part and parcel to "the precondition for self-preservation and self­
development'' in and of the material world (1 10). Interestingly, feminized nature in the 
world of Urizen does not carry the trace memory of a pre-dominated state. Unlike 
Urizen, whose "pre-history" makes up the greater part of the poem, Enitharmon is 
presented as born of domination, in the aftermath of Urizenic mediation, divided from 
that "pre-history," ·since she functions as "the material body of nature," the already­
dominated space which allows for positioning of the subject, or assertion of ego--in 
Blake' s words, "Man begetting his l ikeness / On hi s own divided image" (Urizen VI: 1 5-
1 6). 
This is also a "new mode of being" according to the Adomian definition of the 
"new," in which "the knot is tied aesthetically" between the subject and the world around 
him/her; "its concept . . .  labors under its own abstractness" (Theory 2 1  ). The libidinal 
cathexis-meaning the channeling of creative energy into a material object, or trying to 
12 Enithannon's physical fonn was not created by Urizen; she is a cipher of the Urizenic world actually 
given physical fonn by Los, another of the "Eternals." 
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embody the quality of an immanent, immaterial nothingness in a thing-is attempted in 
the Urizenic world, though it fails to recognize or to harness human desire and its 
potential fulfillment. The titanic figures of Urizen, says Swinburne, are "[s]trange semi­
human figures," with as yet unrealized qualities "clad in somber or in fiery flesh" (Blake 
25 1)  that disallows any attainment of the fulfillment of desire. Rather than allowing for 
such cathexis, such flesh will "allure and confuse the fancy" of the reader; as "[e]very 
page vibrates with light and color" (Blake 25 1 ), the spectator/reader might mistake the 
frenzied imagery as evidence of realized transcendence and fulfillment. As Swinburne's 
treatment of The Book of Urizen illustrates, though, the end result must always be the 
stalemating abstraction of metaphor. Therefore, Swinburne is more interested in the 
creation and exploration of imagery in which the attempt to recognize and to harness that 
desire, and ultimately, inevitably failing to do so, is meaningful in and of itself. In other 
words, Swinburne wants to transform the very way we read the image(s) of the 
catastrophe of meaning. Urizen exemplifies this transformation in The Book of Ahania, 
which Swinburne considers "The Second Book of Urizen" (Blake 252). 13 
The character ofFuzon in Ahania, the son ofUrizen "born of the fiery part of the 
God of nature" (Swinburne, Blake 252), captures Swinburne' s  particular interest, as 
Fuzon accomplishes the astonishing task of separating Urizen from his desire. Fuzon, 
13 Swinburne justifies his comment: "It is worth observing that while some copies [of Urizen] are carefully 
numbered throughout 'First Book,' in others the word 'First' is erased from every leaf: as in effect the 
Second Book never was put forth under that title. Next year however the Book of Ahania came out" (Blake 
25 1-52). However, I feel it is worth noting that, in his commentary appended to the Complete Poetry and 
Prose, Harold Bloom points out that althoughAhania generally "is treated as a mere continuation of The 
Book of Urizen" because its "action carries on from Urizen, it is an altogether different kind of work" 
(907). Swinburne obviously would disagree; and, ifhe ·could respond, Swinburne's answer would probably 
suggest thatAhania provides a constellatively different perspective on the same issues of materiality, m� 
and aesthetic metaphor introduced in Urizen, and even earlier in the Songs. 
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one of the "children begotten on the material body of nature" (Blake 250), is presented as 
a Moses figure at the end of The Book of Urizen, calling together "The remaining 
children ofUrizen" and leading them away from "the pendulous earth" of their father­
god's making (Blake, Urizen IX[2] : 20-2 1). The Fuzon-led exodus is an artificial attempt 
to reclaim the immediacy Urizen forfeited on their behalf. The last line of Urizen 
indicates that the children ofUrizen, dismayed by their awareness of being "bound down 
I To earth by their narrowing perceptions" (Urizen IX: 46-47), are heading to "the salt 
ocean rolled englob'd," a kind of pre-repressive (pre-Urizenic) narcissistic fluidity that 
does not rely on ego-projection; 14 meaning, whereas the Urizenic world is one impelled 
by the individual ego, this pre-Urizenic world would be compelled by an immanent, 
collective ego. However, just as the Biblical Moses never emerges from his exodus into 
the Promised Land, Fuzon never accesses the pre-Urizenic world. Urizen has already 
made the differentiated and differentiating ego both the product of and condition for 
Fuzon's  (material) existence. Fuzon' s very awareness of being born into, and as a result 
of, the lack of immediacy depends on Fuzon' s own ego functioning as "the synthetic unit 
of apperception" (Horkheimer and Adorno 87) which apprehends and understands the 
very concept of difference. In other words, Fuzon apperceives the material world in 
terms of Otherness, and blames Urizen for the discomfort and feeling of "decentered­
ness" Otherness brings. 
In his distress, Fuzon seems to realize that the projecting ego "encounters in itself 
something 'more than itself,'  a strange body in its very center," or extimite (Zizek, Lacan 
1 4  I think it may be of interest here to add that Marcuse refers·to this pre-repressive narcissism as an 
"oceanic feeling" of connection "with oneness with the universe," or a "limitless narcissism" of undivisive, 
unmediated and wunediating selfhood (168-69, italics mine). 
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169), and like the casting of"light to 'Egypt, "' Fuzon attempts to reveal that which 
exceeds "the house of bondage and place of capitivity" formed by Urizen (Swinburne, 
Blake 253). Thus Fuzon separates Urizen from his desire, that excessive part of the 
Urizenic ego which is "more than itself," to try to make sense of difference. Swinburne's 
Fuzon seems to manipulate his awareness of an ego-weakness in Urizen caused by 
subjective differentiation. To Swinburne, The Book of Ahania demonstrates how the 
constant differentiation involved in the making of the Urizenic world, complicates the 
"creative myth" of Urizen-how "it grows, if not wilder in words, stil l  mistier in build of 
limb and shape of feature" (Swinburne, Blake 253). Moreover, Fuzon's death at the 
hands of Urizen, demonstrating the "barren pain of unprofitable fruit and timeless burden 
of desire" one can neither transcend nor fulfill (Blake 254), suggests a resignation to 
differentiated desire. 
Fuzon, then, is another image invoking the Urizenic catastrophe of meaning as 
well as the resultant problems of aesthetic abstraction. He is '.'in revolt against his father" 
as creator (Swinburne, Blake 252), seeking an autonomous existence in difference to the 
Urizenic ego as well as to limit the creator's power. "Typify[ing] dimly the . . .  
Promethean sacrifice" (Blake 253 ), Fuzon steals what the creator god has created for his 
own pleasure: Desire. When Urizen's desire, Ahania, is separated from him, "Dire 
shriek'd his invisible Lust / . . .  He groand anguishd [sic] & called her Sin" and "Then hid 
her in darkness in silence" (Blake, Ahania I: 30-35, 38) where any perception of 
materiality is impossible. There, Ahania/Desire becomes "Unseen, unbodied, unknown" 
(line 42): she is abstracted. As noted earlier, desire "cannot really have any object at all, 
if [such] desire is to remain what it is: the pure negativity of a subject who desires 
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himself in his objects"; this subject can only desire himself in objects "by perpetually 
negating himself in them, by negating them as what he is not-a 'given object' . . .  , a 
thing 'in-itselr" (Barch-Jacobsen 199, italics in original). Urizen knows Ahania is his 
"ex-timated" self, the "strange body" that is a projection of his own ego yet differentiated 
from that ego. As Swinburne describes her, Ahania represents "the divine"-meaning 
Urizen's-"desire . . .  , translated on earth into sexual expression; the female side of the 
creative power-mother of all things made" (Blake 255). As Urizen's desire-as-object 
given to him, she resembles Enitharmon, the female embodiment of"nature" given to the 
masculinized ego. Ahania does seem to serve as the "natural" woman "arous[ing] the 
primitive anger of the . . .  man who is required to revere her" (Horkheimer and Adorno 
1 1 1) as well �s a "precondition for self-preservation" (Marcuse 1 1 0) on Urizen' s part, for 
his reverence and sorrow for the separated Ahania 15 seemingly exhort him to kill Fuzon. 
But, tellingly, the words Urizen utters when making the kill reveal the murderous act as a 
performative fiat intended to affect ego-strength to counter the ego-weakness the 
separation caused : Urizen declares, "I am God. said he, eldest of things !" (Blake, Ahania 
II : 38). Declaring himself "God," Urizen projects an image of complete being-in­
himse/f-an evocation of that comprehensive narcissistic fluidity mentioned above. 16  
This declaration is of course a conscious artifice since Urizen, divided from Ahania, 
knows he i s  not a complete being. 
15 Following the agonizing separation, Urizen apprehends Ahania by "Kissing her and weeping over her' 
(Ahania I: 35). 1 6  In a more Hegelian sense, this comprehensive fluidity could be described as being which is beyond 
"abstract being, " or "precisely that simple fluid substance of pure movement within (the] self' (Hegel I 06-
07). 
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Urizen is distressed by his own ego-weakness, and he seeks to achieve an i l lusory 
unity of selfhood by eradicating Fuzon, the visible and thus opportune_ emblem of his 
subjective differentiation. However, the differentiation very evidently l ingers. Ahania 
remains invisible throughout the poem, signifying Urizen's inability to reconcile himself 
to the concept of being-for-an-other. 11 Swinburne observes that Ahania represents how 
"the love of God, as it were, parted from God, [is] impotent therefore and a shadow" 
(Blake 254). Urizen's love is very egocentric; he must see his love as a projection of his 
self meant only to further the egocentricity of his contemplation of"his" material world. 
Ahania is too much an estranged other, a "not-f' representing "the ' selr (the ' subject') of 
desire [who] is not identical to himself," who is now "something other'' (Borch-J acobsen 
90). Urizen can only conceive his relationship to his own desire in an "I/Other'' 
format. 18 Concomitantly, Ahania is pure being-for-an-other. As suggested by her 
lamentations at being unable to traverse the wide abyss separating her from Urizen and 
thus being unable to physically consummate her (his) desire (Ahania V: 54-7 1), Ahania 
has none of the aspirations of being-in-itself. 
All of this suggests that the radical decentering of subjectivity initiated by Fuzon 
creates a rapturous disunity in which the "dim and gre�t suggestions of something more 
than our analytic ingenuities can well unravel" can be detected (Swinburne, Blake 254). 
In the disharmony between Urizen and his desire, or what Zizek calls "the absolute 
negativity ofl = r� (Metastases 43), when the "f' is exactly the sacrifice, loss, 
expenditure of that which constitutes the "I." Those "suggestions of something more"-
17 A note on the psychoanalytic purpose for Ahania's invisibility: "Desire cannot even pose itself in front of 
itself in order to (re)cognize itself in another itself (another 'self-consciousness't (Borch-Jacobsen 91-92). 
18  As evidenced by chapter five of the poem, in which the speaking "I" is Urizen's Otherness, Ahania, very 
much differentiated from tl1e speaking "I" of Urizen who issues the perfonnative fiat in chapter two. 
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in other words, the images in Blake's poems that attempt to iconize that which cannot 
really be seen or comprehended-are the key to aesthetic negativity. The importance of 
Swinburne's reading of the Book of Ahania, then, is that, more than in his reading of 
Urizen, Swinburne distinguishes the possibilities for synaesthetic subjectivity, a "pouring 
out [of] a succession of images as analogues or facets of a single subject or perception" 
(McGann, Swinburne 73). 
The very excess of this "pouring-out" process which stains the "murmurs of 
revelation" (or "divine babble") rumbling at the boundaries of art's use of "earthly 
speech" points us right back to the issue of the ideogrammatic representations of the 
catastrophe of meaning and the limit experience. Swinburne felt he had to extend the 
aesthetic praxis evidenced in The/, between the exploration of the illimitable possibilities 
of the virtual subject and necessity of limiting the pre-eminence of the creating subject to 
avoid "ego-weakness," to include the necessity of subjectively exceeding the 
conventional boundaries of making and discerning meaning, 19 as evidenced in his 
readings of Urizen and Ahania. That brought him to settle on Blake's Jerusalem as the 
site for furthering such praxis. In the process, Swinburne again echoes his predecessors' 
unenthusiastic criticism of the Prophetic Books, only to use their disparagement in a 
negative way to imply high praise, saying, 
Of that terrible 'emanation,' hitherto the main cornerstone of offence to all 
students of Blake, what can be said within any decent limit? or where 
shall any traveller find a rest for feet or eyes in that noisy, misty land? It 
1 9 1rus, too, can be understood as a facet of the Adomian principle, initially presaged in Swinburne's 
reading of The/, of art establishing praxis because it is "the negation of practical life" (Theory 241 ). 
98 
were a mere frenzy of discipleship that would undertake by force of words 
to make straight these cro9ked ways or compel things incoherent to 
cohere. (Blake 280, emphases mine) 
What Swinburne finds most exciting about Jerusalem is that it exceeds all the "decent 
limits" of empirical experience as well as meaning-making a reader may typically bring 
to a text. 
Jerusalem affects the kind of limit experience instigated but not fully examined in 
Ahania: what Pierre Blanchot describes as "the desire of a man who is without desire, . . .  
pure absence wherein there is nevertheless fulfillment of being" (qtd. by Borch-Jacobsen, 
7). Whereas in Ahania we see the frustrated dissatisfaction of the subject separated from 
(and thus without) his desire, we do not see pure absence or fulfillment of being. Ahania 
is invisible but very much present in the poem, not an absence or a void, and the 
problematics of being prevent the realization of any kind of fulfillment of needs and 
desires in the Urizenic world. The problematics of being are also the problematics of the 
poetic language. Swinburne suggests that the very "force of words" that could render the 
"divine babble" of Blake's Jerusalem into the "earthly speech" that would compel a 
rational "understanding" of the poem's meaning would ultimately fail, as it would require 
"frenzy"-exceeding the limits of scholarship, interpretation, study. The "force of 
words" here, then, is the linguistic enforcement of the limit experience of frustrated 
being, frustrated desire. 
The frustrated desire represented by Urizen/ Ahania is amplified in Jerusalem 's 
"great qualities": 
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[Its] certain real if rough and Jax power of dramatic insight and invention 
shown even in the singular divisions of adverse symbol against symbol; in 
such allegories as that which opposes the 'human imagination in which all 
things exist' -do actually exist to all eternity-and the reflex fancy or 
. belief which men . . .  prefer to dwell in and ask comfort from. (Swinburne, 
Blake 290) 
The barrier between Urizen· and Ahania, "adverse symbol against symbo1," is the barrier 
of metaphoric language, or the mediating barrier(s) separating creation, perception, and 
interpretation. 20 It is particularly significant that Swinburne again evokes the Romantic 
distinction between imagination and fancy here. Fancy's fixed, limited character 
provides one with modes of interpretation (via an always-already mediated perception) 
that offer conclusive order and definite "meaning," that always appear to compel the 
incoherent to cohere. Furthermore, one may find comfort in the limits of"fixities and 
definites" that fancy offers. The imagination can provide a virtuaJ (rather than "real") 
way to surmount those limitations, but the surmounting has a very virtual quality to it, as 
it is all a conscious pretense; an open acknow1edgment that any transcendence of 
limitation the imagination offers is really an artificial transcendence is required here. 
And the recognition of transcendence-as-artifice might cause even more discomfort and 
dissatisfaction than the actual limits one feigns to transcend. 
The recognition of artifice qua artifice might also bring one too uncomfortably 
close to the catastrophe of meaning, and thus recognize all appearance as abstract. 
However, as Swinburne's/Blake' s dueling, divisive symbols propose, fancy cannot 
20 See Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies 35-36. 
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remain a safe haven from instability and abstraction. Fancy still functions as a cipher of 
that catastrophe. Even Coleridge noticed that fancy served as "a mode of Memory 
emancipated from the order of time and space" (5 16), or that trace-memory of"pre­
history'' of immediacy existing prior to the mediated material (or, in Blake's case, the 
Urizenic) world. Fancy and imagination, though differentiated, are both crucial to 
aesthetic insight and invention; in terms of Jerusalem, the tension between the utility of 
fancy and the initiative of the imagination is necessary in the construction of the "myth of 
this building of 'Golgonooza' (that is, we know, inspired art - by which salvation must 
come)" (Swinburne, Blake 287). 
Golgonooza is described in the last two plates21 of the fourth chapter of Jerusalem 
as a "great City'' in "the Shadowy Generation" (Blake, Jerusalem IV: 55); as Swinburne 
says, it is a "spiritual" -or immaterial-dream city "which is redemption and freedom 
for all" (Blake 287), "shadowy" as the trace memory of the pre-Urizenic existence is 
shadowy. In Blake's poem, this city harbors "Visionary forms" in "new Expanses, 
creating exemplars of Memory and of lntellect / Creating Space, Creating Time 
according to the wonders Divine / Of Human Imagination . . .  " (Jerusalem IV: 28-33). 
Swinburne compares this to "the latter chapters of Ezekiel, with their interminable 
inexplicable structures and plans" (Blake 288). Amid the inexplicable plans for "the new 
Jerusalem" given in the Old Testament Book of Ezekiel remains the promise of the 
restoration of Israel to unity with the glory of God. 22 Swinburne reads Jerusalem, 
though, not as an achievement of unity with the subjectively differentiated creator god, 
21 Plates 98 and 99 
22 See especially Ezekiel 28.24-26. 
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Urizen, but as the figurative site of"imaginative liberty" established on the margins of 
Urizen's creation; it is an emanation of the trace "of [the] unfallen days" of an 
undifferentiated world that haunts the Urizenic world, the revelation of"Tirzah" 
exceeding "the perverted incarnation" she takes when reason has been substituted for 
imaginative intuition (Blake 289-90). Furthermore, "the variation of Time & Space" vary 
"according as the Organs of Perception vary," and Golgonoozan subjectivity is described 
as "One Man reflecting each in each" (Jerusalem IV:· 38-40). Here, finally, Swinburne 
reaches the zenith of aesthetic synaesthesia and its counterpart, synaesthetic subjectivity. 
This is what lies· beyond "that 'mild heaven' of dreams and shadows where only the 
reflected image of [men's] own hopes and errors can abide" and the "dupl icity and 
division, perple�ity and restraint" (Swinburne, Blake 290, 282) of differentiated 
subjectivity. 
One of the most pressing question Swinburne must answer, though, is how these 
"Visionary forms" can actually be seen. Blake's constant reliance on the tropes of vision 
and visuality in Jerusalem forces Swinburne to confront again the complicated 
relationship between visuality and the act of perception, especially to consider that 
"[b ]etween retina and world is inserted"-ideologically-"a screen of signs, a screen 
consisting of all the multiple discourses on vision built into the social arena" (Bryson, 
"Gaze" 92, italics in original). We must read the passages of Jerusalem with "equal 
eyes," Swinburne says, to find them " 'full of wisdom and perfect in beauty'" (Blake 297), 
seemingly calling on the idea of stereoscopic vision. In "binocular parallax," the angle of 
each eye differs even when each focuses on the same point in space; thus vision is 
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established as "an operation of reconciJing disparity" (Crary, Techniques 1 19-20).23 
Moreover, nineteenth-century studies in optics suggested that the convergence or fusion 
of images viewed stereoscopically "might not actually be secure" (Techniques 120); to 
again quote from Jerusalem, "the Organs of Perception vary." 
In the case of Swinburne's reading of Blake, the instability of stereoscopic or 
binocular vision seems employed to find a way to differently employ this scree� which 
filters out or at least obscures that which exceeds such discourses and that which does not 
seem to fit conventions of and for comprehension (making "meaning"). 
This screen casts a shadow [ of death] . : . .  For when we look through the 
screen, what we see is caught up in a network that comes to us from the 
outside: mobile tesserae of signification, a mosaic that moves. This 
network is greater than its individual agents or operators. . . .  The screen 
mortifies sight. Its terms are points of signification, chains of signifiers, 
that of themselves have no light. The signifier operates on light and with 
light, but has no light of itself. . . .  The signifier casts its shadow of 
darkness acro�s my vision . . . .  (Bryson, "Gaze" 92) 
The fact that Golgonooza itself is described as the place of the "Shadowy Generation" 
might be cause for hesitation. If Go)gonooza is just another production of screened 
discourse, then it is just another "mild heaven" of dreams and shadows reflecting the 
mortifying (meaning the limited and limiting) chains of signifiers. However, if the 
"multiple discourses on vision" include anamorphotic discourses-as each eye "looks" at 
Golgonooza on a different axis, at a different angle-then it might be possible to "see" 
23 Binocular, or stereoscopic. vision was established by Charles Wheatstone in 1833. 
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what is obscured in the shadow of the almighty screen. However, Golgonooza's 
"shadowy" character could also indicate that it exists in some sort of netherspace in the 
shadow of darkness that falls across "enlightened" vision, and thus beyond the reach of 
rational, ideological "illumination." Golgonooza could be visuality beyond conventional 
vision. 
Blake' s declaration that the "Organs of Perception vary" in this unconventional 
visuality thus suggests to Swinburne a synaesthetic approach in which Swinburne finds 
the catalyst to pursue concepts of visualization beyond what the eye can see. He thus 
approximates the gaze-the attempt to imag(in)e visually that which the eye, or the 
conventional means of visualizing, renders invisible.24 Swinburne assumes an aesthetic 
position in which he presumes to take a "lateral perspective" (Zizek, Lacan 90), a 
completely virtual-meaning knowingly artificial, not transcendent-position in which 
he imagines he sees both sides of the screen: that which is seen through the screen but 
also, more importantly, that which the screen obfuscates or prevents from being "seen" 
altogether. That which the screen excludes is subject to the Swinburnian gaze, which 
employs all organs of perception to "produce ever new 'hidden meanings"' for that which 
exceeds "the ground of the established, familiar signification" (Zizek, Lacan 91). In the 
Poems and Ballads, Swinburne will put this aesthetic theorizing into practice by creating 
poetic embouchures, abyssal mouths which are also gaping eyes, which signify the gaze 
and its many possibilities. 
It is absolutely crucial to distinguish this as being different than the Romantics' 
quest to achieve a subjective "unmediated vision," to reclaim a "pure representation, a 
24 See Jay, Downcast Eyes 353. 
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vision unconditioned by the particularity of experience" (Hartman 1 55). The Romantic 
"unmediated vision" believes the screen can be thwarted or even obliterated. Swinburne 
has no such pretensions. The screen is very much present, very much a crucial 
component, in his schema of remediated vision. As indicated above, any myth of 
unmediated vision Swinburne may present is only used as artifice. In the Romantic-ironic 
style, Swinburne will utilize a myth of immediacy only to deconstruct it in his very use of 
it. Perception is always already mediated, and any claim to bypass the mediation is folly. 
However, if one actively remediates-that is, renegotiates-the mediating ideological 
boundaries, or the limits contained within the multiple discourses with which one 
contends in order to arrive at meaning and understanding, then the myths perpetually 
change. In other words, remediated vision is a procession of a flux of new fictions and 
new self-concepts that continually open new doors of perception by closing others. This 
is not quite a perpetual regression of perspective, mise-en-abyme style; if it were, this 
would merely be aesthetic redux, the reduplication of the same perceptive act, producing 
the same results, ad infinitum. Instead, i� Swinburne' s  remediated vision, the boundaries 
which place limits on perception are like a "repetitive but variegated surface, which is 
experienced in its expansiveness and its depth only through the work of the viewer's own 
dis-integrated or decentered but expanded subjectivity" (Nicholsen 134). 
The new conceptualization of selfhood Swinburne discovers in Jerusalem does 
not exactly stipulate the immanent, collective ego of the pre-Urizenic world, after all. 
Each individual seems irreparably "lapse[ d] . . .  into separate self-righteousness" 
(Swinburne, Blake 25 1 ). The individual subject remains a differentiated and 
differentiating ego, but each individual 's particularities have a share in the trace memory 
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of"the final vision of an [undifferentiated] eternity where the . . .  personal affections 
'born of shame and pride' will be destroyed or absorbed in resignation of individual 
office and quality" (Blake 284-85nl), as suggested in Blake's concept of"One Man 
reflecting each in each." Yet, remaining true to the principle that any universal can only 
be understood "in terms of its own meaning not lodged beyond the particular individuals 
who bear it" (Adorno, Theory 200, italics mine), Swinburne stubbornly clings to the 
utopian idea of a subjectivity beyond contradiction,25 and settles on Blake's 
hermaphrodite as the emblem of the universally particularized subject who both 
possesses and becomes a hieroglyph for remediating visual ity. In this impossible unity of 
self and other, Swinburne imagines a being united in its very violence of disunity. In a 
sense, this is the closest Swinburne can approximate a Urizen-who-is-and-yet-lacks­
Ahania. 
The hermaphrodite, traditionally representing sexless (undifferentiated) beauty,26 
here represents for Swinburne a kind of trace memory of collective subjectivity within 
subjective differentiation. In chapter four of Jerusalem, Blake says, " . . .  Man cannot 
unite with Man but by their Emanations / Which stand both Male & Fem ale at the Gates 
of each Humanity" (Plate 88, lines 10-1 1 ). Though the hermaphrodite traditionally 
represents the "duplicity and division, perplexity and restraint" of the heterosexual 
relationship with feigns the fulfillment of being it cannot bring about, to Swinburne the 
hermaphrodite advocates the amalgamation and annihilation (Blake 282) of the problems 
of ego differentiation. The divided and inconsistent self becomes the site for a liberating 
25 See Adorno, Negative Dialectics 146. 
26 Richard Dellamora discusses the aesthetic tradition of hennaphroditism and how that tradition relates to 
the works of Swinburne and Pater in Masculine Desire; see pp. 67-69. 
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"play impulse." This figure also represents how the imagination professes the 
paradoxical power of its powerlessness to escape the reality in which it is positioned. It 
diwlges how the imagination's fantasy of transcendence is grounded and inhibited by 
material reality while striking an uneasy ambivalence between fantasy and reality, 
providing moments which gesture toward le trait unaire, or what Zizek explains is the 
"differential feature that cannot be pinned to" a point of definite, delineated "symbolic 
identification" (Lacan 75). In sum, the hermaphroditic emblem suggests the 
imagination's pivotal role in establishing a kind of subjective differentiation which works 
around ego-weakness. Moreover, as the next chapter will further illustrate, this emblem 
also suggests an artificial bridging of"the gulf between words and images to be as wide" 
as that division between language's conventional usages and its aesthetic functions 
(Mitchell, Jconology 43), as Swinburne's Poems and Ballads put into practice-and 
praxis-the complicated tension between visual images that pretend not to signify any 
real thing and yet signify what is supposedly unsignifiable in symbols that declare their 
artificiality but teem with diffuse and potential representative meanings. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Influences on Swinburne's Poems and Ballads: 
Rossetti, Baroque Mirrors, and the Semblance of Truth 
"We know that once we are consci�s of it, we have to react to the desire ingrained in us 
to overstep the limits. "-Georges Bataille 
"The artist 's imagination scarcely ever completely encompassed what it brought 
forth. "---:-Theodor Adorno 
Swinburne's most infamous collection, the Poems and Ballads, First Series of 
1 866, was met with a public uproar that Swinburne, despite his claims not to have 
anticipated such a reaction, eagerly perpetuated . The initial reviews of the volume, all 
negative, appeared on August 4th of that year in The Athenaeum and The London Review, 
but Swinburne was particularly upset by the review appearing in the Saturday Review, the 
review which was arguably the most brutal of all . 
The story of Swinburne's  reaction to this review has become almost legendary. 
Swinburne, while walking around London with publisher James Bertrand Payne of 
Moxon and Company, purchased a copy of the Saturday Review and immediately began 
reading the article. Swinburne had been expecting the Saturday Review 's appraisal of his 
poetry to be more positive than the others, given that the journal had commissioned one 
of Swinburne' s friends from Oxford, John Morley, to write it. Morley, as the editor of 
the Fortnightly Review, previously had been quite receptive to Swinburne and his work. 
However, Morley developed his vehement aversion to the subject matter and style of 
Swinburne' s Poems and Ballads into an attack on Swinburne's character. Swinburne's 
immediate reaction to the harsh criticism was to perform a "torrent of vituperation" 
(Rooksby, Life 1 36), a litany of obscenities and "scatological abuse" so intense that 
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Payne, embarrassed by his client's very public tantrum, begged Swinburne at least to 
scream his obscenities in French so other people would mistake him for an "eccentric 
foreigner" (Henderson 12 1). 
In "Mr Swinburne's New Poems," Morley lambasts Swinburne for being an 
indecent and undignified person whose very "position makes it impossible for him to [be] 
receive[ d] with anything but laughter and contempt"; moreover, he suggests that 
Swinburne is so incapable of adhering to the "social duty" of decency that it is "no use, 
therefore, to scold Mr Swinburne for grovell ing down among the nameless shameless 
abominations which inspire him with such frenzied delight.'' Morley also proclaimed 
that the material in the Poems and Ballads was so prurient that even "a professional 
vendor of filthy prints might blush to sell" it . 1 Morley's rancorous reaction to 
Swinburne's poetry suggests the very radical character of Swinburne's aesthetic, though. 
Like many of their contemporaries, Morley was discomfited by the prospect of 
Swinburne, precariously tiptoeing the margins of the already-marginalized traditions of 
the "fleshly" Pre-Raphaelites and French decadents, changing not only the way art is 
perceived but also how art can change, if not in some way reveal new "truths" about, the 
acts and modes of perception. Though Swinburne was enraged by the venomous tone of 
Morley's presentation, he was no doubt inherently pleased by Morley' s discomfort. 
Morley exhibited the discomfort which Swinburne wished his art to instigate, the 
discomfort caused by tensions between the "delight" found in "nameless shameless 
abominations" and the ossifying constructs of "social duty" that often suppress the realm 
of human creative possibility. 
1 Material quoted and discussed by Henderson (I 18-20) and Rooksby (Life 136-40). 
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In 1 856, Swinburne entered Balliol College at Oxford as an undergraduate, and he 
(at his parents' insistence) spent two summers doing additional study at neighboring 
Radley College as well . Swinburne' s  Oxford career was marked by numerous failures, 
inconsistencies, and disappointments. Swinburne failed his "Responsions" qualifying . . 
examination in 1 857 because he spent his time reading Browning's Sordello instead of 
the assigned texts, and then failed his 1858 examination in classics, thus earning two 
stern warnings from the Master and Dean for "neglecting his studies.'' He was often 
assigned to work under tutors such as Benjamin Jowett who discouraged and even 
denigrated his interest in poetry. This made Swinburne even more despondent upon . 
losing the Newdigate Prize for poetry to students he felt were his intellectual and poetic 
inferiors. His disgruntled landlady added to his trouble, lodging complaints with the 
Ball iol Master about Swinburne's late hours, "questionable" company, and "irregular" 
behavior.2 Finally, Swinburne left Oxford in 1 859, despite an apparent improvement in 
his academic progress.3 Reportedly, he was asked by the Balliol Master not to return to 
the college until he was ready to retake his classics examination. He returned in 1 860 to 
retake the exam, but this was probably done only to placate his mortified and angry 
parents; in the end, he failed to take a degree. Swinburne's real interest in Oxford had 
never been in his tutors or his coursework but in the surrounding intellectual scene, and, 
for Swinburne, the scene lost its appeal when Dante Gabriel Rossetti left Oxford in late 
1 858. 
2 See Gosse 63-64. 
3 The reason for Swinburne's sudden departure is still somewhat a matter of conjecture. Following his 
careful examination of the Swinburne family correspondence, Rooksby suggests that Benjamin Jowett, 
Swinburne's Greek tutor, convinced Swinburne's father that a leave of absence was the only way to prevent 
Swinburne from having another clash with the Master and Dean ofBalliol and thus preserve Swinburne's 
last chance to earn a degree (Life 59). 
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It is not surprising that Swinburne,s academic breakdown coincides with �he 1857 
commencement of the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood's "Jovial Campaig��, 4 in Oxford. 
Rossetti and his friends Edward Burne-Jones (then simply "Jones") and William Morris 
were hired to paint pseudo-medieval murals on the walls of the new Oxford Union 
building. Swinburne had been intrigued by the works of Jones, Morris, and Rossetti, 
works in which these artists proclaimed their "Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood" as 
championing a new aesthetic movement. Swinburne was fascinated by the 
"sensuousness, . . .  symbolism, [ and] mystery" which marked the Pre-Raphaelite effort 
and "by a quality often cruel and melancholy in its pictures, poems and tales" (Doughty 
232). In Rossetti's redefinition of aesthetic criteria, Swinburne found an articulated 
defense of his own, often maligned, literary interests. And, in Rossetti, Swinburne found 
a literary mentor who inspired him to explore the immanent possibilities for human 
satisfaction latent in the material realm, to privilege the artist's subjectivity over the 
disinterested critique of the aesthetic object, and, ultimately, to create the "Lady of Pain" 
as the site of an emerging creative and aesthetic power. 
By invoking what McGann calls a "debased" or a "contaminated Romanticism . . .  
in which the poet comes to resemble Tennyson's Ulysses, who became a part of all that 
he had met" (Game 44-45), Rossetti undertook an exploration of the uncertainties of the 
artistic imagination and its relative powerlessness to unify self and other, flesh and spirit, 
the subject and the art-object. His creative work demonstrates that he was both dedicated 
to and disi l lusioned by the Enlightenment narrative of the universal, prolific, ideal self 
capable of overcoming all obstacles, transforming the objective world by means of 
4 This was Rossetti's own name for the time he spent painting the Oxford Union murals (Doughty 224). 
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subjective revelation. He retains the Romantic notion that the "compulsion" driving the 
individual artist to create art "lies in the disproportion between [human] desires, or 
[human] ideals, and the world of reality" (Abrams 1 39), but with the realization that the 
individual artist cannot create proportion or bring about balance between human desire­
the individual ' s  self-conscious aspiration to fill the lack or void preventing him/her from 
experiencing full knowledge/recognition of him/herself as well as accessing the full 
meaning �fthe symbols of the discourse which situates the subject5- and the reality of 
the material world. 
Furthermore, Rossetti appears to realize that, if it is the individual ' s  exploration of 
the disproportion between desire and reality that serves as the inspir�tion for art, that 
disproportion must necessarily be maintained. Rossetti converts this narrative of 
constantly exploring this disproportion into the narrative of the process of self­
recognition; for, as one's desire leads him or her perpetually to propose grandiose 
schemes of fulfill ing desire in reality, schemes in which the subject would no longer 
account for her/his existence by (mis)recognizing her/his "self' in an other, but see 
her/himself as who s/he really is; however, if these schemes were to work, the process of 
(mis)recognition would cease altogether, and the subject would fall into stasis, 
"becom[ing] one with the assumption of his desire (Zizek, Lacan 1 3 1 ;  Barch-Jacobsen 
85). Thus, these schemes necessarily fail because "desire' s raison d'etre . . .  is not to 
5 Here I have applied several definitions of "human desire." As Borch-Jacobsen explains, the articulation 
of desire "means that it is spoken in the language (the marginal symbol) of the dr� the symptom. or the 
'individual myth.' but without being recognized in that language in the form of full and authentic symbolic 
speech"; moreover, he reiterates the Sartrean idea that desire "bears witness to the existence of lack in the 
being of human reality" ( 153, 200, italics his). Zizek discusses the lack which "the symbolic edifice" 
offered in the symbolic network of discourse "attempts in vain to repair" (Lacan 32). And Lacan himself 
points out that, in discourse, "(t)he subject is presented as other than he is, and what one shows him is not 
what he wishes to see" (Concepts 104). 
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realize its goal" of fulfillment, "to find full satisfaction, but to reproduce itself' (Zizek, 
Plague 39). One is then led to recuperate his/her sense of "self' amid that failure to 
fulfill desire just as perpetually. 
This requires Rossetti 's romanticized subject to re-establish his/her subject 
position continually in order to buffer his/her "poetic and spiritual" -or, for "spiritual" I 
would substitute psycho/ogical-"insecurity" (Honnighausen 1 50). This insecurity 
emerges because the subject's acts of self-recognition are misrecognitions 
(meconnaissances) or misconstructions of seltbood iri which the subject (self) rather 
reductively exists only in the context of the unfulfillable fantasy. When the fantasy fails, 
the context for seltbood dissipates, causing the subject to disperse, or vanish (Lacan, 
Concepts 83). For Rossetti and subsequently Swinburne, as with Tennyson' s Ulysses, 
every failure to articulate self-recognition becomes an opportunity to try a different mode 
of articulation, "an arch wherethro"' to reach that "untravell'd world whose margin fades 
I For ever and for ever" ("Ulysses" 19-2 1 )-the as-yet "untravel I 'd" space in which the 
self could potentially articulate recognition of itself, in its relation to both fantasy and 
reality. 
Rossetti channels this continual compulsion to articulate and recognize the self 
into a serious attempt to reconstruct or restore "the original point of vision" from which 
one can envision his/her own seltbood (Concepts 81 -82) as well as to secure a more 
articulable subject position by altering the conventions of the fantasy providing its 
context. Rossetti believed that the repeated attempts to breach the margin separating 
desire and satisfaction, fantasy and reality, would find their eventual end in success, 
insofar as he believed his art could reveal the margin to be just "an illusionist projection" 
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(McGann, Game 102). Swinburne, though, is more interested in exploring the 
compulsion, per se, thus rendering the compulsion similar to drive, "the domain of the 
closed circular palpitation which finds satisfaction in endlessly repeating the same failed 
gesture," a domain located "beyond the fantasy which sustains desire" (Zizek, Plague 
30). More specifically, Swinburne is interested in how the selfs failure to recognize 
itself as a manifestation of drive corresponds to the structure of drive itself, as drive 
"attain[s] its satisfaction without attaining its aim" (Lacan, Concepts 203, 179). The 
Swinburnian self is constituted by a radical drama of self-dispersal, in that the 
Swinburnian self is compelled to enact repeatedly-and the self finds satisfaction in-the 
failure to recognize itself. In other words, it constantly aims for self-recognition, but it 
accepts and revels in the perpetual failure of desire, thus allowing Swinburne to find 
pleasure in the perseveration of the drive. 
I believe Swinburne gleaned this idea in part through his careful study of 
Rossetti's works. Swinburne seems to have recognized what Jerome McGann does later, 
that Rossetti's poetic "self' is so "immersed in its turning and shiftings" that, even in the 
"[p]oems that seem evidently intimate and personal," the constructions of"self' "are 
almost invariably haunted by other possible voicings" (Game 147). Rossetti's "self' 
continually misrecognizes itself, and the "voices" of other possible misrecognitions, not 
yet revealed, haunt him. Rossetti, though, wanted to establish within the self a notable 
locus or matrix where all the "the great discourses of desire: dream, nightmare, art, 
poetry" (McGann, Game 1 55) could meet, and thus merge. In this way, he could position 
the self, meaning how he rendered himself in his art, as gatekeeper of the "untravell'd 
world" of unified signifier and signified, or art before the catastrophe of meaning. 
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Rossetti feels the inability to represent meaning with precision as a great loss; therefore, 
Rossetti explores the discourses of desire, searching for satisfaction through the constant 
construction of fantasies that are actually always what Zizek would identify as "the 
narrative[s] of this primordial loss" (Plague 32). 
In Lacanian/Zizekian terms, then, one could say that, whereas Swinburne shows 
interest in the complex interplay between desire and drive sited in/by the subject, Rossetti 
is more interested in how the subject expresses and contends with desire, not drive. 
Rossetti 's artistic subjects, both the representations of"himself' and his other poetic 
personae, oppose what Zizek calls "the radical closure" of the drive, "the eternal return of 
the same" failure (Plague 3 1  ). The "desiring subject" opposes this closed circular 
structure with its "finitude [and] temporality" (Plague 3 1). In the case of Rossetti, the 
"desiring subjects" featured in much of his poetry are fixated on the physical body as the 
ultimate representation of human temporality and, especially in his later work, he 
demonstrates an obsession with death. One could even say that Rossetti continually falls 
under the spell of what Zizek calls the "false opening," or the construction within fantasy 
of an ostensible way to circumvent the radical closure of the drive, whereas Swinburne 
entertains no such illusions, entertaining the "false opening" of drive only as a reminder 
that such circumvention is "precluded by the very fundamental structure" of the 
drive/desire interplay (Plague 29). 
Even though Rossetti' s  work, featuring desiring subjects such as the famous 
"Blessed Damozel," explores the ideas of life after death and the existence of the eternal 
soul, Rossetti's afterlives are such "false openings," notoriously effecting the limitations 
of life on earth. For example, Rossetti's Damozel "leaned out / from the gold bar of 
Heaven" to look upon life on earth and "her bosom . . .  made / The bar she leaned on 
warm". (1-2, 45-46). Furthermore, she lies 
across the flood 
Of ether, as a bridge. 
[ And] Beneath, the tides of day and night 
With flame and darkness ridge 
The void . . . .  (3 1-35) 
1 1 5 
Fundamentally distinct from the "the souls mounting up to God" which "[go] by her like 
thin flames" (lines 41 -42), she represents the finitude of the material world. Clinging to 
physical form, she also clings to the fantasy of fulfill ing her desire in physical sexuality�6 
this fantasy serves "as the very screen that separates desire from drive" allowing the 
Damozel "to (mis)perceive the void"-that loss or /ack-"around which drive circulates" 
(Zizek, Plague 32). Swinburne, on the other hand, presents "The Leper'' in contrast to 
Rossetti 's "Blessed Damozel ." Like Rossetti, Swinburne renders a sexual relationship 
between one dead lover and one still living. However, there is a sense of an almost blind 
perseveration present in Swinburne' s desiring subject (the narrator) that is not articulated 
in the Damozel. Not only does Swinburne' s narrator continue his relationship with the 
corpse of the woman who detested him whifo she was alive, thus eschewing Rossetti 's 
notion of a transcendent sexuality, but he also notes it has been "Six months, and I sit still 
and hold / In two cold palms her cold two feet" ("Leper'' 102-03). Rather than fulfill ing 
him, this "Love bites and stings [him] through" (line 105). 
6 In Rossetti 's poem, the Damozel beckons her lover to join her in heaven for a sexual tryst. 
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Arguably, Swinburne's narrator does not "(mis)perceive the void"- the loss, the 
lack- in the same way Rossetti 's Damozel does. Instead, Swinburne's narrator 
articulates how this repetitive necrophi1ia fails to fulfill that lack: 
. . .  surely I would fain have done 
All things the best I could. Perchance 
Because I/ailed, came short of one, 
She kept at heart that other man's. ( 132-36, emphasis added) 
Swinburne's narrator repeats the act, knowing that it ultimately fails to fulfill him, and 
also knowing that his desire will never be recognized by his lover-in part because she is 
a corpse (thus unable to recognize anyone or anything) and in part because she, in life, 
had focused on her desire for a previous lover. 
Here desire is the effect of the conjunction between the compulsion of drive and 
what Lacan calls "sexual reality," or the social structure which emerges because 
"[e]xistence . . .  rests upon copulation" (Concepts 1 50). Thus it "is more or less bound up 
with the finality of reproduction," manifesting itself as the "effective presence" of the 
libido (Concepts 153). The libido, for Lacan .and, I �ould argue, for Rossetti and 
Swinburne, is not merely the compelling sexual instinct. It functions as a component of 
the ego which makes the subject "the representative of reality's demands"; the subject 
who looks for another to fulfill the lack attempts such fulfillment within a sexual 
relationship in which one finds "an 'object' of love" and becomes "an 'object' of love" 
for another subject (Barch-Jacobsen 28-29). However, Lacan also points out that "desire 
is neither the appetite for satisfaction n'?r the demand for love, but the difference that 
results from the subtraction of the first from the second" (Ecrits 287). 
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In the libidinal economy situated in and by both Swinburne' s and Rossetti' s  
subjects, the object of the subject's "love"-the "object-cause of [his or  her] desire" 
(Zizek, Lacan 4)-- is not truly, completely attainable. The demand to be loved 
(recognized) by the other is never met, and both subjects demonstrate an awareness that 
they merely "encircle" the possibilities of satisfaction, knowing it will "elude [their] 
grasp no matter what [they] do to attain it" (Lacan 4). However, Rossetti ' s  Damozel still 
attempts to find satisfaction in the fantasy "conceived as a scenario that realizes [her] 
desire" intended to satiate desire, rather than "reproduc[ e] it as such" (Lacan 6-7), 
whereas Swinburne's  leper finds a perseverant satisfaction knowing that his necrophiliac 
scenario manifests and reproduces his desire without satiating it. Because Swinburne 
explores the interplay between the failure of drive and the perpetuation of desire in his 
Poems and Ballads, he strays from Rossetti ' s  conviction that one must retain hope that 
desire will not always fail to be satisfied despite art's perpetuation of the "vain desire" 
and "vain regret" which fails to "assuage the unforgotten pain / And teach the 
unforgetful to forget."7 However, haunted by Rossetti 's hopeful belief in fulfillment, 
Swinburne wrestles with the failure of desire, not by hoping to find an immanent 
resolution within the perpetual and perpetuating structures of fantasy, but by 
renegotiating within art the very understanding of and possibilities for human satisfaction 
itself. 
Swinburne admired what other critics detested about Rossetti ' s  painting and 
poetry: its emblematic excesses, especially as they relate to the excessive "fleshliness" of 
Rossetti ' s  erotic imagery. Whereas their contemporaries, such as Robert Buchanan, 
7 Dante Gabriel Rossetti, "The One Hope." sonnet 101 from The House of Life, lines 1 -4 and 13-14. 
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spumed Rossetti's aesthetic for asserting the primacy of aesthetic aff ectiveness over the 
"meaning" of the individual artwork, Swinburne embraced Rossetti's attempt to privilege 
aesthetic affect as a means of exposing the very indeterminacy of all processes of 
producing/deducing meaning. Buchanan's claim that Rossetti's poetry eschews the 
"clear, simple, natural, and beautiful" significations of"[t]he soul's speech and the 
heart's speech," and instead draws more attention to its own textual, or linguistic, 
"meretricious tricks" (895) uncannily resembles the criticism of Blake that Swin�ume 
found iniquitous. Blake stood accused of creating "insipid" and "absurd" art which 
reinforced the "utter impossibility of representing Spirit to the eye" instead of 
surmounting it; Rossetti was subject to similar accusations. To Swinburne, at least 
during the time the majority of the Poems and Ballads were composed ( or at least heavily 
revised from earlier manuscripts), Rossetti was the next "Blake," the Eternal Artist 
revaluating a debased or contaminated Romanticism, focusing not on Romanticism's 
achievements but on its failures-that which exceeded the Romantics' grasp, so to speak. 
Swinburne admired the "clear sheer power and weight of plain passion clothed 
with such luxury of colour and splendour of sound" of Rossetti's art (Letters 2: 64).8 He 
even compared Rossetti to Shelley, proclaiming that some of Rossetti's poems should 
supercede Shelley's. Swinburne's overzealous comparison is, of course, the result of his 
eager and sometimes blind devotion to Rossetti during this period. Nevertheless, it 
reveals Swinburne's awareness of the shift from, and the resulting "affinities and 
differences" between, Romanticism and the "late romantic symbolism" employed by the 
Victorians. Rossetti's Pre-Raphaelite symbolism u_shers in "a new and striking self-
8 Swinburne, letter to Dante Gabriel Rossetti, 7 Dec. 1869. 
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consciousness, colouring both inte11ect and sensibility, and, as a result . . .  a complete 
reorientation of its literary theory, forms and motifs" (Hennighausen 5). As Lothar 
Hennighausen observes, "late romantic symbolism" like Rossetti 's moves away from the 
Romantic notion of creating "a direct experience of nature" in favor of exploring the 
mediated quality of that experience, making the experience itself "secondary to its 
symbolic implications" ( 40). 
In the exploration of the mediation of experience, then, Rossetti strives to indicate 
that which exceeds direct experience, or immediacy, itself. In this contemplative 
deliberation and celebration of excess, Rossetti provides Swinburne a template for 
reorienting the development of post-Romantic art, revitalizing traditional forms and 
motifs with innovative possibilities. Shelley "conceives aesthetic experience as a formal 
process that produces-in the mind's engagement with the dynamics, textures, and 
resistances of art-critical thinking itself as a form of truth" (Kaufman, "Legislators" 
709). As Robert Kaufman has argued, Shelley strives to "hol[ d] emancipatory gesture 
and formal constraint together'' ("Legislators" 7 10) by focusing on the relationship of the 
imagination to the "materials, instruments and conditions of art . . .  which limit and 
interpose between conception and expression" (Shelley 483). Rossetti, on the other hand, 
conceives aesthetic experience as an engagement with formal processes in a way that 
draws attention to what those pro�esses exclude, acknowledging the excluded "excess" as 
a pivotal component in critical thinking. For instance, as McGann has noted, Rossetti ' s  
painting demonstrates a purposeful "erosion" of the typical way artists arrange 
perspective (Game 67); likewise, I would say Rossetti, in his poems, uses language in a 
way which purposefully erodes the readers' expectations of what such language usua1ly 
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"means" in the given context. He reminds the reader that what the imagination conceives 
is always more than what the language can express. So, while Shel ley in the "Defence" 
calculates a precarious dialectic between formal limitations and imaginative freedom to 
create a conceptual space for the aesthetic, 9 Rossetti is more interested in gesturing 
toward that which cannot be calculated at all, or what exceeds any kind of aesthetic 
equation or formula. As Rossetti articulates in "Hand and Soul," one should consider the 
trope or symbol in an artwork as something that the artist has imaginatively "seen," but 
paradoxically also recognize that "it [is] not a thing to be seen by men" ( 56). The artist 
imaginatively sees what exceeds sight. 
In both his paintings and his poems, the excesses ofRossetti 's visual imagery are 
gestures toward the excesses of symbolization. In other words, Rossetti relies on the 
production of verbal and visual excess in his art to convey his awareness that the artist's 
symbol, or image, can never adequately represent the multiplicities of that which s/he 
intended to signify. He hopes such excess wil l intrude upon the symbol as it is presented, 
thus forcing the reader/viewer to consider the symbol as a virtual aggregate of all possible 
but otherwise unrepresentable meanings concentrated into one "spot," to find the facet of 
the symbol which suggests that it has a "mysterious detail that 'sticks out, ' that does not 
[otherwise] 'fit' into the symbolic network" (Zizek, Lacan 1 1 6). Thus Rossetti uses the 
formal processes of aesthetic representation to stage a breakdown of those processes by 
the very vulnerabi lities in his language-the network of symbolic representation 
available to him. 
9 Most compelling is Kaufman's suggestion that, in his attempt to create a liberating dialectical relationship 
between enlightenment reason and poetic/aesthetic "sympathy," Shelley must employ "calculative 
restriction" so that art can '"enlarg(e] the circumference' of calculation's opposite nwnber, the 
imagination" C'Legislators" 723). 
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. The paradox lies in the fact that the unrepresentable is not, and by definition 
cannot be, a product of human intention, since it is specifically what resists being 
incorporated into symbolic representation. Rossetti did not claim to have found a way to_ 
overcome the paradox and to incorporate the otherwise incorporable into symbolism; 
rather, his project was dedicated to pushing the limits of this paradox. He intended to 
acknowledge the existence of the incorporable by creating visual and verbal excess, 
though he also seems to have recognized the limits of his intent. McGann notes that 
Rossetti 's pictures provide "recurrent moments of perspective that play alongside 
moments that develop contradictory perspectives" -or glances aside-as well as 
"moments that refuse perspective altogether" (Game 1 1 1). In those moments that refuse 
perspective, Rossetti gestures at the limits of aesthetic representation as a way of 
gesturing toward the otherwise unrepresentable. In the end, Rossetti 's intentional 
excesses do not capture the unrepresentable, but they bring the acknowledgment of the 
unr�presentable into play within the process of creating and viewing/reading art. His 
excesses, moreover, are not intended to "fit" into the accepted, or acceptable, symbolic 
network of the artistic conventions of his milieu. Rossetti 's aesthetic works in reaction 
against these conventions, to demonstrate defiantly that art strives to contend with that 
which does not "fit" within the limitations set through the expectations set by convention 
and to exceed both these expectations and the limitations of"acceptable" symbol ism. 
To create this reactionary aesthetic, Rossetti utilized nostalgic treatments of the 
themes, tropes, and conventions of medieval, Renaissance, and baroque art, exploiting the 
tensions between past and present, retrospective utopian fantasy and the dissatisfactions 
of contemporary reality, seeing with the imagination and seeing with the vegetative eye. 
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Swinburne was particularly fascinated by how Rossetti figured all these binaries into one 
overarching, multi-faceted symbol which displaces, rather than erases, the schisms 
between body and soul, physical love and emotional love. Rossetti focuses his painting 
and poetry on a woman, the Beloved, in whom all binary tensions gravitate. Very much 
like the medieval love poetry of his idol and predecessor, Dante Aligheiri, Rossetti 's  
work does not seek to "define and instantiate" the Beloved but use the Beloved as the 
virtual site or center for the "presence and action" (McGann, Game 55) of his aesthetic. 
The Beloved is 
the apparition of Woman, of the woman who could flit out the lack in 
man, the ideal partner with whom the sexual relationship would finally be 
possible, in short, The Woman who, according to Lacanian theory, 
precisely does not exist. The nonexistence of this woman i s  rendered 
manifest to [the artist] by the absence of her inscription in the 
sociosymbolic network: the intersubjective community . . .  acts as if she 
does not exist, as if she were only his idee .fixe. (Zizek, Lacan 80) 
The Beloved does not exist in and of herself, because Rossetti presents her as male 
fantasy, or, as Zizek phrases it, "only as she appears or is mirrored in male discourse" 
(Metastases 105) situated by the male subjects/narrators in his poetry. Many of the 
women who play the role of Beloved in Rossetti' s  canon blatantly do not exist, in the 
most literal sense, because they are either deceased (the Damozel, the "dead ladies" of his 
translation of Villon, the first beloved featured in "The House of Life" sequence) or 
mythical figures (Lilith, Proserpine, Pandora). Rossetti has his male subjects/speakers 
(re)create these women in attempts to fulfill lack that really cannot be fulfilled. As 
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fantasies invented to fit into his male subjects' "'private' formula[s] for the sexual 
relationship"-inasmuch as "for a man, the relationship with a woman is [thought] 
possible only inasmuch as she fits his formula" (Zizek, Plague 7)-these supernatural or 
mythic women end up reinforcing the relationship's utter impossibil ity, consequently 
sustaining the male subjects' desire. Even the non-mythic, "Jiving" women in Rossetti 's 
poetry have almost as untenable an existence. They are depicted as prostitutes like his 
famous "Jenny," who projects an image that exists only for the male gaze, and who 
approaches the sexual transaction as the kind of"asymmetrical non-relationship" in 
which, Zizek notes, the woman remains nothing but an object, an "inhuman partner" 
whose subjectivity is a non-issue (Metastases 108-09). Or, the women are presented as 
remote figures steeped in superstition or narratives of the distant past, l ike "Sister Helen," 
a witch who seems as much as an object of curiosity as her wax fetish, and Aloyse of 
"The Bride's  Prelude," who seems more like a stock character in a cliche morality tale 
than a "real" woman. Because the Beloved 's very "existence" is always so dubious, she 
is unable to establish a determined identity for herself: there are never clear moments in 
which "she realizes she is just a passive element in the interplay of libidinal forces," so 
she is not established as a "subject" (Zizek, Lacan 64). "Deprived of every real 
substance," she "functions as a mirror on to which the [male] subject projects his 
narcissistic ideal" (Zizek, Metastases 90), but what/who is being reflected by the 
Beloved? One cannot be sure if the Beloved demonstrates the male subject's  "ego ideal," 
qualities/possibil ities he wants to possess, or if she demonstrates the subject's "ego that 
regards itself as the ideal," qualities/possibil ities the subject already has or thinks he has 
attained (Lacan, Concepts 61 ). The slippery slopes of identity here represent the same 
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kinds of important slippages between the other binary relationships Rossetti surveys in 
his work. 
As Jerome McGann notes, "Identities, as well as the names and words that signify 
them, are fluid, dynamic markers of the presence of [the] action" of revaluating 
interpretative process in Rossetti ' s. aesthetic (Game 55). Moreover, this aesthetic is 
"pursued through a series of intense moments" (Game 57), moments that are always 
subject to change; meaning that a new, constellative relationship between seemingly 
binary or opposing elements is (re)forged in every successive moment of intensity. The 
Beloved is portrayed as both what she is and is not: dead and alive, absent and present, a 
real woman and a fictional character, a historical figure and a contemporary. 1° Carole 
Silver points out that this entails a "dream logic" that allows "a single image [to] 
. symbolize numerous wishes, impulses, attitudes, and persons," "that one face may 
represent those of many people," as well as allows one to see him/herself "as double or 
multiple" (1 1 ). Thus the perspective of the subject-both the viewing/reading subject 
and the artist-as-subject-is the catalyst for this aesthetic multiplicity. In sum, the 
Beloved is not so much a sign of imaginative unity but of the imagination renegotiating 
the old aesthetic, philosophic, and critical tensions. 
Martin Danahay, in "Mirrors of Masculine Desire," claims that Rossetti 's art 
precipitates Rossetti 's "search for his own identity . . .  through the realization of 
1 ° For example, Rossetti painted the likeness of his wife long after her dea� and he painted the likeness of 
Jane Burden Morris repeatedly, not only during their absences from one another but also after their affair 
· had soured. Though his lovers served as models, the painted female figures are depicted as versions of the 
"non-existent" Beloved- mythic goddesses, epic heroines, literary figures. Consequently, the paintings 
were never intended, nor do they function, as portraits, per se. For a more detailed account, see McGann, 
Dante Gabriel Rossetti and the Game That Must Be Lost, especially Chapter 6, "Venus Surrounded by 
Mirrors." 
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di.fferance, the sudden knowledge that what Rossetti would l ike to designate as an 'I' that 
is present to itself can only be represented through artificial secondary media, such as 
mirrors, texts, and paintings" (38). Yet Dahanay's argument, though astute and useful, 
needs to be amended, especially when Swinburne's evaluation of Rossetti 's treatment of 
"identity" is considered. Danahay seems to suggest that Rossetti has a somewhat stable 
concept of his own identity, or ego, which is perpetually reinforced by his aestheticized 
relationship of otherness to the Beloved. The critical legacy of reading Rossetti 's poetry 
as autobiography and viewing his paintings 1ike snapshots in a family album often tricks 
us into reading the historical "Rossetti" into the speakers of his poems. As Adorno 
reminds us, every artist gives his/her artwork "shape from out of him [or her]self'; 
nevertheless, "art is no replica of the subject" (Theory 41), nor is art a statement 
conferring identity. The reciprocity of subject and art object "cannot be that of identity" 
(Theory 1 66). Instead, the artist creates a "latent f' which is a self which only "speaks . . .  
through the [art]work . . .  through the action of the work's language" (Theory 1 67), a self 
which appears as an imaginary reconstruction of how the self is seen by an other; and, as 
the work's language has been rendered vulnerable, the "I" rendered through such 
language becomes a virtual site yielding multiple possibilities for viewing/reading 
subjects to explore relationships between subjects and aesthetic objects. 
More specifically, the "latent I" is a site where one can explore the paradox of 
desire, its requisite meconnaissances and the compulsory failures of self-identification in 
art. The "latent I" is part of the paradox of desire. The subject not only fails to identify 
(recognize) him/herself in the art object, consequently not fulfilling his/her constitutive 
lack of self-identification; the subject is also driven to seek and to represent him/herself 
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in an "endless sliding" of one signifier after another, all the while "get[ting] hooked on a 
particular object which thereby starts to function as the object-cause of his [or her] 
desire" (Zizek, Plague 8 1  ). "[I]nfinite desire"-especially in the form of self-dispersal it 
takes here-must "focus on a finite object" because the object must become the locus of 
the signifying chain that "governs whatever may be made present of the subject" (Plague 
8 1 ;  Lacan, Concepts 203). The object in this case, the Beloved, functions to "give body" 
to the subject's lack (Plague 8 1  ), place-holding the Jack she gives the illusion of being 
able to fulfi11. In this way, the Beloved is a "specular image" of lack, she cannot be 
"anything but a decay," or dispersal, of the process of identification (Barch-Jacobsen 96). 
As a "specular image," she "gives body to the gaze" (Lacan, Concepts 84)-the gaze 
being the mechanism which configures one' s perception, or how one "sees" not only his 
surroundings but his or her self. 
Nevertheless, to distinguish the Beloved, as Danahay does, as purely the site of a 
specular relationship between the gaze and human desire is to oversimplify the operation 
of the gaze and its compound manipulations. Notwithstanding its specular attributes, the 
gaze, as it is deliberated in Rossetti ' s  works, is the medium by which self-consciousness 
is established; like Sartre after them, Rossetti and consequently Swinburne reaffirm the 
Hegelian idea that "self-consciousness is real only as long as it knows its echo in another 
person" (Stem 93). As Sartre explains in Being and Nothingness, the gaze inculcates 
being-for-itself "determin[ed] . . .  to exist inasmuch as it cannot coincide with itself' ( 125-
26) : meaning, the self has "to exist at a distance from itself," thwarting the principle of 
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identity1 1  in that the "self' determined in the gaze is always indeterminate, not able to 
reach or to express the self "one ii' ( 128, 367). The gaze requires one to re-circumscribe 
constantly his/her subject position, to remake oneself perpetualJy as a "subject"; in other 
words, the subject "is always in the making, always becoming" some other version of the 
self (Stem 99) because "self one ii' will always be subject to misrecognition, the subject 
positioned by misrecognition. 
Granted, Danahay does admit that "the masculine subject's search for a 
complementary self-image" in the other is always "thwarted" by the Beloved' s  "refusal to 
reflect accurately the artist' s  self-image" ("Mirrors" 38), thus indicating that Rossetti 's 
aesthetic is concerned with the failure to recognize the self even through the mechanisms 
described above. Though Danahay correctly reads the Beloved as "a threat to the 
imaginative unity and coherence of the masculine subject" which ultimately leads to 
Rossetti 's "disappointment" ("Mirrors" 41 ,  50), he does not fully take into account that 
Rossetti, like Swinburne, was fascinated by and compelled to investigate those very 
"threats." Christopher Nassaar has commented on how Rossetti upholds a very Victorian 
belief that "each human being has an unconscious mind" -or self--"where the real 
personality is buried and [s/he] often tries desperately to get in touch with the buried self' 
(24). Furthermore, Nassaar reads Rossetti 's Beloved figure as presenting selfhood from 
the "perspective of the agony of separation" (25}-what I read as the "separation" of the 
"self one ii' from the versions of self perpetually interposed by the gaze. 1 2  I contend that 
this is the separation between the projected/projecting ego, which is a "degraded 
1 1  As Stem explains, "The being-for-itself, or human consciousness, was characterized as being what it is 
not and not being what it is. It is not at all, but is always creating itself; consequently it never coincides 
with itself, thus falling outside the principle of identity" (96). 
1 2  Nassaar presents this assertion in an explication of Rossetti's "Proserpine." 
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consciousness" and not "the adequate representation" of what the self is (Sartre 365), and 
the "buried self' that cannot be present-inasmuch as the subject will never "coincide 
with him [or her]self' (Stem 40), since the "true self' wil1 never coincide with any of the 
subject positions imposed by the gaze of the other. When all these components of the 
Beloved are considered, we can "see" the very illusory quality of the presentation of the 
subject that is usually obscured. In other words, Rossetti's Beloved allows the viewer 
virtually to "see" beyond the margins of the offered subject positions, virtua11y to "see" 
· the dissonance between the representations of selves and the unrepresentable self, and to 
acknowledge the aesthetic importance of the dissonance existing within such artful 
renditions of the breakdown of art. 
This specular quality-which al1ows the Beloved(s) of Rossetti's work, and 
successively the "Ladies of Pain" which Swinburne creates, to operate as complex 
symbols of ego differen�iation, desire, and dissonance-resembles the function of what 
Martin Jay cans the "baroque mirror," which is not "the flat reflecting mirror'' that aids 
"the development of rationalized perspective," but an "anamorphic mirror, either concave 
or convex, that distorts" the flat, planar, rationalized "visual image" (Eyes 48). The 
"visionary'' quality of the Pre-Raphaelites' work-"the understanding that forms and 
images possess powers in themselves . . .  that cannot be comprehended or even entirely 
contro11ed by the artist who is their medium," the creation of provisional vantage points 
to exercise the relativity instead of the stability of convention, subjectivity, making and 
discerning meaning (McGann, "Medieval" 108)-is a nostalgic nod to the art of their 
predecessors. This is a paradoxical treatment of the Lacanian Real here, the attempt to 
account for "that which is refractory, resistant, . . .  lacking in the symbolic order, the 
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ineliminable residue of all articulation, the foreclosed element, which may be 
approached, but never grasped: the umbilical cord" of all symbolic representation 
( Concepts 280). The Beloved figures the nostalgia for both the past and for a "return" to 
a mythic, prelapsarian moment of complete selfbood (in which the self could be 
"apprehended as a real existent," in which the subject could be self) 13  in art that she 
should conceal rather than express: Rossetti 's Beloved beckons the spectator/reader to 
become a "naive other" to her, so that the spectator/reader can be "absorbed, enchanted" 
by the Beloved and bel ieve in the "very illusion of perfect self-mirroring" she insinuates 
(Zizek, Lacan 1 14). She deflects the spectator/reader's gaze, though, unsettling the 
spectator/reader, allowing for the kind of traumatic eruption supposedly screened from 
"the totality of [one's] field of vision" (Lacan 1 14). Because the Beloved fails to 
revitalize the utopian aesthetic narratives of the past, she implies that a dystopic element 
lurks in nostalgia, that the past cannot provide us a vantage point from which we can 
objectively identify ourselves and thus aggressively counteract the gaze' s formative role 
in the construction of subjectivity. We cannot "see ourselves seeing ourselves" as others 
do; the subject cannot see her or himself as s/he appears in the other's consciousness. 
Even more so than Rossetti , s Beloved, Swinburne's "Lady of Pain" subverts 
nostalgia to present the past nostalgically as such, to point out and exploit nostalgia 
purposefully, and to expose the efforts to conceal the eye/gaze antinomy 14 as portrayed in 
13  See S�e 123. 
1 4  Lacan distinguishes the antinomy between the gaze & the eye in his Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. Zizek summarizes Lacan's argument as follows: "[T]he eye viewing the 
object is on the side of the subject, while the gaze is on the side of the object. When I look at an object, the 
object is always already gazing at me, and from a point at which I cannot see it" (Lacan l 09). This is a 
perspective so subjective that it cannot be shared. In other words, the subject cannot see the point from 
which s/he is being seen (in the act of seeing). 
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the relationship between the contemporary artist and his/her nostalgically objectified 
narrative of"history." Swinburne's "Ladies of Pain," like the texts in which they are 
situated, function as screens assertively deflecting the gaze of the other; they establish "a 
fracture, a bi-partition," so to speak, "which isolates the function of the screen and plays 
with it" (Lacan, Concepts 106-07). In other words, Swinburne's texts are "screen-like" in 
that each text is a "locus of mediation" (Concepts 107) between the Beloved, who is 
"characterized by being what [she] is not and not being what [she] is" (Stern 96) �nd 
represents the past as it "no longer is" as well as the past that "is not" or never was 
(Sartre 162), and the artist whose subjectivity is established only within the gaze of the 
Beloved-as-other as well . There is no unity between the artist-as-subject and the 
Swinburnian version of the Beloved : the artist wants to incorporate into a penultimate 
version of "self' all possible "selves" anticipated via the Beloved's gaze, though the 
Beloved is created to resist that very cohesion between "self' and "other-which-is-self." 
As Adorno establishes in "Night Music," nostalgic elements-such as those represented 
by Swinburne's version of the Beloved- gesture toward sites in an artwork where 
cohesion disintegrates: the apparatus for interpretation and comprehension breaks down. 
The "original contents" of history "are visible solely by virtue of the disintegration of 
their gestalt-like unity in �he form of the work," and thus "interpretation wanders around 
lost among the fragments. " 15 Swinburne, like Rossetti, cannot present the past except as 
a fragmented pastiche of what may have been. Yet, by employing an artistic technique of 
that fragmented, nearly inaccessible past-the baroque mirror-they both reflect on 
history anamorp�otically, "reform[ing] a distorted picture" of history ·"by use of a 
15 I have used Shierry Weber Nicholsen's translation, provided in Exact Imagination, Late Work 35. 
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nonplanar mirror" (Jay, Eyes 48). 
Martin Jay, in "Scopic Regimes of Modernity," describes the baroque as marked 
by a celebration of "the dazzling, disoriented, ecstatic surplus of images" as well as its 
rejection "of the monocular geometricalization of the Cartesian tradition with its illusion 
ofhomogenous three-dimensional space with a God's  eye view from afar" (16-17). 16 In 
many ways, this could also be used to describe the Pre-Raphaelite art that so influenced 
Swinburne. Though Rossetti and his followers had stated in The Germ that their art was 
pledged to "truth to nature," adhering to every detail and providing an exact reflection of 
such, 17 Rossetti ' s  own work demonstrates his realization that any kind of truth content in 
artistic representation is constantly renegotiated. 
Any attempt to represent nature truthfully is to question continually "the truth of 
something made," which is "the question of semblance and the rescue of semblance as 
the semblance of the true" (Adorno, Theory 1 3 1). More simply, by attempting to be 
"truthful to nature," Rossetti establishes that the concept of"nature" itself cannot be true. 
Here the concept of nature comes into being when the artist establishes him/herself as the 
dominating other. The artist creates the artwork which, "[w]holly artifactural . . .  seems to 
be the opposite of what is not made, nature"-nature distinguished here as that which is 
beyond human creation, cohesive in itself, and thus something existing independent of 
human reflection and human identity-thinking-yet "each refers to the other: nature to 
1 6  To be fair, Jay draws upon the work of French philosopher Christine Buci-Glucksmann here-he cites La 
Raison Baroque (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1984) and La Folie du Voir (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1986). 
17 The Germ was a short-lived journal dedicated to the new Pre-Raphaelite aesthetic. These phrases appear 
in F.G. Stephens's essay on early Italian art, commissioned by Rossetti and published in the first issue. See 
The Germ: Thoughts Towards Nature in Poetry, Literature, and Art, intro. W.M. Rossetti, New York: 
AMS, 1965. (This is a reprint of the 1901 collection. The four individual issues of The Germ appeared in 
1850.) 
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the experience of a mediated and objectified world, the artwork to nature as the mediated 
plenipotentiary of immediacy" (Theory 62, emphasis added). Through this constant 
mediation, culture violently imposes itself on nature; by doing so, in this particular case, 
the Pre-Raphaelite artist knowingly acts as an aggressive interlocutor between himself 
and nature, claiming that he can render nature truthfully because he renders nature as 
other than himself.-and as a complete, cohesive other at that. To render nature 
truthfully in every exact detail would be to render nature's complete cohesiveness: an 
impossible task. So, nature conceptualized as a unified whole becomes material for art; 18  
yet, as nature is always "in disunion with itself' (Horkheimer and Adorno 39), the 
dissonance created by such disunion will exceed the fullness of cohesion necessary for 
precise representation. 
Such excess seems correlative to what Zizek calls "the foreclosure of the 
[Lacanian] Real," meaning 'the exclusion of presymbolic "natural, substantial . . .  'being' 
always identical to itself," which nonetheless leaves an "indivisible remainder" which 
both sustains and traumatizes artistic representation (Plague 132; Borch-Jacobsen 17). 
Similar to the violent imposition culture is to nature, this lurking, traumatic constituent of 
the "Real" violently imposes itself on cultu�e; it resists being "reduced to a place" or 
symbol, "even if it is an empty place in the symbolic order" (Zizek, Lacan 169). Thus a 
triangular relationship between artist, nature, and the Real emerges: the artist, subject to a 
symbolic network violated by the Real, violates nature in tum by trying to encapsulate 
nature in an inviolate state, consequently violating it via human mediation which takes 
18 This is based on Horkheimer and Adomo's statement that "nature as a whole is material for society" 
(87). 
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the form of domination. What results is disunion between all these contributing factors. 
Moreover, complicating matters even further, the precise details of such disunion 
themselves will exceed full representation, and the details rendered on the canvas or page 
will be a semblance of the truth-in Rossetti 's case, the truth of dissonance and its 
resultant surplus-that one may try to rescue but never fully recover. 
Hence Rossetti 's use of a peculiarly flat perspective in his painting; in a very 
baroque move, he purposely fails to create fully the illusion of three-dimensional space 
on the canvas, choosing instead a more two-dimensional perspective which distorts 
conventional depth perception. Conventional depth perception, Jay argues, is often 
employed to de-eroticize art, as it "creates such a distance between the . . .  eye and the 
depicted scene that the painting lacks the immediacy associated with desire" (Foster 27). 
Baroque artists, however, wished to gesture toward that kind of immediacy by employing 
a distorted perspectivalism which "casts its attentive eye on the fragmentary, detailed, 
and richly articulated surface of a world it is content to describe rather than explain" (Jay, 
"Scopic" 1 3). A distorted, more two-dimensional perspective obliges the viewer to "look 
awry" at the canvas, to view the canvas from several different angles to see the "exact 
details" on it. In this way, the viewing subject must approach the artwork "with an 
' interested' view, supported, permeated, and 'distorted' by desire" (Zizek, Lacan 12, 
italics his), thus approximating the way relationship between subject and object, self and 
other, is always "distorted" by the economies of desire. This is not direct reflection but a 
multiplex of mediated and remediated reflections; and, with each different angle or 
perspective the subject assumes in considering the artwork, s/he "self-consciously revels 
in the contradictions between surface and depth, disparaging as a result any attempt to 
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reduce the multiplicity of visual spaces into any one coherent essence" (Jay, "Scopic" 
17). Moreover, the false sense of the unification of this visual multiplicity evoked by/in 
the artwork is created by the visual excess or surplus of images in this multiplex. Though 
the multi-faceted qualities of the baroque-inspired perspective tirelessly gesture toward it, 
the "truth content" of art19 "negates the made" (Adorno, Theory 1 3 1  ). The content of 
nature, like the content of history employed in art, must be apprehended as exceeding its 
very conceptualization. 
Swinburne, more consciously than Ros*tti, engaged in acts of play with 
concept(s) of history commonly acknowledged to be unstable, fragmented, and even 
"untrue." Antony Harrison points out that the majority of the Victorian artists treating 
historical themes produce "an idealization" of those earlier cultures which "loo[k] back 
nostalgically upon what they perceived as a period of uniform social and spiritual values, 
of social integration, of political and cultural stability," portraying those epochs as 
instances of"man and his society [existing] in idyllic harmony with nature" and with one 
another (Medievalism 3-4). Swinburne's poetry, however, adopts a more radical stance 
toward the past. He recognizes that any nostalgia for an era in which (hu)man and nature 
shared a kind ofunmediated, symbiotic relationship is nostalgia for a trace moment of 
wholeness which occurred before culture violently imposed itself on nature, a moment 
that is both ahistorical and unreachable, never really having existed in history and 
distinguished only by its absence. It is as if Swinburne searches for a kind of place­
holder that Horkheimer and Adorno call mana, a place-holder for the otherwise un-
19 Adorno points out that the meaning. the "truth contenr' of artworks is enigmatical : "The indefatigably 
recurring question that every work incites in whoever traverses it-the 'What is it all about?'-becomes 'Is 
it true?'-the question of the absolute, to which every artwork responds by wresting itself free from the 
discursive form of the answer" (Theory 127). 
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placeable "remembrance'' of a prior, undifferentiated nature "in the subject, in whose 
fulfillment the unacknowledged truth of all culture lies hidden" (40). Swinburne, though, 
seems aware that his fascination with past searches for mana has everything to do with 
revaluating how past artists/spectators considered, searched for-how they "gazed" at­
mana. Swinburne thus foregoes the illusory stability granted by nostalgic treatments of 
the past, instead opting to show how one' s perspective on the past is always shifting, 
always transforming the "past" into a distorted mirror reflecting the "present"-and 
present desire. 
Consequently, he develops the themes of antiquity, medieval ism, and the 
Renaissance into vehicles portraying his contemporary concerns: the relativity of social 
and spiritual values, social disintegration, and the instability of cultural conventions. To 
Swinburne, the ancient world is less the golden age of civilization than an earlier stage of 
the sensuous consciousness in revolt against the encroachment of reason; the medieval 
quest for the Holy Grail figures the failure of an ascetic Christianity, which is haunted by 
and is always perilously close to succumbing to the echoing thrall of the sensual ities of 
paganism; and, the cultural and artistic triumphs _ofthe Renaissance are infused with, if 
not a result of, the sexual treachery, religious hypocrisy, and moral depravity of elite 
ruling families like the Borgias. Like the decadentftn-de-siecle artists who succeeded 
him, Swinburne is an "aesthetic voyager'' through history who "becomes a voyeur; 
unable to encounter the real world" -or "real" history, history as it "really was"-"he 
endures or lives an echo or a reflection or its visual counterpart" (Gordon 33). As 
Swinburne prefigures the fin-de-siecle decadence movement by twenty years, though, the 
decadence he draws upon is that which Jakob Burckhardt attributed to the end of the 
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Renaissance, which culminated in the baroque-a period, says Burckhardt, which 
ironically links "profound" moral and spiritual "corruption" with "an artistic splendor 
which shed upon the life of man a lustre which neither antiquity nor medievalism could 
or would bestow upon it" (2: - 443). The baroque style interjected i.nto the high 
Renaissance "sign[s] of irresolution" providing diffident yet ornate glimpses of the 
insecurity, disparity, and disunity lurking in its aesthetic conventions and the culture 
which created them; yet these singular moments of cultural disintegration became the 
seeds for "revolution or readjustment in the arts" (Sypher 106) as well as the subject's 
relationship to art. Richard Le Gallienne, a major figure in late nineteenth-century 
British decadence, similarly describes the decadent aesthetic as "consist[ing] in �he 
euphuistic expression of isolated observations" (8 1 ), particularly observations of the 
individual artist in dissonance with the world surrounding him/her. Similarly, 
Swinburne's aestheticized history is comprised of observations (interpretations) of 
isolated historical incidents; and, in a very baroque fashion, these observations are 
"glaring flashes of perception" figured in "brutal acts and unexplained contradictions" 
(Sypher 123). 
One of the best examples of Swinburne renovating the complex liaisons between 
subjectivity, desire, and history established in the Pre-Raphaelite aesthetic can be found 
in "Satia te Sanguine." This poem experienced some minor attention in the late 1960s 
when it was mentioned in a series of short articles about the life of Mary Gordon Disney­
Leith, Swinburne's favorite cousin, published in The Times Literary Supplement. Among 
the articles was an anecdote claiming that "Satia te Sanguine" was a "furious satire" 
Swinburne written about "the vein of cruelty [Swinburne] thought he sensed" in his 
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cousin, who seemed both to encourage and to repel Swinburne's romantic and sexual 
interest in her, including a sexual interest in flagellation (Henderson 269). Apart from 
such claims for the poem's  biographical importance, though, the poem remains critically 
ignored in favor of the lengthier, more blatantly sexual poems like "Anactoria" or "Laus 
Veneris" and the mythical ly tragic attributes of"Dolores" and the poems to Proserpine. 
But, as it demonstrates rather succinctly the schemes for exploring subjectivity and 
perception Swinburne commences in grander fashion in these more celebrated works, the 
poem sets up a dynamic model for reading the other poetry in the volume. 20 
Furthermore, Swinburne' s portrayal of ritual sacrifice here serves as a rudimentary 
template for the portrait of the ineffectuat pitiable Christ figure he later creates in Songs 
before Sunrise 's "Before a Crucifix." 
The poem's title indicates that it is loosely based on the legend of Queen 
Tomyris.2 1  According to Herodotus, King Cyrus of Persia attempted twice to capture the 
widowed queen's throne: first by seduction, which failed, and then by force, murdering 
her only son in the battle. In retribution, the queen had Cyrus killed and his decapitated 
head brought to her in a bowl of blood. The bowl was inscribed with the words "Satia te 
sanguine quem semper sitisti, " or, "Sate yourself on the blood for which you have always 
20 Philip Henderson reports that many of these poems discussed in this chapter and the next--,-"Satia te 
Sanguine," the Proserpine poems, and "Faustine"-were composed and continually revised between 1862-
1864. "Anactoria" and "Dolores" seem to have been written slightly later than the rest of these. 
21 The legend of Queen Tomyris was a somewhat popular subject for Renaissance and baroque painting. 
Queen Tomyris was among the historical and mythological figures painted by Italian Renaissance artist 
Andrea del Castagno in his famous fresco, transferred to canvas in the mid-1800s and displayed in the 
Galleria degli Uffizi, Florence; Swinburne went to Florence in 1864 and likely saw the painting when he 
toured the Galleria with novelist Elizabeth Gaskell. Queen Tomyris was also painted by baroque artists 
Jodochus van Winghe (the Flemish artist whose patron was Emperor Rudolph II) and Peter Paul Rubens. 
As his letters indicate, Swinburne traveled Europe several times during the late 1850s and early 1860s, 
frequenting art museums and galleries. 
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thirsted." In Swinburne's dramatic monologue, though, the names ofTomyris and Cyrus 
are never used. The speaker, a presumably male unrequited lover, addresses his distant, 
cruel beloved. This evokes a surplus of implied images, asking the reader to "look at" the 
dramatic situation of the poem fro.m several different angles. From one perspective the 
speaker seems to be Cyrus failing in his attempt to seduce Tomyris, and from another 
perspective the speaker seems to be an emanation of the conventional courtly lover 
professing his devotion to the aloof object of his desire. Yet, from other perspectives, the 
speaker can be seen as either a disgruntled admirer seeking violent revenge for his 
spumed advances ("I wish you were stricken of thunder / And burnt with a bright flame 
through" [lines 36-37]) or a cowering would-be lover expecting to be harmed if not 
murdered by his beloved, who "kills men's hearts with a breath" (line 4 7) and "suck[ s] 
with a sleepy red lip / The wet red wounds in his heart" (58-59), again invoking the 
violent acts of both legendary figures alluded to in the poem's title. 
Because Swinburne merely gestures toward the legend of Cyrus and Tomyris and 
its various historical contexts (ancient, Renaissance, baroque, Victorian), the speaking 
subject of the poem cannot be firmly located. The subject, who both is and is not Cyrus 
and/or a courtly lover and/or the poet, is simultaneously positioned in several virtual 
sites, created by the allusory presence-which-is-absence of those historical contexts, 
while inhabiting no actual site at all. The poem creates in itself an amorphous fantasy 
space for self-negation, allowing for what Adorno terms "incapacitation of the subject," 
or the moment in which one confronts "the truth which expels man from the center of 
creation and reminds him of his impotence," imposing "a subjective mode of conduct 
[which will] confirm the sense of impotence [and] cause men to identify with it" 
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(Negative 66-68). _The speaker of Swinburne, s poem is impotent, or powerless, in that 
the truth of his desire-his nothingness, the objectless (beloved-less) void of desire he 
actually desires-renders him somewhat speechless within his very speech. For he can 
only identify himself, his own powerlessness, with a figurative "f' which cannot be 
definitively located, named, or identified. Consequently, he is not even the center of the 
speech acts he creates; he "speaks out of' the poem which does not depict him as a real, 
tangible subject, per se (Adorno, Theory 1 68). Thus this incapacitated subject "speaks 
himself by abolishing himself . . .  as 'real"' (Borch-Jacobsen 1 14). 
Tellingly, in the last five stanzas of the poem, the speaker introduces a third term 
or person into the libidinal economy depicted in the poem. For the first twelve stanzas, 
the speaker seems interested only in depicting the self/other relationship, featuring 
himself as the "I," or imaginary ego, who desires the beloved and wishes the beloved to 
recognize, if not reciprocate, his desire in turn. However, in stanza thirteen, the speaker 
addresses the beloved as "you that we love" (line 44, emphasis mine), temporarily 
displacing himself-or the speaking "I"- as an object of/for desire in the stanzas that 
follow, transferring that object status to another figure, Christ. With this move, he also 
transfers the insatiability of his desire to the beloved, who violently tries to satiate her 
desire through the crucifixion: 
As the tame beast writhes and wheedles, 
He fawns to be fed with wiles; 
You carve him a cross of needles, 
And whet them sharp as your smiles . . . .  
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You thrill as his pulses dwindle, 
You brighten and warm as he bleeds, 
With insatiable eyes that kindle . 
And insatiable mouth that feeds. 
Your hands nailed love to the tree, 
You stript him, scourged him with rods, 
And drowned -him deep in the sea 
That hides the dead and their gods. (52-55, 60-67) 
The Christ figure here, a "tame beast," seems less than God and more like what 
Horkheimer and Adorno, in their discussion of "specific representation" in ritual, call 
"the sacrificial animal . . .  massacred instead o/the god" ( 10, emphasis mine). The 
speaker obviously relishes in the violence enacted on Christ, evoking what Bataille in 
Erotism calls "the ancient comparison of sacrifice and erotic intercourse" (90). As 
Bataille explains, both "the act of love" and sacrifice "reveal the flesh" (Erotism 92). For 
the speaker, the beloved's body, like "the lost white feverish limbs / Of the Lesbian 
Sappho, adrift" (I. 9-10), is not accessible to him, but the pleasures of the flesh can be 
revealed to him at least partially through the spectacle of crucifixion. Here the Christ 
figure and not the beloved becomes the object of the speaker's fantasy of being "laid 
open to the violence of the sexual urges . . .  ; t<? the impersonal violence that overwhelms 
[him] from without" (Erotism 90). In this moment of specular fantasy, the speaker 
imagines himself as both Tomyris enacting violence on Cyrus and as Cyrus the victim of 
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frenzied violence, the denied courtly lover and the beloved taking pleasure i n  denial.22 In 
a very Sadean way, the speaker derives pleasure from fantasies of being both sexual 
victim and victimizer simultaneously. Thus Swinburne uses the Chri stian myth of 
Jesus' s sacrifice to demonstrate the transformation of sacrifice into a virtual site for 
exploring the multiplicities of subjectivity-specifically, the muitiplicities erupting from 
the interplay between deflected subjectivity and destroyed (or annihilated) subjectivity. 
The deflected subject identifies with another,23 as when Swinburne's speaker engages in 
plural and inclusive serial identifications; the destroyed subject is "the imaged 
embodi�ent" of the lack, aware that "no wealth of experiences" or serial identifications 
can fill that void (Lacan, Concepts 89; Zizek, Plague 122). 
When Swinburne has his narrator, in a mode of deflection, identify with both the 
victim and the victimizer, he seems to (re-)employ the Romantic notion of the self­
transcending subject able to "see himself seeing himself' in various roles. However, as 
Swinburne brings the Sadean notion of sado-masochistic ecstasy into play, this "stepping 
out of the self' becomes a gesture of the destruction of the subject as well. Swinburne's 
narrator exhibits plasticity, as he is both the sadistic "absolute subject" who reduces 
another ''to an object-instrument" for his own satisfaction and the victim divested of any 
22 Because the speaker assumes two imaginary, simultaneous subject positions here, the speaker's 
masochistic fantasy seems reminiscent of the kind of fantasy Freud discusses in "A Child is Being Beaten": 
Not only does the act of violence become "a meeting-place between (a] sense of guilt" which "transforms 
sadism into masochism" and "sexual love," but it allows an individual to enact a "masochistic attitude 
(which] coincides with a feminine one" as well as assuming a sadistic attitude like that of the female 
aggressor who is "endow(ed] . . .  with masculine attributes and characteristics" ( 184, 193, 196). Ultimately, 
though, it seems Swinburne's speaker, like the "girl" Freud says "escapes from the demands of the erotic 
side of her life, . . . is no longer anything but a spectator of the event which takes the place of a sexual act" 
( 196). 
23 "What I myself am not (namely, a subject. free, autonomous, independent, and so on) is always another 
. . .  who is taking my place-that place or social position where I would like to be" (Borch-Jacobsen 24). 
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subjectivity, reduced to object status.24 In sadism "we encounter direct negation" and 
"violent destruction" of the subject-as-masochist who "assumes the form of disavowal" 
negation takes here---"that is, of feigning, of an 'as if which suspends [the] reality" in 
which subjectivity must be palpably signified (Zizek, Metastases 9 1). Paradoxically, 
then, Swinburne's subject directly negates himself, assuming the "as if' moment in which 
he refuses the n�rcissistic fantasies sustaining identification of self; all the while, if not 
identifying, at least gesturing at, the subject as he who negates, or he who sacrifices 
himself. 
As Horkheimer and Adorno have pointed out, "The transformation of sacrifice 
into subjectivity occurs under the sign of the artifice that was already a feature of 
sacrifice"; in that artifice, the "self loses itself to preserve itself' (56, 48-49). The 
sacrificial Jesus, God in human form, is supposed to signify "the appearance of the whole 
in the particular'' (Horkheimer and Adorno 19), or every possible dimension of human 
identity in one particular, symbolic form. When the speaker of"Satia te Sanguine" 
addresses his the beloved as "you who we love," this "we" seems to suggest the speaker's 
identification with Jesus: "the absolute mediation" of the human and God "in the person 
of Christ, who is simultaneously the representative of God among human subjects and the 
subject who passes into God," as "the only identity of man and God is the identity in 
· Christ" (Zizek, Metastases 39). "God" is the signifier for that which can fill the lack. 
Failing to identify with the beloved, who rein�orces rather than fills the lack, the speaker 
here enacts a sort of transference. Jesus becomes the "subject who is supposed to know" 
how the lack can be overcome (Lacan, Concepts 233). In yet another paradox, by 
24 See Zizek, Lacan l 08-09. 
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enacting identification with Jesus with the inclusive pronoun "we," the speaker attempts 
to "step out of himself' and sustain that "as if' moment signified by Jesus/God-a 
moment in which the desire for identification is _suspended, and the schism between "the 
perishable individual," subject of7to the temporal finitude of fantasy or specular 
identification, and the "perennial Universal," the radical eternity of negativity, is not so 
profound (Metastases 40). Actually, though, by identifying with Jesus, the speaker 
subjects the god "to whom [sacrifices] are made . . .  to the primacy of human ends, and 
dissolve[ s] his power" (Horkheimer and Adorno 50) to fulfill any lack or bring about any 
kind of transcendent "as if' moment. Zizek explains that Jesus's sacrifice marks "not the 
passing of God's terrestrial representative but the death of the God ofBeyond"-the 
(im)possibil ity of the "as if' moment-"Himself' (Metastases 46). Swinburne's poem 
suggests this as well, since he establishes that Jesus and the speaker are both subject to 
the impossibi lity of fulfillment. Jesus "loves" the beloved because he experiences the 
same "lack" as Swinburne's speaker; or, perhaps more accurately, Jesus is portrayed as 
having the same "lack" as the speaker because Jesus, the superlative deity who would 
fulfill lack, does not really exist except as the speaker's fantasy projection of his ideal 
"self," just as the ideal woman does not really exist for the male subject. 
Because the Jesus figure in this poem is just another of the speaker' s serial 
identifications, the traditional redemptive qualities of Christ's sacrifice do not come into 
play here. An actual sacrifice does not even take place, as the person sacrificed does not 
really exist; the ritual of crucifixion is portrayed as artifice. In the poem's final stanza, 
the speaker admits, "And for all this, die he will not; / There is no man sees him but 
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f' (68-69). The speaker has come full circle, again invoking the personal pronoun, 
speaking once again as an incapacitated subject. He is more aware of the impotence of 
his subject position, in that he recognizes the artificial quality of his fantasy of sacrifice 
and the failure of the sacrifice to satisfy his desire in ways the beloved either cannot or 
refuses to. After the charade of the sacrifice ends, the beloved "came and went and 
forgot" (line 70), obviously not as haunted by the emptiness of the violent act as the 
speaker is. The symbolic body of the Christ figure in the beloved's Sadean ritual i s  
revealed as an empty placeholder. the speaker, identifying again with the beloved and 
thus detaching himself from the Christ figure, realizes that Jesus cannot recognize the 
beloved's desire, or any human desire, for fulfillment. He also realizes that fulfillment 
cannot be found in any representation of otherness (the Christ figure or the beloved). 
Thus, any pleasure the speaker initially takes in the transgressive Sadean fantasy of self­
destruction and self-negation ultimately perpetuates rather than satiates the "pure empty 
Otherness" (Zizek, Plague 30) of desire. So, the body of the Christ figure, an ineffectual 
attempt to satisfy what is  insatiable, is drowned in the deep sea "That hides the dead and 
their gods" (I. 66-67), indicating that here "Jesus" functions as yet another symbol of (to 
borrow Wordsworth's famous phrase) a creed outworn. 
Importantly, the Christ figure, like the other characters in the poem, is never 
referred to by a proper name. This reinforces his role as a mirror of the speaker as 
incapacitated subject. Recall ing the advocation to castrate God that Swin�urne explores 
in his Blake essay, Swinburne creates a decisively disempowered god figure, a signifier 
signifyi1'g the absence of God's presence in this world yet also representing humanity' s  
relative powerlessness over the lack signified in  death, or the "truth" of the Real. In sum, 
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the sacrifice as artifice is disclosed, and the speaker has realized "the inevitable 
experience of the uselessness and superfluousness of sacrifices" (Horkheimer and Adorno 
53). In the poem's final line, the speaker declares, "I hope he [the Christ figure] will 
some day die," indicating that he wishes for a time in which the actual will be possible, 
for a time that will end any reliance on artifice. Swinburne's choice to use "hope" 
instead of "know" is quite important, though, as it indicates a sensitivity to the limitations 
intrinsic to the material world. 
The shadowy Queen Tomyris providing the tremulous foundation for "Satia te 
Sanguine" is but one emanation of the legendary heroine pervading the Poems and 
Ballads. Like the women featured in Pre-Raphaelite painting, many of Swinburne' s 
legendary heroines are real women elevated to cultic or mythic status through 
imaginative remediation. That is, just as history is constantly recreated and retold in his 
work, transformed by the constantly fluctuating dimensions of subjective experience 
(Nicholsen 50), Swinburne's historical figures attain specific aesthetic properties: They 
become symbols, or placeholders, for the flux of multiple discourses and multiple subject 
positions that continually create new sites for exploring the shifting relationship between 
the given work of art and its subjective content(s) by displacing other, previously initiated 
or recognized sites. 
Many critics, like Lene Ostermark-Johansen, find such perpetuity of flux a 
detriment to Swinburne's aesthetic, clinging to T.S. Eliot's famous dismissal of 
. Swinburne's inability to make determinate assessments of any work of art, or the function 
of any specific aesthetic properties in a given work. She claims: 
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Each passage builds up toward a climax, but most of the thoughts and 
ideas developed during [his] moments of excitement dissolve and are 
never integrated into a full conclusion. Swinburne's associative mind 
carries him from one image to the next, thus leaving the reader to finish 
his train of thought in the intervals before yet another outburst of his 
enthusiasm introduces another set of ideas. ( 50) 
Ostermark-Johansen echoes Peter Anderson's claim that Swinburne is a poet employing 
"endless deflections" in a failing dialectic tension "not between surface and depth, but 
between surface and nothingness," a "nothingness [which] displaces depth"; in due 
course, because Swinburne does not want to disclose (and thus endlessly deflects) the 
"horror" of what Anderson calls "the void of desire," Swinburne "sought to escape in 
himself' ("Sterile" 1 8). 
Anderson's identification of Swinburne's fascination with the nihilistic qualities 
of desire is crucial, as are Ostermark-Johansen' s observations of the disintegrative 
element characterizing Swinburne's aesthetic. That being said, though, the 
characteristics of Swinburne's poems that these critics tend to disparage are revaluated in 
the strong, thought-provoking counterarguments of other critics such as Rikky Rooksby 
and Ruth Robbins. Both Rooksby and Robbins, whose critical projects are influenced by 
the proliferation ofDerridean deconstruction, recognize that the production of flux and 
deflection in Swinburne's poetry importantly functions to "circumlocate"25 subjectivity 
and history in Swinburne's aesthetic. These critics apply Derridean notions of play and 
25 I have borrowed this tenn from Robbins. who coins it from her adaptation of Derrida's early work on the 
aesthetic. 
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deferral to their readings of Swinburne's poetry, characterizing Swinburne's  poetry of 
flux as a seemingly endless "play of signifying references
,, 
eroding the limited 
possibilities of the circulation of representative "signs," thus allowing a symbol or 
signifier to function like "reflecting pools" or images which provide "an infinite reference 
from one to the other" but always defer definitive, concrete meaning-the "kernel of 
truth" one is trying to represent (Derrida, Grammatology 1, 36). Arguably, Swinburne 
seems to engage in what Derrida calls a "dangerous promiscuity and a nefarious 
complicity between the reflection and the reflected," in which aesthetic representation is 
a narcissistic exercise of self projecting "self," inasmuch as "one thinks as if the 
represented were nothing more than the shadow or reflection of the representer" 
(Grammatology 36). Additionally, for Derrida, writing (in this case, writing poetry) is 
the attempt to restore what the shadow or reflection denotes as absent or lacking by 
creating a "presence," but that presence will always be "disappointed" because it, 
paradoxically, continually dislocates what it attempts to restore (Grammatology 143). 
Ultimately, though, Swinburne's poetry suggests that this Derridean formulation can be 
used to indicate that the "condition of impossibil ity" of locating truth in representatio� 
locating the "true" self, is simultaneously "its condition of possibility
,
, (see Zizek, Plague 
129). More specifically, Swinburne's practice of enacting deferral of meaning-the 
"reality" underlying aesthetic representation, the "real self' underlying the subject as s/he 
is represented-via the process of serial identification can be read as the condition of the 
possibility for representing subjectivity as such. 
This, in tum, provides Swinburne the opportunity to display a dynamic of 
"unfolding and shifting perspectives" (Nicholsen 38) in the exploration of the "radical 
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intersubjective character" (Zizek, Plague 8) of fantasy and how it sustains desire. 
Fantasy "'stages' desire" which "is not the subject's own, but the other 's desire" (Plague 
8-9). And the Swinburnian subject engages in serial identifications-. trying on "shades 
of otherness," so to speak-to answer the fundamental questions of desirer--"What do 
others want from me? What do they see in me? What am I to others?" (Plague 9)­
while endlessly deferring the actual (inaccessible) answer. This is not, as Anderson 
would have it, the "practice of profound poetic ( self-)deception" ("Sterile" 18, 
parentheses in original). I believe it to be more like Adorno's practi�e of seeking to meet 
human desires and t<? provide the grounds for finding satisfaction-pleasurer--in the 
perseverance of an intense multiplicity of perspectives inherent in aesthetic experience 
itself.26 
It is important here to differentiate between the Adornian sense of negativity and 
the Derridean, especially considering that Swinburne's strain of negativity arguably 
portends Adorno's much more than Derrida's. With Derrida, aesthetic negativity can 
translate into an "ultratranscendental" moment of"nonaesthetic cognition," in which one 
is able to "make absolute claims" about "the reflective assembly of identity or meaning of 
signs," assuming a grammatological position beyond the aesthetic; these absolute claims 
point "in the direction of resolution" to the problems of representation (Menke 225, 1 95-
97). In Adorno, though, aesthetic enjoyment is unique, "based on pleasure . . .  which does 
not let itself be recognized or identified" definitively (Menke 12). In Adorno's  version of 
26 This is based on Adomo's contention in Aesthetic Theory that the artwork, in its entirety, elicits the 
viewing subject to have a powerful aesthetic experience only inasmuch as the particular facets or elements 
of which the whole is comprised are "restored to the detail," or not fully ceded to the whole. These 
unceding individual facets or details, always in tension with the idea of artistic wholeness or "unity," give 
the work of art an intensity which "thickens and explodes" with tbe flux of multiplicity ( 187). 
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the via negativa, that pleasure is found in the exposition of where and in what we fail to 
render that very pleasure literally, in the words and images and identifications which are 
necessarily limited in their abil ity to express what they do not really signify. In the 
Adornian mode of aesthetic negativity, when one intends to render something or someone 
in art literally, one really subverts his/her own act of rendering. An example of this is 
Swinburne' s presentation of Lucrezia Borgia in his "Ballad of Death": the more 
Swinburne presents his Borgia as a literal rendering of the historical woman, the more it 
becomes apparent that his Borgia is _a figurative rendering expositing the limits of the 
rendering, expositing what Borgia is not, but what she could represent Swinburne does 
not .create an "ultratranscendent" moment in which he (or his reader) becomes cognizant 
of the nonaesthetic, singular Borgia, in which one can "see oneself seeing" the "true" 
Borgia. Instead, Swinburne portrays Borgia as a fluid series of portrayals, each a 
different facet of the untranscendable limits of rendering her "presence." 
Precisely because his poetic persona have this serial quality, Swinburne is often 
accused of providing only superficial portrayals of his subjects. In "Swinburne's Internal 
Centre," Rooksby argues that the superficial ity often ascribed to Swinburne's aesthetic 
really results from a critical misunderslanding of Swinburne' s use of"lyric emotion" as a 
mirror for the cycle of identifications his subjects enact in his poetry. Swinburne's 
Poems and Ballads are indebted to the dramatic monologues of Browning and Tennyson, 
in that the situations or events portrayed in Swinburne's poems are relayed via the 
intonated voices of fictionalized speaking subjects, in a manner wholly dependent upon 
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those characters' emotional, expressive reactions and interpretations. 27 In Browning's 
work, for instance, one encounters a gallery of subjects whose monologues command a 
version of the "subjective utterance of the Romantic lyric," in which they confess their 
"intimate obsessions, fantasies, and pathologies," strongly persuading the 
reader/spectator to identify with them (Gregory 494-95). But, because these forced 
identifications rely on the use of an affected, bombastic rhetoric, the reader instead resists 
the identification and regards the subject of the monologue in a detached manner. The 
persuasion is revealed as persuasion per se, and the speakers appear more as superficial 
and limited case studies of specific pathologies rather than as figurative sites 
demonstrating the fluctuating dynamism of human subjectivity. It is probably for reasons 
like this that many critics typically contend that the "lyric emotion itself is  regarded as 
untrustworthy and inauthentic" (Rooksby, "Centre" 26). 
Swinburne, though, uses lyric emotion not to force identification with a singular 
figure, but to facilitate an encounter with the poetic language triggering the serial 
identifications which can express a wider variety of ''human feeling" as well as "the 
articulation of a . . .  vision of human existence" distinctive to each reader (Mcsweeney 
125). He entices his reader to approach his poetry outside of the role of enlightened 
spectator. Rooksby notes that the modem spectator cultivates distance from what s/he 
observes, and from that distance "comes de�achment, [ and] detachment brings 
27 Rooks by seems to have based his approac� in � on Thais Morgan's contention that, due to critics' 
persistence in regarding Poems and Ballads "as the fictionalized autobiography of a sexually and socially 
maladjusted individual . . . .  Swinburne was not granted the skill of aesthetic distancing" generally 
accredited to Tennyson and Browning (Morgan, "Dramatic" 176). Perhaps some of the critical perception 
regarding Swinburne's lack of "aesthetic distancing" stems from the young Swinburne comparing his style 
to the lyrisme romantique established in the work of his favorite French Romantic poet, Hugo. Hugo's 
poetry is "deeply subjective"; like the poetry of Alphonse de Lamartine, Alfred de Musset, and Alfred de 
Vigny, it "appear[s) to depend greatly upon the individual poet's experiences and feelings" (Cuddon 518). 
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alienation," until eventually alienation "begets judgment" ("Centre" 26). But Swinburne 
wants his spectator, the reader of his poetry, to submerge him/herself in the voice of the 
poem's speaking subject-to feel what Swinburne's character feels, see what his 
character sees. In other words, Swinburne's ideal reader will reflect upon the world as it 
is (in the spirit of the baroque mirror) refracted by his character's distinctive perspective. 
What Rooksby calls Swinburne's "lyric emotion" is the affective aspect of Swinburne's 
poetry employed to overcome the alienation between observer and observed, gazing 
subject and gazed-at object, promoted by reason. The Swinburnian spectator should 
bypass the alienation which forces the observed "object . . .  [to] be dominated by 
preformed categories of the understanding"-meaning judgment-and instead experience 
· the object "spontaneously," "naively" (Nicholsen 1 7- 1 8). Though, as Adorno would be 
quick to point out, such naivete is an illusion, but an illusion that has not completely been 
subsumed "under the categories of a dominating conceptual understanding" (Nicholsen 
1 8). This i llusion is "something always already required by [the] contemplation" of 
artworks (Adorno, "Presuppositions" 97). Thus, for example, the historical figures 
featured in Swinburne's poetry are not really the same figures described in canonical, 
historical narratives; instead, Swinburne reimagines them so that his reader encounters 
the figure, paradoxically, both outside of and despite the details already established and 
irrevocably flavored by conventional historical narratives. In this way, Swinburne's 
historical figure symbolizes his practice of "circumlocating" the subject in art: exploring 
the multiple possibilities "in which a subject may be . . .  placed in terms of what is 
(spoken or written) around or about it" (Robbins 42). 
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Robbins' s  argument relies heavily on Derrida's notion of ''aboutness"28 and his 
claim that we must "negotiate, deal with, transact with marginal effects," especially 
concerning the "differential network" produced within and by a given text, "a fabric of 
traces referring endlessly to something other than itself, to other differential traces . . .  
overrun[ ning] all the limits assigned to it" ( qtd. by Robbins 42). Considering her 
emphasis on the trace, which is "the memory of an ever-receding origin that always 
remains elusively outside of what it produces in the present . . .  [which] never leads to 
spatial simultaneity and full visibility" (Jay, Eyes 506), Robbins suggests that the 
subject's position is always a virtual site, a kind of bridge provisionally suspended 
between the margins of past (what has already occurred, accessible only by recollection 
which is always erratic) and possible future experiences (what has yet to and may not 
ever occur, articulable only as conjecture), what one has and/or has not seen and what 
one has yet to and possibly may never see. This is the chaotic differential network of a 
subject's current frame of reference. In the particular case of Swinburne's treatment of 
the subject, Robbins notes, 
Before we can begin to talk about something [ or someone], we must know 
what . . .  limits it, defines it, frames it. What is at stake is the possibility of 
communication, the sending of messages across the frame from the picture 
to the world, or from selt7selves to (the) other(s) . . . .  The frame is not a 
pure limit, but a series of mo(ve)ments, events, in time and space, strung 
28 '"About', as a preposition, offers us at least two modes of qualification-of time and space-which are 
also merely approximation," leading us to question "circumlocution (talking about) and circumscription 
(writing about) in order to think about the ways in which a subject may be circumlocated-pJaced in terms 
of what is (spoken or written) around or about it" (Robbins 42). 
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together or kept rigorously apart: it is several instances of the preposition 
'about' ,  multiple approximations. ( 43) 
Because the Swinburnian subject is a circuitous "series of mo(ve)ments, events in time 
and space"-movements which sometimes seem to lack a m�nifest continuity-many 
critics have disparaged Swinburne's characters for lacking a discernible "internal centre." 
In doing so, though, these critics fail to acknowledge that the speaking subject of a 
Swinburne poem has for his/her virtual "internal centre" a kind of "tumultuous energy'' 
(Rooksby, "Centre" 28}' generated by the constant establishment and subsequent 
absorption of the limitations of the "self' or ego in the cycle of serial identification. The . 
Swinbumian subject refuses to be defined by the limits s/he cannot transcend, so s/he 
perpetually lurks "about" these limits, recasting them with every tum of the identificatory 
cycle, finding some gratification in the drive-like persistence. In this cycle, the 
emergence of an expanded ego and the fragmentation of the ego coincide.29 The ego 
seems large enough to encompass the compilation of dissonant identities it encounters, 
but it also becomes fragmented by the repetitive substitutions of the extraneous serial 
"selves" for its own. In other words, the ego expands to accommodate the very 
misrecognitions that fragment it. The ego is situated "about" its own dissolution. 
In similar vein, then, Swinburne's historical figures are situated "about" their 
usual contexts in traditional historical narratives. The frame of the conventional narrative 
is Swinburne's point of departure. From there, he gestures at the traces of the Real in his 
poetic subjects, the remainder of the dissolute ego stuck in the grand concourse of 
29 My analysis here is based on Zizek's assertion that the Cartesian cogito-the "pure thought" and "its 
bodily remainder" -is the site where "emergence and loss," or the "void of self-relating negativity," 
coincide (Plague 12-13). 
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meconnaissance the subjects of his poems have become, by inventing discourse threads 
which teasingly point toward what the reader will never fully know about those poetic 
subjects. Swinburne cannot, of course, represent that which exceeds historical, textual 
representation altogether, or the aspects of the subject -that the spectator/reader will never 
quite see. However, he is aware that when one creates a representative figure, one 
involuntarily creates the excess lurking "about" the figure as �ell. 
As I mentioned previously, the outstanding example of the fluid textual 
explorations "about" subjectivity is Lucrezia Borgia of"A Ballad of Death." 
Swinburne's Borgia, the first "Lady of Pain" one encounters in the Poems and Ballads, 
First Series, serves as a template for the endless deflection of self-certainty and the 
refusal to resolve desire falsely through the temporality of fantasy. In a somewhat 
restrictive fashion, Peter Anderson reads the motion of serial identification in the poem as 
futile activity simply marking "the essential empti�ess of the beautiful image," which is 
offered to the spectator/reader only "to be mourned as the lost object of desire" ("Sterile" 
19). In his disparagement, though, Anderson dismisses the critical importance of the 
"emptiness" Lucrezia Borgia symbolizes in the poem. Swinburne's "Borgia" is a study 
of the network of differential traces that once constituted the real-life subject that was 
Borgia, complicated not only by the spectator/reader's navigation of the traces of Borgia 
sustained and created by history books but also by the spectator/reader's awareness that 
Swinburne's "Borgia" is not the historical Borgia but a figure created about Borgia. 
The speaker in the "Ballad of Death" circumlocates Borgia by imploring the 
personified Love, the ostensible audience for his speech also seeking audience with the 
princess, to "Cover thy lips and eyelids" and "let thine ears / Be filled with rumour of 
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people sorrowing" (lines 4-5), immediately establi shing that the "real'' Borgia will not 
hear the invocations made in her name or be physically seen. Only by attuning oneself to 
a symphony of aural components-like the music which Adorno attests "is a non­
conceptual, non-discursive language which . . .  represents the social world outside it" in a 
kind of "re-presentation [that] can be more than a simple mirroring" (Jay, Adorno 1 33)­
can one reinvoke the dead princess via the imagination, to be seen only in "the mind's 
eye." Anderson astutely notes that Swinburne chooses Borgia to demonstrate his 
departure fro� the Pre-Raphaelite treatment of historical subjects: instead of the 
"sublime" idealism of Rossetti 's medievalism, Swinburne offers "a counter ideal of a 
lurid and bloodstained Renaissance" ("Sterile" 19). However, this is not exactly 
"Swinburne' s nostalgia for the lost licentiousness of the aristocracy" of the 
Renaissance/baroque epochs, as Anderson simplifies it ( 1 9), but it is a treatment of 
nostalgia nonetheless. Anderson convicts Swinburne of looking at the "licentiousness" of 
the Renaissance/baroque aristocracy as a "nai've other" enchanted by the illusion that, in 
Swinburne's very fascination with Borgia, Swinburne sees in her his own gaze-as if he 
can see the world as Borgia had seen it. In Anderson's reading, then, Swinburne's Borgia 
seems very much like a copy of one of Dante Gabriel Rossetti' s  Pre-Raphaelite historical 
subjects, a subject who inhabits a world already re-enchanted by the "creative principle" 
of art30 conveyed through the aestheticizing gaze of the individual artist. But, as much as 
the Pre-Raphaelite artists like Rossetti wanted their idealized depictions of history to 
project "aura or 'mystery, ,,, this ends up becoming "a reifying process of aestheticization 
. . .  which purchases a frozen aesthetic moment, or a 'moment's monument"' within the 
30 See Dialectic of Enlightenment 5. 
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gaze "at the price of life in real time" (Barclay 1 9). However, Anderson, despite his · 
important claim that Swinburne's nostalgia is not the Pre-Raphaelite version, does not 
consider how Swinburne very pointedly plays with the concept of the Pre-Raphaelites' 
failure to re-enchant the world through nostalgia. 
In a different way, Swinburne presents hi.s historical subject as object of the 
speaker's gaze, demonstrating his awareness that the speaker (as well as the reader) will 
"apprehend" Borgia "as an object at a certain distance . . .  which escapes [the speaker] 
inasmuch as it unfolds about itself its own distances" (Sartre 343). The object, as 
"other," is paradoxically very distant fro.m the speaker and yet an interloper in the 
"space" in which the speaker establishes his own subject position; concurrently, the 
speaker must redefin� that space as organized around this other, tnough there is 
something about the space-and the other who affects it-which escapes definition 
altogether. Borgia escapes total definition because she is 'something he cannot actually 
see; when the speaker says, "O Love, thou knowest if she were good to see" 
(line 21 ), he implies that "Love" sees what he cannot, or that which exceeds usual human 
vision. Swinburne's speaker, unlike his Pre-Raphaelite poetic counterparts, 
acknowledges the screen, or the "opaque" space which mediates between self and other, 
making actual rapport impossible {Lacan, Concepts 96). Here "Love" is not only, like 
the screen, mediates between the speaker and Borgia; "Love" is also an imaginary 
audience, and also the name assigned to the virtual locus of the "self-conscious 
perspectivism"31 in the individual imagination. In such "self-conscious perspectivism," 
31 Tilis is Martin Jay's tenn. See Dqwncast Eyes 188. 
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one tries imaginatively to collapse "the distance between the subjective consciousness" of 
the observer and the object being observed (Jay, Eyes 1 90). 
Moreover, the speaker also addresses "Time," the personification of the virtual 
locus of varying historical narratives: "O Time, thou shalt not find in any land / Til l ,  cast 
out of thine hand, / . . . Another woman fashioned l ike as this" (22-25). Swinburne's 
Borgia is circumlocated by what Adorno, in "Beautiful Passages," calls exakte Phantasie 
or "exact imagination."32 Shierry Weber Nicholsen explains that such a site 
marks the conjunction of knowledge, experience, and aesthetic form . . .  
point[ing] provocatively and explicitly to the relationship between 
exactness-reflecting a truth claim-and the imagination as the agency of 
a subjective and aconceptual experience[,] . . .  emphasizing the 
imagination' s capacity to discover, or produce, truth by reconfiguring the 
material at hand . . . .  (4) 
"Time" wil l  not find another Borgia fashioned as the speaker's Borgia, because the 
speaker's Borgia· exists only in the speaker's "complex relationship to the shifting 
reception" ofLucrezia Borgia in history (Nicholsen 50). That relationship always 
changes as the speaker's current perspective, a kaleidoscopic revision of the traces of 
"Borgia" found not only in the conventional concept of Borgia but also in critique of that 
convention, shifts. In other words, the poem is a site at which we can explore variations 
on the theme ofLucrezia Borgia, "enact[ing] the mo(ve)ment" of the speaker' s imaginary 
encounter with Borgia-which in turn becomes the reader' s encounter-rather than 
32 Here I am following Nicholsen's lead, translating tl1e phrase as "exact imagination" rather than "exact 
fantasy,n because " Adorno (seems to) evoke Kant and tlle aesthetic rather than Freud" (229n9). 
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finding it presented "in a linear or narrative form" (Robbins 46). 33 And all these 
variations are "true": the speaker's implicit claim to have encountered the "true" Borgia 
in his vision is just as defensible as an individual reader's claim to have encountered the 
"true" Borgia in his/her act of reading the poem and thus enacting the "imagination's 
capacity to discover" the "truth,'� which is always in a process of becoming. 
The "Lady of Pain" is the template for this perpetual process of becoming. To 
quote again from Robbins, the "lady" in Swinburne's work is a mirror image for the 
viewer (or reader), "an image in which the viewer's gaze is ever caught between . . .  two 
faces"-the face that is reflected and face doing the reflecting-"searching for clues and 
equivalence in the space-parergon-between them" (50). This is not presented as a 
perfect( ed) mode of vision but as a suggestion of a remediated imaginative vision, 
indicative of an active renegotiation of the limit experience within the multiple 
conjunctions of knowledge, experience, and aesthetic form. In the sixth stanza, 
Swinburne renegotiates the conjunction(s) of satisfaction and dissatisfaction of desire, the 
paradox of finding ecstasy amid alienation, as he describes the permutations of his 
speaker's ever-reflected-and-reflecting gaze reflected in the distorted (or baroque) mirror 
which is Borgia: 
The tears that through her eyelids fell on me 
Made mine own bitter where they ran between . . .  
She saying; Arise, lift up thine eyes and see 
If any glad thing be or any good 
33 Robbins actually uses these phrases in her explication of the poem "Verses: Before a Mirror'' Swinburne 
wrote to accompany Whistler's painting, Symphony in White No. 2 (1 865), but the aesthetic trope of 
"framing" Robbins discovers in the "Verses� is applicable to all Swinburne's poems from this period. 
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Now the best thing is taken forth ofus . . . . (5 1-52, 54-56) 
Borgia's eyes are closed, initial ly suggesting a faiJure to recognize the speaker's desire. 
She cannot, wil l  not, refuses to look at him. Thus she seems to function as a Lacanian 
mirror which 
captures, freezes, and alienates the subject by expatriating him in an image 
that dominates, subjugates, and "suggests" him. On the other hand, and 
simultaneously, it permits him to see himself--that is, to separate himself 
from his image by seeing himself in front of himself. (Borch-Jacobsen 82) 
With eyes wide shut, she redirects the speaker' s gaze back to himself, specifically his 
tears. The speaker' s tears "run between" Borgia's, because there is really no distinction. 
Borgia's tears are the speaker's because Borgia is really the speaker; or, more 
specifically, Borgia is a projection of the speaker's prolifically fragmented ego. 
This is further made evident by the fact that what Borgia "says" in the poem is 
purposefully not set apart from the rest of the verse by the use of inverted commas. On a 
surface level, the speaker seems to disappear in the statement attributed to Borgia, 
"speak[ing] himself as nothing," but, on a deeper level, he uses Borgia as the screen 
through which to enunciate his own "pure desire of self' (Borch-Jacobsen I 08). Desire is 
the "best thing taken forth of us" (line 56): it is not only what allows the individual 
subject to locate him/herself episodically among the "modulation of the signifying chain" 
of the material world, but also to access that which exceeds the common understanding of 
the material world as well-the truth( s) of "what we are as well as what we are not, our 
being and our non-being" (Lacan, Seminar 321 -22). Here, the speaker speaks himself 
cryptically as both what he is and as what he is not (Borgia). In the terms Swinburne 
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introduces in William Blake, the speaker uses the modulations of the "kingdom of 
speech" to enter the "kingdom of dreams" (or, given the presence of Borgia in this case, 
one might suggest "queendom" is the better term here). In the realm of dreams, the 
speaker aspires to access the "magic of enjoyment" which exceeds the material world 
which binds him "to a specific social function and, ultimately, to the self' (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 105). 
The speaker's social function here would be that of a lover-specifically a courtly 
lover. The speaker notes that "At kissing times across her stateliest bed / Kings bowed 
themselves and shed" tears like "Pale wine" (lines 62-64), paying a respectful and 
honorable homage to the "sweet . . .  / Mouth whereby men lived and died" (73-74). To 
these mourning kings, Borgia is the courtly beloved, detached and unattainable. The 
kings are "condemned to remain an asymmetrical non-relationship" with Borgia, who 
remains "an inhuman partner"; as such, the relationship between them and Borgia cannot 
be "transposed into a symmetrical relationship between pure subjects" (Zizek, Metastases 
I 08-09). The speaker, though, attempts to traverse the detachment the other mourners 
have toward her : He throws hiinself upon the corpse in grief, lets his tears "r[un] down I 
Even to the place where many kisses were," and the parting kiss to the deceased becomes 
a series of cunnilingual kisses "fill[ing] the tender interspace" where "the flowers cleave 
apart" (lines 83-84, 87-88). He becomes what Zizek, borrowing from Poe, calls "the imp 
of the perverse"; by imaginatively engaging in necrophiliac activity with Borgia's corpse, 
the speaker "accomplish[es] an act 'only because it is prohibited"' (Metastases 99). This 
is a deliberate parody of funeral be�avior intended to, in the spirit of Sade, reveal not 
only the perversions lurking but also the pervasiveness of excess within social 
---------------------- -- --
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conventions such as acts of mourning. The perversion of Swinburne' s speaker "marks 
the point at which the motivation of an act, as it were, cuts off its . . .  l ink" to external 
reality "and grounds itself solely in the immanent circle of self-reference" (Metastases 
99). 
However, in this circle of self-reference, Swinburne's speaker reinforces the more 
Lacanian "structure of perversion," the "inverted effect" of fantasy in which "the subject 
. . .  determines himself as object, in his encounter with the division of subjectivity" 
(Concepts 1 85). He portrays himself as "the object-instrument of the will-to-enjoy 
(volonte-de-:iouir)--which is not his own will" but the other's; the speaker thus "does not 
pursue his [necrophiliac] activity for his own pleasure" (Zizek, Lacan 108-09) but to 
pleasure Borgia. Whereas Swinburne's other necrophiliac persona, the leper, all but 
admits that his actions are for his own pleasure (which he finds in his very failure to 
fulfill the lack at the center of all constructions of subjectivity), the speaker here is more 
pointedly portrayed as victim of the pleasure of the femme fatale, the embodiment of the 
lack, that fundamental divide which constitutes the subject, whose identity is always 
determined by what/who the subject is not.34 
Because Swinburne's speaker perverts the mourning rituals for Borgia so that 
they become more about the speaker' s sense of lack than the actual loss of Borgia> 
Swinburne> s speaker embodies the melancholia often mistaken for mourning, which is 
obfuscated by mourning rituals and yet exceeds them. Freud established that melancholia 
results when the subject's relationship with the object of his desire/"love," in whom s/he 
is supposed to recognize her/himself and be recognized by the other in tum, proves 
34 See Zizek, Metastases 5 1 .  
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impossible. Rather than redirecting that desire of and for recognition to a new object, the 
subject withdraws it into his/her ego instead. This establishes "an identification of the 
ego with the abandoned object," which can result in "emptying the ego until it is totally 
impoverished" (Freud, "Mourning" 586, 589). Zizek develops this further, explaining, 
[T]he mourner mourns the lost object and kills it a second time through 
symbolizing its loss, while the melancholic is not simply the one who is 
unable to renounce the object but rather the one who kills the object a 
second time (treats it as lost) before the object is actually lost . . . .  [T]he 
melancholic is not primarily the subject fixated on the lost object, unable 
to perform the work of mourning, but rather the subject who possesses the 
object but has lost his desire for it because the cause that made him desire 
the object has withdrawn, lost its efficiency. ("Melancholy" 662) 
Importantly, the melancholic has lost desire for himself: the "object-loss [is] transformed 
into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person"-the subject-as­
object who is lost-is transformed "into a cleavage between the critical activity of the 
ego and the ego as altered by identification" (Freud, "Mourning" 586). Swinburne 
purposefully includes the contrasting detail of the kings to demonstrate the difference 
between melancholy and mourning in the poem. The kings, perhaps Borgia's former 
lovers, move through the conventions of mourning not only to acknowledge the loss of 
Borgia but also to symbolize the loss of their desire-as their desire manifested itself 
through their desire/or her-with the "spikenard bruised for a burnt-offering" (line 65). 
Importantly, the kings are a part of the speaker's fantasy visi�:m; they are meant to 
represent historical men who, unlike the speaker, had known the flesh-and-blood Borgia. 
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They had a physical "object-relationship" with her, a "narcissistic identification" in 
which each king wished to "incorporate" her into himself, that was "shattered" 
("Mourning" 586-87). The speaker, on the other hand, "knows" Borgia only in his 
attempts to weave the historical traces of"Borgia" into an object of his desire. As Borgia 
is not actually present in the poem, "we cannot see what it is," exactly, "that is absorbing 
him so entirely" ("Mourning" 584). So the speaker constantly grasps at these traces 
whose fullness is always already lost to him, demonstrating his fixation on the very 
gesture of loss. 
The speaker's fixation on loss becomes more evident in the stanza immediately 
following the described necrophil iac event. Abruptly, .the speaker's adoration of Borgia 
no longer functions as the central element of the poem, and the speaker's passionate 
fervor suddenly turns bitter. His ecstatic engagement with the beloved shifts into a 
lament that "in the days when God did good to me, / Each part about her was a righteous 
thing," and that "The beauty of her bosom [was] a good deed / In the good days when 
God kept sight ofus" (9 1 -92, 95-96). The cause that made him desire Borgia has 
withdrawn, and, as a result, the speaker withdraws into the kind of melancholy which 
occurs "when we finally get the desired object, but are disappointed in it" (Zizek, 
"Melancholy" 662). The difference is, of course, that the speaker only "gets" the desired 
object in the spectacle of fantasy created in the poem. Nevertheless, even the fantasy of 
"getting"-the artifice intended ostensibly to fulfill  desire-causes the speaker 
disappointment. By invoking God for the first time in the poem, Swinburne motions to 
his use of God in other poems, like "Satia te Sanguine." In "Satia," the God-figure 
symbolizes an absence-which-is-presence in the material world-a function very similar 
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to that of Borgia here. Additionally, "God" reinvokes the catastrophe of meaning, in that 
"God" (as well as Borgia) is the ultimate signifier of aestheti� signifiers. The signifier no 
longer conveys meaning via its appearance, but the abstraction, and sometimes the very 
absence, of definitive meaning. Here, Swinburne seems attached to the very indexical 
gestures that mark the loss of definitive meaning. 
The absence of the definite is marked by the "[s]cars of dam�ge and disruption" 
by which "art desperately negates the closed confines" of the limitations which delineate 
· the "definite" (Adorno, Theory 23). Swinburne gestures towards these scars in the final 
stanza, when his speaker again addresses his ostensible audience, though this time the 
audience is the poem itself, not "Love": 
Now, ballad, gather poppies in thine hands 
And sheaves of brier and many rusted sheaves 
Rain-rotten in rank lands, 
Waste marigold and late unhappy leaves 
And grass that fades ere any of it be mown . . . .  ( 10 1 -05) 
On the surface, this appears a dismal description of encroaching autumn. However, the 
"sheaves" and "leaves" can be read as references to paper, especially the paper upon 
which the poem itself is written. 35 The speaker asks the poem itself to "gather 
poppies"-to numb itself, to diminish its own power and affectiveness. The poem' s 
power is further diminished by the state of the "sheaves" and "leaves" of the manuscript: 
35 Linda McDaniel has also suggested that this is "alternate imagery for printed poetry" (98). However, she 
also contends that the previous lines describing necrophiliac activity should also be read as metapoetic. 
She suggests that we should read Borgia as a metaphor for the book itself, considering "the bosom or 
'parted breast flowers' (to] represent the twi� parted pages of an open book, 'cloven apart' at the 
'interspace' where the pages are bound" (97). 
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rusted, waterlogged, and faded, the poem itself would scarcely be legible. Only a trace 
of the poem would be left on such soggy pages, and if the poem were reduced to a mere 
trace of other intersecting traces, one must begin anew the task of circumlocating Borgia, 
as well as the speaker's  subject position. With the introduction of another trace, the 
viewing/reading spectator's perspective on these figures changes. 
Swinburne chooses to end the poem with a very Hegelian commentary on desire 
itself, imploring the ballad to "Seek out Death's face ere the light altereth, / And say 'My 
master that was thrall to Love / Is become thrall to Death,,, ( 107-09). From one 
perspective, the speaker of the poem ( or a version of Swinburne-as-poet) is the "master" 
and the poem itself the "slave who works for the master," laboring to compress the 
master's affects "in relation to an idea, a concept" (Kojeve 48)-in this case, Borgia. 
From another perspective, the master of the poem "act[s] not for the sake of subjugating a 
thing, but for the sake of subjugating another Desire (for the thing)" (Kojeve 40, italics in 
original) by way of the screen, the locus of mediation between the gaze and the individual 
subject. It is as if the poem has become an other to the speaker, generating its own 
desire-portrayed here as desire for the desired object, Borgia-that competes with the 
speaker's  own. The speaker' s last attempt to subjugate the other's desire is to 
figuratively "kill" the ballad by ending it. Here, one could argue that the speaker 
attempts to move out of melancholy into mourning; for the speaker, mourning the loss of 
Borgia, symbolically kills her a second time with the symbolic "death" of the poem itself 
All these things considered, though, neither Swinburne's  speaker nor his poem can 
compete with the power of death itself, the "absolute master." 
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As mentioned above, the cause ·for Swinburne's  speaker's desire ofi'for Borgia 
suddenly dissipates from the poem, as it is deflected; the speaker realizes that Borgia, like 
the uncanny Beloved of Rossetti's  poems, is a specular image ofhimself.-specifically, 
his real "desire of death," or desire to recognize himself as "pure abysmal ek-stasis in the 
'nothing' of the other's desire" (Dorch-Jacobsen 96). In the conscious creation ofBorgia 
as a fantasy object, Swinburne necessarily must have the speaker experience a "psychic 
reality" in which he realizes that he is "the identificatory character who 'fulfills' [his 
own] wish" as well as realize that identificatory acts "can neither 'fulfill ' the wish nor 
'satisfy' desire" (Borch-Jacobse,n 95-96). Swinburne's speaker wearily bids, "Bow down 
before him [Death], ballad, sigh and groan, / But make no sojourn in thy outgoing; / . . .  
Death shall come in with thee" (1 10- 1 1 ,  1 14). Importantly, the poem can no longer speak 
but merely "sigh and groan." This marks "the boundary" of the poem's "negativity," or 
where the "artwork say[s] what is more than the existing, and . . .  do[es] this exclusively 
by making a constellation of how it is, 'Comment c •est"' : the poem both represents the 
absolute (of desire, death) and keeps it at a distance (Adorno, Theory 132-33). The poem 
itself cannot absolutely signify the truth of desire. But, by constantly transposing each 
member of a group of signifiers that gesture toward the truth of desire, though at a 
distance, the artwork makes a "promise" to attempt to represent what is "yet to be heard, 
yet to be seen, even if it [is] the most fearsome" ( Theory 13 5). 
The "promise" of a meaningful representation of the interplay between drive, 
desire, and the misrecognitions inherent in any act of identity formation, in which we 
may find some satisfaction, is the goal of Swinburne's aesthetic. His Borgia, the 
template for all his poetic identities and identifications, may exist in a "'between ' time 
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and 'between-the-Jines' space"-the virtual space in which we establish subject-positions 
as well as meaning-but she clearly exceeds "her own implied annihilation, her framing 
into art" (Robbins 48). I think Peter Anderson is correct when he says Swinburne's 
poetry is like a Foucauldian "incitement to discourse," but rather than inciting a discourse 
which imputes universality ("Sterile" 20), Swinburne's poetic discourse "is disruptive, 
not only of what we are seeing, but of the who we are that does the seeing" (Robbins 5 1 , 
ital ics hers), as well as the who we are actually looking at. The imaginary portrait of 
Borgia becomes the imaginary portrait of the speaker-as-poet who, in tum, via acts of 
reflection and identification, becomes an imaginary portrait of the spectator/reader at a 
specific time, from a specific perspective. There is a vulnerability in this kind of 
constellative or serial approach to subjectivity, noticed and called nihilistic by Anderson 
and others, in that the plenitude of identifications risks identification entirely. In other 
words, in the constant, deflective deferrals that occur with every attempt to assert 
selfbood in the Swinburnian universe, "Who am I?" seems a hopelessly unanswerable 
question. Yet, as Adorno writes in Endgame, "[N]ihilism implies the opposite of 
identification with nothingness," but the negation inherent in nihil ism can also be "the 
possibility of another world" -or, in this case, a self--"not yet in existence" ( qtd. by 
Zuidervaart 1 59). Re-viewing the constellation of selves serially produced in each poem, 
identity is not irremediably lost; it is present-made possible--as an "interface" between 
multiple impulses toward identification36 with several possible "others." In his article 
critiquing the '"New' Swinburne," Anderson defines this nihilism as "infinite desolation" 
36 This is based on Jonathan Alexander's suggestion that Swinburne's fictional personae are established in 
"the free play of . . .  impulses" like one experiences in a consented-to sadomasochistic encounter: "Identity 
. . .  thus becomes the recognized, not sublimated, interface between simultaneously expressing violent 
impulses and delimiting them" (34). 
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and the "terror of total fragmentation
,
, and accuses other critics of enacting "a denial" of 
its "disintegrative power" (32); in doing so, he ignores how Swinburne's serial 
identifications demonstrate his investiture in constellative practices which create 
conditions of possibility rather than deny them. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Serial Identifications and Constellations: Poems and Ballads' Imaginary Portraits 
"[T]here is a picture for which I would give the eyes out of my head if I could see it 
without them ... . "-Algernon Charles Swinburne 
"[W]e ourselves always stand at the center of these curious pictures. " -Theodor Adorno 
As his portrayal of the complex relationship of the spectator/speaker to Lucrezia 
Borgia in "A Ballad of Death" indicates, Swinburne's pursuit of subjectivity through the 
textual production of a constellation of selves renders identity-the idea of there being an 
individual subject to pursue-vulnerable. If one portrays the subject as a kind of nexus 
of multiple impulses toward identification with several possible "others," one runs the 
risk of presenting a model of subjectivity that seems too fragmented, too disintegrative to 
be actively effective or aesthetically innovative (Anderson, "New" 32); rather than 
allowing the subject the conditions of possibility which more traditional models would 
deny him/her, the subject-as-nexus might seem to be an agent reinforcing the condition of 
impossibility. Many critics have previously noted that Swinburne excelled in the creation 
of pastiche, 1 so much so that the patchwork of various personae and narrative threads in 
his poems seems (to some) disingenuously pieced together, the relationships between the 
borrowed elements calculatingly ambiguous. Some contend that Swinburne' s pastiche is  
self-conscious of itself as such, as pastiche that makes readers suspicious. A 
constellatively produced and serially (re)positioned subject may seem to be another 
version of Swinbumian pastiche, a kaleidoscopic melange which emphasizes its own 
kineticism more so than the important interpretative possibilities presented by each 
1 McGann discusses Swinburne and pastiche in great detail; see Swinburne: An Experiment in Criticism 79-
91.  
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successive constellative connection being made. After all, pastiche is imitation; 
Swinburne's processes of serial identification may seem like imitations of multiple 
possibilities for identity-formation rather than actual possibilities. That being said, one 
must consider that, for Swinburne, pastiche-in the forms ofimitation, allusion, and 
translation-was among the "essential marks of the poetic life" (McGann, Swinburne 
81 ). Swinburne himself called it "[t]he miraculous faculty of transfusion" which "is the 
kind of test which stamps the supremacy of an artist" (Essays 16-77}-a transfusion of 
(re)discovered and unexpected possibilities into established forms and once-familiar 
personae. Swinburne, like Adorno after him, held fast to the belief that art "cannot be 
isolated from expression, and there is no expression without a subject" (Theory 42); 
believing in the multiple possibilities inherent in any single expression, he thus wanted to 
represent a subject constituted by the very multiple possibilities s/he expresses. 
Swinburne practices this kind of literary transfusion _in his recreations of historical 
and mythological characters-his "Ladies of Pain"-in the Poems and Ballads. He 
renders all these figures as monadic structures. As such, each character portrayed in 
Swinburne's monologues functions as an ideogram which attempts to gesture at the 
original version of the character, either the "real" historical person or the character as she 
appeared in the very first account of the myth-though that original version is continually 
displaced by the variants of the historical and mythological narratives that have 
developed over time, variants which are also accounted for ideogrammatically. This 
technique is not just a synechdochic practice in which one narrative strand is offered as 
the whole or "true" narrative; instead, it is a practice in which Swinburne attempts to 
crystallize the process of the variant narratives paradoxically differentiating from and 
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intertwining with one another. In other words, Swinburne creates the "Lady of Pain" to 
demonstrate that the individual figure is always multiple, always a conglomeration of the 
processes of serial identification. 
In his recreations of historical women, Swinburne is primarily concerned with 
revealing how historical narratives fai l to account for or to represent adequately the 
desires of history's human subjects; he seems to have understood that human history is 
just as much "the history of a constant alienation of desire in the desire of the other" 
(Barch-Jacobsen 90) as it is descriptions of the actions notable people took in past events. 
Therefore, Swinburne' s historical portraits become spaces in which he represents the 
perpetual human desire for recognition (of one's desire) as it shapes and interplays with 
! . 
conventional historical narration. However, Swinburne treats his mythological figures 
somewhat differently from the way he treats his historical ones. His mythological 
portraits, like his historical portraits, are sites in which he explores how desire shapes and 
interplays with the development and continuation of narrative, as well; but, they are also 
sites in which he explores the specifically tragic dimensions of desire. Whereas 
Swinburne presents his historical women with an awareness that their very narratives 
function to eterna1ize them, he imbues his mythic women with an awareness of the limits 
of expressing human desire and the dissatisfaction caused by experiencing those limits. 
As Lacan would say, the mythic characters demonstrate awareness that "life . . .  is 
[always] about to turn into certain death, a death lived by anticipation, a death that 
crosses over into the sphere of life, a life that moves into the realm of death" (Seminar 
248). 
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Historical Portraits: Sappho and Faustine 
Swinburne' s most celebrated literary transfusion of a historical figure occurs in 
"Anactoria," which is probably the selection from the Poems and Ballads that has 
received the most critical attention The speaker in this poem, Sappho, is a familiar 
legendary heroine who, presented as a constellative chain of possibilities throughout the 
poem, becomes increasingly defamiliarized. Once defamiliarized, she can "claim that 'I 
am Metaphor"' because, no longer limited by conventional narrative, Swinburne's 
Sappho can entertain multiple variants of the legend of Sappho, yet each version i s  
presented in  terms of a previous or "other" version; in  this way, Sappho "mirror[s] 
multiple perspectives at once" (Wagner-Lawlor 9 1 7- 1 8). 
Swinburne knew the multiple histories and fictions framing the figure of Sappho 
well. What we supposedly know of the "real" Sappho is deduced from the fragmented 
remnants of her poetry, which are but traces and probable fictions in and of themselves. 
The "historical" accounts of her life appearing in later works are mostly suspect. Ovid, 
for example, reinvented Sappho as an ideally tragic poetess, a heterosexual woman who 
committed suicide because her love for a ferryman, Phaon, was unrequited. Renaissance 
writer John Lyly represented Sappho as a double for Elizabeth I, the "Virgin Queen," 
idyllically renouncing her sexuality for the sake of duty.2 Lylf s presentation was a kind 
of model for the normative version of Sappho presented in the classical scholarship 
Swinburne studied at Eton: he was taught that Sappho was a model of purity and chastity, 
a poet and schoolmistress who lived the life of the mind by conceding, or at least de-
2 In Sapho and Phao, first performed for Queen Elizabeth and her court and subsequently printed in 1584, 
Sappho abandons Phaon to preserve her chastity and accept her duty as foster-mother to Cupid. Given 
Swinburne's literary interests in the Renaissance and in euphuis� it is safe to assume that Swinburne was 
familiar with Lyly's play. 
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eroticizing, bodily pleasures. 3 However, Swinburne was familiar with the invocation of 
Sappho and/or "her sisters" in decadent French poetry-specifically, Baudelaire's and 
Gautier's respective uses of"lesbian personae . . .  [to] cross over into the forbidden 
. territory of feminine feeling and bodily sensation" (Dellamora 75)-and this invocation 
is the primary framing device here. 4 Swinburne counts on his reader's  initial perspective 
of Sappho having been skewed by these multiple distorted accounts provided by previous 
writers. His poem acts as an anamorphotic mirror in which these multiple distortions of 
the "real" character of Sappho can be brought together in a variety of constellated 
patterns, reflected into each other, and then refracted away from the reader's perspective 
to suggest that the "real" Sappho will always deflect their gaze, inasmuch as the one, true, 
"real" Sappho is not accessible, or even present( ed), here. Swinburne goes to great 
lengths to suggest that Sappho-like any subject, in historical or mythical narratives, or 
in "real l ife"-is a cipher of multiplicity. 
As he does in the other selections in the Poems and Ballads, Swinburne proposes 
the multiplicities of subjectivity by presenting his speaking subject in relationship to an 
other, a beloved who is both present and absent. Unlike in the "Ballad of Death," in 
which the audience ("Love") was a separate entity from the beloved, in "Anactoria" the 
ostensible audience is the beloved. And, whereas in the "Ballad of Death" the virtual 
3 Swinburne once remarked that the "fragments of Sappho . . .  (that) were part of the classical syllabus of 
boys in England's leading public schools . . .  (were those) 'which the Fates and the Christians have spared 
us"' (Rooksby, Life 142). 
4 No recollections provided in any of the Swinburne biographies or in his collected letters indicate that 
Swinburne had read Mary Robinson's Sappho and Phaon ( 1796). Perhaps this is not surprisin& since, as 
Jerome McGann indicates. "Robinson's work had little influence on subsequent treatments of Sappho" 
("Robinson" 55). However. as Robinson's poem portrays "Sappho's own desire" and elaborates "a fully 
conscious eroticism" ("Robinson" 73), it seems equally surprising that Swinburne would not have had 
knowledge of the poem-especially considering Swinburne's grea� lifelong interest in all things pertaining 
to Sappho. 
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presence of Borgia was marked by the speaker' s "dream vision" of her, Anactoria is 
present only as she i s  framed by Sappho's descriptions of her. ·Anactoria is found only in 
"aboutness," inasmuch as the poem is "about" her;5 Sappho, more so than the speaker of 
the "Ballad," realizes the power she can wield within discourse to both create and dispel 
the fantasies of sustaining and satisfying her own desire. Sappho is not eager to share 
this power, though, as she implores Anactoria to "sigh not, speak not, draw not breath" 
(line 5)--in short, Sappho warns Anactoria not to make a sound. Consequently, the 
virtual Anactoria remains silent throughout the entire poem (unlike the virtual Borgia, 
who is given somewhat of an entry into the speaker's language in the "Ballad of Death"). 
If Sappho were to give Anactoria entry into discourse, Sappho could not continue 
to exude what David Riede would call "Romantic authority," or the "il limitable 
ambitions" and power of artistic creation, over her: for Sappho, "communicat[ing] even 
uncertainties in tones of certainty, . . .  can only be done by writing"-or, in this  case, 
speaking-"within a 'world of poetry' that is removed from the world of [ material] 
actualities" (''Authority" 22, 37). Anactoria is circumscribed in Sappho' s  description of 
her own desire. Anactoria' s "body is the song," her "mouth the music" (lines 75-76): 
here Swinburne again emphasizes the poem's existence on the very margins of 
materiality-the poem is a "song," a form of art without physical or visual body, rather 
5 David Cook has argued that "the presence or absence of a listener in Swinburne's poem must remain an 
open question, for so many of Sappho's lines are addressed to Anactoria not in apostrophe but very much 
as if she were on the scene and capable of responding" (85, emphasis mine). I find Cook's use of the 
phrase "as if' quite telling, for it seems to contradict his insistence on leaving the matter open. Instead, the 
"as if' suggests that Anactoria is a likeness, or a virtual presence, which is about the paradox of 
representing the presence and absence of a desired "other" simultaneously. Moreover, Swinburne has 
based this poem on Sappho;s poem "Anactoria" (also translated as "To an Army Wife") in which Sappho 
laments the loss of the already-absent Anactoria yet conjures up a specific visual likeness of her by 
employing both memory and imaginatioa 
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than a physical, visual artwork inscribed upon a page.6 But this is a body, a mouth, 
completely of Sappho's design and under Sappho's  control . Sappho is quick to add, 
"[T]hou art more than I, / Though my voice die not till the whole world die" (76-77). 
Anactoria is "more than" Sappho because she is the symbol of Sappho as herself and as 
other. In other words, Anactoria is the "paradoxical 'mirror"' in which Sappho can "give 
body" to her desire yet create a body-within the poem, and/or the body of the poem 
itself.-"that, this time, would no longer be the image of the body," per se (Borch­
Jacobsen 232). 
As Allison Pease observes, "Bodies are de�cribed [here] . . .  not as physical 
artifacts, but rather as one great"-and I would ad� virtual-"body of desire, a series of 
metonyms" ( 49). The (intact) physical human body itself conventionally suggests a kind 
of material unity, a completeness; it also suggests the hierarchy of the universal over the 
particular, insofar as, although the details of individual bodies differ, they al l share the 
same general shape and set of characteristics. But, if the body is  treated as a metonym, 
signifying a virtual rather than actual body (of desire), the descriptions of the body itself 
reveal "the illusion that the power of fascination" and desire "belongs to the object [ or 
body] as such" (Zizek, lAcan 33). Moreover, it demonstrates that the body has no real 
material unity; instead, it is a structure like al l others in the symbolic field: "always 
already barred, crippled, porous, structured around some extimate kernel, some 
impossibil ity" (lAcan 33). As Adorno establishes in his Aesthetic Theory, "The material 
unity of artworks is al l the more illusory the more its forms and elements . . .  do not 
6 Swinburne also alludes to the fact that Sappho's poetry originally was intended as an aural art fonn; her 
initial audience would hear the poem in recitation. Only later were the written poems pasted into scrolls. 
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emerge immediately from the complexion of the individual work" ( 1 86). The bodies 
Sappho constructs in her monologu�her own body, Anactoria's body, the body of the 
poem-have no real distinction, nor are they unified. They emerge gradually, 
incompletely, abstractly. Each is a particularized fragment circumlocating "the great 
body of desire," gesturing toward the possibility of representing what is impossible to 
truly represent in material form or symbol :  all the possibilities of finding pleasure in the 
quest to satiate an ultim.ately insatiable desire. 
Swinburne employs the fragmentation of and confusion between the bodies in this 
poem, so that the individual reader can arrange them in a constellative pattern, 
subsequently envisioning one or more possible relationships between them and thus find 
his/her own "meaning" in the poem. Jennifer Wagner-Lawlor astutely argues that the 
confusion of these aestheticized virtual bodies acts as "a kind of metaphorical 
' indiscretion"' marked by "that problematic crossing of subject ('I') and object ('you')," 
but she reduces it to a "symptom of warring impulses within a single metaphoric field" 
(920). I would contend that the metaphoric or symbolic field, due to its fragmented and 
porous quality, is never "single"; though we use the singular form ("field") to name it, 
this field is a multiplicity of possible fields not reducible to a singularity (yet represented 
by a term that suggests singularity). The bodies in "Anactoria" demonstrate that the 
metaphoric visual image can no longer occupy merely one place, or function in just one 
field of signification, in an artwork. Any conventional metaphoric images of unity, such 
as images of bodies joined in sexual intimacy, speak only to the dissonance inherent in 
that supposed unity of self and other, signifier a�d signified, subject and object. 
Swinburne deliberately repudiates the conventional use of sexual metaphor by presenting 
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sexual activity in this poem as sadistic, vampiric, �nnibalistic. He must "disrup[t] the 
sexual fantasy of ecstasy and incarnation, in which ·the ideal becomes body' (Wagner­
Lawlor 920) and attempt to demonstrate that those very disruptions of the ideal are the 
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most aesthetically crucial because the failure of th� sexual fantasy to realize the ideal 
revives the plenitude of possibil ity. 
The ideal fails to become embodied in the scene of Sappho's  sexual fantasy, in 
which Sappho literal ly wants to devour Anactoria and become Anactoria incarnate. 
Sappho initially creates the fantasy as a means of transcending the separation between the 
desiring "f'/"eye" and the desired "you"/object of the gaze. To do so, Sappho must 
imagine that her "lips were tuneless lips," silenced as Anactoria is silent; moreover, 
Sappho imagines Anactoria as the agent of her silencing, as Sappho is si lenced by 
pressing her lips "To the bruised blossom of [Anactoria's] scourged white breast" {lines 
1 05-06). In the fantasy of her own silence, Sappho imagines herself surrendering control 
of her own mouth, which creates the "song"-the poem-which not only circumscribes 
the body of Anactoria but establishes Sappho's own presence. In silence, the mouth that 
creates the poem, which gives it presence, would paradoxically create absence in the 
cessation of speech (as the poem would cease to exist, here, if Sappho were silenced), 
which is why Swinburne employs copious imagery of consumption: 
Ah that my mouth for Muses' milk were fed 
On the sweet blood thy sweet small wounds had bledf 
. . .  That 1 could drink thy veins as wine, and eat 
Thy breasts like honeyf that from face to feet 
Thy body were abolished and consumed, 
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And in my flesh thy very flesh entombed! (1 07-08, 1 1 1 - 14) 
Though Swinburne creates very visual images of vampirism and cannibalism, he has 
S�ppho articulate them in specifically oral terms to indicate that poetic vision is a process 
of attempting to represent visually those sensations that cannot really be seen (i .e., one 
can "watch" this process, but stil l  not know how it would really feel to be engaged in this 
activity). In this cannibalistic "confusion ofbodies,n the mouth mimics the activity of the 
gazing eye in that it wants to envelop and consume its object. But the mouth here also 
achieves what the gazing eye cannot: when the subject engages in the act of consuming 
the other, the image of the subject's desire emblematically receives the object of her 
desire, implying that the subject is no longer "frustrated by an object in which [her] desire 
is alienated," an object which represents the subject's alienation from pleasure, from 
enjoyment (Lacan, Ecrits 42). 
Thus the mouth, transposing the eye, functions much like what Derrida calls the 
embouchure: the "mouth or outlet" that is the virtual locus of all correlations made in the 
metaphoric field of poetry-virtual in that it "can no longer be situated in a typology of 
the body but seeks to organize all the sites and to localize all the organs" 
("Economimesis" 277, 282) in a site about the body. To apply this more directly to the 
poem, the virtual locus of the poem itself can no longer be situated in the trope of the 
body, neither Sappho's own or Anactoria' s virtual body. Even more, Sappho cannot 
situate her subject-position with any precision in the body of her poem nor in the other 
body (Anactoria's) she has created for herself, nor can she decidedly circumlocate her 
desire in any of these aforementioned bodies. In her fantasy of devouring Anactoria, 
Sappho attempts to localize in herself all the various aesthetic p�icularities generated 
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within the poem. Her mouth is an embouchure which consumes particular elements of 
art to (re )emit them as an individualized expression, inasmuch as her expression 
reorganizes those particular elements into a different constellated pattern. In other words, 
and to reinvoke Swinburne's cannibalistic image, Sappho wishes to consume the 
particular elements which comprise "Anactoria" so that she may (re)emit a different 
expression or version of" Anactoria"-a version which is more pointedly "Anactoria-as­
Sappho." The Swinburnian embouchure, then, is an eye/mouth hybrid, an orifice that the 
subject both sees through and senses with, and then emits the affect of the experience. 
With the embouchure, Swinburne does not intend to provide an easy solution for 
the "problems of identity and temporality" by conjuring a kind of deus ex machina in a 
trope meant to induce a subsuming "imaginative transcendence" (Wagner-Lawlor 9 18, 
924). In fact, the Deus in the poem is woefully unable to transcend : -"Him would I reach, 
hill) smite, him desecrate, / Pierce the cold lips of God with human breath, / And mix his 
immortality with death" (1 82-84). Like the God of the "Ballad of Death," Sappho's God 
has left the world;7 and, like the Beloved's crucifixion of the Christ figure in "Satia te 
Sanguine," Sappho's attempt to "kill" God reveals itself as an empty sacrifice. To 
Sappho, he is but a lacuna, like Anactoria, though he lacks the fluid materiality Sappho 
ascribes to Anactoria. In her deliberately enounced transgression of an absent authority 
figure, then, Sappho transgresses nothing (no thing) but the idea of a Godlike 
transcendence. She can imagine what it might be like to "be one with" everything in the 
world, "With all the high things forever" (lines 276-77). However, this dream vision of 
7 "Anactoria," lines 175-77: "Hath he not sent us hunger? who hath cursed / Spirit and flesh with longing? 
filled with thirst / Their lips who cried unto him?" 
1 80 
wholeness is always tempered by her admission that it is one of many possible, subjective 
renderings of the feelings, ideas, sights, sounds, experiences she has taken in and 
subsequently (re-)expressed: hence the poem's most famous line, "Memories shall mix 
and metaphors of me" (2 14). The very personal quality of the vision of transcendence 
here is its own limitation: one can never transcend the self, even if one situates her 
subject position in a virtual, fantasy space. 
The canon of Swinburne criticism is overwhelmed with various interpretations of 
�his cryptic line. I agree with Jennifer Wagner-Lawlor that it "points to a central 
problematic of the poem" (922). She claims that the problem is the poem's "central 
indiscretions-the conflict between states of love (I/you), of life (body/spirit), and of 
metaphor itself (identity/nonidentity)" (922). Concurrently, Thais Morgan argues that the 
central problem is that the very sexualized version of Christian sacrifice portrayed in the 
poem destroys binary categories; that in the physical contact Swinburne envisions 
between Sappho and God, '"Memories' of the deep relationship between religious and 
sexual 'metaphors,' between desire for God and desire for erotic . . .  pleasure, wil l  trouble 
the reader until he or she is no longer sure" of any demarcations ("Dramatic" 1 84). 
Wagner-Lawlor and Morgan both effectively recognize Swinburne's poem as a careful 
study in binarism, but they both portray the binaries in the poem as static. Even if the 
demarcations get blurred, as Morgan observes, Morgan's  assumption is that those 
demarcations are stil l  there, just not apparent in Swinburne's blurry perspective. Morgan 
also assumes that Swinburne provides his reader with one specific perspective to employ 
while reading the poem; but, as I argue above, such is not the case. Rather, I prefer to 
reconsider Allison Pease's suggestion that Swinburne creates "semantically and 
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physically ambiguous" aesthetic bodies, bodies whose very indeterminacy allows them to 
exceed constructed conventions of gender and sexuality (50). Such ambiguous bodies 
illustrate how demarcations between conventionally binary categories are just as 
semantically and physically ambiguous here. As they were for Dante Gabriel Rossetti, 
the margins dividing separate elements in a sequence, separate narratives, separate 
identities and desires are constantly negotiable for Swinburne. The margins between 
Sappho and God, Sappho and Anactoria, Sappho and the poem are constantly 
renegotiated here as well . The reader navigates through the ambiguities, individually 
ascertaining how the "memories mix"-specifically, the cultural collective versions or 
"memories" of the historical Sappho-and produce the "metaphors of me": not only the 
"f'/"me" which demarcates the character/persona of Sappho, but the "f'/"me" which 
demarcates the reader. 
In these "metaphors of me," the reader/Swinburne explores a kind of Adornian 
non-identity, which 
doesn't  just mean the opposite of identity . . .  or what doesn't fit into 
certain categories, which is usual ly just a metaphor for a different identity, 
but refers to what escapes or eludes every sort of identity . . .  which 
nevertheless exists in the shadow or penumbra of identity, as the fleeting 
reminder or glimpse of unrealized possibilities, of what that identity 
locked out, excluded, or can't quite become. (Redmond online) 
Sappho, the Swinburnian "Lady of Pain" in this poem, is the metaphoric site establishing 
the non-identity of both the speaking subject and the reading/viewing subject. Sappho is 
more than the locus of all the historical trace narratives surrounding her persona; she is 
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more than what those traces gesture at. She offers a glimpse of the unrealized 
possibilities of everything "Sappho" could ever possibly represent. Swinburne does not 
offer his Sappho as just another different way of identifying Sappho; she is every possible 
way one could identify Sappho. The spectator/reader, led through a kaleidoscopic 
process of identifying "Sappho," can perhaps consider his or her own identity-his or her 
own "metaphors of me"-just as kaleidoscopically. Importantly, though, Swinburne's 
Sappho cannot "sing" what she has excluded in her auto-enunciation, what she cannot 
quite or has yet to become. At the poem's end, Sappho admits that her metaphoric, 
poetic language is the "Lotus and Lethe on [her] lips like dew"; with every enunciation 
she speaks one possibility only to exclude or to eclipse another, the penumbra of which 
remains elusively "shed around and over and under" her, an ambiguity like "Thick 
darkness and the insuperable sea" (lines 302-04). 
Swinburne's "Faustine" offers another treatment of history, identity, and the 
· penumbra which exceeds such constructs. In "Faustine," though, Swinburne is able to 
explore the problematics of historical representation more explicitly than he does in 
"Anactoria," since "Anactoria" is a poem which becomes more about the aestheticized 
psychology of the relationship between desiring subject and desired object than the 
continual displacement of the historical subject within the historical narratives that frame 
and circumlocate her. In tone and presentation, then, "Faustine" arguably resembles the 
"Ballad of Death" more than "Anactoria," in that the speaker of"Faustine" passionately 
addresses a deceased historical figure. Like Lucrezia Borgia, both Roman Empresses 
Faustina-Faustina the Elder, wife of Emperor Antonius Pius, and their daughter, 
Faustina the Younger-are primarily historicized as figures of sexual scandal . Due to 
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Swinburne's considerable knowledge of and interest in the ancient world, his failure to 
specify which Faustina he writes about should be read as intentional and not accidental, 
suggesting yet another aspect of play in the precarious act of producing and recognizing 
identity. 
Faustina the Elder was principally known for her charity work throughout her 
husband's  reign; however, the elder Faustina became a figure of sexual depravity when 
her daughter (her namesake) did. Faustina the Younger was more politically active; she 
notably accompanied her husband, Marcus Aurelius, during most of his military 
campaigns. Some historical reports claim Faustina's devotion to her husband gained her 
the admiration of her husband' s  soldiers, who nicknamed her Matri Castrorum, "Mother 
of the Camp." Other accounts, like that offered by historian Sextus Aure1ius Victor, 
claim that Faustina indulged in innumerable and sordid extramarital affairs with the 
soldiers. 8 Oppositionally, though, Marcus Aurelius in his personal diaries describes his 
marriage as hannonious, and Fausti�a as "so obedient, so affectionate, so genuine" ( qtd. 
by Bums online). Swinburne claimed to have written the poem after meeting a woman 
whose face reminded him of the profiles of Faustina printed on ancient Roman coins,9 
which places him in a position not unlike his Sappho: from the "memories that mixed"­
not only Swinburne's memory of the woman with a Faustinian profile, but also his 
8 Following the title, Swinburne has appended "Ave Faustina Jmperatrix, morituri te salutant." As Marilyn 
Woroner Fisch has noted, this is "the very salutation addressed to Caesar by the g)adiators 'about to die"' 
( 1 ). The speaker assumes the role of the gladiator saluting his empress here; interestingly enough, one of 
the claims made by Faustina the Younger's detractors (a claim recorded in the HistoriaAugusta) was that 
her son, the Emperor Commodus, was fathered not by Marcus Aurelius but by one of his favorite 
f.adiators. 
Swinburne gives this as his inspiration for writing "Faustine" in his "Notes on Poems and Reviews" 
(365). However, this contradicts Frederick Sandys's earlier account, in which he claimed that Swinburne 
wrote "Faustine" while he and Swinburne were on a train; to pass the time, they decided to see who could 
write more lines of poetry using that specific name. (See ·momas 80.) 
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memories of the various historical accounts of the empresses he had read during his 
studies, and how the ancient historians themselves had let the accounts of each Faustina 
mix together-he creates a virtual (re)presentation of a Roman Empress which 
incorporates not only a11 he knows about each Faustina but also gestures toward what he 
can never really know about either one of them. In other words, Swinburne gestures 
toward the impossibility of desire: just as desire functions "not to realize its goal . . .  but to 
reproduce itself as desire" (Zizek, Plague 39), Swinburne' s "Faustine" functions not to 
realize the goal of determining all there is to know about the empresses Faustina, but to 
reproduce, continual1y and serially, variant versions of"Faustine." 
As David Riede notes, Swinburne adapts the "the He11enic and Roman idea of 
cyclical alternation in generations" to his purposes here (Study 53), but this is not exactly 
· a case of a Roman Empress being born again in Victorian England. Like the other 
historical women presented in Poems and Ballads, Swinburne's Faustine is the figure 
representing the multitude of alternating possibilities of representing "Faustina," even if 
every one of those alternate possibilities is not in itself avai lable for aesthetic 
representation. By circumlocating the empress(es) Faustina in the "Faustine" of his 
poem, which was in tum supposedly circumlocated by an otherwise unnamed 
contemporary woman, Swinburne uses Faustine to enact "a process of alienation [and] 
divestiture of the self' or the subject position (Nicholsen 52), as Faustine is a multitude of 
possible "selves" shadowing the illusory constant "self' suggested by the singular name. 
Swinburne beckons the reader to "look" at Faustine, to see what (as Norman Bryson 
would say) exceeds the ideological screen which limits the perspective used to "view" 
Faustine. The speaker of Swinburne's poem tells Faustine, "You have the face that suits 
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a woman / For her soul 's screen" (4 1-42), indicating that the face marking Faustine' s 
identity limits the expression of "soul," or spirit, in her aesthetic representation. 
Faustine's face marks her function as imago in the poem: her image represents the 
perpetual "pregnant moment" of the poem itself, which resists its own concrete or 
material representation, beckoning the imagination not to hypostatize simply in the 
poem's "historical content" (Adorno, Theory 85) but to strive to exceed it. Faustine is an 
aesthetic image or, rather, a series of aesthetic images that "are not fixed, archaic 
invariants" already determined by conventional historical narratives ('f'heory 85-86); 
however, because Swinburne's  Faustine refuses to be determined by narrative, she must 
fail to be determined sufficiently as plenitude within the poem, too. The imago of 
Faustine-as object of desire-may be the "goal," but the goal of desire cannot be 
obtained (Theory 85). Consequently, by describing Faustine as "A queen whose kingdom 
ebbs and shifts / Each week" in the constant recapitulation of"Wine and rank poison, 
milk and blood, / Being mixed therein" ( I  1 - 12, 17-1 8}, Swinburne suggests that she 
ultimately eludes his attempts to des�ribe her in her multiplicity. 
At first, the speaker of the poem declares, "You come back face to face with us, / 
The same Faustine" (63-64, emphasis mine). But, as he moves through various 
descriptions of the possible motivations and explanations for her return-"the slain man's 
blood and breath" which revived her (line 67), "the bitter lust / That galled" her (75-76), 
her rebellion against the "dust and din" of "years entomb[ ed]" (8 1 -82}-he finally 
realizes this Faustine is never the "same" at all .  He poses two seemingly innocuous 
questions which actually demonstrate that the object of his desire eludes him in his 
monologue: "Where are the imperial years? and how / Are you Faustine?" (87-88). In 
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asking the first question, the speaker notes the passing of ancient Rome; in doing so, he 
separates those "imperial years" of ancient Rome from the time and place from which he 
speaks to Faustine. In doing so, on one hand, the speaker insinuates that continuing to 
place Faustine overtly in those "imperial years" will only reduce her to her external 
history; 10 on the other hand, though, he paradoxically reinforces Faustine's relationship to 
that external history, a history he cannot access directly or depict with accuracy. Because 
he can grant her only partial-and paradoxical, as it is wholly artificial-liberation from 
the external historical narratives of the empress(es) Faustina, then, the speaker must ask 
her the second question, in which he implores her to re-establish her identity, to 
determine, how is she Faustine? To ask the question differently, how can she be the 
Faustine of those "imperial years" if those years are long gone, if the real story of the 
empress(es) Faustine is unrecoverable from the traces of historical narrative that linger in 
the present-especially if one divorces Faustine from those narratives? 
Swinburne answers the question by reinforcing his Faustine's very artificial 
qualities. More specifically, his Faustine is an artifice representing the failure to 
reincarnate the very empress(es) who ruled in those irretrievable "imperial years," all the 
while entertaining the prospect that the "Faustine" persona is "historically ubiquitous," 
having omnipresent possibilities in the form of a "constant flux" (Riede, Study 53-54) 
persisting in all incarnations of this historical narrative. "Art is no replica of the subject" 
(Adorno, Theory 41 -42), but it must employ a subjec�-as-artifice in order to express 
figuratively all the possibilities inherent in the artwork. "The first Faustine" is just one 
10 My reading here is based on Adomo's statement that artworks are "incommensurable with historicism" 
because, "instead of following their own historical content, (historicism] reduces them to their external 
history" (Theory 182-83). 
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constituent of the serial barrage of"new Faustine[s]" that the poem evokes; "after change 
of soaring feather / And winnowing fin"-meaning, with every reallocation of the flux­
a "new Faustine" wakes (100, 109- 12). 
To reinforce his implication that Faustine is an ideal artifice for subjective 
expression, as a circumlocated, expressive aesthetic subject that flaunts its very 
aestheticization, Swinburne even offers a version of Faustine as an automaton: 
You seem a thing that hinges hold, 
A love-machine 
With clockwork joints of supple_ gold-
No more, Faustine. ( 140-44, emphasis mine) 
As such, Faustine on one hand seems, like the courtly Beloved of the previous poems, the 
"uncanny other," a "pure machine, . . .  the Other which is not our 'fellow-creature"' 
(Zizek, Metastases 90). On the other hand, however, Faustine only "seems" like a thing. 
Her very status as artifice challenges her static "thingness"; she is a dynamic form that, 
circa desire, defies the conventional reductiveness of form. She is a simple "thing" no 
more. She exemplifies the decadent condition "under which aesthetic subjects and 
objects become mutually substitutable, one for the other" (Gordon, "Spaces" 5 1  ); 
Faustine, as an aestheticized subject, is "bound up with, preformed and mediated by the 
object"-in this case, the object being this automatized body (Adorno, Theory 166). Yet 
she is more than simply the automatized body, inasmuch as the automaton, a work of art, 
is a thing which "become[s] the antithesis of the reified monstrosity'' (Theory 167); 
Faustine is a place-holder for a plenitude that exceeds "thingishness." Though she has 
not transcended (because she cannot transcend) form altogether-Swinburne is careful 
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still to mention Faustine's heavy hair (line 153), strong face and chin (1 57), and "sweet 
and keen" lips ( 16 1 )-she becomes what Adorno would call an "open form" (Theory 
1 4 1) in which, in a display of her "thingish" qualities, she openly aspires to represent, to 
express, more than any "thing" currently can. 
Mythological Portraits: Phaedra, Philomela, Proserpine, Dolores 
In her article on "Swinburne's Divine Bitches," Marilyn Woroner Fisch discusses 
what she calls "an anti-entropic monism" ( 1)  common to Swinburne's revisionary 
treatments of female mythological characters, such as Proserpine in both the "Hymn to 
Proserpine" anci "The Garden of Proserpine" and the notorious Dolores, Swinburne's 
archetypal "Lady of Pain." "Time can alter only the form" of Swinburne's mythic 
woman, says Fisch, but "her essence, and her function" as an "immutable" superfluity of 
possible permutations, exceed the physical form ( 10). Fisch claims these mythic women 
are all variations of the "divine bitch archetype," though she fails to define what exactly 
the "divine bitch archetype" is. I believe she has developed this archetype or trope by 
drawing from representations of the ancient Lycian goddess Malija, who was 
incorporated or "mixed into" the goddess Athena when Greek culture infiltrated Lycia. 1 1  
Malija, as the goddess of the hunt, was often referred to as the "divine bitch." Also, as 
the appointed guardian of a portal between earth and the underworld, Malija was believed 
to lead her priests and priestesses in a journey to the underworld and back; paradoxical ly, 
though Malija asserts her independence from the typical female role of creatrix by 
1 1  It is likely that Swinburne had read about the archaeological studies of ancient Lycian culture occurring 
in the mid-nineteenth century. It is just as likely that Swinburne would have seen the artifacts Sir Charles 
Fellows had taken from his excavations of the ancient Lycian city of Xanthos and displayed in the British 
Museum. 
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maintaining perpetual virginity, she is responsible for the "re-birth" of souls rapt in the 
underworld. Thus Malija, the "divine bitch," is a "monad" in that she represents the 
perpetual process of life and death as "immanent" yet "crystall ized,, into a specific form 
(Adorno, Theory 1 80); she is also a "monad" in that she has valence, or the ability 
constantly to produce an effect/affect. 12 Within her "self' she is never singular, just as 
Malija is not "just,, Malija but also Athena: she is the combined effect/affect of self and 
other, identity and non-identity, being and becoming, representation and what exceeds it. 
One could argue that this combination is "anti-entropic," as Fisch suggests, because it 
attempts to account for the loss of information or meaning which always occurs in any 
act of signification, especially the use of metaphor. 
Though Fisch does not list either Phaedra or Philomela among Swinburne' s 
"divine bitches," I think the poems featuring both characters can be explicated as 
significant case studies, though on a smaller scale than that of the major goddesses of 
Poems and Ballads, of how Swinburne uses hi s mythological figures, even more than his 
historical figures, to establish sites where the limits of artistic representation are pushed, 
stretched, and redrawn. Jerome McGann has already established that Swinburne's 
mythic female figures should not be read as '"compensations' . . .  for the loss of a 
previously valued possession or ideal" or beloved, but as attempts to "fantasize a so­
called reality, even live through it, in order to justify and make possible a continuous 
intercourse with the creatures of his imagination" (Swinburne 220). 13 Yet, if one should 
1 2  Thus I am not only using Adomo's modification of Gottfried Wilhelm Liebnitz's definition of"monad" 
but also applying how it is defined in chemistry ("an atom that has valence"). 
1 3 McGann argues in Swinburne: An Experiment in Criticism that Swinburne's "Ladies of Pain" are a 
montage of "essential images" of his beloved cousin, Mary Gordon (220), to whom Swinburne may or may 
not have proposed marriage. Rooksby also notes that. upon Mary Gordon's announcement of her 
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not read the goddess-figure as a compensatory artifice by which Swinburne fulfills an 
otherwise unrequited love, one should not read the subject fantasizing reality and 
enacting a constant intercourse with art as the definitive Swinburne himself, either. The 
"Swinburne" of this imaginative process is carefully and consciously crafted as an 
aestheticized, artificial subject position; the subject who establishes a virtual (rather than 
real) intercourse with "creatures of his imagination" is just as virtually and artificial ly 
situated as those "creatures." One could even go further and suggest that the "creatures 
of the imagination" are affects of the subject, or a Lacanian kind of '"formative' 
identification" going beyond "vision and ideal modeling" : they are multiple "matter[s] of 
affection _of the 'ego' by the 'other
"' (Borch-Jacobsen 69, italics his). It "makes possible 
the ecstasy of alienation" in which the "I" of the poem attempts to become the "other, 
through a corporeal-affective mimesis" (Borch-Jacobsen 70), but the "ecstasy of 
alienation" is intermingled with tragedy in al l these cases. Phaedra has "strange blood in 
[her]," which makes her realize that she is "not of [her kin's] likeness nor of' her stepson 
Hippolytus's ("Phaedra" 50-5 1 ), and the alienation results in murder. Likewise, 
Philomela realizes that she is not of her kin' s likeness, either; her sister Procne has 
forgotten the murder of her son, which still haunts Philomela, and "The heart's division 
divideth" them ("Itylus" 44). 
In his seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan suggests that tragedy is the 
site of perpetual action in which 
engagement to Colonel Disney-Leith in late 1864, Swinburne fell into a state of "bitterness and anger," and 
was overheard proclaiming that Mary's marriage marked "'the tragic destruction of all his faith in 
woman. '" Rooksby concludes, "[H]e must have felt that [he and Mary) should have been together and that 
her choice was the wrong one for both of them." He also notes that Swinburne wrote "Dolores" and "Satia 
te Sanguine" during this period. See Rooksby. Life 91-1 10. 
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[t]he hero[ine] and that which i s  around [her] are situated with relation to 
the goal of desire. What occurs concerns subsidence, the piling up of 
different layers of the presence of the hero[ine] in time. That's what 
remains undetermined; in the collapse of the house of cards represented by 
tragedy, one thing may subside before another, and what one finds at the 
end . . .  may appear in different ways. (265) 
The difference in what appears at the end, .of course, depends on the perspective with 
which one co�siders that end. The relationship between the different layers of subsidence 
can be arranged and interpreted in a variety of ways. This is similar to the presentation of 
Swinburne' s historical women, in that the historical women are situated in relation to the 
speakers' goals of desire-not only the goal to "fill in" the aporia of desire, but the end 
goal of accepting the aporia desire will always cause, as well as be. They also consist of 
the "different layers" of the variant versions of their respective personae, how those 
personae have been reconstructed through the passing of time. However, Swinburne does 
not emphasize the tragic element of his historical women as he does their mythic 
counterparts. The "killing" of Anactoria is a mere gesture of tragic loss marking 
Sappho's melancholy as well as the triumph of her own narrative, her poetic voice; 
Faustine figures the speaker's resistance to reification and inertia in art via an embrace of 
indeterminacy. Nonetheless, Swinburne's historical women do not demonstrate the kind 
of catharsis enacted by his mythic figures; not a purgation as in a purification or a 
removal, but a release-a release of emotion, what Rooksby calls "a tumultuous energy, 
elemental, suffering but undefeated" ("Centre" 28). The embouchure of the "divine 
bitch" is not merely "vomitive or emetic," as Derrida would say, but more "expressive 
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and emissive" ("Economimesis" 282), and she does not express any need for purification 
from or any other kind of forgiveness for behavior-specifically, sexual or sexually­
motivated behavior-that resists the societal norm. Rather, to savor the excess in the 
realization "that she is just a passive element in the interplay of libidinal forces, she 
'subjectifies' herself, she becomes a 'subject"' by becoming "an object/or herself' rather 
than just for an/other subject (Zizek, Lacan 64). 
When the mythic woman becomes an object for herself, she still endures the kind 
of suffering that accompanies tragedy� as a "passive element,, in any given scene, she 
sometimes seems more victim than heroine. But Swinburne's mythic women resemble 
Sade's Justine, who is both victim and heroine, and who is heroic because she is not 
destroyed by her victimization. Rather, the heroine's victimization allows her to create 
her own virtual subject position, rather than simply allow others to establish that position 
for her. As Lacan points out, in this "typical Sadean scenario," the victim 
retain[s] the capacity of being an indestructible support. Analysis shows 
clearly that the subject separates out a double of [her]selfwho is made 
inaccessible to destruction, so as to make it support what, borrowing from 
the realm of aesthetics, one cannot help calling the play of pain. For the 
space in question is the same as that in which aesthetic phenomena disport 
themselves, a space of freedom. (Seminar 26 1) 
In the expression of the "play of pain," the heroine rebels against semblance, or 
conforming to societal norms. In this way, Swinburne's  mythic women-his "Ladies of 
Pain"-demonstrate what Adorno claims is art's "rebellion against semblance, [its] 
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dissatisfaction with itself," and expresses art's "desire for di ssonance" which is 
"effectively expression" (Theory 1 10). 
Swinburne' s Phaedra is a "pil ing up of different layers" of the character offered in 
previous texts, Euripides's Hippolytus and Jean Racine's Phedre. Both texts are versions 
of the ancient myth of Phaedra, wife of King Theseus, whose unrequited desire for her 
stepson Hippolytus brings her to an unfortunate end. Racine's  Phedre embodies "[t]he 
soul ofRacinian -tragedy" established by his previous treatments of tragic classical 
heroines Andromache and Iphigenia: "the machine inferna/e steering the helpless and 
graceless protagonist fueled by his/her. obsession and egoistic instincts to certain 
irredeemable doom" (Chapman online). Euripides's Phaedra is similarly l imited by ate, 
or a "criminal desire'' 14 that entices one to exceed an established limit, that determinately 
brings an unfortunate end. However, Racine wanted his Phaedra, unlike Andromache or 
Iphigenia, to retain some dignity and nobil ity despite her adulterous and incestuous 
passion, dignity and nobility that he felt she did not have in the Hippolytus. 15  Racine's 
Phaedra regains her dignity by confessing guilt and then committing suicide as atonement 
for her sin; in other words, she regrets having exceeded the established limit, cedes her 
desire, and becomes noble only in that regret. Swinburne, too, wishes Phaedra to 
demonstrate a certain kind of nobil ity, but not through regret or atonement. His Phaedra 
proudly, unrepentantly refuses to cede her desire. Her nobility is in defiance, or what 
1 4  This is Lacan's rendering of the tenn, as he is not satisfied with defining it simply as "misfortune." See 
Seminar, pp. 262-64, 283. 
1 5  Whereas in Euripides's version Phaedra herself accuses her stepson of rape as revenge for spurning her 
advances, making the accusation in her suicide note, Racine has Phaedra's maid Oenone make the 
accusations instead. 
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David Riede calls her "Promethean urge," akin to the inversion of Christian asceticism 
Swinburne reads in Blake's "To Tirzah" (Study 55). 
Swinburne structures a triangular narrative, voiced by Phaedra, Hippolytus, and a 
"Chorus of Troezenian Women.,, Phaedra figures the machine infeniale of excessive and 
exceeding desire, Hippolytus the object of that desire, and the Chorus the social attempts 
to limit desire. Unlike the typical function of the Chorus in classical drama, Swinburne's 
Chorus does not provide "emotional commentary''16 but attempts to restrict Phaedra's 
emotional outbursts by applying reason. Phaedra's speeches are vibrant, affective 
catharses for which the Chorus admonishes her: "O queen, take heed of words; / Why 
wilt thou eat the husk of evil speech?" (10-1 1). The Chorus believes Phaedra's speech is 
"evil" because they regard it as dangerously empty speech (a "husk"), performances 
gesturing toward what discourse should not express. Her speech reveals what the Chorus 
wishes to avoid. To put it another way, the Chorus reads Phaedra's speech as a kind of 
"imaginary resistance" in which she wants to "avoid [her] desire by calling on the 
other''-the Chorus-"to bear witness," but Phaedra's speech is really "symbolic 
revelation," signifying the recognition of (her) desire that Phaedra caHs on the Chorus to 
witness (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 7). Phaedra's mouth is like an embouchure, which takes in 
the Chorus's resistance to her confessions and recasts it as recognition of what cannot be 
fully embodied in the images provided in her speech. At one point, the Chorus describes 
Phaedra's mouth in terms that evoke the embouchure, referring to her mouth as "an evil 
born with all its teeth," spewing "love . . .  cast out of the bound of love" (74-75). The 
16  Here I am privileging Lacan's assertion that the Chorus in Greek tragedy typically functions to "talce 
care" of the play's "emotional commentary" (Seminar 252). 
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Chorus speaks husks of words with the husks of mouths, whereas Phaedra speaks about 
other possibilities of sensing the sinthome-the signifier as it is "not yet enchained" 
within discourse, thus "permeated with an enjoyment" impossible to articulate (Zizek, 
Lacan 132)--belying the usual articulation of the empty symbols of empty speech to 
which the Chorus usually "bears witness." 
Hippolytus, assuming the crown in his father's stead, is also the empty husk of a 
king. At the beginning of the poem, Hippolytus begs Phaedra to stop making him the 
object of her gaze: "let me go; / Take off thine eyes that put the gods to shame;, ( 1-2). 
This admonition has two functions: on one hand it is Hippolytus' s attempt to deflect 
Phaedra's gaze, and on the other hand it is an attempt to wield authority over her. The 
Chorus also attempts to wield the same kind of authority over her in its appeal to her 
sense of "Pure shame" (line 46), to no avail. Hippolytus beseeches the Chorus to 
interrupt Phaedra' s gaz�"Let not this woman wail and cleave to me," "Loose ye her 
hands from me" ( 42, 44}-because he is uncomfortable with his status as the other who is 
not only the object of but a "powerless witness" to Phaedra's gaze. He is a microcosm of 
the Chorus, the "big Other" acting as "the agent of social authority" here rendered 
impotent, unable to enac� any authority to limit Phaedra's actions (Zizek, Metastases 74). 
Hippolytus is quick to attribute Phaedra's behavior to "the gods' wrath with her'' rather 
than the configurations of desire, declaring that he plays "no part" (line 43) in her desire 
for him. By having Hippolytus so quickly deny hi s role in the dynamic of desire, though, 
Swinburne has Hippolytus reinforce his very role as the fantasy object, the other with 
whom the sexual relationship is  impossible. Moreover, Hippolytus i s  importantly unable 
to comprehend that Phaedra, looking awry at him, eventually gazes beyond him; that her 
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gaze is transfixed, not on Hippolytus, per se, but on the awesome "event whose 
comprehension exceeds our capacity of representation" (Metastases 74)---the 
manifestation of desire itself. Phaedra admonishes him for his limited power to thwart or 
even interpret her gaze, as well as his readiness to believe that her desire is limited to 
desire simply for him: "Man, what have I to do with shame or thee?" (line 48). 
Moreover, by posing this question, Phaedra asserts that she really has nothing to do with 
Hippolytus. Swinburne's Phaedra seems to understand that Hippolytus is not actually 
"an embodiment of the impossible Thing, . . .  the materialized Nothingness" (Zizek, 
Lacan 83) that will fulfill her desire. Even if she had something to do with Hippolytus­
meaning, even if he were amenable to a physical relationship with her-Phaedra would 
not be satisfied. Her repeated requests for sexual contact are juxtaposed with requests for 
Hippolytus to kill her. If Phaedra is slain, then she can ostensibly traverse the actual 
distance between illusory fulfillment and actual fulfillment of desire. 
As a "passive and impotent" observer to this display, Hippolytus is "divided 
between fascination with enjoyment and repulsion at it" (Zizek, Metastases 15), whereas 
Phaedra elides the division between being fascinated by and being repelled by the horror 
at the event horizon of death and desire. "My veins are mixed, and therefore I am mad," 
she proclaims (line 53), but her "madness" figures her embrace of the dissonance and 
multiplicity contained in the poem's narrative. Phaedra herself is what Adorno would 
call a figure of a "progressive [aesthetic] consciousness of antagonisms on the horizon of 
their possible reconciliation" (Theory 19  I ). Yet she also delineates the impossibility of 
fully representing any such reconciliation; at one point, she asks Hippolytus, "What shall 
I say? / There is no good word I can compel thee with" (1 07-08). As yet there is "no 
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good word" to compel reconciling the different and antagonistic layers of aesthetic 
representation; there is only the unspoken practice of perpetually arranging the layers in 
constellation to approximate the possibil ity. And the possible is what Swinburne, in the 
poem, calls his readers to visualize, or "bear witness to." 
As Phaedra tells Hippolytus and the Chorus near the poem' s end, "I take you to 
my witness what I am" (I 30): 
For like my mother am I stung and slain, 
And round my cheeks have such red malady 
And on my lips such fire and foam as hers. 
This is that Ate out of Amathus 
That breeds up death and gives it one for love. ( 1 37-41) 
Here she names herself inheritor of the legacy of her mother, Pasiphae, the notorious 
lover of the bull, as well as her sister Ariadne, who had previously been Theseus' s lover 
but was spumed by him; some versions of the myth name Amathus as the place where 
Theseus had abandoned Ariadne. Phaedra wants Hippolytus and the Chorus to see that 
she is the "red malady"-the symbol of the "criminal desire" or ate that persists despite 
each generation's attempts to erase it, control it, and even blind us to its existence. The 
"fire and foam" on Phaedra' s lips is the narrative of that perpetual desire which breeds 
death in love's stead; again, this is part of Phaedra's  comparison of herself to her mother, 
as "Desire flows out of her / As out of lips doth speech" ( 147-48). 
Like Pasiphae, Phaedra performs desire to give it representation; as these women 
affect desire, they provide "a locus �fthe sensual element in art" that does no� require, 
nor does it promise, any "sensual pleasure in the observer" (Adorno, Theory 82). 
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Hippolytus certainly takes no sensual pleasure in Phaedra , s performances of desire; by 
the time Phaedra delivers the speech quoted above, he has already recoiled from her, 
demonstrating his repulsion "with cloak upgathered to the lip, / [And] Holding his eye as 
with some ill in sight " (1 17- 1 8, emphasis mine). Phaedra accepts her ek-sistence-the 
"ultimate possibility" of representing all, which is "a 'freedom-toward-death"' (Borch­
Jacobsen 1 5) which only a tragic heroine can accept: 
For now shall I take death a deadlier way, 
Gathering it up between the feet of love 
Or off the knees of murder reaching it . . . .  (1 83-85) 
Her acceptance is a display of "tumultuous energy," as she takes into herself the 
"elemental" quality of the ate which drives rather than commands her; her narrative 
expresses her aspiration not only to situate a representation of all possibilities, but also to 
have others "bear witness" (recognize) her aspiration, and she remains at the end 
"suffering but undefeated" (Rooksby, "Centre" 28). 
But what if the tragic heroine has to demand perpetually that someone "bear 
- witness to" the narrative of desire that flows from her lips, speaking "what she is"? What 
if the tragic heroine, encumbered with immortality, is unable to emulate Phaedra and thus 
cannot accept her death at all? Can she still be an aesthetically effective cipher of the 
"tumultuous energy" of the limit experience that Swinburne celebrates? Swinburne 
considers such questions in his rendering of Philomela in "Itylus." Philomela is the 
emissary of many tragic events: she was raped by her sister Procne's husband Tereus, and 
Tereus cut out Philomela's tongue to prevent her from telling Procne about it. However, 
Philomela wove her narrative account of her rape into a tapestry and sent the tapestry to 
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Procne; as a result, Procne murdered her son (Philomela's nephew) and fed the body to 
Tereus in revenge, a grisly and cruel act to which Phi lomela bears witness. In some 
versions of this myth, Philomela plays an active role in the murder, whereas in other 
versions Procne acts alone. However, the gods took pity on these il l-fated women and 
turned them into birds: Philomela the nightingale, Procne the swallow. In Ovid' s  version 
of the myth, Procne's son is named Itys; "Itys," though, is a variant spelling of"Itylus" 
which, not coincidentally, is the name of the son of another tragic mythic heroine, Aedon, 
who envied her sister Niobe so much that she conspired to kill Niobe's son. Aedon 
murdered her own son by mistake, and the gods turned her into a nightingale forced 
continually to sing her sorrow. 17 As in "Satia te Sanguine," Swinburne uses only the title 
of this poem to circumlocate his speaker's identity within the interwoven traces of several 
previous narratives; proper names are never used, and only the mention of the swallow­
Procne-suggests that the speaker of the poem is Philomela. But Swinburne' s version of 
Philomela is also a version or emanation of Aedon, as both Philomela and Aedon are 
complicit in the same "criminal desire" and, as nightingale(s), complicit in the same 
creation of an affective narrative of that desire. 18  
In her study of the poem, Margot Louis asserts that the narrative of"Itylus" also 
has a triangular structure. However, whereas the triangle of "Phaedra" is formed by three 
characters, the triangle of "Itylus" is formed by three different "modes of 
communication": 
17 Margot K. Louis compares the myths of Philomela and Aedon in more detail in "Family Secrets, Family 
Silences" (455). 
1 8  In Swinburne's poem, Philomela and Procne have already been turned into birds, and the poem is the 
song the nightingale (Philomela) sings. 
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one a visual art, explicit but disastrous; another, a beautiful but 
meaningless poetry, an art of denial ; while the third mode is that of a 
poetry powerful and painfully meaning-full, an art of memory and the 
affirmation of tragic events . . . .  Swinburne's  language can range from the 
non-referential or even anti-referential deconstruction of meaning, to a 
furious fullness which relies for its energy on a passionate belief in 
referentiality, a passionate commitment to referentiality. ("Family,, 454, 
emphasis mine) 
Swinburne must triangulate these three "modes of communication" to make the 
entropy-or "meaninglessness,"-ofthe poem' s verbal aporias or blind spots 
aesthetically effective (and/or affective). Philomela' s narrative, a verbal version of her 
· tapestry, strives to provide visual images of the catastrophe of meaning, to retain the 
"tumultuous energy" of emotion that nostalgia otherwise tends to subjugate, to 
accommodate the immediate meaning which is otherwise lost. In comparison, the 
swallow' s song lacks any real signifying capacity-that is, instead of abstractly gesturing 
toward the "no-thing of desire" that cannot really be signified, it fai ls to gesture at all­
and Phi lomela (and, I would further argue, Swinburne) is troubled by this instance of 
failure. 
Procne and her troubling song, much more manifestly than Phaedra and her 
performances of desire, address the problematics of the sinthome: Procne is the "certain 
One" who 
does not partake . . .  of the articulation proper to the order of the Other. 
This One is of course precisely the One of jouis-sense, of the signifier 
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insofar as it is not yet enchained but rather free-floating, permeated with 
enjoyment: it is this enjoyment that prevents ir from being articulated into 
a chain. (Zizek, lacan 1 32) 
Philomela, on the other hand, cannot share in Procne's ex-sistence, the enjoyment which 
is impossible for her to experience, because that very enjoyment is excluded by her very 
referential song, which is part of the symbolic order. Through the character of Phi lomela, 
Swinburne seems to admit a version of the Lacanian realization that "we are always 
forced to choose be�een meaning and ex-sistence: the price we have to pay for access to 
meaning is the exclusion" of the kind of ex-sistence (lacan 1 37). 
The dizzying verbal/visual collage of Philomela' s narrative can be compared, in 
several ways, to a phantasmagoria. In such a "magic lantern show," the projected scenes 
swiftly change; but the individual sl ides are arranged on a circular device, suggesting the 
repetitiveness of a cycle. Likewise, "A thousand summers are over and dead" (line 2) for 
Philomela, yet she has relived the same cycle-not only the cycle of seasons, but also the 
cycle of events involving her life's tragedy-repeatedly, in the same way, a thousand 
times. Swinburne also begins each stanza, save one, with a variation of the poem's first 
l ine, "Swallow, my sister, 0 sister swallow," to further suggest that the poem's cycles are 
almost inescapable. The problem Philomela has with her sister Procne is that Procne has 
literally swallowed the narrative of their tragedy and does not reconstitute or re-express it. 
Procne' s  song has become a beautiful but meaningless "art of denial," prompting 
Philomela to ask, 
What hast thou found in thine heart to sing? 
. . .  Shall not the grief of the old time follow? 
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Shall not the song thereof cleave to thy mouth? 
Hast thou forgotten . . .  ? ( 5, 10- 12) 
Philomela seems trapped in a cycle of nostalgia, in that she is transfixed on "[t]he small 
slain body, the flowerlike face" ofltylus (line 53); in her refusal to release her 
transfixion, she has extracted the figure ofitylus from the context of the past and 
"inser[ted] it into a kind of mythic, eternal, timeless present" (Zizek, Lacan 1 12). In 
perpetually singing her nostalgic lamentation for Itylus, Philomela claims she is "fulfilled 
of [her] heart' s  desire," and her description of how the song emoted from her "tawny 
body and sweet small mouth / Feed[s] the heart of the night with tire" ( 1 5- 1 8) suggests 
enjoyment. However, this claim is  undermined by her identification with the figure of 
"the grief of old time." For "to identify with the dead one . . .  amounts to identifying with 
a simple image of death, and thus to postponing enjoyment" (Borch-Jacobsen 96). 
Procne has not postponed but has embraced her enjoyment, and Philomela seems to 
resent her for it. In fact, Philomela wishes that she could do the same, crying, "Could I 
forget or thou remember, / Couldst thou remember and I forget" ( 4 1 -42). In this 
nostalgic cycle, Philomela has a limited, imaginary existence in "the place of [desire's] 
unfulfillment (or, if you will, of its 'fictional ' fulfillment)" (Borch-Jacobsen 96). Her 
fulfillment is illusory, like the heightened illusions of semblance and unity projected by 
the phantasmagoria. 19 
It is important to note that Philomela does acknowledge her entrapment in the 
cycle of illusions in the fourth stanza. In this stanza, Philomela does not begin by 
addressing her sister, but by acknowledging her own subject position as fixed within the 
19 See Adomo's discussion of the phantasmagoria in Aesthetic Theory, pp. 102-03. 
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cycle of unfulfillment-a fixed quality which Procne, the ever-"changing swallow," does 
not appreciate: 
I the nightingale all spring through, 
0 swallow, sister, 0 changing swallow, 
An spring through till the spring be done, 
Clothed with the light of the night on the dew, 
Sing, while the hours and the wild birds follow, 
Take flight and follow and find the sun. ( 19-24) 
Here Swinburne triangulates the aporia of Procne' s song, the "painful meaning-
full[ ness ]" of Philomela's song, and an explicit visual image of nostalgia, albeit a 
different perspective on nostalgia than offered in the previous stanza. Swinburne 
redirects the reader's perspective to insinuate a parallel between Philomela's nostalgic 
lament for Itylus and the poet' s nostalgic lament for an unmediated relationship with 
nature before human domination-the kind of nostalgia Swinburne reads into Blake. In 
the moment in which Philomela sings and the "wild birds follow," Philomela seems to 
have become part of a nature which is not the "artifactitious domain" of "cultural 
landscape" which regulates and eventually displaces "natural beauty" (Adorno, Theory 
64). However, in this poem, Philomela is treated as an artifact of a specific cultural 
landscape. As a mythic character, she is the product of the human mediation of nature 
implemented in antiquity; as a mythic character whose story is perpetuated in every 
succeeding er�, she is as a figure of the continual human mediation of nature, as wen. 
This is why the image of the wild birds is crucial here. Philomela does not follow the 
wild birds; they fonow her lead. When she speaks "what she is," her "criminal desire," in 
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her narrative, it is not merely her personal tragedy of rape and murder; above all, it is the 
disenchantment of nature. 
As Horkheimer and Adorno remind us, humans "have always had to choose 
between their subjection to nature or the subjection of nature to the Self' (32); even as a 
nightingale, Philomela leads the "wild" birds, making them her subjects as they "find the 
sun." Nonetheless, when nature has already been disenchanted, "the dark horizon of 
myth i s  illumined by the sun of calculating reason" (Horkheimer and Adorno 32); 
Phi lomela is ordering the "natural" scene around her according to what Robert Kaufman 
might call a "self-interested narrative" (''Legislators" 718). Philomela' s narrative 
disrupts the "blur" of signifiers {Louis, "Family" 458), untethered to the symbolic 
network that gives meaning, comprising Procne's song-intentionally, as Philomela later 
begs her, "I pray thee sing not a little space" (50, emphasis mine). By "resisting 
symbolization," Procne's song indicates that she has "lost [her] place in the symbol ic 
universe" (Zizek, Lacan 1 36-37), and Philomela, in contrast, continually reconfirms her 
place in that symbolic universe by determining how the surrounding elements of the ,, 
natural scene relate specifically to her, to the narrative she constructs. The unknowability 
of Procne's total immersion into nature threatens P�ilomela's affirmations of her self, her 
existence. 20 
Procne does not acknowledge her self at all; the only vestige of Procne' s human 
identity or seljhood extant in the narrative is in Philomela's constant cry of"sister," 
which is Philomela' s attempt to tether Procne to the symbolic network through the 
20 Here I mean "existence in the sense of a 'judgment of existence, ' by which we symbolically affirm the 
existence of an entity: existence is here synonymous with symbolization, integration into the symbolic 
order-only what is symbolized fully 'exists'� (Zizek, Lacon 1 36). 
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"social bond" of discourse (Lacon 1 32). Philomela admits, though, that "where [Procne] 
fliest"-beyond the social bond of discourse--"! shall not follow" (line 28): in other 
words, Procne has flown to "the dimension of 'what is in the subject more than [her ]self' 
and what [s]he therefore 'loves more than [her]self'" (Lacan 132). Philomela, on the 
other hand, seems to remain "at the level of mythology at which the self appears as 
sacrifice to itself," a "denial of nature in men [and women] for the sake of domination 
over non-human nature and over other[s]" (Horkheimer and Adorno 54). As a mythic 
figure, Philomela is a "figure of repetition" and "compulsion," "programmed always to 
do the same thing" (Horkheimer and Adorno 58}-sacrifice that element of what is 
"more than herself' to repeating the actions of domination, subjecting everything in her 
midst to the social bond. Philomela is compelled to revisit "the occasion of an historic 
catastrophe" of sacrifice (Horkheimer and Adorno 5 1  ), because she cannot escape the 
event which for Procne is "all past over'' (line 33). She "goes forth among sea-gulfs 
hollow / To the place of the slaying of ltylus" (46-47), to find "[tlhe ruins and fragments" 
of the tragic moment "left behind," which "take on an expressive qual ity" (Nicholsen 42) 
when woven into Philomela' s "tapestry of signifiers."21 She takes in the ruins and 
fragments of Itylus' s life and death and emanates the artifice of 
The hands that cling and the feet that follow, 
The voice of the child' s blood crying yet 
Who hath remembered me? who hath forgotten? (56-58, italics in original) 
Her nostalgic object becomes the artifice by which she represents her "criminal desire," 
her mediation of not only nature here, but subjectivity. By projecting the voice ofltylus, 
21 I have borrowed the phrase "tapestry of signifiers" from Margot Louis ('Family" 460)� 
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Philomela calls us, as readers/spectators, to bear witness to "what she is," by speaking as 
who or what she is not: she is not ltylus, though she uses the sacrifice ofltylus to 
represent her own sacrifice of self. 
As Louis defines her, Philomela is the tragic heroine circumlocating subjectivity 
via the "powerful plurality of modes" <?f communication "and the ways in which 
opposing voices within a single text actually cooperate to a single if complex end-the 
revelation and commemoration of the past'' ("Family" 461 ). More that this, though, 
Swinburne' s Philomela calls our attention to the revelation of"truth" as it is only in 
"error, forgetting, slips of the tongue, bungled actions, deformation, and pretense" that 
she reveals herself to us, the readers-we "who insist on pursuing [her] where [she is] 
not" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 5). She commemorates the slain Itylus in her "radical 
negativity" : Philomela is a subject who negates herself at the end by adapting Itylus' s 
voice, coming close to representing "pure Desire, pure difference from [her ]self as the 
condition of relationship with [her ]self' (Borch-J acobsen 19 1  ). Swinburne makes sure, 
however, that the divisions between "selves" and "others" in this poem are blurred, 
creating the kind of"compendium-like dialectic without detail" found in Adomo's work, 
"in which one idea" -or one narrative, one subject, one historical moment-"shifts into 
the next virtually without boundaries" (Nicholsen 49, emphasis mine). Thus Louis's 
comment should be taken further to indicate that Philomela is the virtual site for revealing 
and commemorating myth and myth' s failures, illusion and illusion' s inability to re­
enchant a disenchanted world, artifice and artifice' s  necessary failure to satisfy a desire 
which is ultimately unsatisfiable. 
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Both Philomela and Phaedra function as virtual sites for the constellative 
expressions of an aestheticized "revelation and commemoration" of desire, in the same 
way that Swinburne's major goddesses, such as Proserpine and Dolores, do. The "radical 
negativity" of_Philomela' s song and the "freedom-toward-death" expressed by Phaedra 
are modes of illustrating what Antony Harrison calls Swinburne' s  "moments of life 
where hope and fantasy mingle," in which the expressed l ived moment becomes 
peculiarly similar to the "dissoluti�n of the self' and "expansion into the world" 
Swinburne associates with his images of death ("Eros" 30). Harrison goes further to 
suggest that the end result is an approximation of a sought-after "perfect continuity with 
the world" in which "perfect freedom" is found in the "fluid unrestraint" of the subject's 
"complete penetration of and combination with all surrounding elements" ("Eros" 30); 
nonetheless, I think he is  mistaken in his assumption that Swinburne' s poetic "fluidity," 
or flux, is unrestrained. 22 Swinburne may stretch the restraints or limitations of 
discourse, perhaps even eliding some of them in hi s uses of artifice, but, as illustrated in 
his treatment of Procne, the "fluid unrestraint" of le sinthome cannot be reached. 
Procne's song cannot be artistically rendered and, moreover, Philomela's narrative 
reveals how myth attempts but fails to restore the "ruins and fragments" of the lost 
continuity of the enchanted world, including, of course, the dissolution of the established 
22 Harrison makes a similar contention in a later article, claiming that Swinburn�wing upon the 
"mythology of 'Soul-Making, '" of"enrichment and redemption through desire and suffering" he admired 
in Byron's and Keats's poems, as well as the "interpenetration" of physical and moral passions in the works 
of Victor Hugo-does not deviate from his predecessors' "fundamentally Romantic concern with the need 
to escape the constraints and limitations of mortal life and carnal passions" ("Losses" 690-91, 699). I agree 
that Swinburne is interested in pushing the limits of any kind of boundary or "constraint"-material, 
ideologicaJ, visual, verbal-but I think Swinburne is clearly invested in pushing those limits within the 
scope of material existence and most definitely carnal passions. Many of his characters exhibit a 
conspicuous des'ire for death but any transcendence via death is suspect; likewise, many of his characters 
are dead but, as they remain very much a part of the material world (e.g., his Borgia), they do not represent 
transcendence or escape strongly at all. 
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dichotomies between human and nature, flesh and spirit. Yet the very presence of Procne 
in "ltylus"-and the very mention of the song that even Swinburne cannot transcribe-­
retains and renews the hope of restoring the lost continuity amid the failure. 
In the Proserpine poems, Swinburne finds that conventional renderings of myth-­
and the conventional renderings of goddesses in those myths-merely force "all dead 
years [to] draw thither" to portray "Dead dreams of days forsaken" ("Garden of 
Proserpine'' 67, 69). Such a "dead dream" fails to suggest the possibility of restoring 
such continuity; and, left merely to express dead years and dead dreams, Swinburne's 
goddesses become tragic figures, languishing in their discontinuity with the world, 
seemingly having no place in it whatsoever . .  By portraying the goddesses' estrangement 
from the world while simultaneously provoking his readers to hope continually for the 
goddesses' return to it, Swinburne arguably offers, in an Adornian fashion, "a critique of 
myth as well as a [movement] toward its redemption" or revaluative recovery (Theory 
1 1 8). Proserpine is still relevant "To men that mix and meet her / From many times and 
lands" ("Garden" 55-56). Like the other tragic goddesses, she is perpetually (re)made 
relevant by the men and women who read Swinburne 's poem, mixing the threads of 
various narratives about the goddess, in their readings of the poem and consequently 
"meet" the new possibilities that the goddess figures. In short, the goddess becomes a 
trope in which the "tumultuous energy" she represents is predominantly generated by the 
affect engendered in the reader. In the reader/spectator's encounter with the figure of the 
Swinbumian goddess, s/he encounters a virtual stte in which (as Harrison claims) "hope 
and fantasy [can] mingle," but where fantasy is comprehended as failing to satisfy human 
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desires, where the limitations of the fantastic in art are acknowledged as such, and the 
hopefulness for the future moment in which human desires can be met stil l  remains. 
Proserpine, like Philomela, is traditionally caught in a nearly inescapable cycle; as 
the reluctant goddess of the underworld who emerges annually to banish the winter, she 
seems to be the inescapable cycle. But Swinburne questions this traditional reading of 
her. The customary versions of the myth portray Proserpine's time in Hades as a misery 
she longs to end with her joyful production of the spring, but in Swinburne's "Garden of 
Proserpine," she has withdrawn her promises of regeneration from the seasonal cycle. 
The spring does not arrive to replenish the "Blown buds of barren flowers" (line 14) and 
nothing grows but "bloomless buds of poppies" (27) and the "grapes of Proserpine" 
which "she crushes / For dead men deadly wine" (28, 3 1 -32). Here Swinburne echoes 
Keats' s  reference to "nightshade, [the] ruby grape of Proserpine" in the "Ode on 
Melancholy" (l ine 4); however, whereas the speaker in Keats' s ode exhorts his listener 
not to withdraw from the world by partaking in such "poisonous wine" (2), the speaker of 
Swinburne's poem aspires to achieve that withdrawal . Swinburne's speaker vocalizes a 
desire for death in his proclamations that he is "weary of days and hours" and longs for 
the "sleep eternal / In an eternal night" ("Garden" 1 3, 95-96). 
The same occurs in the "Hymn to Proserpine," in which the speaker beckons the 
absented goddess to return to the Christianized world, to save the world from the empty 
ritual of Christ's death and resurrection and its untenanted promises of eternal life. The 
speaker of the "Hymn" derides "the pale Galilean" conqueror as well as Christianity' s 
use of the "ghastly glories of saints, dead limbs of gibbeted Gods" (lines 3 5, 44) as 
· concrete proofs that "life goes on" even after death, rather than as abstractions suggesting 
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the indetenninacy of death. 23 Instead of seeing the "gibbeting" of God as symbolic 
sacrifice, the speaker sees it as an empty "imitation of fear" that still subordinates the 
individual subject (Adorno, Theory 47), as it operates only on the subject's fear of 
death.24 Yet death is an inevitable part of nature; and the "pale Gali lean," thwarting 
death, making it into a fearful taboo, has trumped the natural cycle, leaving the speakers 
ofboth Proserpine poems victims of"too much love of living" ("Garden" line 8 1 )  and 
thus not able to embrace the death which brings "fulfill[ment] of unspeakable things" 
("Hymn" line 52). The natural cycle as traditionally figured by Proserpine has been 
disrupted. Now, reminiscent of Philomela, Proserpine is the uncanny element in her 
. milieu. She signifies disenchantment, specifically here the disenchantment of the 
Christian attempt to "re-enchant" the world. The speakers of both the "Hymn" and the 
"Garden" call on her limited powers-as a goddess assumed immortal but able to die in a 
disenchanted world-to demonstrate that "dead men rise up never" ("Garden" line 86), 
that "there is no God found stronger than death" ("Hymn" line 1 10). Christianity can 
suggest that death in the material world is insignificant in light of the suggestion of 
eternal life, but Proserpine-a disenchanted figure-must necessarily re-emerge as the 
"freedom toward death," the desire, that Christianity cannot eclipse. 
23 My reading is based on Adomo's discussion of how an artwork's abstractness-"that irritating 
indeterminateness of what it is and to what purpose it is"-"is a provocation, (since] it challenges the 
illusion that life goes on" (Theory 22-23). 
24 To some readers, Swinburne's negative treatment of Christianity seems almost glib, superfici� even 
forced. Margot Louis attributes this to Swinburne mixing his interest in "demonic parodies" -such as 
Baudelaire's "Les Litanies de Satan" and, of course, Sade's over-the-top reversals of Christian moral 
codes-with a more seriously thoughtful and deeply felt "pessimistic, anti-sacramentalist vision of 
language itself (as] one aspect of a broad and bitter pessimism" about a God who seems powerless to stop 
"the disintegration which proceeds everywhere and always." See Swinburne and His Gods. pp. 22-25, 
especially the section on ''The Tradition of Blasphemy." 
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Remarkably, then, Proserpine' s significance lies in her suggested insignificance to 
the Christian world, because the Christian world dismissed her for locating the 
possibilities of exploring the "desires and dreams and powers" ("Garden" line 1 5) it 
sublimates. To underline this play of "significance," Swinburne does not have Proserpine 
speak in either poem, rendering the reader/spectator unable to "bear witness to" the 
goddess; she is only gestured at, circumlocated by the multitude of layers created within 
the speakers' impassioned pleas. Margot Louis has argued that both poems portray 
Proserpine in "faint figures of the . . .  fleeting and uncertain things we call material 
realities, or of the stil l  less certain prospect of a better and ideal existence" and in words 
that "can only be flung at" the goddess "they attempt to describe," words that "can only 
evoke"-because they are unable to "embody"-"a reality beyond themselves" 
("Proserpine" 3 1 7- 1 8). Louis astutely recognizes that, as readers of Swinburne's poems, 
we must not rely on the ordinary processes of finding the goddess and deciphering what 
she "means" in Swinburne's poems. Like the speaker of the "Garden," Proserpine's 
ersatz worshipper, Swinburne's reader must look at the world via a perspective of 
"doubtful dreams of dreams" (lines 4-5). 
Consequently, this suggests embracing a kind of "crisis of aesthetic semblance" 
(Adorno, Theory 101 ); for, in dreaming about dreams, the kind of perspective determined 
by the conventional limitations of the material world is doubly altered. This perspective 
allows one to embrace the "inconsistency in the form of contradictions" between what 
something "appears to be" and "what it is," and to see how Swinburne "emphasizes" 
Proserpine, art(ifice) l ike the poem itself, as "[art's] own impossibility" (Theory 10 1). 
. . 
Here Swinburne applies the Pre-Raphaelite "dream logic" that he admired in Rossetti : 
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Proserpine is "a single image" symbolizing "numerous wishes, impulses, ·attitudes" and 
thus can be seen "as double or multiple" (Silver 1 1  ).2s 
From the dream perspective, Proserpine performs a different kind of mimesis in 
that she does not merely "foste[r] assimilation to the world and Others" by simply. 
providing the reader/spectator access to Swinburne/the poet,s specific wishes, impulses, 
and attitudes which may be other than his/her own; by affecting each reader individually 
and provoking a variance of wishes, impulses, and attitudes in each reader, she makes 
"sensuous access to the world" possible (Gebauer and Wulf 288). Such "sensuous 
access" is not a "pessimistic" practice of the "sexual del ights of pain" that Louis claims 
undermines the hope for a "better and ideal existence" ("Proserpine" 3 1 5). Instead, it is 
the sensual (re)affirmation of the promise of"all the joy before death" that Proserpine 
figures-the possibility of some day accessing the "things fairer than all these things" 
currently available to one in the material world ("Hymn" lines 26, 29). As Bataille 
explains it, the "joy before death belongs only to the .person for whom there is no beyond; 
it is the only intellectually honest route in the search for ecstasy'' ("Joy'' 236, italics in 
· original), or a sensuous experience of enjoyment in the world. The "pale Gali lean" defers 
desire and ecstasy to the beyond, but Proserpine represents the limit disconnecting the 
here from the beyond: that is, she represents the beyond of death-that which cannot be 
tethered to symbolic discourse-only as it can be artificially represented in the here and 
now. In the �mbrace of that artificiality, she . implies that the beyond, l ike the sinthome, is 
25 Louis offers a similar comparison between Swinburne's and Rossetti's depictions of goddesses: "[In 
Proserpine] we find two constructions of the feminine, one inextricably involved and identified with the 
world of the senses, one almost entirely detached from that world. This duality is very common . . .  in the 
works ofD.G. Rossetti" ("Proserpine" 3 17). However, whereas Louis explicitly sees this as Swinburne's 
way of exploring binary constructs, I wish to emphasize Swinburne's concentration on multiplicio/, how the 
"single image" proposes numerous (and notjust two) possibi lities. 
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inarticulable. In the material world, one can certainly dream and fantasize about 
articulating the inarticulable, but dreams and fantasies are indeterminate il lusions of 
exceeding material limits, not guarantors of actual transcendence. The "dream logic" just 
allows one to manage those l imits differently, to generate new possibilities of 
representation within those discursive limits. 
Notwithstanding the above observations, the following question is still left 
partially unanswered: why must this aesthetic require reaffirming the promise of 
enjoyment through pleasure-which-is-pain? The answer, I believe, can be found in a 
reading of Swinburne' s poem, "Dolores," about his notorious, penultimate "Lady of 
Pain"-the professed epitome of all the women of his Poems and Ballads. Antony 
Harrison has commented on the poem's  "consuming 'depth of feeling'" and its "tortured 
expression of simultaneous lust, fear, doubt, rebellion, and hope" ("Losses" 693); Allison 
Pease on its "transgression away from the frame of civilization and its . . .  emotional 
norms" (47); Jerome McGann on its "self-indulgent histrionics" (Swinburne 208); and 
David Riede on its parodic treatment of "the spiritual, emotional suffering of the Blessed 
Virgin" and her role in Christian asceticism (Study 50). However, these critics tend to 
read the poem's dialectic of "asceticism and sadism" as potentially resolving itself in a 
kind ofpraxis26 that Julian Baird suggests is the transformation of spiritual love into 
physical cruelty (55). 
Yet where Harrison wants to find the poem's "redeem[ing] . . .  subtle spiritual 
qualities" ("Losses" 693) and Riede wants to find "an eternal feminine principle" (Study 
26 Praxis in the sense that the dialectic is resolved via an envisaged "transformation of these forms" or 
categories, transcending the boundaries separating tbese supposedly diametrically-opposed categories 
(Lukacz, History 177). 
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54), there is only the perpetual flux of expression which "shaH change as the things that 
we cherish, / ShaU fade as they faded before" ("Dolores" 429-30). She arguably 
embodies BataiUe' s "Heraclitean Meditation" in that she allows the reader to "imagine 
human movement and excitation, whose possibilities are limitless: this movement and 
excitation can only be appeased" or even represented "by war" ("Joy" 239)-or, more 
speciticaUy in this case, the violent extremes of human sexual behavior which bind one to 
the here of the material world, the experience of the body, rather than what lies beyond it. 
Swinburne is vigilant in his insistence that Dolores is "A beautiful passionate body / That 
never has ached with a heart" (8 1 -82). Like one of Sade's heroines, she neither practices 
nor responds to the transformation of sexuality into tenderness which "express[ es] the 
delusion of spiritua1 love"-what Sade's Count Belmor, in Juliette, caHs "a false and 
always dangerous metaphysic" like religion; when lust is transformed into Jove, the Jover 
and the beloved are both prevented "from being seen as what [ she or] he really is" 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 108). To avoid all prospects of seeing such delusion, "the pulse 
of [Dolores's] passion" (line 22 1)  must be felt; and the feelings of extreme pleasure and 
extreme pain exhibited in the poem attest to the "richness of detail" Swinburne uses in his 
art to celebrate the "diffuseness" in which every visual aesthetic element engenders a 
non-visual-a moving, exciting-counter-impulse (Adorno, 'I'heory 1 88). This also re­
examines the issue of"joy before death" that Swinburne introduces in the "Hymn to 
Proserpine." Like the worshippers of P�oserpine, the worshipper of Dolores focuses on no 
other object than what is presented him in the immediate, material life (Batail le, "Joy" 
236). 
2 1 5  
In "Dolores," the speaker i s  not deluded into thinking his worship of Dolores is a 
spiritual encounter in the religious sense. 27 Rather, the speaker encount�rs the "spirit" of 
the aesthetic, or that quality which makes an art of appearances seem more than mere 
appearance. Twice he calls Dolores "mystic" (in lines 7 and 20) but only ironically. The 
poem may denote an attempt at communication between man and goddess, but only as it 
represents the actual impossibil ity of such communication as well as its inability to 
quench "the hunger of change and emotion, / . . .  the thirst of unbearable things" or to 
satisfy "the desire that outruns the delight" ( 1 05-06, 1 1 0). Swinburne/the speaker can 
write Dolores into being, but her only "mystic" quality is what Derrida would say is "in 
the tracing potency of the trait, at the instant where the . . .  inscription of the inscribable is 
not seen" (Memoirs 45, italics in original). We are called to bear witness to Dolores, "our 
lady of suffering," through the performative speech acts of Swinburne's speaker, though 
she "escapes the field of vision" (Memoirs 46). Or, to put it another way, we are called to 
bear witness to how Dolores escapes the field of vision, how she "shalt blind" the 
speaker' s-and thus our-"bright eyes though he wrestle" with the task of representing 
her (line 201 ). Dolores cannot be seen, so she must be sensed in other ways; to 
experience Dolores, one must, as the speaker does, affect her. 
And, to do so, one must rediscover "the ability to live intensely, [though] this has 
been lost"; the speaker of"D?lores" suggests that this rediscovery lies in "[t]he abil ity to 
sin intensely" (Riede, Study 54). 
As our kisses relax and redouble, 
27 "I have passed from the outermost portal 
To the shrine where a sin is a prayer; 
What care though the service be mortal?" (129-3 1)  
• 
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From the lips and the foam and the fangs 
Shall no new sin be born for men's trouble, 
No dream of impossible pangs? 
. . .  Too sweet is the rind, say the sages, 
Too bitter the core. (89-92, 95-96) 
The tragedy of Dolores is that she expresses the "lips" and "foam" and "fangs" of an 
expressive "criminal desire" which goes largely ignored. The "sages" of Christian 
asceticism have decided the range of possibilities in its tastes are too extreme and thus 
forbid experiencing them; but, in this narrowing of experience, the "sages" advocated a 
life devoid of intensity, in which enjoyment is always postponed, unattainable. The 
speaker here, then, resembles Swinburne's Philomela: his offering to Dolores is also a 
song gesturing toward "the place of [desire' s] unfulfl/lment (or, if you will, of its 
'fictional' fulfillment)" (Borch-Jacobsen 96). Such songs to Dolores had been silenced 
by those "sages," but Swinburne's speaker' s song is a very purposeful rebellion against 
that silence; his song is what Adorno would cal l a "desecration of silence" (Theory 134). 
Because Swinburne's speaker repeatedly refers to physical experience as "sin," the poem 
does seem "entangled in the nexus of the guilt" (Theory 134) of Christian asceticism; 
however, Swinburne uses the word "�in" only to negate that guilt typically invoked by it. 
For, also like the case of Philomela, it is the guilt that postpones and prevents fulfillment 
that must be refracted-deflected, obscured-from experience. In the heightened 
illusions of semblance and unity offered by the ascetic Christian promises of fulfillment 
in the beyond, Swinburne's speaker longs for a moment, now lost, in which "Pain melted 
in tears, and was pleasure; / Death tingled with blood, and was life" ("Dolores" 179-80). 
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Like all the other characters and speakers in  the Poems and Ballads, the speaker 
in "Dolores" strives to establish a constellative moment in which "rebellion against 
semblance, [its] dissatisfaction with itself," and art's "desire for dissonance" (Adorno, 
Theory 1 10) can be effectively expressed. In this way, Swinburne attempts to situate his 
readers, as well as himself as "poet," within a relationship to dissonance and 
dissatisfaction. In this relationship, the multiple ways of discerning dissonance and 
dissatisfaction become, in themselves, experience� in which one approximates beauty and 
pleasure in the resistance to what is traditionally beautiful and pleasurable, and one 
approximates satisfaction in the perpetuation of the attempt to satisfy insatiable human 
desires. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
In the Space between Decadence and Democracy: 
Swinburne, Republicanism, and Songs before Sunrise 
"I have tried not to get the mystic elemental side of the poem, its pure and free 
imaginative part, swamped by the promulgation of the double doctrine, democratic and 
atheistic, equality of man and abolition of gods .. . .  "-Algernon Charles Swinburne 
"[L]anguage is itself something double. Through its configurations it assimilates itself 
completely into subjective impulses; one would almost think it had produced them. " 
-Theodor Adorno 
"My voice was often the voice of many, the echo of an idea shared by the young. " 
-Giuseppe Mazzini 
Following the publication of Poems and Ballads, First Series in 1 866, Swinburne 
began to pursue his interests in European revolutionary politics more actively. At 
Oxford, Swinburne had demonstrated an evident amount of sympathy and allegiance with 
the republican movements in France and Italy. However, at that time, his republican 
fervor seemed more like a reiteration of his friend John Nichol's republicanism than a 
fully realized personal commitment. Both Nichol and Swinburne were members of the 
Old Mortality Society, a group of Balliol students who met weekly to discuss "the more 
general questions of literature, philosophy, science, as well as the diffi.Jsion of a correct 
knowledge and critical appreciation of our Standard English Authors" 1 -and, at Nichol's 
urging, politics. As fellow member A. V. Dicey once noted, Old Mortality's discussions 
took up "the cause of foreign nationalities, and especially of lta�y, the crimes of Louis 
Napoleon, and the abolition of . . .  all restrictions on the freedom of opinion" ( qtd. by 
Rooksby, Life 51  ). Swinburne became interested enough in these discussions to place 
1 The name "Old Mortality" refers t� the members' belief that tbey were all in delicate, questionable health 
and thus were going to die young. 1rus often-quoted description of the Old Mortality Society's purpose is 
taken from The Old Mortality Register, the minute-book of all their meetings, which is now in Oxford's 
Bodleian Library, MS. Top., Oxon. d. 242.f.4. 
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two portraits of revolutionaries on his wall: one of Felice Orsini, who tried to assassinate 
Louis Napoleon in 1858, and one of Giuseppe Mazzini, a prominent figure in the Italian 
revolutionary movement (the Risorgimento), whose name was linked to Orsini's at the 
time.2 At this time, Swinburne also began writing about republican themes, 3 but once 
Rossetti's "Jovial Campaign" arrived at Oxford, Swinburne seems to have transferred his 
fervor from revolutionary politics to the Pre-Raphaelite project. 
In some ways, Swinburne's interest in social and political revolution seems to 
have been, like his forays into Sade, French decadence, and Blakean Romantic prophecy, . 
a measure of rebellion against the orthodoxy expected and promoted by his privileged 
upbringing. Swinburne's maternal grandfather was an aristocrat, the third Earl of 
Ashburnham, who claimed to trace his family lineage back to the Norman Conquest. His 
favored paternal grandfather, Sir John Swinburne, having lived the majority of his life as 
a nobleman in France, continued to maintain the social and political principles and even 
the customary dress of the ancien regime even after moving to England. Sir John did 
eventually renounce his Catholicism and become an "ultra-liberal" member of Parliament 
(Henderson 6); as Donald Thomas has noted, though, "Sir John did not believe in taking 
his political radicalism to extremes," having considered the post-revolutionary socialist 
movements in France as "enemies of liberty" ( 10), and Swinburne shared his 
2 However, by the time Orsini attempted to assassinate Louis Napoleon, he and Mazzini had already 
severed ties, and Orsini never infonned Mazzini about the assassination plans. Because Orsini ' s bombs 
had been manufactured by a British engineer, Thomas Allsop, who was sympathetic to Mazzini and his 
cause-and because Orsini had frequented Mazzinian circles in London before the assassination attempt­
it was publicly assumed that Mazzini had been involved in Orsini' s plot. (See Sarti 178.) 
3 For instance, Swinburne wrote a poem about republican Rome, "Temple of Janus," for a poetry contest he 
did not win and thus seemed to have lost interest in the piece. At this time, he also wrote an "Ode to 
Mazzini," which was found among Swinburne's private papers only after his death and posthwnously 
published by Edmund Gosse. 
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grandfather' s  l ifelong suspicion of democratic equality for all citizens. 4 He seems to 
have combined his grandfather' s suspicion of democracy with Victor Hugo's belief that 
noblesse oblige and revolutionary leadership were complementary (Thomas 10). 
Undeniably, Swinburne took pride in his aristocratic lineage throughout his life, using the 
posture of noblesse oblige during his most republican period: for example, in a letter to 
one ofMazzini 's  more radical associates, Emilie Ashurst Venturi/ he boasted of how 
"unspeakably important" his aristocratic background was (Letters 2:29-30). 
Swinburne's insistence on reminding his correspondents of his aristocratic lineage 
also diwlges his lingering interest in how his predecessors' poetry is admixed with 
noblesse oblige politi�s. In the precedent established in the works and lives of Byron and 
Shelley, in particular, Swinburne found the paradoxical al liance of nostalgia for 
aristocratic privilege and the encouragement of revolution. Ideally, the aristocrat was in a 
unique, privileged position to be called to the "duty to become an active, transfigurative 
force in material life" (Eagleton 2 1  ). The aristocratically privileged poet, especially, had 
right of entry into what Shelley calls "an additional class of emotions" which produce a 
"treasure of expressions" which can become "the representat.ion and the medium . . .  [for] 
equality, diversity, unity, contrast, mutual dependence, . . .  the principles alone capable of 
affording the motives according to which the will of a social being is determined to 
action" ( 48 1 ,  emphasis mine). Robert Kaufman identifies this orientation as the site of an 
Adornian tension between "emancipatory gesture and formal constraint"; in this case, the 
emancipatory gesture of"imaginative aspiration" which presents itself as political 
4 Edmund Gosse, in the introduction to his Life of Algernon Charles Swinburne, famously quips, 'The poet, 
although so great a republican, was no democrat" (3). 
5 Venturi and Swinburne corresponded frequently between 1867 and 187 1 .  The letter is dated "September 
28," but the year is missing; Lang presumes it to be 1869 (Letters 2:29). 
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aspiration ("Legislators,, 7 10) collides with the constraints of the position of privilege, 
which "takes for granted" the "'under-class[ es]'" who exempl ify "a struggle for survival 
to which all else is sacrificed" (Lucas, "Republican" 42}-a struggle that the privileged 
poet's "imaginative aspiration" not only conspicuously conflicts with but also 
romanticizes. 
One of the most interesting aspects of Swinburne's politica] poems is that his 
republican lyrics retain the monarchical structures associated with the governments 
Swinburne advocates dismantling. Freedom/Liberty is almost always represented by-or 
personified as-a benign monarch or humanized divinity, very much like the 
representation of Freedom in Tennyson' s "Of old sat Freedom on the heights."6 In 
Tennyson's poem, Freedom is "in her place" "on the heights"; she must step down from 
her lofty position "To mingle with the human race" (lines 1 ,  5, 10). This mingling, 
though, seems rather aestheticized. Tennyson's Freedom is a source of imaginative 
inspiration, a "fair form [which] may stand and shine" (line 2 1 ), but a form which seems 
psychologically rather than physical ly manifest; Freedom here is the intangible belief that 
"light[s] our dreams" (22) and thus inspires the labor of political struggle. Yet, though 
this inspiration may be the "Grave mother of majestic works" ( 13) of liberation, the 
inspiration seems somewhat removed from the Jabor required to actuate these "majestic 
works," since the poem does not account for them. 
6 Swinburne's rather vehement dislike for certain aspects of Tennyson's personality as well as his frequent 
deprecating remarks about Tennyson's poetry have been well noted. Donald Thomas observes that, in the 
1870s in particular, Swinburne made Tennyson into the archetypal "sanctimonious philosopher" to whom 
he directed "merciless ridicule" (183). However, Swinburne and his friend Edwin Hatch had once spent an 
evening discussing poetry with Tennyson in January 1858, and the experience left quite an impression on 
Swinburne, so much so that Swinburne recounted the conversation of that evening, quite fondly and in 
vivid detail, when offering his condolences to Lady Tennyson upon Tennyson's death. (See Rooksby, Life 
55, 269-70.) 
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Similarly, in Swinburne's Songs, those who labor to restore "Liberty" to the seat 
of power perform aesthetic labor which is presented without its corollary, material 
(manual) labor. For example, in "A Watch in the Night," Liberty assumes one of the 
noblesse oblige voices featured in the Songs, wistfully noting that, distanced from the 
bloodshed and physical warfare, 
I feel not the red rains fall, 
Hear not the tempest at all, 
Nor thunder in heaven any more. 
All the distance is white 
With the soundless feet of the sun. (146-50) 
-The revolutionary subject-as-poet is the "prophet" who uncomfortably stands "Banished, 
uncomforted" yet "free" on the verge between the privilege granted by previous 
structures of undemocratic government and the desire to "Freely to freedom . . .  [give] / 
Pledges" ("Watch" 1 0, 3 1 -32) to undermine the very structures ensuring that privilege. 
This is Swinburne's way of re-engaging the Romantic paradox of resisting the status quo 
at both ends of the spectrum: in his poems, Swinburne reveals what Adorno would call 
the "yawning schism between their aesthetic trouvai/les'-discoveries, which require 
travail (work)-"and a political posture that is manifest in the content [/nhalt] and 
intention of [art]works," a schism which purposefully and "significantly damages 
artistic," and even political, ideological "consistency" (Adorno, Theory 254). 
Swinburne's return to exploring republicanism was the compound result of his 
discussions with friends William Michael Rossetti and George Meredith, who shared 
John Nichol's political fervor, and meeting Mazzini, whom Swinburne came to call his 
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"Chief," on March 30, 1 867. Before this meeting, Swinburne' s correspondence with 
several friends demonstrates his increased desire to become more politically oriented. 
Swinburne implored Meredith for details about Meredith' s  experience as a war 
correspondent in Italy and Austria "when the heat of the storm" of political unrest "was 
raging" (Letters 1 :23 1 ).7 William Michael Rossetti, whose father had been exiled from 
Italy in 1 82 1  for conspiring against King Ferdinand and his Austrian supporters, 
corresponded with Swinburne often about their shared hope for "a present revolution and 
republic" in Italy as well as for "a successful Orsini to plunge France into a Medea's 
caldron of life-restoring troubles and ferments" (1 :230). In a letter to Bayard Taylor, 
dated March 1 8, 1 867, Swinburne even expresses a wish to leave England, "this Siberia, 
this exile's Lapland, for my chosen Mother Italy" (1 :232). And, after finally meeting 
Mazzini, Swinburne told his sister Al ice that he "cannot . . .  believe more in the 
Republican cause" ( 1  :240). 8 
As many biographers have noted, it is unclear if Swinburne arranged to meet 
Mazzini through politically connected friends, such as Nichol, or if he arranged the 
meeting himself through his correspondence with the exiled politician. There is also an 
often-repeated tale, attributed to Edmund Gosse, that Swinburne's former tutor Benjamin 
Jowett gathered a group of Swinburne's friends and acquaintances together in early 
March 1 867 to figure out "what could be done with and/or Algernon" (Gosse 1 66, italics 
in original). Many of Swinburne's associates, including Jowett, were troubled by 
7 Letter from George Meredith to Swinburne, 2 Mar. 1867. Meredith was recounting the events of the 
previous year. In 1866, Italy formed an alliance with Prussia and declared war on Austria The Italian 
annies did not fare well in the war, but, as Austria suffered a major loss at the hands of Prussian forces at 
the battle of Sadowa, the Italian forces were able to liberate Venice from Austrian rule. Austria then 
relinquished its political interests in Gennany to Prussian reunification efforts. 
8 This letter is dated 10 Apr. 1867. 
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Swinburne's  activities during this period: his regular visits to London's flagellation 
brothels, the bizarre behavior he exhibited during his frequent public drinking binges, and 
his association with Simeon Solomon and George Powell, both of whom were rumored to 
be homosexual and thus were considered socially disadvantageous. 9 Supposedly, Jowett 
recruited Mazzini to divert Swinburne's  attention from his vices and from disreputable 
friendships. 10 This account, like many of the other anecdotes in Gosse's Life of 
Swinburne, is questionable, but Gosse is  correct in his report that Mazzini did have some 
interest in Swinburne' s "moral improvement" ( 166). 1 1  Mazzini told Swinburne that he· 
disliked most of the Poems and Ballads, which. he considered "songs of egotistical love 
I 
and idolatry of physical beauty," and that Swinburne was wasting his talents on 
meaningless poems that could "lull us to sleep" (Mazzini qtd. by Henderson, 1 37). 
However, Mazzini apparently thought well enough of the few politically charged poems 
that do appear in that volume to encourage Swinburne to continue to write political 
poetry in the spirit of "do[ing] good and serv[ing] others exclusively'' (Letters 1 :242). 12  
In the late 1 860s, Mazzini l ived in London and organized the Universal 
Republican Alliance, a group of European and American supporters of republ ican ideals. 
Roland Sarti comments that "[s]omething resembl ing ·a personal cult developed around 
9 Solomon's arrest for soliciting sex in a public restroom confinned the suspicions about his sexual 
orientation, but this arrest did not occur until February 1873. After the arrest, though, Swinburne refused 
any further contact with him. 
10  See Thomas 158-59; Henderson 137. 
1 1  A significant portion of Gosse's book depends on uncorroborated stories from people who knew 
Swinburne only briefly and on second- or third-hand accounts of events which occurred before Gosse 
befriended Swinburne in the early 1870s, after nearly all the work on the Songs had been finished. 
Moreover, Gosse's text is an uncomfortable balancing act between his admitted "hero-worship" of 
Swinburne (Gosse 200) and his professed need, as he told Thomas Wise, to "conquer a feeling that 
Swinburne was rather sickening (as] there is a very ugly side to him" (Gosse qtd. by Greenberg, 96). This 
discomfort leads Gosse to admit that he did not consider Swinburne "quite like a hwnan being" (Gosse 
201). � as such, Gosse's Life o/Swinbume is a work of "concealments and distortions" (Greenberg 96). 
12  Letter from Swinburne to Lady Jane Swinburne (his mother), 7 May 1867. 
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[Mazzini]," as Emilie Ashurst Venturi garnered support for Mazzini ' s  causes from the 
scholars, philanthropists, and other "free-thinking Christian" political activists in her 
family's acquaintance ( 12 1 ,  1 12). 13 As Cecil Lang notes in his introduction to 
Swinburne's Collected Letters, it is only because Venturi saved her letters from Mazzini 
that we know about the prolific correspondence Mazzini and Swinburne shared during 
this time (1 :xxxv). Very few of the actual letters between Swinburne and Mazzini 
remain. Mary Gordon Disney-Leith burned any letters she found upon Swinburne' s  
death that "disturb[ ed] the marmoreal image of Algernon that she wanted to bequeath to 
posterity'' (Lang I :xxxii), likely including Swinburne's correspondence with Mazzini, of 
whom Swinburne's family sharply disapproved, and Mazzini did not save any of the 
correspondence he received (Sarti 8). Among one of the extant letters, though, is one 
Mazzini sent to Swinburne on March I 0, 1 867, before they had even met face-to-face. In 
this letter, Mazzini commands Swinburne to "shake us, reproach, encourage, insult, brand 
the cowards, hail the martyrs," to "[g]ive us a series of 'Lyrics for the Crusade"' and thus 
fulfill "his great Duty" as a poet of revolution (qtd. by Henderson 1 37). Thus Swinburne 
began to work seriously, and sometimes in fits of frustration, on the poems that comprise 
the Songs before Sunrise. 
It is important to note that the shift from hedonistic dissolution to revolutionary 
vehemence is not as great as Mazzini (pr possibly Jowett) may have thought, particularly 
considering that Swinburne' s  interest in the political corollaries of Sade's writing was 
13 Emilie Venturi was rather well connected in London. Her father, William Henry Ashurst, was a 
prominent London solicitor who had campaigned for many radical causes including the emancipation of 
women. The family's circle of friends included Thomas and Jane Carlyle. The family also had notable 
connections in the British government, as Emilie's sister Caroline married an "ultra-liberal" member of 
Parliament. 
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part and parcel to his interest in the Sadean explorations of human sexuality. Despite the 
disappointment Swinburne claims to have felt in "that 'rosy hour' with eyes 'purged by 
the euphrasy and rue' of the Marquis de Sade and his philosophy," discovering that 
Sade' s shock value depended mostly "on the pungency of the perfume and its power over 
the nerves," he was still intensely affected by how Sade "stimulate[ d] the senses by that 
preliminary pleasure so as to inflict the acuter pain afterwards on their awakened and 
intensified susceptibility" (Letters 1 :78). 14 In other words, Swinburne perceived Sade' s 
writings as attempts to awaken human sensibilities in a way that would allow for what 
Marcuse calls the "release of sensuous energy," a release that allows for freedom which 
can "only . . .  [be] founded on and sustained by the free gratification" of individua!s ( 19 1  ) . 
Furthermore, as Dorothea Barrett suggests, Swinburne saw in sadomasochistic 
practice the possibility that such practice could be used as a model for ideal "human 
interaction" ( 1 1 1  }-a model in which all human interactions are recognized equally, 
democratically, without censure or exclusion. Just as one "confront[s] the mutability and 
proximity" of supposed opposites "pleasure and pain," one must confront the mutability 
and proximity of social, political, and religious polarities (Barrett 1 1 1  ). However, a 
model which privileges these kinds of sensual expression must also account for the 
economy of desire-and, specifically, what desire lacks-which compels human 
interaction as well. Just as Swinburne was fascinated by how Sadean fantasy reveals the 
inability of fantasy to (ful)fill the lack (desire), 15 and thus perpetuates itself, he was also 
14 Letter to Richard Monkton Milnes (Lord Houghton), IO Feb. 1863 . As Lang notes, Swinburne quotes 
here from Milton's Paradise Lost, Book XI, line 4 14. 
1 5  Inasmuch as the desired object of the fantasy is "not symmetrical with the subject" but is instead "the 
'lack of object' insofar as the subject finds him (or her]self in it as the object (she or] he is not-that is, as 
desire" (Borch-Jacobsen 200-0 l ). 
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fascinated by how revolutionary struggle demonstrates the inability of revolution to meet 
its own goals, and thus perpetuates itself. The bodies subject to sexual violence in 
Sadean fantasies are "so displaceable . . .  that the narrative cannot reach any closure, or 
rather only a kind of 'half relier that administers salt to [the] wound," or the 
un(ful)fiJlable lack (Vincent 284). Likewise, the bodies-agents-of revolutionary 
struggle in Swinburne's political poems are displaced via the same kind of serial 
identifications enacted in the Poems and Ballads, so that the narratives of revolution they 
profess do not reach any closure, either, and instead punctuate the inabil ity of revolution 
to fulfill its own goals. 
Revolutionary Failure and Political Androgyny: 
Glimmers of the Republican Aesthetic in the Poems and Ballads 
In her recent study of Swinburne's political poems, Stephanie Kuduk identifies 
what she calls the "republican aesthetics" informing and being formed by Swinburne' s  
poetry of the late 1 860s/early 1 870s. In the republ ican aesthetic, "poetry [is] an agent of 
social and political change," and poets "translate republican ideals . . .  into poetic form" 
(Kuduk 253). In Songs before Sunrise, Kuduk asserts, Swinburne explores "[t]he 
republican idea that ideological and physical power are united" by providing within each 
poem a site where the conflation of political power and repressive ideology can be 
negotiated (260). Revolutionary action aims to challenge the ideas that sustain the 
dominant ideology-the body of ideas representing the social needs and aspirations of a 
specific culture, as promoted and upheld by the government-or to replace it entirely. 
When one thinks of revolutionary action, likely one thinks of some kind of physical, 
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material conflict, like Orsini' s assassination attempt on Louis Napoleon, Garibaldi's  
revolt against the monarchic rulers of Sicily, or  even the organization of political activist 
associations like the Universal Republican Alliance. However, as Mazzini 
communicated to Swinburne, physical, material conflict can only put into practice the 
ideals already generated by the persuasive, creative power of the intellect. To Mazzini, 
"[l]iterature . . .  was the secret political weapon" (Sarti 32) upon which the success of any 
revolutionary activity depends; Kuduk's definition of the Swinburnean republican 
aesthetic echoes Mazzini's assertion that "the ink of the wise is a match for the sword of 
the strong" ( qtd. by Sarti 54). Three poems featured in Poems and Ballads, First 
Series-"A Song in a Time of Order," "A Song in a Time of Revolution," and "Les 
Noyades" -can be evaluated as initial considerations of the politicized and politicizing 
aesthetic Swinburne later negotiates in the Songs. However, these poems seem to suggest 
that the "ink of the wise" reveals the shortcomings of the republican "sword"; instead of 
assuring its strength, the poems demonstrate how a politicized aesthetic can conflict with 
the predominant ideas of actual political movement which inspires its very creation. 
"A Song in a Time of Order" is subtitled "1 852," which is not the actual date of 
its composition 16 but the date marking the false sense of despotically imposed calm that 
existed before the revolutionary stonn that would soon overtake Europe. In 1 852, the 
citizens of France voted to give Louis Napoleon the title of Emperor, thus ending the 
period of the post-revolutionary Secon� Republic; Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour, who 
opposed Mazzini's "radical" ideas for revolution, became Prime Minister of Sardinia-
1 6  As Rooksby notes in A Poet 's Life, 1858 is the earliest date of composition for any of the Poems and 
Ballads (132). Rooksby does not offer a more specific date for this poem, but Swinburne did publish the 
poem in the April 26, 1862 issue of the Spectator prior to including it in the Poems and Ballads. 
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Piedmont and used his power to undermine the revolutionary efforts of Mazzini's  
factions; and Austria, which controlled many Italian principalities, passed the 
Sylvesterpatent, or New Year's Eve Edict, which returned the country to the rule of an 
absolute monarchy. The speaker of Swinburne's poem exhorts his audience, the 
revolutionaries quieted by the resurgence of absolutism, to "Push hard across the sand" of 
the desert of such ossifying autocracy, to retain or to rediscover the hope that their ideals 
can stil l  be translated into a material expression: "For the salt wind" of a stil l-possible 
republicanism stil l  "gathers breath" (lines 1 -2), and the revolutionary movement remains 
"The pulse tide of the sea" which "swel ls and welters and swings" with the promises of 
"the fresh fierce weather'' of a radical political vital ism on the horizon (7-8, 1 3). These 
possibilities wil l  be materialized, the speaker promises repeatedly, by the "three men" 
who "hold together'' so that "The kingdoms are less by three." These men are not named, 
but one of them is undoubtedly Mazzini; one could argue the other two are followers of 
Mazzini ' s-perhaps Giovanni Pianori, who attempted to assassinate Louis Napoleon in 
1 854, and Giuseppe Garibaldi, who led several armies of revolutionaries in attempts to 
oust the French and Austrian rulers from their Italian strongholds. However, Swinburne 
could just as easily refer to other Mazzinians such as Carlo Pisacane, who led an army to 
l iberate Naples from Bourbon rule in 1 856, or the priest Enrico Tazzoli ,  a Mazzinian 
organizer in Austrian-controlled Lombardy. In the end, definitively identifying those 
who complete the Mazzinian trinity here may not matter, as to Swinburne any of these 
candidates are synonymous with Mazzini himself Like so many of the other personae 
created in Poems and Ballads, the figures in the poem are purposefully not named 
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because they are intended to figure in the processes of serial identification: they are all 
versions, or traces, of the republican savior. 
Notably, all the men I have named as possible historical ·analogues to the shadowy 
revolutionary figures mentioned in this poem are marked by failure, as are the other 
Christ figures featured in Poems and Ballads, who fail to fulfill the conventional 
promises of redemption or transcendence. The plots that began to take shape in 1 852 all 
failed: Garibaldi suffered major losses in his early mil itary ventures on behalf of 
Mazzini ' s  cause, Pianori was executed for his crime, Pisacane committed suicide to 
prevent being taken a prisoner of war, and Tazzoli was arrested for conspiring against the 
Austrian government and publicly whipped. 17 Furthermore, Mazzini ' s  popularity was 
greatly diminished due to his prolonged exile from Italy as well as Cavour's skil l at using 
his political triumphs to make Mazzini look ineffective and out of touch with the needs of 
Italian people. 
At the same time, it is important to realize that Swinburne writes about 1 852 with 
the allowances of hindsight. Swinburne recognizes, as Karl Marx does in his 1 852 essay 
on the "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," that the failures of the past "weig[h] 
like a nightmare on the brain of the l iving" (Marx 595). Swinburne saw the culmination 
what Marx had predicted : that many of the revolutionary ideas that evolved from the 
reinstitution of authoritarian order in Europe that year failed to counteract that oppressive 
authority. Furthermore, Swinburne's remediated vision of 1 852 serves as an example of 
how, in their attempt to "creat[e] something entirely new," revolutionaries "anxiously 
conju_re up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle 
17 Interestingly, in line 50 of the poem Swinburne specificalJy mentions "the Austrian whips." 
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slogans, and costumes to present the new scene . . .  in this time-honored disguise and this 
borrowed language" (Marx 595). Marx stated that revolution in the nineteenth century 
should not "draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future"; that revolution "must 
let the dead bury their dead" (597). In similar vein, Swinburne' s poetry demonstrates 
how drawing upon the past, how reconstructing templates for revolution from "the bones 
of the dead," 18 will necessarily result in the failure of that revolution-albeit the kind of 
necessary failure which allows the revolutionary "to keep [his or her] passion at the 
height of . . .  great historical tragedy'' (Marx 596)--the kind of tragedy which, Lacan tells 
us, "reveals to us the line of sight that defines desire" (Seminar 247). In this "line of 
sight," one is forced to describe revolution as Lacan defines desire, as a "perpetual effect 
of symbol ic articulation"; revolution is envisioned as a self-perpetuating event. 19 
Such emphasis on the tragic dimension of political revolution suggests a notable 
and important difference that exists between Mazzini 's republicanism and Swinburne's-­
one that existed well before Swinburne was officially drafted into Mazzini 's  circle, and 
one that would cause Swinburne to write poems that did not quite characterize the 
revolutionary effort in ways Mazzini wanted, or even anticipated. Whereas Swinburne's  
political poetry anticipates revolutionary failures, thus concentrating on the struggle itself 
rather than its improbable, even utopian, goals, 20 Mazzini never fully acknowledged the 
1 8  See line 46 of Swinburne,s "Song in Time of Revolution." 
19 See the "Translator's Note" to The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. pp. 278-79. 
20 Swinburne,s treatment of revolutionary failure shares some similarities with Shellef s, such as Shelley's 
depictions of cyclical violence in "The Mask of Anarchy" and the perpetuated conflict between Asia and 
Demigorgon in "Prometheus Unbound." Notably, at the time he composed many of the Songs before 
Sunrise. Swinburne corresponded frequently with William Michael Rossetti concerning Rossetti 's 
upcoming volume of Shelley's poems as well as with the poet Mathilde Blind, whose "Shelley: A Lecture', was published in 1870. Swinburne's letters suggest he was more intrigued by Shelley's poetic style than 
Shelley's political agenda. At one point, though, Swinburne asked W.M. Rossetti to read portions of the 
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possibility or prospect of failure in his quest to create an Italy unified by republicanism. 
Throughout his l ife, Mazzini truly believed he "had to carry out the will of God on earth 
' so that the divine plan may be fulfilled'" (Sarti 8 1 ). He presented himself as the messiah 
of the Italian people, "the Cristo uomo sacrificing [himself] for their redemption"; in 
other words, Mazzini is the universal symbol of the possibility of a unified, less 
autocratic Italy not lodged beyond the particularities of the Italian people, w�om he 
called "the Cristo popo/o" (Sarti 8 1  ). Swinburne was aware that the possibilities once 
signified by Mazzini ' s  public persona had not materialized, especial ly as the Cristo 
popo/o demonstrated "a notable lack of interest in prolonging the national revolution" 
(Sarti 198). On the surface, the "Song in a Time of Order'' seems a call to relight former 
revolutionary fires; upon a closer reading, though, it seems more like a statement 
pronouncing the inevitable failure to bring radical possibilities to fruition. There is  a 
sense of bravado in the speaker' s  exhortation to "Let the wind shake our flag like a 
feather'' and face "the teeth of the hard glad weather'' (lines 45, 53), especially as he has 
already admitted that "the ranks that are thin shall be thinned" and "the names that were 
twenty are [now] ten" (35-36). 
The companion piece to this poem, "A Song in Time of Revolution (1 860)," 
considers the political cl imate of that year. 1 860 marks the end of Louis Napoleon' s  
dictatorship, as he  initiated a series of liberal reforms relinquishing many of his powers to 
France's National Assembly; likewise, Emperor Francis Joseph I introduced a form of 
constitutional government in Austria. In Italy, Garibaldi finally experienced military 
drafts of the Songs to make sure he was not "treading too much on ground preoccupied by Shelley . . .  on 
the outworks of 'Prometheus Unboundm (Letters 2: 120). 
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success, capturing Sicily and creating a provisional government there; the Piedmontese 
army invaded the Papal States, wresting political authority from the church; and Cavour 
convinced several other Italian principalities to vote for annexation to Sardinia-Piedmont, 
setting the stage for the creation of the unified Kingdom ofltaly the following year. 
Swinburne's poem, though, expresses only muted happiness at such turns of events. The 
speaker of this poem comments that the wi�d pushing the old regimes out of these lands 
"is full of the shouting of mirth" (line 33), a mirth which is sustained by revolutionary 
chaos-the priests are "scattered like chaff," the rulers are "broken like reeds,'' the 
. aristocracy is left "utterly naked and bare" (lines 6, 1 6). Strangely, though, Swinburne' s 
poem focused more on the ousted parties, who "are grieved and greatly afraid" and 
"grievously stricken at heart" (1 1 ,  _29). The only revolutionaries specifically mentioned 
in the poem are deceased. The events of 1 860 comprise "the song of the quick . . .  to the 
ears of the dead" (line 2), though the song does not stir them, and the events are also "the 
breath of the face of the Lord that is felt in the bones of the dead" ( 46), though it fails to 
breathe life back into them. 2 1  
The Christian Lord may be "the life and the resurrection" (John 1 1 .25}, but 
Mazzini, the self-proclaimed Lord of the Revolution, is unable to fulfill that role and thus 
is conspicuously absent from this song. His sacrifices for his Cristo popolo have been 
made in vain. Mazzini was estranged from the events of 1 860: Garibaldi, l ike Cavour, 
had distanced himself from Mazzini in order to appease the political moderates, and there 
21 See Ezekiel 37. 1-14. In this vision, God shows Ezekiel a valley of dry bones which represent those who 
are exiled from Israel and thus are not in a position to rebuild Israel as the kingdom of God. In the vision, 
though, Ezekiel is commanded to prophesy while God breathes on the bones, and the bodies are 
reassembled and resurrected. Notably, in Swinburne,s poem, the exiles remain dead, thus unable to rebuild 
Italy as a unified kingdom. 
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were anti-Mazzinian demonstrations in the streets as well as anti-Mazzinian tracts printed 
in several newspapers following Garibaldi 's  victory. As a result, Mazzini 's figurative 
"sword of the strong" is rendered dormant and ineffectual in Swinburne's poem: "Where 
the sword was covered and hidden, and dust had grown in its side, / A word came forth 
which was bidden, the crying of one that cried" ("Revolution" 43-44). Again, though, 
whereas the traditional mythic Christ is the "Wor� made flesh" (John 1 . 1 4), an example 
of a performative fiat that accomplishes its goal of rendering the ideal in the material 
world, the savior of the revolution's performative fiat is an empty gesture. It is "bidden," 
perhaps by the memory of the lost revolutionaries; thus it seems perfunctory, a duty of 
mourning rather than a contemplati�e act of belief, solicited in a time of anguish rather 
than fervor for and sincere devotion to the cause-qualities that Swinburne's poem 
purposefully refuses to evoke. Just as Christ cried out that God had forsaken him, the 
supposed savior of the revolution-the "sword of the strong" -cries out that he has been 
forsaken by the revolution itself. 
The failures inherent in the Ital ian revolutionary struggles are anticipated in the 
failures experienced in the French Revolution, which Swinburne chronicles in "Les 
Noyades." As Karen Alkalay-Gut argues, the poem in part demonstrates a "supremely 
romantically and politically fulfilling death, a dream of gratification made possible only 
by the Revolution" (54); but, like all other dreams of gratification Swinburne explores in' 
his poetry, the dream a�tually gratifies nothing. Instead, it perpetuates a kind of drive 
circling around the very impossibility, a lack, of fulfillment, again demonstrating how 
Swinburne equates revolutionary struggle with the erotic pursuits he investigates in his 
poetry; his revolutionary politics, like his sexual preoccupations, become a "strange 
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domain . . .  of the closed circular palpitation which finds satisfaction in endlessly 
repeating the same failed gesture" (Zizek, Plague 30). In "Les Noyades," revolutionary 
political fantasy and sexual fantasy are the same. 
The poem's title (l iterally, "The Drowned") refers to French revolutionist Jean 
Baptiste Carrier's practice of drowning political prisoners in the Loire River during the 
Reign of Terror ( 1793-1 794). Carrier would strip the prisoners naked, tie each man face­
to-face with a woman, preferably pairing a peasant with an aristocrat, and then drop the 
"couple" into the river through trap doors in the bottom of his ship; he called this practice 
mariage republicain. In his account of Carrier' s noyades, which inspired Swinburne' s 
poem, Thomas Carlyle recounts that Carrier, seeing "the pale swollen corpses . . .  tumble 
confusedly seawards along the Loire stream, the tide roll ing them back," marveled that 
the scene embodied " 'fie J torrent revolutionnaire ' "  ( 648-49). The revolutionary torrent 
is the excess of terror made visible; by focusing on the corpses, Carlyle/Carrier redirects 
our attention to how the "external, material feature[ s ]" of revolutionary atrocities reveal a 
"truth" about revolutionary idealism that would otherwise be eclipsed (Zizek, Plague 3). 
Carrier' s remark demonstrates what Zizek would call an attitude of"contemplative 
fascination" toward the corpses which are the "traumatic" "excremental excess" of the . 
revolution; Swinburne's poem shares that attitude, though it also demonstrates how that 
fascination creates an ambiguous and unsettling "relationship between fantasy and the 
horror of the Real it conceals" (Plague 5, 7). Swinburne's poem recasts Carrier's  
fascination with the corpses into a fantasy in which the corpses embody physical 
sensual ity, a fantasy meant to conceal the horror of death and yet "at the same time . . .  
creates what it purports to conceal" (Plague 7). 
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In the poem, Swinburne assigns the fantasy to a man "rough with labour and red 
with fight" who is paired with a "faultless, . . .  wonderful, white" noblewoman (lines 14, 
1 8), awaiting the watery completion of their "republican marriage." The laborer declares 
that the event of his demise, though a "small thing in [God's] eyes, / . . .  is greater in mine 
than the whole great sea" because he will drown with his fair lady ( 43-44). Both critics 
who have offered thorough studies of this poem previously, Robert Greenberg and Karen 
Alkalay-Gut, have read it as a companion piece to "The Leper," in which Swinburne 
explores sexual taboos by manipulating the trope of the untouchable fair lady of courtly 
love. Greenberg sees the poem as an attempt to capture the "transgressive moment" of 
passion (1 03); similarly, Alkalay-Gut decides it is a description of being "[ d]rowned not 
in water but in passion" (59). However, whereas the leper has an authentic experience of 
passion in his relationship to his "fair lady," the laborer seems very far removed from any 
sort of experienced passion. When the laborer declares, "I have loved this woman my 
whole life long" (line 45), the statement seems empty since nothing in the poem indicates 
that the laborer and the noblewoman had any prior connection. 
Here Swinburne superimposes fiction onto historical fact, since he would have 
known from his studies that Carrier paired his victims together at random. Swinburne 
uses the fiction of the laborer' s unrequited love for hisfemme repub/icain to emphasize 
the inhumanity and injustice of the laborer's death-a meaningless death which displays 
the inhumanity and injustice that characterized the Reign of Terror in revolutionary 
France. By constructing a fantasy in which he orgasmically drowns "laughing for love" 
(line 55) with an ostensible lover who is a part of himself (''we are one not twain" [50))­
a lover who he claims wil l  "mix with me, touching me, lips and eyes" (56), filling his 
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lack and offering transcendence-the laborer attempts to make his death meaningful. He 
tries to present his death as the moment in which he overcomes adversity, his class status, 
his human limitations; the laborer boasts, "For never a man, being mean like me, / Shall 
die like me til l  the whole world dies" (53-54). With this boast, Swinburne demonstrates 
how the laborer obfuscates the horror of his own situation, his own death, by constructing 
a sexual fantasy in which the formerly sublimated happiness and pleasure can re-emerge. 
The laborer' s fantasy is  one in which dying with his desired other becomes the attempt to 
recog}!ize and to retrieve what he had hitherto lacked, 22 as well as the attempt to release 
himself from "the eternal struggle against suffering and repression" (Marcuse 1 8, 29). 
The laborer' s death is also a "forced choice," the only option he has in the Reign 
of Terror, though his fantasy deludes him into portraying his own death as a freely made 
choice among multiple options ostensibly available for him to consider. Here the fantasy 
operates to "maintai[n] the false opening''-a construction, says Zizek, which reinforces 
rather than disrupts the publ ic symbolic order (Plague 29). Paradoxically, the 
revolutionist regime of France, despite its declarations of liberte, imposes a "phantasmic 
frame of unwritten rules" which determines how each individual wil1 "choose 'freely'" 
(Plague 29)-rules which differ, of course, based on one' s social class and political 
affiliations. The laborer desires la liberte as promised in the Revolution's slogan, 
although Carrier's  scheme here impl icitly excludes him; his very "capacity to desire 
involves the paradoxical structure of the forced choice" that reinforces his exclusion 
(Plague 30). I think Swinburne purposefully represents the laborer's desire for freedom 
through the construction of fantasy, just as h� purposefully chooses to describe this desire 
22 See Borch-Jacobsen 200. 
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in a laborer 's voice. Through the fantasy, Swinburne equates the libidinal economy of 
sexual fantasy with that of revolutionary fervor; the lover will always fail to attain his 
beloved, and so the revolutionist will always fail to attain the utopian government of true 
equality, liberty, and fraternity. This failure represents the desire for attainment it 
sustains. Attainment would imply a troubling self-dissolution, since the 
lover/revolutionist would no longer labor to sustain "that dialectic of the ego and/or the 
[ desired] other" which is equated here with the dialectic between the "proletarian," whose 
sense of self is positioned in his alienation from the "master," and the "master'' in whom 
the proletarian wants to recognize himself.-a dialectic which would be dissolved in a 
"universal and homogenous State (alias the classless society)" (Borch-Jacobsen 86, 90). 
Yet one labors for that all-elusive attainment nonetheless. Swinburne's laborer, though, 
performs what Robert Kaufman, following Adorno, calls the ''special kind of labor" of 
aesthetic experience, in which "the subject," "effectively reconstructing what Adorno will 
represent as the artwork's own process of discovering still-obscured areas of the social," 
realizes that "significant facets of society remain to be discovered" although ''such 
discovery is unlikely to occur through use of society's ow� extant concepts for 
understanding itself' (Kaufman, "Social"). This kind of re-discovery of the social 
condition requires finding ways to (re)position the ego in a plenitude of new positions 
which allow for reconsiderations of the very alienation such ego-positioning entails­
rather than the attainment of one's ultimate goal. 
Conceivably, it is the recognition of fantasy as just a false opening which is 
obscured in the social and political milieu. If one were to recognize the false opening for 
what it really is, then one could "traverse the fantasy," or "suspen[d] the phantasmic 
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frame of unwritten rules'' by treating the forced choice as a true choice (Zizek, Plague 
29). In this particular case, the laborer treats the forced choice (the "choice" to die made 
for him by Carrier) as a true choice (as if he really does have the option to not enter into 
the deadly "republican marriage" but freely chooses not to exercise it). If the laborer 
were to traverse his fantasy, though, he could recognize that_ his professed autonomy-his 
ability to choose between options-is merely "appearance qua appearance," or artifice. 
Importantly, the laborer fails to recognize his fantasy as a false opening as such. He is 
problematically limited to two choices in this l ibidinal economy: he can either embrace 
his own death or retreat into fantasy, and he does the latter. Either way, the laborer is  
stuck in a very limited position; in death as well as in the escape fantasy provides, the 
laborer is excluded from the plenitude of possibi lities for what does not yet-but could­
exist in the material world,23 despite the many limitations that world exacts. 
Accepting the dual l imitations of the libidinal economy is not the same as 
considering its limitations as fluctuating, variable, subject to redefinition. Seemingly 
recognizing the stalemated position of his laborer, then, Swinburne abruptly breaks from 
the character of the laborer, introducing another speaker to contrast the laborer' s  voice. 
At first, this speaker seems to share the laborer's fantasy of drowning with a lover in the 
Loire; however, he uses only conditional verbs in hi s speech, distancing himself from the 
fantasy in a way the laborer could not, consequently indicating that he recognizes that 
fantasy is an unreal event of an improbable fulfillment. "Lost beyond hope, [and] taken 
far out of sight" (line 63), this second speaker is aware that there is  no end to his longing. 
23 I have based this, in part, on Adorno' s contention that "art stands as a reminder of what does not exist" 
(Theory 240). 
240 
He realizes that "fantasy cannot be the mere capacity to escape the existing by positing 
the nonexisting as if it existed" (Adorno, Theory 173). Still, like the laborer, he cannot 
effectively use fantasy to reveal the moment of total demystification. Swinburne uses 
both personae in an Adornian fashion to propose that fantasy is able to suggest an 
"unrestricted availability of potential solutions" to the problems of social and material 
limitation (Theory 173, emphasis mine) inasmuch as political revolution entails the 
constant production of potential means of resolving, rather than actual resolutions for, 
social ills and material inequities. 
Swinburne' s eroticized description of Carrier's "republican marriage," the 
supposedly fulfilling fusion of male and female, borrows from the tendency in 
nineteenth-century French literature to make hermaphroditic or androgynous characters 
symbols of republ ican/revolutionary ideals. As A.J.L. Busst remarks in his landmark 
study of the androgyne in nineteenth-century literature, "In the class strife of post­
Revolutionary France, . . .  the androgyne often signified . . .  absolute social equality" (9).24 
Busst points out that this idea was developed considerably by the philosopher Pierre­
Simon Ballanche, who compared the French Revolution to the conflict between the 
patricians and the plebeians in ancient Rome. According to Ballanche, 
[t]he male, patrician principle will rehabilitate the female, plebeian 
principle by gradually initiating it into the knowledge of the religious, 
moral and civil laws which God gave man to prevent him from misusing 
24 Busst also notes that "(t]he distinctions . . .  between the tenns 'androgyne' and 'hennaphrodite' have 
always been purely arbitrary and consequently often contradictory" (1). As Busst's study is both careful 
and compelling, I defer to his scholarship for my purposes here and use the tenns somewhat 
interchangeably, as he does, with the understanding that both indicate aesthetically "a person who unites 
certain of the .. .  characteristics of both sexes and who, consequently, may be considered as both a man and 
a woman or as neither . . .  , as bisexual or asexual" (I). 
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his l iberty, and which the patricians handed down from generation to 
generation. (Busst 21)  
This idea was echoed in some of the French literature Swinburne read, notably that of 
Victor Hugo and Honore de Balzac. Swinburne carefully studied how both Hugo and 
Balzac expressed the socio-political implications of the hermaphroditic trope in the very 
material components and physical activity of the hermaphroditic body. Their treatment 
of political androgyny resembles the Saint-Simonian philosophy of the French social 
reformer Barthelemy Enfantin, who had belonged to the Carbonari, the secret society 
dedicated to the Italian revolutionary cause, at approximately the same time as Mazzini .  25 
To Enfantin, "republican marriage" was a paradigm for civic virtue rather than 
punishment. He insisted that "the social individual is  a couple, composed of a man and a 
woman-in other words, that the individual citizen is an androgyne" or hermaphrodite 
(Busst 26). 
Yet, as Busst explains, Enfantin' s doctrine of the androgynous republican is a 
celebration rather than a disparagement of the substance of human sexuality: "[T]he 
material world must be shown to be in no way inferior to the intellectual or moral world, 
the activity of the body to the activity of the mind, manual labour to philosophy" (25). 
According to Enfantin' s Saint-Simonian doctrine, "thought and matter are not two 
distinct entities but just two aspects of existence" (Busst 25). "The rehabi litation of 
matter" allows for "the rehabil itation of the flesh',; "to raise woman up from her inferior 
25 Enfantin joined the French offshoot of the Carbonari. a faction founded by the many Italian exiles living 
in Paris at that time, in 1823; Mazzini did not seek membership in the Carbonari, and thus start agitating the 
Carbonari to step up their revolutionary efforts. until 1827. There is no evidence that Mazzini and Enfantin 
ever met, but Mazzini did spend the early 1 830s in Paris trying to incite the Carbonari there to liberate the 
province of Savoy from Piedmontese rule. 
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position"-to allow her equal standing with the male principle in the hermaphroditic 
trope-is "to legitimize sexual pleasure," to legitimize "the natural activity of the body" 
(Busst 25), as a way of demonstrating the possibilities still avai lable in the material world 
which could be made evident through revolutionary socio-political change. Thus, in 
nineteenth-century French literature, Swinburne found revaluative treatments of the 
premise he found important in Sade's work: the reimagined body as the site for the equal 
and inclusive recognition and legitimation of all human interactions and pleasures. 
However, as Busst also notes, literature written in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century emphasizes the "isolation, loneliness, . . .  and despair" of a decadent, 
hermaphroditic sexuality (39). This shift demonstrates the revolutionists' disappointment 
at their failure to actualize their goals and to live their ideals, the citizenry's impatience 
with wavering (and often poorly organized) revolutionary causes, and a pervasive 
pessimism generated by class struggles which were perpetuated rather than reconciled. 
From the French decadent writers he admired, such as Henri la Touche and Theophile 
Gautier, Swinburne distinguished how the failure to achieve a position of autonomy in 
the "real world" often led one to seek such a position within art and to find similar failure 
there. In La Touche's Fragoletta, a novel set during Napoleon Bonaparte's  struggles to 
control Italy, the hermaphroditic hero/ine dies without establishing effective relationships 
with any of the persons he/she encounters, and his/her inability to establish a definite 
social role for him/herself subtly mirrors the ins�ability of the Italian political climate.26 
26 I agree more with Nigel Smith's reading of Frago/etta, which opposes Busst's. Busst dismjsses La 
Touche's novel as a poorly written potboiler that exploits the hermaphroditic trope for its sensationalism; in 
doing so, Busst completely disregards (by not even mentioning) the novel 's many political subplots, 
subplots which often depict actual historical figures tliat had played a part in Bonaparte's rise to power. 
Nigel Smith notes how the juxtaposition of Fragoletta 's hermaphroditism and the France/Italy conflict 
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And, in Gautier's Mademoiselle de Maupin, the androgynous title character who is the 
embodiment of an aristocracy detached from ( and thus made to seem extraneous to) the 
everyday world, pronounces herself the heir of the "thirst for the impossible" associated 
with the degeneracy of the privileged class of ancient Rome; this suggests that she feels 
she has no place in a post-Revolutionary society. 
Swinburne mirrors these sentiments in poems such as "Fragoletta" and 
"Hermaphroditus." In "Fragoletta," a poem inspired by La Touche's  novel, he creates a 
"sexless" (line 4) Medusa-like androgyne who delivers empty promises of sexual 
fulfillment in fleeting dreams. Likewise, in "Hermaphroditus," an homage to Gautier' s  
similar poem "Contralto," Swinburne declares that "the fruitful feud of hers and his" has 
turned into "the waste wedlock of a sterile kiss" (lines 1 8- 1 9). These poems are read 
appropriately as statements about the impasse of I 'art pour / 'art-demonstrating with 
eerie precision how "artworks with truth content do not blend seamlessly with the 
concept of art" (Adorno, Theory 227). Adorno notes that "[t]he truth content of artworks, 
which is indeed their social truth, is predicated on their fetish character" (Theory 227). In 
these poems, the hermaphroditic/androgynous body is a fetish-a concentrated locus or 
site of expressive power-which, though a product of the social milieu, is situated as 
something outside of that milieu, containing a self-sufficiency, or ''ideological autonomy, 
. . .  allowing it to speak against the very social order" which produced it (Eagleton 348). 
delllOlllstl'lates "clear development ofa mise en abyme of binarism" (67). Furthermore, Smith suggests 
that La Touche, who published his novel in 1829, "wtdoubtedly felt that the situation in [Italy] . . .  reflected 
that of his own society as it headed towards another revolution" (69). 
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Such a symbol, as offered in art, cannot express the "truth" of its social relevance; 
instead, it perpetually expresses the triangular conflict between art itself, the condition <?f 
its production, and the variety of ways a work of art can be interpreted. 
Thi s  continuum of conflict, as demonstrated by the Poems and Ballads as well as 
the study of Blake, plays out in its own virtual space, responsive to its own artificial ity, 
on the margins of the "real world." . In the case of the Songs before Sunrise, as we shall 
see, Swinburne's poems are not quite lyrics for a real-life crusade but lyrical explorations 
of a revolutionary aesthetic which parallels, rather than advances, the real-life politics of 
their historical moment. Swinburne foretells Adorno' s conviction that a work of art "is 
internally revolutionary," inasmuch as art "has the tendency toward social integration" 
although society does not tend to want to integrate art into itself (Theory 228). 
Moreover, he also foretells Adorno's conviction that art is revolutionary because it 
depends upon-and perpetually redefines-the "palpable dependencies and conflicts" 
between art's "autonomy and [its]fait social" (Theory 229). Rather than aiming to enact 
social and political change among the masses, as Kuduk claims, Swinburne' s 
revolutionary aesthetic aims to enact artistic and introspective change on an individual 
level by offering a superfluity of possibilities for social critique which are subject to 
constellative interpretations. 
As part of the development of this revolutionary aesthetic, as I wil l demonstrate 
below, Swinburne brings his earlier explorations of the hermaphroditic trope to his poems 
about Italy. Swinburne offers the Songs before Sunrise as an aestheticized field of 
myriad and sometimes contradictory revolutionary possibil ities, lodged in diverse 
representations of an ineffectual messiah in an uncomfortable relationship to an ancient 
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divinity, a gender-full god/dess of "the Beloved republic" ("Hertha" line 227), who can 
only fai l to fill his lack. This is  not to claim that all of Swinburne's political poems 
specifically revolve around the transformation of the hermaphroditic trope, though. 
Rather, Swinburne uses the Italian revolution itself in the Songs before Sunrise in the 
same way he uses the hermaphrodite/androgyne in his works-as a fetishized trope 
locating the conflict between art and reality, the conflict between an aestheticized 
perception of the material world and the ossified perception of that world offered by the 
dominant discourse. Of course, this ·involves various treatments of the complicated figure 
of Mazzini, the celebrated visionary whose political vision is exposed as incongruously 
indeterminate. 
"I set the trumpet to my lips and blow": Childe Swinburne to Republicanism Came 
Swinburne told Will iam Michael Rossetti that "The Eve of Revolution," the third 
poem in Songs before Sunrise, is "the centre poem and mainspring of [the] volume" 
(Letters 2: 95).27 Kuduk finds the poem to be indi�ative of Swinburne's ''experiment 
with formal strategies for realizing [the] power" of poetry to articulate the formulations 
of political change through "the fusion of one man's specifically literary endeavor and 
the fiery power of republ ican politics" in action (259-60). McGann, though, reads such 
articulation as an end in itself, pointing out that Swinburne is unable to envision "the final 
end of war or suffering or struggle because his understanding . . .  [of it] is cyclical" 
27 Letter from Swinburne to W.M. Rossetti, 14 Feb. 1870. Also, in this letter, Swinburne mentions that the 
poem is "all but finished." 
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(Swinburne 248-49, italics his).28 While the poem does suggest that "poetry can break 
the chains" of ideological power "by liberating the reader's consciousness," it does not 
quite reach the purported goal of "secur[ing] the complex relation between song and 
sword," thus "mak[ing] automatic the political power of poetry" (Kuduk 260-61 ). 
Instead, the complex relation between the aesthetic and the political is perpetually 
renegotiated-thus never secured-in what McGann calls "a feeling for death and the 
flux of change" (Swinburne 249). Moreover, even if the poem lives up to its promise to 
"liberate the reader's consciousness," liberation of consciousness on such an individual 
level does not guarantee the generation of any kind of mass political power; thus the 
poem does not provide a definitive call to political action. Instead, I contend that the 
poem almost seems like a retreat into artifice, a defiantly decadent escape, via art, from 
an environment of socio-political dissatisfaction. 
I believe that the speaker of "The Eve of Revolution" should be recognized as a 
slightly distanced commentator masking his irresoluteness of authority or purpose with 
an oscillating voice of bravado rather than, as Kuduk claims, a Blakean prophet of 
"political radicalism" (257). The speaker does emote the lofty, authoritative tone of the 
prophetic seer that Swinburne admired in Blake's Prophetic Books, a tone which conveys 
the new "evangel" of a revolutionary aesthetic in words bearing "strong significance and 
earnest passion" (Swinburne, Blake 194). But, it is important to note that Swinburne was, 
28 Again, Swinburne's depiction of human/social struggle is similar to Shelley's. Elsewhere in his boo� 
McGann says that Swinburne uses a Shelleyan "technical (poetic) device" in which he "pour(s] out a 
succession of images as analogues or facets of a single subject or perception," and "(t)he repetitive 
character of the device makes it extremely adaptable to the sort of prophetic lyric Swinburne constantly 
wrote . . . .  (T]hey heighten . . .  one's attention to the vastness of the unity of cosmic hannonies and 
correspondences" (Swinbume 73). Applied to the political poems in particular, this device demonstrates 
how the social and political conflict of any historical era "is equally involved in (such] processes of 
repetition and variation" (Swinbume 249). 
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at times, perplexed by, if not skeptical of, that style of delivery; as Swinburne notes in his 
Blake essay, the prophetic tone featured in some of Blake's  poetry allows for "the 
confusion, the clamour . . .  and other more absolutely offensive qualities-audacity, 
monotony, bombast, obscure play of l icence and torturous growth of fancy" that 
accompany and perhaps even taint the prophetic message of impending revolution and 
promises of the fulfil1ment of the republican ideals of social and intellectual freedom 
(Blake 185). 29 
Additional ly, one might also propose that the prophetic voice is  used ironically, 
given the poem's resemblance to Robert Browning's "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower 
Came."30 Referring to his propagation of revolutionary prophecy, the speaker of 
Swinburne's "Eve of Revolution" says repeatedly, "I set the trumpet to my lips and 
blow." I believe this line refers to the end of Browning's poem, in which Childe Roland 
declares, "Dauntless the slug-horn to my lips I set, / And blew . . .  " (203-04). In 
Browning's poem, Childe Roland, having "Heard failure prophesied so oft" (line 38), 
29 Though Swinburne is careful here to add that such "offensive qualities" ultimately do not "quench or 
even wholly conceal the living purport and the imperishable beauty" of Blake's Prophetic Books (Blake 
185), he discusses the portentous qualities of the works repeatedly. Curiously, Swinburne felt that the 
bombastic tone of Blake's poems specifically about political revolution detracted from their effectiveness. 
He callsAmerica ''a noble myth of rebellion" which nonetheless suffers from "ha(ving] more of thunder 
and less of lightning" than Blake's other works; Europe, he says, is equally lamentable in that Blake's 
apocalyptic prophecy of revolution seems just a "somewhat halting and bewildered fable" (Blake 237-39, 
243-45). Yet one could argue, nonetheless, that the "Eve of Revolution" somewhat resembles Blake's 
Milton-particularly the end of Blake's poem, in which Satan "Come(s] in a cloud, with trumpets & 
flaming fire," declaring, "I hold the Balances of Right & Just & mine the Sword" (Milton 2: Plate 38(43], 
lines 50, 54, emphasis mine). In his explication of Milton in the Blake essay, Swinburne claims that a 
"single, final act of redemption" in which one successfully reaches a goal of peaceful perfection "is not 
admitted as sufficient, or even possible" (Blake 267). 
30 Swinburne knew Browning's poem well and admired it enough to borrow almost exactly Browning's 
descriptions of Roland's inhospitable environs to describe the barren landscape ofMentana, Italy, in a letter 
to Lady Trevelyan, 19 Jan. 1861 (see Letters 1 :38). Mentana was also the scene of Garibaldi 's failed 
attempt in 1867 to take over papal territory-a failure Swinburne commemorates in other poems in the 
volume, "The Halt before Rome" and "Mentana: First Anniversary." Additionally, Swinburne seems to 
have had some regular acquaintance with Browning during the time he was writing the Songs (see 
Rooksby, Life 164, 199). 
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seems resigned to the futility of his quest, and the "furious, self-frustrated energy" 
(Bloom, "Broken" 549) that Childe Roland experiences throughout the quest becomes an 
end in itself. The quest is undertaken for the sake of questing and not with the hope of 
successfully finding the impossible object he seeks.3 1  In the poem's  open-ended finale, 
Childe Roland is flanked by the ghosts of his predecessors, all fallen knights marked by 
their failures, who conditionally form around him "a living frame / For one more picture" 
(200-01). All Browning offers us is Roland heralding his own arrival at a pivotal 
moment in which, to borrow one of the lines from Swinburne's poem, "[His] name is not 
yet writ with theirs that fell" ("Eve" 25 1 ); but, by calling out his own name, Roland · 
seems to add it to the list of the fallen. However, Browning's poem effectively casts 
doubt on the prophetic mode in its demonstration of uncertainty: prophecy suggests the 
impending attainment of the goal of a quest, even if the goal is one's own death, but 
Childe Roland does not experience any sort of attainment. As Leslie M. Thompson has 
carefully noted, one can read Roland's  journey as paralleling the journey of the Christian 
believer who lives life preparing for the imminent, apocalyptic battle between good and 
31 As Robert Langbaurn notes, Browning's poem is a tale of "sheer questing" in which "the experience not 
the situation" (192), not the goal or the end result, is important. Somewhat similarly, Harold Bloom (in 
"How to Read a Poem") has suggested that Browning replaces the "ego-ideal of the traditional quest" with 
the enigmatic Dark Tower as a way of demonstrating that any object of a quest is unattainable. The 
majority of the criticism of Browning's poem notes-and. in some cases, laments-that it is not clear what, 
exactly, the goal of Roland's quest is. Given the often-noted similarities between "Childe Roland" and 
Tennyson's "Sir Galahad," one could allude that Roland is on a Grail quest, especially if one agrees with 
John King McComb's assertion that "the object of the quest . . .  (should} be imagined as some bright 
spiritual success" (464-65). Furthermore, Mario D' Avanzo compares the poem.to Shelley's "Triumph of 
Life," asserting, "The spirit of beauty and truth that rewards the once oocorrupted Rousseau with visionary 
power [in Shelley's poem} . . .  is akin to the grail vision that Roland has quested to achieve" (703). 
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evil because Browning borrows heavi ly from the language of biblical prophecy (347).32 
Whereas the bibl ical prophecies suggest this conflict will be ultimately resolved, though, 
Browning leaves his hero irresolute; perhaps pronouncing nothing more than bravado 
when faced with the radical closure of his situation-a situation in which his final act, 
irresolute though it may be, seems forced by prophecy itself In some ways, it can be 
compared to the forced choice masquerading as a false opening in the symbolic 
framework like that faced by Swinburne's laborer in "Les Noyades"; only Childe Roland 
demonstrates awareness of the prophecy as a limit experience, noting that the forced 
choice, "ended, then, / Progress" by comparing the forced choice to "when a trap shuts­
[ and] you're inside the den" ("Childe Roland" 1 7 1 -72, 1 74). 
The speaker of"The Eve of Revolution'' proclaims the coming of the "hidden 
hour that hast our hope to bear" (line 4 1 8) which seems to be just another false opening 
in the political framework. To make the false opening seem like an actual prospect of 
freedom, he claims to be invested with a prophetic authority originating from "The 
trumpets of the four winds of the world," which "From the ends of the earth blow 
battle . . .  " (lines 1 -2). . Swinburne's speaker seems eager to present the revolutionary 
events as ushering in an epoch "of liberation that go[ es] beyond the historical instant" and 
to insinuate that his song is "fraternally allied with the world spirit" (Adorno, Theory 
208). The "world spirit," in this case, is posited in the idea of an Adam Kaedmon-like 
"single, individual," hermaphroditic being-not unlike Blake's Albion--whose separate 
parts, driven "to the four corners of the modern world," strive for harmonious 
32 Various lines hi Browning's poem evoke the warnings given to the Israelites by Isaiah and Jeremiah as 
well as the apocalyptic scenes prophesied in the Book of Revelation. For specific details, see Thompson, 
pp. 349-5 1. 
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reunification; this struggle to recuperate a lost wholeness thus becomes the template for 
all "universal history'' (Busst 1 3).33 On the "Eve of Revolution," the world spirit suffers 
from this diffusion: Swinburne's speaker counterposes the oppressive "dim tribes of 
kings," "reaping men that reap men for their sheaves," with a freedom-seeking feminine 
force whom he describes as an invasive "night. [that] heaves, / With breasts palpitating 
and wings refurled," inspiring revolution with her "wild wind of vision" (lines 2-1 1 ,  
emphases mine). The speaker problematically relies on a grandiose creation myth to 
authorize his voice. And, even more problematically, the speaker does not have direct 
access to the prophetic vision entrusted to him; the original vision is twice-removed from 
him. First, t�e vision is given to the speaker synaesthetically, "With many tongues of 
thunders" (line 1 8)--meaning, what was once an ideogrammatic visual communication, a 
"synchronic structure" conveying a multitude of intellectual ideas and affective states 
simultaneously (Mitchell ,  Jcono/ogy 25), is transmuted into vocal speech which cannot 
signify all the possibilities inherent in the ideogram. Secondly, the speaker receives the 
transmuted vision indirectly, as the message of revolution is delivered by a voice distinct 
from the goddess-like force's "wild wind of vision." Described as "A voice more instant 
than the winds are clear" (24), it 
Say[s] to my spirit, "Take 
Thy trumpet too, and make 
A rallying music in the void night' s ear. . . .  ["] (25-27) 
33 This is actually Busst,s gloss on the development of this idea offered in Victor Hugo,s Fragment 
historique (1829), a work with which Swinburne-given his enthusiasm for, as well as extensive correspondence with, Hugo-would have been familiar. 
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This voice, as it echoes his request for Swinburne to deliver a "series of lyrics for the 
crusade," is surely meant to be Mazzini's. 
Consciously portraying himself a leader of the revolution, both the historical 
Mazzini as well as Swinburne' s fictionalized version upheld himself as the chosen one 
authorized not only to receive the prophetic vision but also to share it; since Mazzini 
consciously mythologized himself as the Cristo uomo despite his inability to manifest 
much of his· claimed political clout, his authority is somewhat suspect. Yet the Mazzini 
figure in Swinburne's poem shares this tenuous position of"authority" with the speaker 
and urges him to "set the trumpet to [his] lips and blow'' (38ff.). The Mazzinian prophet, 
though, is presented as another fai led Moses, unable to meet his goal despite the very 
prophecy which promised him the impending satisfaction of reunifying the "world spirit" 
in the Promised Land. Mazzini and/or the speaker remain(s) divorced from the ''one 
Republic" (line 270), the vision of a new, political Canaan. The night, which earlier 
brought the prophetic vision of freedom, "is broken eastward" ( 49). Moreover, the · 
promised land-the embodiment of that freedom-is a barren mother who once nursed 
The weanling peoples and the tribes that were, 
Whose new-born mouths long dead 
Those nine-fold nipples fed . . . .  (I. 56-58)34 
But now, as a "Dim face with deathless eyes and withered hair," a distanced "Fostress of 
obscure lands'' (59-60), Freedom' s impending promise to manifest herself rings false. 
34 These lines allude to the nine tribes of Israel that God bade Moses to lead to the Promised Land (Joshua 
14.2; Num 34. 13). 
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Thus Swinburne's speaker, trying to renegotiate the impasse between the prophet 
renounced by his own prophecy and the promised land that cannot be reached, interjects a 
nostalgic lament for "where for us began· / The first live light of man": Greece (73-74ff.). 
Greece is a manifold emblem in the poem, signifying not only another example of 
nineteenth-century political revolution but also a lost "golden age" of republicanism. 
Mazzini had encouraged the Risorgimento to model itself after the Phili/re Hetairia, the 
secret society of revolutionaries who instigated the 1 82 1  Greek revolt against the 
repressive rule of the Ottoman Empire. Though Swinburne had some interest in the 
Greek revolution due to Byron's involvement in it, he was much more interested in the 
political climate of ancient Greece-as much for the Greeks' constant political struggles, 
I believe, as for their idea of the polis, a representative government equated with the 
notion of"the whole citizen body'' (Morris 26), a unified "world spirit." Swinburne is 
careful to include sites of both ancient Greek success and despondency in his description; 
tellingly, all the sites Swinburne mentions are important to the Persian Wars, in which the 
city-states of Athens and Sparta had to work together to defeat a common enemy despite 
their very different ways of putting the idea of the polis into practice. "[T]he sun" 
guiding the speaker's survey of the imagined Grecian landscape first rests on 
Thermopylae (line 86), the site of the Spartan army's defeat at the hands of the Persians 
in 480 BC and then becomes "The light [which] is Athens where those remnants rest," 
presumably meaning the remnants of the city after the Persians burned it to the ground 
following their victory at Thermopylae; but the "light" is also "Salamis the sea-wall of 
that sea," where the Greeks managed to defeat the Persians in a naval battle (lines 87-88). 
By carefully counterbalancing each site of Greek victory with one of defeat, Swinburne 
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implies that the "golden age" of Greece was an age of perpetual political strife and, 
consequently, implies that the European struggle for freedom will be just as unremitting. 
Moreover, as Swinburne knew from his very meticulous study of ancient Greek 
history, the Greek victory at Salamis did not lead to any political stabil ity in the region. 
It led to the formation of the Athenian Empire which smothered the previously 
independent Spartan city-state. As an empire governed by an elite group of dictatorial 
archons, Athens itself became wholly incompatible with the idea of the polis on which it 
was founded. With Athens' traditional social fabric so frayed, rebell ious Spartans were 
able to overthrow the Athenian Empire in the following Peloponnesian War; the resultant 
era of the oppressive Spartan Hegemony eventually gave way to the Theban uprising; the 
Theban rulers were subsequently toppled by the formation of the Second Athenian 
Empire, and so on. By proposing the comparison between the political instability of 
ancient Greece and nineteenth-century Europe, then, Swinburne suggests that the struggle 
to "Build up our one Republic state by state, I England with France, and France with 
Spain,35 / And Spain with sovereign Italy . . .  " (270-72) will never end with the creation of 
a unified republic, or even the installation of similar practices of republicanism in each 
individual country. There is no way to unify the "whole citizen body" of Europe with 
one trope, one rubric, or even one prophecy. 
Because the prophecy of republican unification presents itself as untenable, just as 
the goal of establishing a stable (if not utopian) republican government remains 
untenable, Swinburne's speaker attempts to abandon the prophetic mode near the end of 
35 In 1868, Queen Isabella II traveled to France to cement an alliance with Louis Napoleon; she returned to 
find her country in a state of civil unrest and political upheaval. Shortly following Isabella Il's abdication 
of the throne, Giuseppe Fanelli, who had once headed a Mazzinian organi7.ation in Naples and fought in 
Garibaldi 's anny, moved to Spain and began the Spanish anarchist movement 
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the poem: "I take the trumpet.from my lips and sing . . .  " (369, emphases mine). Here the 
speaker consciously constructs his own song, a song that allows him an escape into an 
isolated, purely aesthetic realm. In fantasies of a "Swift Revolution" ushering in the era 
of a "Serene Republic," the speaker "Strike[s] music from a world that wailed and 
strove": he proclaims that the "very freedom" one seeks in political revolution should be 
found in the "change and death, / Whose now not hateful breath / . . .  gives the music 
swifter feet to move" (374-414). On one hand, the speaker's own "song," distanced from 
the prophetic mode, could be polemical music in the Adornian sense, in that it "sets itself 
at a distance from . . .  the impoverishment and falsity" of the previous mode of discourse 
(Adorno, Theory 177). In it, the "crackling" of "the friction of the antagonistic elements 
that the artwork [otherwise] seeks to unify" (Theory 1 77) can be heard-in this case, 
meaning the "crackling" of the antagonism underlying the pairing of the Mazzinian and 
the Swinburnian voices, the pairing of political idealism with aestheticized fantasy. 
Earlier in the poem, the speaker advocates shifting international borders in the 
formation of the idealized single Republic; here he demonstrates the perpetual shift but 
constant delineation of the border between the actual practice of revolutionary politics 
and the aesthetic representations of those politics. On the other hand, this kind of 
"republican aesthetic," despite the self-aware negotiations of its own internal tensions, 
may not completely "break the chains" of the dominant discourse and achieve the 
"liberat[ion] of . . .  consciousness" (Kuduk 261). Whatever "autonomy" the speaker' s 
song claims, whatever independence his song achieves from the earlier prophetic mode, it 
is still "a function of the . . .  consciousness of freedom" that Adorno tells us remains 
"bound up with the social [ and political] structure"-and. prophecy-it claims to defy 
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(Theory 225). The speaker can only "take the trumpet from [his] lips" once he has used 
the trumpet of prophecy to establish his position; meaning, in other words, it is only in a 
differential relationship to the prophetic mode that the speaker, s anti-prophetic "song" is 
granted independence from prophecy. Just as "art becomes social by its opposition to 
society', (Theory 225), the speaker's song of liberation becomes prophetic by its very 
claim to oppose the prophetic message. As such, the speaker's escapist fantasy of ideal 
freedom falters in the end, for the speaker reverts back to the prophetic mode, beckoning 
the exiled Cristo uomo, Mazzini, into his fantasy, as if Mazzini could make his fantasy a 
reality: the speaker asks the prophesied "child-god" to "Come forth, be born and live," to 
bring the "hand reconquering heaven, to seat man there" (lines 4 19, 427-28). 
Evocatively, in the poem's last line, the speaker begs the messianic leader to "Hasten 
thine hour" of his prophesied deliverance of the people into a new era of governance, as 
the speaker, s song itself seems an ineffective call for liberation. 
In "Super Flumina Babylonis,"36 Swinburne recreates the fantasy of ideal freedom 
which falters in "Eve of Revolution," but this time the fantasy includes the "blast of 
deliverance [which] in the darkness rang, / To set thee"-meaning the Cristo popolo, the 
audience addressed in the poem-"free" ("Babylonis" 7-8). The first incarnation of the 
popo/o in the poem, though, are the ancient Babylonians, for whom the revolutionaries 
alternately weep and sing ( I ,  5). King Cyrus of Persia, when he conquered Babylon by 
36 The title of this poem refers to Psalm 137: 
By the rivers ofBabylon­
there we sat down and there 
we wept 
when we remembered Zion. (1 37. l )  
This psalm is a lament of the Jewish exiles for the lost holy city. Interestingly, the exiles in the psalm are 
asked by their captors to '"Sing us one of the songs of Zion'" (3). However, in his poem, Swinburne seems 
to equate the Jewish exiles with the Babylonians subject to Belshazzar's tyranny. 
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dethroning the tyrannical King Belshazzar in 539 BC, was heralded by the citizens as 
their "deliverer," but Swinburne seems to question whether Cyrus delivered the 
Babylonians out of their oppression. Cyrus, considered a predecessor of Christ, was a 
prophesied savior of God's chosen people: after Babylon fell, he allowed the Jewish 
captives to return to their homeland. But he also created the vast, powerful Persian 
Empire, imposing his monarchic rule on the Babylonian people. Xenophon and other 
ancient historians may have characterized Cyrus as a rather benign and ethical ruler; 
nonetheless, as Cyrus' s legacy remained an exemplar for future projects of empire­
building, Swinburne seems to have found him a problematic messiah. An aspect of 
cruelty persists in sovereignty, as Swinburne makes evident in Poems and Ballads ' "Satia 
te Sanguine," in which Cyrus engages in fantasies of sado-masochistic subjugation . . In 
"Babylonis," Cyrus engages in another form of subjugation, leaving the "bondmen and 
bondwomen" who struggle to replace an empire with a republic "to be scourged and 
smart, I To toil and tend"; as long as his empire persisted, they were "harrowed," 
"subdued," and "crushed" by the weight of oppression, and "no change came" (Jines 23-
28). The supposed deliverance does not occur until Babylon is figuratively reborn as 
nineteenth-century Italy, and the neo-Babylonian/Italian people, in torpor because they 
have forgotten or dismissed their prophetic legacy,37 will meet the next coming of their 
deliverer (29ff. )-Mazzini. 
However, Babylon, even as it is reborn as Italy, remains a fallen state in which the 
messianic leader has always already been crucified and resurrected. As such, the leader 
37 "[T)hey knew not their forefathers, nor the hills and streams / And words of power, / Nor the gods that 
were good to them . . .  " (37-39). 
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is only accessible within the elusive, speculative fantasy of a unified republican nation. 
The revolutionaries are unable to have actual contact with-and thus are unable to relate 
to-the fantastic, transcendent incarnation of their supposed deliverer. Instead, they 
encounter an angel who announces that Mazzini has been resurrected as an all­
encompassing "Mother Italy" (see lines 77-88).38 The angel further instructs them to 
"Put no trust in men's royalties, nor in great men's breath, / Nor words of kings" (91 -92); 
here the serial identification between King Cyrus and Mazzini is interrupted, and the 
angel-the very agent of prophecy-instructs the re�olutionaries to disregard the 
prophecy he decrees fulfilled (the prophecy the revolutionaries would have received via 
the "breath" of "great men" [line 91 ]), revealing it as artifice. 
The opening of the sepulchre itself, an alleged act of revelation, is another mode 
of artifice exposed in the poem, representing the false opening for republicanism that 
Mazzini and his followers created in Italy's dubious political framework. Instead of 
bearing witness to a resurrection, Swinburne's audience is asked to bear witness to an 
ideological vulnerability lingering within Mazzini's republican movement. 39 In the 
rhetoric of his public speeches and published political tracts, Giuseppe Mazzini tended to 
"trea[t] abstractions"-such as the God of deliverance (the Father of a Nation), the 
unified Mother Italy, and the Italian people delivered into republican utopia-as if they 
were corporeal entities" or entities waiting to manifest themselves corporeally and thus 
38 The angel tells them that Mazzini/Italy's "body most beautiful, and her shining head / These are not 
here" (8 1-82). Swinburne draws upon two New Testament accounts of the resurrection here. In Matthew 
28. 1-7, the angel appears to Mary Magdalene in front of Jesus's empty tomb; in John 20. 17, Jesus himself 
appears to Mary Magdalene, instructing her not to touch him, calling his materiality into question-it is as 
if he is a presence-which-is-absence. One could also argue that this is an allusion to the "daughter [of] 
Babylon," or the personification of the Babylonian people, featured in Psalm 137.8. 
39 My reading is based on Zizek's discussion of how "phantasmic support of the public symbolic order . . .  
bears witness to the system's vulnerability" (Plague 28). 
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transform material reality (Sarti 41 ). Yet, like the liberatory ideals explored in "The Eve 
of Revolution," these abstract possibilities are only possible inasmuch as they are 
functions of the political system they claim to defy; these are the possibilities the current 
system "is compelled to allow for" while simultaneously ensuring that they "will never 
actually take place" (Zizek, Plague 28). 
Swinburne's poem shows Mazzini an abstraction to be an artifice; the blending of 
Mazzini, the proclaimed Father of a Nation, and Mother Italy into a seamless "republican 
marriage�' proves to be, like Swinburne's Hermaphroditus, the ineffectual "waste 
wedlock of a sterile kiss." In "Hermaphroditus," the hermaphro.ditic figure is an 
inaccessible ideal of harmonious unity that ultimately fails to signify an ideal state of 
achieved integration, self-sufficiency, and praxis; in "Babylonis," the androgynous 
messiah-figure fails both to signify a similar ideal state and to deliver the Cristo popolo 
into it. Instead, this "perfect" political androgyne is a political ideal so transmuted into a 
purely aesthetic object that its relevance to political practice is questionable. The 
aesthetic object can mediate between lived experience (in the material world) and 
aesthetic experience, but, if the object does not have a significant presence, the 
reading/viewing subject will not be able to situate him/herself in a dynamic, effective 
relationship to it.40 Aesthetic experience as lived experience should "co-enac[t] or 
folio[ w] . . .  the internal dynamic" suggested by the object (Nicholsen 17)--in this case, 
the aestheticized object internalizes the dynamic between the revolutionary and the ideal, 
unified Italy. However, if the object is inaccessible, then the possibility of converting the 
aesthetic experience of the object into lived experience becomes inaccessible as well. 
40 See Adorno, Theory 115. 
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Significantly, Mazzini-as-Italy-incarnate never actually appears in the poem; the 
resurrection is never made manifest except in the angel 's proclamation. So what the 
revolutionaries in the poem-and, consequently, Swinburne' s  reade�s-see is a failed 
dynamic, the alienation between revolutionary and revolution, Mazzini and Italy, even 
the power of the pen and the power of the sword. 
As he also illustrates Mazzini 's very alienation from the unified "Mother Italy" 
which is the object of his (Mazzini's) desire, Swinburne demonstrates how the perception 
of the revolutionary spectators shifts. In doing so, Swinburne introduces a differential 
relationship what the spectators wish to see and how the Mazzini figure is situated in/by 
their gaze; in a very Lacanian way, then, Swinburne allows the Mazzini figure to be seen 
"as other than he is" (Concepts 104). Here Swinburne' s version of Mazzini is not meant 
to be perceived as the Cristo uomo inspiring a "religion of politics," or as a cipher 
encompassing all the possibilities promised by the Risorgimento 's faith in the 
revolutionary cause; he isfantasmata, a place-holder for the "revised versions of those 
impressions called up by the imagination in the absence of . . .  [that which] originally 
stimu)ated them" (Mitchell, Jconology 10). His lack of presence in the poem 
demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the split subjectivity the historical Mazzini cultivated: 
Mazzini spent his life trying to adapt himself to the revolutionary movement' s 
expectations of political and social freedom-enacting a "being-for-others" in which he 
became an object signifying the goals of the revo1ution as a way of obtaining 
"acknowledgment of [his] being" (Stern 93) within the collective gaze of the 
Risorgiment�so desperately that he eventually began to project himself as the 
"punctiform object" of his fantasy, a revo1utionized, socio-politicaJly liberated Ita)y, 
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itself. (See Lacan, Concepts 83.) Yet, even in his incarnation as an aestheticized subject 
who becomes his desired object, Swinburne's Mazzini still appears in a divided state in 
which he signifies the revolution and its goal only by signifying its impossibility. In 
other words, he signifies his own aphanisis; he is a vanishing subject fading from view 
(Concepts 208- 10), his vanishing act rendered in media res. Even the angel admits as 
much, saying, "Fotan hour, if ye look for him, he is no more found, / For one hour's 
space" (lines 109- 10). 
· In "Before a Crucifix," Swinburne creates one of the most notable brief spaces in 
which the Christ/Mazzini figure is (re)visualized. As both Margot Louis and David 
Punter have previously noted, the poem makes strong statements about the hypocrisies of 
Christian doctrine and the failure of Christian practice to bring relief to the suffering or to 
bring freedom to the subjugated. Both critics acknowledge the poem's political subtext: 
Punter, using the lens of Deleuze and Guattari's theories, reads the poem as an 
exploration of how religion is a political tool used to produce social repression; Louis 
reads it as an analogue of the French Revolution peppered with ideas borrowed from 
Victor Hugo, Jules Michelet, and Ernest Renan. 41 However, neither critic situates the 
poem in the context of the volume's Italian theme, and, problematically, neither critic 
even mentions Mazzini. Both critics do provide crucial assessments of the poem. Louis 
observes that "Swinburne attempts to affirm the worship of Christ in a new sense" only to 
find "that any kind of Christian affirmation is impossible" (Gods 98}-an observation 
41 Jules Michelet, a friend of Victor Hugo's, wrote La histoire de la revolutionfranfaise (1868), an 
enthusiastic firsthand account of revolutionary France before the rise of Louis Napoleon; in the book, 
Michelet claims that Christian ideology and Republican idealism are the two antagonists of revolutionary 
struggle. Ernest Renan was a noted scholar of history and philosophy dedicated to the Republican cause; 
he wrote La Vie de Jesus (1863), in which he suggests that "the human Christ is 'hidden' behind the 
'viewless veil' woven by centuries of Christianity" (Louis, Gods 94). 
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that could be used to describe the challenge Swinburne issues to Mazzini's·Christian 
posturings. Punter claims the poem is Swinburne's rebuke of a Christianity which fails to 
articulate the particularity of human desires, since Swinburne draws our attention "to an 
ambivalence at the heart" of Christianity which forces any messianic figure in the 
position "to deny difference" ("Cross" 356, italics his); Punter's claim seems supported 
by Swinburne's commentary on Mazzini's singleness of vision and his alienation from 
the Italian people in other poems. 
That being said, though, the poem does not aim to create "a symbolic system 
[which] can adequately present the People, their suffering and their self-regeneration," as 
Louis suggests (Gods 98), nor does it, as Punter contends, really "provid[e] us with 
enactments of the poet, the artist, striving for a place in this world where power swings 
free and has the means to make us experience anew the wound," or psychic trace, of"the 
violence of generations" perpetuated by "self-defeating lust" ("Cross" 359). Instead, 
Swinburne takes extreme measures to demonstrate how such a symbolic system functions 
as a constellative field denoting only the possibilities of representation, as well as to 
suggest that any messianic figure's claim to rematerialize fully the trace of generations­
old human struggle, and then rectify it, is yet another mode of artifice. 
Swinburne portrays the "piteous God" of the crucifixion (line 8) as an icon of 
human alienation. He is "God of this grievous people, wrought / After the likeness of 
their race"; yet, with his "blind, helpless, eyeless face" (13-14, 16), he hardly serves as 
the other who allows the people to recognize themselves in him. Instead, the eyeless 
Christ is a symbol of meconnaissance: the individual subject's construction of the 
illusion of transcending one's pitiable state by "seeing oneself see oneself' (Lacan, 
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Concepts 83) is frustrated if the figure meant to epitomize the attainment of this godlike 
view is really eyeless. The scene of the crucifixion is what Lacan would call "[t]he 
spectacle of the world," the punctiform of "the gaze which circumscribes us," which 
"appears to us as all-seeing" (Concepts 75) .. The figure on the cross in Swinburne's 
poem, as "the likeness of [the] race," is the aggregate of humanity's common Platonic 
fantasy "of an absolute being to whom is transferred the quality of being all-seeing"; in 
the body of Christ, all unattainable or previously lost perspectives/possibilities are 
allegedly (re)constituted "not from the body, but from something"-or someone, in this 
case the deity-" . . .  call[ed] the flesh of the world, the original point of vision" (Concepts 
75, 8 1-82) in which form is content, in which meaning is immediate rather than 
interpreted. 
However, the Christ figure fails to reconstitute lost and otherwise inaccessible 
perspectives; he cannot (ful)fill /ack. "The sacred body hangs and bleeds," so the "flesh 
of the world" is mutilated, incomplete, not fully (re)constituted; he has not "fed full 
men's starved-out souls" (lines 84, 39). The Jesus icon is like an artwork "whose real 
powerlessness and complicity with the principle of disaster becomes plainly evident" 
(Adorno, Theory 234). He cannot avert the "disaster" of human suffering, just as he 
cannot rescue the "original point of vision" from the "catastrophe of meaning" in which, 
Adorno tells us, "appearance"-that which remains visible, attainable, comprehensible­
"becomes abstract" (Theory 22). The Christ figure's failure to overcome the principle of 
disaster, even by sacrificing himself to it, is revolutionary only insomuch as the symbolic 
system which iconically maintains him demands an element "of heroism, of sacrifice"­
of a dynamic of contestation-which is a "self-deception" concealing "the limitations of 
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the content of their struggles" (Marx 596). Similarly, as an aestheticized icon to which 
the people he supposedly exemplifies cannot relate-supposedly an "other" able to 
complete that which each individual "self' lacks-the Christ figure characterizes a 
subjectivity which is "self-alienated and concealed" (Theory 169). 
Swinburne also notes that the "slain, spent, and sacrificed / People" themselves 
are "the grey-grown speechless Christ" ( 101 -02). Paradoxically, then, each individual is 
that "other" to which s/he cannot relate. So, in this move, Swinburne not only portrays 
Christ as an individual other who promises (but fails) to fulfill the subject's desire for 
wholeness but also as the Other Lacan says is "the locus of speech" which determines the 
emergence of the subject (Concepts 1 29). Swinburne further emphasizes the 
impossibility of establishing a relation to Christ by shifting his speaker's perspective 
from that of a witness to the "actual" crucifixion to that of a modern agnostic in lines 
1 33-35 :  
And mouldering now and hoar with moss 
Between us and the sunlight swings 
The phantom of a Christless cross . . . .  
By depicting Christ as a mere trace of past mythic narratives here, Swinburne reveals the 
previous, highly visualized account of the crucifixion to have been only a fantasy. It was 
not Christ who was able to (re)constitute lost and otherwise inaccessible perspectives; 
rather, the speaker, the artist, is the one able to offer virtual recreations of a lost 
historical/mythical "original point of vision." 
Punter proposes that, in this moment, Swinburne's absentee Christ, presaging 
Deleuze and Guattari's notions about the face determining signification via language, 
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"suggests to us that the figure of the cross is that which arises to deny facialisation, to fit 
all humans" ("Cross" 3 56).42 But, Punter does not note that even in the fantasy 
Swinburne's Christ was eyeless, thus having a distorted face, "destroyed, dismantled," 
arguably just as much "[ o ]n the road to the asignifying and asubjective" (Deleuze and 
Guattari 171)  as the bodiless phantom. Where eyes once were, Swinburne presents 
embouchures which emit the very "purpose-lessness [/e sans-fin] which leads [one] back 
inside" oneself (Derrida, "Economimesis" 279), to the inarticulable abyss or void which 
is "the undecidability as to where [one's] true point is," somewhere between the '"real' 
self' and one's "external mask" or face (Zizek, Plague 14 1  ). Just as the elements of 
representation break down in the fantasy of Christ, they break down outside the fantasy, 
too: The cross is "Consumed of rottenness and rust, / . . .  Dead as their spirits who put 
trust, / Round its base . . . ,, (1 39, 142-43). The Cristo popo/o are left "muttering" (line 
143) what Punter calls "a trope for inarticulacy, for the silence of the powerless" ("Cross" 
354). 
Contained in this "trope for inarticulacy" is also "the seed of a reproach": 
[R]eproach for a failed intercessor, one who should have been 
"articulating" the connection of humankind to the divine and yet could 
only find it in himself to believe himself forsaken by the very god who had 
sent him to perform that function . . . .  [T]he poet is calling the people's 
attention to the "grey-grown speechless Christ" and thereby joining in, and 
42For Deleuze and Guattari, the face is the intersection between signifiance, the "white wall" on which the 
"signs and redundancies" of the symbolic order-discourse-is inscribed. and subjectiflcation, the "black 
hole" in which "consciousness. passion, and redundancies" is lodged. The face is a kind of place-holder 
allowing for identification, a place-holder for the process in which the limited subject expresses him/her 
"self' in discourse by "overcoding," a fantastic filling of. the "surface-holes" of his/her indeterminacy, 
fluidity, the abyss of that which cannot be signified, that which cannot be related to an/other (169-70). 
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encouraging others to join in, with the mockery offered to the crucified 
Christ. ("Cross" 3 54, italics in original) 
On one hand, this is precisely what Punter distinguishes as Swinburne's rebuke of a 
Christianity which fails to articulate the particularity of human desires ("Cross" 356) and 
thus, as Margot Louis says, offers a discourse which, socio-politically, "is worse than 
useless" (Gods 95). On the other hand, this is just as much a rebuke of Mazzini; despite 
Mazzini' s  decades-long struggle to revolutionize Italy, 
. . .  we seek yet if God or man 
Can loosen thee as Lazarus, 
Bid thee rise up republican 
And save thyself and all of us . . . . ( 127-30) 
The people's mockery here is the derision of Mazzini : the anti-Mazzinian demonstrations 
following the revolutionary victories of 1 860, Mazzini 's  inability to "save" or even to 
relate to his "Cristo popolo " from his jail cell during the liberation of Rome in 1 86 1  (as 
well as his inability to "save" himself from incarceration), and the opportunities for 
revolutionary action that Mazzini and his peers did choose were not ones in which they 
could actively achieve enough distance from the existing socio-political structures they 
purported to oppose. 
As Swinburne himself admitted, one cannot "do good and serve others 
exclusively; . . .  I can't. If l tried I should lose my faculty of verse . . .  " (Letters I :242)-­
in other words, he would be rendered inarticulate. In several published articles in which 
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he discusses aesthetics from a political perspective, 43 Mazzini maintained that Romantic 
and post-Romantic art was the articulation of a "socially irresponsible individualism"; to 
"rise up republican," the new artist would have to speak with a "new voice capable of 
giving artistic expression to [a] spirit of association" (Sarti 87), to develop a discourse of 
universalizing representation which would not alienate the artist/speaker from his/her 
audience. Such universalizing representations, Swinburne contends, are like religious 
doctrine, always alienating one's audience as they weave "a viewless veil" over the 
"hidden face of man" ("Crucifix" 169-70). Mazzini , s insistence that "religion [was] a 
necessary element of revolution and faith in God the necessary underpinning of political 
conviction" (Sarti 4) is exactly what Swinburne calls "The poison of the crucifix" (line 
1 86). According to Deleuze and Guattari, "It was under the sign of the cross that people 
learned to steer the face and processes of facialization in all directions" (1 78-79), and 
Punter uses this to make the case that Swinburne introduces a sense of play into "the 
aesthetic gift of Christianity over many centuries of representation" ("Cross" 356). 
Nevertheless, this poem seems to show instead that an aesthetic Christianity, as lately 
represented in Mazzini, "freezes" the republican cause in a static metaphor-a metaphor 
so static that it causes the very struggle of revolution to· cease altogether.44 
When the metaphor becomes static, it also becomes degenerate, ineffective, and 
unable to sustain the kind of play Punter wishes it to demarcate. Whereas in "Super 
43 Many of these articles appeared in L 1taliano, a publication produced by Risorgimento members and 
sympathizers exiled in Paris, in the mid 1830s. Swinburne's correspondence with William Michael 
Rossetti during the mid to late 1860s and early 1870s suggests that W.M. Rossetti had shared some of 
Mazzini's publications with Swinburne. 
44 Here I have borrowed from Kuduk' s assertion that, in poems such as "Hertha," Swinburne relies on 
paganism to show how it differs from the Judeo-Christian tendency to "freez(e] spirituality in a particular 
metaphor" (265). 
Flumina Babylonis" Mazzini and "Mother Italy" are allowed at least the artifice of 
making a "republican marriage," here the Christ figure is faced with 
The leprous likeness of a bride, 
Whose kissing lips through his lips grown 
Leave their God rotten to the bone. ( 1 78-80) 
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The "leprous" bride is what Zizek would call the "undead" core of the static metaphor or 
fantasy that "lives" on; she signifies how Mazzini, as the metaphoric Christ, "cannot find 
[his] proper place in the text" or in the discourses of either Christian tradition or 
revolutionary politics (Zizek, Lacan 23). The static metaphor becomes "a disturbance . : . 
in the process of symbolization" (Lacan 23), or the kind of playful representation Punter 
claims Swinburne endorses. Corrupt and contagious, "Mother Italy" cannot give herself 
to the supposed ''Father of the Nation" and form the kind of hermaphroditic image 
suggested in "Super Flumina Babylonis"-paradoxically because the Father of the Nation 
from whom she is (to be) created as well as to be reunited is mere "carrion" ("Crucifix" 
l ine 192) in the same state of deterioration and disease. This more vividly reinforces 
what was more subtly implicated in "Babylonis": that the political hermaphrodite, "the 
symbol of the _union of the self and the non-self' (Busst 66), represents nothing but its 
fai lure to represent such a union. However, in "Babylonis," the fai lure of the 
. hermaphroditic trope to signify such union (because the trope exists in the context of a 
prophecy of unification) at least signifies the possibil ity for such a union, though the 
possibility cannot as yet be actualized; here, where the prophecy of the union is absent, 
even the possibil ity of such seems to be precluded. 
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The "bride" Mazzini/Christ looks for but does not receive in "Before a Crucifix" 
is likely Hertha, the goddess of the republic, who is 
the mouth that is kissed 
And the breath in the kiss, 
The search, and the sought, and the seeker, the soul and the body that is. 
("Hertha" 28-30) 
Swinburne presents Hertha, a disenchanted but still awe-inspiring Gaia figure, as the "I 
AM which began," which begat both "God and man / . . .  equal and whole" ("Hertha" 1-3). 
But Hertha, once "The life-tree" who offered the promise of salvation in the "sap of [her] 
leaves" (1 1 8, 120), has become the crucifix itself. She declares that "Gods . . .  / That take 
and that give," such as Christ/Mazzini, "are worms that are bred in [her] bark that falls 
off; they shall die and not live" ("Hertha" 12 1 -22, 126). In tum, these cast-off elements, 
whose "foul foliage" is "ingraffed by priests" back onto Hertha, obscure her true form 
and instead portray her as "The tree of [Christian] faith" ("Crucifix" 163-64); the "foul 
foliage" of Christian dogma becomes a parasitic infection in the wood "Consumed of 
rottenness and rust, / Worm-eaten of the worms of night" ("Crucifix" 140-41).45 Though 
she claims to be a separate deity who has become contaminated by the Judeo-Christian 
God, Hertha's monologue reveals that she is (at least a part or version of) the God whose 
worship commands the hierarchical ordering and the oppression of the natural world; to 
put it more simply, Hertha, the "Earth Mother," has become the symbol of her own 
45 "Hertha" immediately precedes "Before a Crucifix" in the volume, suggesting that Swinburne 
pwposefully paired the poems together. As a result, I believe that Swinburne expected the tree images in 
both poems to be read intertextually-especially as Swinburne told William Michael Rossetti that "Hertha" 
"has the most in it of my deliberate thought and personal feeling or faith" (Letters 2:85), thus serving as 
counterpoint to his lack of faith in Christianity as represented in "Crucifix." 
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oppression.46 Yet her monologue implies that she sti l l  holds the promise of redeeming 
the natural world by subsuming the version of God who represents men's "unmediated 
lordship and mastery" over that world. 47 
Moreover, she is  "All forms of al l faces, / All works of all hands" ("Hertha" 157-
58): Hertha is "a metonym for humanity" who "collectivizes human experience, 
integrating individual lives into the ongoing life of 'man"' (Kuduk 265). As such, she 
seems to be the penultimate serial identifier, a personification of the mode by which 
Swinburne explores the multiple possibilities allowed by subjective differentiation 
withput slipping into the kind of"ego-weakness" which renders art little more than "the 
attunement . . .  to the most fleeting individual reactions" (Adorno, Theory 239). Because 
Swinburne takes great pains to show Hertha as a multiply-positioned subject able to 
identify with, and to incorporate into herself, what falls on both sides of existing 
ideological dichotomies-death/life, time/infinity, man/woman, body/spirit-it is 
tempting to suggest that Swinburne is consciously eluding the trap of creating nothing but 
an "interiority of landscape" (Pittock, "Nineties" 122), a decadent landscape in which 
one, individual perspective is concretized and thus cannot provide any opportunity to 
entertain variant perspectives. In such a landscape, the "fleeting individual reaction" that 
Adorno warns us about is upheld as a universal (and universalizing) experience, although 
it is really a "fictional" experience in which "no one is actually participating" (Theory 
239), an experience which cannot be engaged dialectical ly. However, as Margot Louis 
notices, Hertha "does not really assimilate disparate elements'' (Gods 1 1 3). In her 
46 "I am that which unloves me and loves; I am stricken / and I am the blow" ("Hertha" 23-24). 47 See Horkheimer and Adorno 12. 
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monologue, she commands the reader to "behol[ d] the fruits of me fair" while promising, 
"I am with you, am in you and of you" (lines 192, 2 10, emphases mine). The equation of 
Hertha and the "you" of humanity is always interrupted by a preposition; Hertha 
continues to sustain the separation of herself from humanity until the very end of her 
monologue, and, as a result, the majority of the poem sustains the kind of (Christian) 
hierarchy Swinburne finds and maligns in "Before a Crucifix." Hertha's self-references 
are meant to seem inclusive, but her monologue insists on the differentiation between her 
all-inclusive "self' and the "other'' of humanity: early in the poem, Swinburne establishes 
Hertha, the "Mother, not maker," as quite separate from humanity, the "children [who] 
forsake her'' (lines 79, 8 1  ). 
Her metonymy, then, is problematic. Swinburne applies the "logic of ' fetishistic 
inversion"' to his presentation of Hertha, as Hertha demands that her audience-­
collective humanity-treat her as the realization of the (im)possible Thing/God(dess), 
while actually she is God(dess) only inasmuch as her audience continues to recognize her 
as such. As soon as her audience becomes cognizant that her Goddess-hood is a 
"performative effect, the effect itself is aborted" (Zizek, Lacan 33). As Zizek explains, 
once "we attempt to ' subtract' the fetishistic inversion and witness the performative 
effect directly"-as perfonnance as such-her "performative power will be dissipated" 
(Lacan 33). And this helps to explain Swinburne's choice to present "Hertha" as the 
precursor to "Before a Crucifi�." In the latter poem, Swinburne' s speaker reveals that 
godhood, and all the promises of unity, redemption, and/or transcendence detailed in 
"Hertha," is absolute perfonnance. Thus, when one returns to the very last line of 
Hertha's  monologue--"Man, equal and one with me, man that is made of me, man that is 
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f' (240)--one finds that it rings false. The witness to the crucifixion always already 
knows that the "magic" of the kind of signification in which the divine signifier really 
signifies collective humanity and its myriad desires "is utterly untrue" (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 9). 
Kuduk claims that, in the.final line, Hertha offers an intuitive apprehension of 
rather than a definitive (and thus limiting) designation of human desires, "appearing to 
evoke for humanity its own power and divinity," thus revisiting Blake's notion that "all 
deities reside" within humanity itself,48 and preparing the way for realizing "a vision of a 
sustainable republic of love, community, and equality" (268). The crucial word here is 
· "appear'': the intuitive power of"Hertha" is concretized and aestheticized as a political 
concept, a concept which is both limited and limiting, and thus is not actually present in 
the poem or truly accessible to humanity at large. Conceptualized, Hertha's "power'' is 
precluded from perspectives and circumstances yet to be imagined. Besides, as Adorno 
would caution, the kind of synthesis prescribed for this ideal republic is false because it 
conceals its own "no less false, rigid polarity; the aesthetics of intuition is founded on the 
model of a thing"-not an idea or intuition qua intuition-and "[in] the synthesis" 
provided in the poem "the tension, its essence, gives way to a fundamental repose" 
(Theory 97, emphasis mine). Hertha' s final statement evokes the vision of a static 
"republic" which quells the dissonance upon which the republican struggle depends. As 
Emilie Venturi once described it, Mazzini "viewed man as a perfectible creature" (Sarti 
48 In William Blake. Swinburne notes that. whereas "others" treat religious faith and devotion by 
prescribing "inductive rule and law," Blake offers "assumptive preaching and intuition" (149). Also, 
Swinburne sums up "Blake's Pantheistic Iliad in a nutshell": "Extra hominem nu/la salus. 'God is no more 
than man; because man is no less than God"' (Blake 165nl, italics in original). 
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209)49 and, likewise, Mazzini always believed that a republic was a perfectible state. 
Despite Mazzini's exhortation to the Vatican's 1 870 Ecumenical Council that one must 
affirm the inexhaustible "continuity of creation" instead of the stasis of concepts like 
perfection ( qtd. by Sarti 209), even in governance, his continua) expectation of attaining 
the perfect, and arguably static, end to his political struggle demonstrates how he valued 
the impossible goal much more so than the aim. 
Swinburne confronts Mazzini's belief in human perfectibility and the possibility 
of a perfect republic his "Hymn of Man," written on the occasion of the Ecumenical 
Council's decree in papal infallibility. In this poem, Swinburne reinvokes Hertha, 
attempting to-and calling attention to his failure to-re-imagine her in her "true" form, 
or to see her as if his vision was not mediated by the Judea-Christian wor)dview. In other 
words, he wants to see Hertha as a monadic goddess in which all the possibilities 
immanent in her are immediately comprehensible, rather than subject to the conventions 
and modes of interpretation. He imagines seeing Hertha before the event of the 
catastrophe of meaning, before her appearance was abstract: 
When her eyes new-born of the night saw yet no star out of reach; 
When her maiden mouth was alight with the flam� of musical speech; 
. . . [With] Eyes that had looked not on time, and ears that heard not of 
death; 
Lips that heard not the rhyme of change and passionate breath . . . .  
(7-8, 1 1 - 12) 
49 Venturi's assessment is applicable. As Sarti explains, Mazzini "rejected the fundamental doctrines of 
original sin . . .  as 'absurd'" (34). 
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As in "Eve of Revolution," Swinburne considers the possibility of a prelapsarian mode of 
musical communication which exists in a kind of Adornian negative dialectic to "the 
impoverishment and falsity" of conventional language (Theory 1 77); here "The word of 
the earth to the spheres" is the same as "the note of her song" ("Hymn" line 3). Still, by 
emphasizing Hertha's mouth and eyes and then making the synaesthetic move of 
presenting her lips that hear, suggesting that her speech is immediately heard and not 
mediated by interpretative structures, Swinburne gestures toward the embouchure-like 
image he presents in "Before a Crucifix." 
But the poem then shifts; Swinburne' s  speaker notes that, in this "perfect" state, 
Hertha does not experience "passionate breath" or "The rhythmic anguish of growth, and 
the motion of mutable things" ("Hymn" 12-1 3). Hertha's/Swinburne' s failure to evoke 
speech whose meaning is immediate-not dependent upon mediation via existing, 
necessary interpretive structures-mirrors the untenabil ity of the Mazzini an goal of a 
utopian republic. Hertha, the Goddess of the Republic, is impoverished, mediated if not 
completely eclipsed by "the God th.at ye make you [who] is grievous" because he 
separates "spirit" from earth "and gives not aid" in the attempt to reconcile the two (line 
4 1  ). Because the belief in the God who separates spiritual passion from earthly passion is 
so pervasive, any description of Hertha's "Lovely . . .  firstborn passion, and impulse of 
firstborn things" seems false, especially as "Love" -desire-still "lay shut in the shel l 
world-shaped" (lines 24, 27). Thus Swinburne can only construct the artifice of Hertha' s 
mana-like wholeness to obfuscate the otherwise-inarticulable abyss or void at the heart of 
human desires. In such a "perfect" state, there would be no desire because there would 
be no emptiness to conceal ; in complete fullness and satiety, there would be no passion-
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no suffering, no alienation to endure--but also no longing, no aspiration, no perseverant 
struggle in which to find satisfaction. Such an absence of passion is troublesome to 
Swinburne because it marks the absence of the aesthetic dimension which particularizes 
"the complex of physical sensations by which we move in and know the world"; without 
such passion, the human existence is "anaesthetic,, (Bruhm 123, 128). Hertha's "song" 
becomes static, and the divine word becomes more like what Adorno would call a "mute 
and inconsequential" conceptualization of human struggle (Theory 1 8). 
Rather than simply "replac[ing] the divine word with human expression as the 
source of material and poetic creation" (Kuduk 262) or attempting to "destroy [the] 
symbolic system" of Judeo-Christianity by parodying it (Louis, Gods 99), Swinburne 
presents "the word"-language--in its very concretizing thingishness, as one of the 
· "Things" he explains "are cruel and blind" since "their strength detains and deforms" 
("Hymn" line 65). One is "detained" from reaching Hertha, the ideal, because any 
language used to signify her presence excludes her from realization, denoting her absence 
not only from the poem but also from the formation of any republic. Like the writing 
which constructs "the 'screen of the word"' (Derrida, Grammatology 3 1  ), Hertha's 
"song" is "the locus of mediation" (Lacan, Concepts I 07) between the 
representable/attainable and the unrepresentable/unattainable. Hertha is an imaginative 
place-holder of the attainability of perfection, unity without dissonance; but that 
attainability is a fantasy, only appearing "In thunders of vision and dream, and l ightnings 
of future and past" ("Hymn" line 68)-the future which cannot be known and the past 
which is always subject to the reconstruction of trace narratives. "Man is the master of 
things" (line 200, emphasis mine) because he cannot transcend them. "Ears hath he, and 
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hears not; and eyes, and he sees not; and mouth, and is dumb" (1 84): Hertha' s song, once 
rendered into language-the symbolic network of human expression-is so mediated that 
it is inaccessible. Swinburne does not "destroy the symbolic system" because this system 
still incorporates "the tongue [which is] more than the speech" (line 1 37), though the 
"tongue" is obscured. Thus, he demonstrates the importance of the individualized and 
individualizing struggle to create a textual space in which new possibilities of expression 
can be explored by contravening and exploiting the system' s  very limitations. 
Overall, because Mazzinian politics values the struggle only as it is a progressive 
means to an achievable, perfectible end, Swinburne's enthusiasm for those politics is 
forced. Most critics dismiss these poems in a sweeping gesture, characterizing them as a 
rather unfortunate result of the supposedly highly impressionable Swinburne's blind 
devotion to (and perhaps misplaced faith in) a figure who liked to court controversy as 
much as he did. But such readings fail to consider how the poems pointedly call attention 
to the very forced quality of the politically charged language. Although it is tempting to 
claim, as Kuduk does, that in these poems Swinburne finds the "potential . . .  to speak for 
all of humanity" as he attempts to ascribe a singular voice to the human multitude {270), 
the poems themselves, exploring the fragmentations and eccentricities of subjectivity as 
well as the impossibilities of achieving utopian perfection through the use of serial 
identifications, suggest that the concept of perfectibil ity is another concept which 
"detains and deforms" the possibil ities for fulfill ing human desires yet to be realized. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
"What strange height of saddest speech": 
Revis(ion)ing the Catastrophe of Meaning in Atalanta in Calydon and Erechtheus 
"I must say I always read [the Greeks J with the most passionate sympathy and magnetic 
attraction to the thought and utterance alike that any poet ever puts into me. " 
-Algernon Charles Swinburne 
"Tragedy is the perfect aesthetic model, both as source and explanation, of human 
existence. " -Jerome McGann 
"The basic tendency in tragic forms, ·in contrast to its mythical subjects, the dissolution of 
the spell of fate and the birth of subjectivity, bears witn_ess to . . . the collision between 
mythic law and subjectivity, to the antagonism between fateful domination and a 
humanity awakening to maturity. " -Theodor Adorno 
With the publication of Erechtheus in January 1 876, Swinburne marked his poetic 
coming of age, as the long classical drama shows the maturation of the aesthetic brought 
forth in the Poems and Ballads, First Series and cultivated in the Songs before Sunrise. 
Erechtheus is arguably the greatest example of the paradox at the heart of Swinburne's 
poetry: he presents an exhaustive treatment of religious myth, both pagan and Christian, 
in the continuous series of allusions embedded in the poem's complex imagery-imagery 
which plays against the austere power of a pathos that se�ms almost deceptively simple 
in its forthright, and sometimes brutal, candor. In Erechtheus, Swinburne reconsiders the 
kind of tension between utopian political idealism and the failure of such idealism to 
sustain the hopeful development of sustainable political practice, this time placing it in 
ancient Greece rather than nineteenth-century Italy. At the same time, though, 
Swinburne continues to emphasize the hopeful possibilities to be found in the failure to 
achieve lofty, utopian ideals, concentrating on political and human struggle rather than 
the expectation of achieving the impossible solution. Swinburne more clearly establishes 
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a pattern of socially and politically productive failures in Erechtheus, represented by the 
Athenian po/is, than he does in any of the Songs before Sunrise. Whereas, in the Songs, 
the Mazzini figure always experiences failure in isolation, failure in polis becomes a 
collective experience; moreover, the collective experience of failure, and the struggle and 
suffering caused by failure, provides the polis-a construction much like art itself is a 
constructiorr-what Adorno would call its "humane content." 1 I believe that exploring 
the "humane content" of human failure will help better explain why some previous 
critics, such as W.R. Rutland, claim that Swinburne's aesthetic achieves a kind of 
"ethical intensity and spiritual elevation" in Erechtheus that does not appear in any of his 
previous works ( 191). 
One might surmise that Swinburne offered Erechtheus as a serious demonstration 
of his poetic gifts in order to cuny favor with his peers and critics-especially since 
Songs before Sunrise, though it did not generate the kind of vitriolic criticism that the 
Poems and Ballads did, was not received favorably. The Saturday Review had dismissed 
the volume as evidence that Swinburne was still "[ o ]ffensive . . .  as he always is," merely 
trading his interest in "unnatural" love for "delight" in "blasphemy" and "in the reddest 
of Red Republicanism";2 the Athenaeum 's reviewer was slightly more kind, offering mild 
praise for "Hertha" but dismissing two of the poems, "Before a Crucifix" and "Hymn to 
Man," that Swinburne felt were especially crucial to the volume. Many of the critics who 
had responded to his previous work ignored the Songs altogether, which further added to 
Swinburne's angst. Because the Songs remained a personal rather than a professional 
1 I have based this on Adomo's observation, in hisAesthetic Theory. that "suffering . . .  is (art's) expression 
· and in which form has its substance. This suffering is the hwnane content that unfreedom counterfeits as 
itivity" (260). 
r>;he Saturday Review, 14 Jan. 187 1. 
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milestone for Swinburne, his only taste of real critical adulation still remained the 
publication of Atalanta in Calydon in March 1 865, nearly a full year before he would 
come to be identified almost entirely by the fracas over Poems and Ballads' daring sexual 
content and its hostile reception. 
At the time of its publication, Swinburne considered Atalanta, a long poetic 
drama about the mythic Calydonian boar-hunt, "the best executed and sustained of my 
larger poems" (Letters 1 :  1 1 5).3 While Swinburne had worked on Atalanta, he had also 
been revising fragments of Chaste/ard, a long drama about Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, 
which he had written sporadically since his days at Balliol. Chastelard was published on 
the heels of Atalanta, in hopes that Chastelard would gain favor and popularity precisely 
because it was a work "by the author of Atalanta in Calydon." However, as Rikky 
Rooksby notes, Chastelard is a cheerless work "celebrat[ing] a perverse and wilful death­
wish" (Life 122), chaotic in form and plot, since it is a patchwork of rewrites and 
rearrangements sporadically undertaken over a six-year period; as such, it not only failed 
to appeal to readers, but literary critics also found it extremely disappointing. Following 
the Songs, Swinburne returned to writing long poetic dramas: he composed another play 
based on the life ofMary Stuart, titled Bothwell (1 874), and a retelling of the legend of 
Tristram and Iseult, Tristram of Lyonesse, which he began in 1 870 but would not finish 
until July 1 882. Like Tristram, Bothwell was an arduous and often unsatisfying project, 
in part because Swinburne found it difficult to manag·e its overwhelming length and 
scope, but perhaps more so because the poem's very length and scope alienated his 
targeted readership. Even Swinburne himself commented that, with Bothwell, "It may 
3 Letter to Lady Trevely� 15 Mar. 1865. 
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well be that my ambition to give it such fullness of national and historical interests as the 
subject seemed to me to demand has overleapt itself . . . .  [T]he mark might be beyond 
[my] reach" (Letters 2:301).4 What had always seemed very much within Swinburne's 
reach, though, was classical Greek drama. As popular as Atalanta had been, Swinburne 
later found the poem "not Greek enough"; so, desperate to revisit and perhaps even 
surpass his former success, he set out in August 1 875 to create "a companion piece to 
Atalanta' which would be "a more perfect original example of Greek tragedy''5 and thus 
be "more universal (so to speak) in its relation to human thought and emotion" (Letters 
2:55, 67).6 
Erechtheus was written during a three month period in which Swinburne, under 
the watchful eyes ofBenjamin Jowett and Theodore Watts, experienced a calm and sober 
respite from an otherwise tumultuous time in his life. Following the publication of the 
Songs in 1 87 1 ,  Swinburne's behavior became even more erratic and dissolute. His 
excessive drinking, now nearly uncontrollable, not only caused many of his friends to 
shun his company but also caused prolonged periods of serious illness in whic� his 
parents took him away from London to "rest" in an environment in which he had no 
access to alcohol. During that year, Swinburne's perpetual alcoholic rages were 
compounded by his anger over the publication of Robert Buchanan's infamous "Fleshly 
School of Poetry" tract. Though Buchanan, s real target was Dante Gabriel Rossetti-for 
Swinburne merits only occasional mentions in the piece, as Buchanan more or less 
4 Letter to John Nichol; the specific date is missing, but Lang's research indicates that Swinburne wrote it 
sometime "in the middle of July," 1 874. 
5 Letter to William Michael Rossetti, 21 Aug. 1875. 
6 Letter to E.C. Sted� 8 Sep. 1875. Stedman was commissioned to write an article about Swinburne for 
Scribner 's Monthly; during the time Stedman was researching his article, he and Swinburne began a 
friendly correspondence which they maintained for several years. 
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dismisses him a "little mad boy letting off squibs" (890)--Swinburne took the attack 
personally, especially because his friendship with Rossetti became a casualty of 
Buchanan's attack. In 1 872, not long after Swinburne learned of Mazzini 's  death, 
Rossetti abruptly severed ties with Swinburne as part of his (Rossetti 's) attempt to 
recuperate from a nervous breakdown and subsequent suicide attempt.7 Within a period · 
of a few months, then, Swinburne lost the friend and mentor who had inspired the Poems 
and Ballads as well as the friend and mentor who had inspired the Songs before Sunrise. 
As a result, Swinburne seemed to lose all remaining direction in his life. The next few 
years found him devoting an increasing amount of time to his friendships with John 
Thomson, who shared his interest in London's flagellation brothels, and George Powell, 
whose fascination with pornography and unconventional sexual practices rivaled his own. 
Benjamin Jowett, whose antagonism to Swinburne's chosen vocation as poet lessened in 
his later years, again stepped in to provide Swinburne some guidance; as did a new 
acquaintance, the solicitor Theodore Watts. Both men were concerned that Swinburne 
was becoming increasingly depressed, bored, and restless, having spent the greater part of 
the early to mid 1 870s under his parents' watchful eyes. In August of 1 875, Jowett 
invited Swinburne to accompany him on a vacation, during which, in an attempt to 
distract Swinburne from seeking solace in alcohol, he re-engaged Swinburne in the study 
of classical l iterature. Out of that study the idea for Erechtheus was born. Theodore 
Watts then took Swinburne on vacation to Southwold (on the east coast of England) 
during the months of September and October, where the poem was finished. 
7 Buchanan, s article is generally attributed to causing Rossetti 's breakdown, though Rossetti , s physical and 
mental health had been shaky for some time prior to the publication ofBuchanan,s piece. 
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Reconsidering Atalanta: The Subject, the Animated World, and the Problem of Ate 
Because Swinburne wrote Erechtheus as the companion piece to Atalanta, one 
cannot appreciate its complexity without first exploring the features of Atalanta that the 
more mature Swinburne reconsidered, revised, and then embedded deep within its many 
allusory layers. As several critics have already pointed out, both works can be read as 
Swinburne's attempt to write his own version of Aeschylus's Oresteia. For example, 
David Riede, working from _Thomas Wymer' s earlier reading, sees Atalanta 's main 
characters, Althaea and her son Meleager, representing "a split between the old and new 
orders"; Althaea's "submission to the will of the gods, stoic acceptance of fate, and 
unquestioning obedience to law" mirrors the "old ways" explored in the first two plays of 
the Oresteia, Agamemnon and The Libation Bearers (Riede, Study 93), whereas Meleager 
represents the "new order'' of a "creative kind of law" flexible enough to uphold "life as 
something not merely to be endured but to 'lighten and lift up higher"' (Wymer 5), the 
kind of flexibility implied in the final play of the Oresteia, The Eumenides. Jerome 
McGann, on the other hand, argues that Erechtheus stands alone as "a collapsed 
Oresteia " because Erechtheus 's "tragedy is pure and formal," issuing "a mood of awe 
and wonder," whereas Atalanta, focused on "passion . . .  [which] is sapphic and 
elemental," "devolve[s] into wild desires for beauty and order'' (Swinburne 1 28-29). Ian 
Fletcher's reading seems to support McGann's because Fletcher finds it "difficult" "to 
detect Aeschylus as a model" for Atalanta; rather, he says the model is Euripides's 
Hippolytus. Fletcher detects a "mysterious moral tone" in the poem since he reads 
Swinburne's characters as helplessly controlled by _divine caprice like Euripides' s 
Phaedra ("Atalanta" 1 80, 1 82). And Rikky Rooksby notes that Atalanta was probably 
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influenced, at least in part, by the fragments of Euripides's Me/eager included in a 
volume of classical literature8 given to him by friends upon his graduation from Eton 
(Life 1 13). 
Swinburne' s own correspondence suggests that perhaps he felt that Euripides's 
influence was too great on Atalanta, as he wrote to Edmund Gosse that he resented 
anyone comparing Erechtheus to the work of Euripides, "who was troubled with a 
dysentery of poetic imagination and a diarrhoea of rhetorical sophistry" (Letters 3: 100). 9 
Interestingly enough, this comment echoes some of the negative reviews standing out 
among the sea of praise he had received for Atalanta, especially Browning's 
pronouncement that the poem was "a fuzz of words" and Ruskin's more pointed 
observation that the poem, while impressive, was like the "foam at the mouth" of a 
"demoniac youth" ( qtd. by Henderson 107), or even Lord Houghton' s opinion that it 
overflows with a "bitter, angry anti�theism" which is suite4 "among the aberrations of 
human nature."10 This rather modem strain of"bitter, angry anti-theism," though, is what 
Swinburne came to equate with the political and cultural idealisms he associated with 
Greek culture. While working on Erechtheus, he wrote to William Michael Rossetti that 
Greek culture was "the highest and most sacred possible" subject for him to write about, 
because he found "the birth and redemption of Athens, i.e. of the world's  supreme type of 
poetry and liberty and light in all kinds" (Letters 3 : 80) to be a more appropriate narrative · 
for human salvation than the birth of Christ and Christ' s  later redemption of 
8 Poetarum Scenicorum Graecorum Fabulae Superstites (1851), ed. Karl Wilhelm Dindorf. 
9 This letter is dated 2 Jan. 1876. 
10 The review by Lord Houghton (Richard Monckton Milnes) appeared in the Edinburgh Review, July 
1865: 202-16. 
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humankind. 1 1  · In comparison, at the height of Atalanta 's popularity, he often contended 
that conventional Christians were "slaves of faith and fear" who misguidedly 
characterized any human attempt to assume responsibility for personal or cultural 
renewal as "blasphemous rebellion against their Supreme Being" (Letters 1 :  1 14). 12 For 
Swinburne, the divine caprice of the Greek gods that Swinburne explores and questions 
in Atalanta represents the same divine caprice he attributes to the Judea-Christian God; 
but, he arguably felt, in retrospect, that Atalanta did not critique human resignation to the 
divine as much as it could have. 
Atalanta in Calydon calls into question the enchanted world of Greek pantheism. 
The poem embodies what Horkheimer and Adorno identify as the opposition of reason 
and spirit, "the true antithesis of enlightenment and mythology": 
Mythology recognizes spirit only as immersed in nature, as natural power. 
Like the powers without, inward impulses appear as living powers of 
divine . . .  origin. Enlightenment, on the other hand, puts back coherence, 
meaning and life into subjectivity, which is properly constituted only in 
this process. (89) 
The myth of the Calydonian boar hunt was a good testing ground for this dialectic, 
especially as Swinburne could explore the opposition between divine decree and the 
impulse of the human subject by recasting Meleager's death at the hands of Althaea as an 
act of subjective impulse, rather than as an act resulting not from human will but from the 
will of the gods, the austere realization of prophecy or divine caprice. Swinburne 
I I This Jetter is dated 19 Oct. 1875. 
12 Letter to William Bell Scott 15  Mar. 1 865. In tlus letter, Swinburne reacts to the comments that Lord 
Houghton and other "rampant critics" made concerning A ta/an ta 's anti-theism. 
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skillfully parallels Althaea' s act of filicide with Meleager' s act of slaying the boar, the 
destruction of a symbol of the enchanted "natural" world inasmuch as the boar appears at 
first to be the agent of Artemis's rather subjective and vengeful impulse; though, "as an 
organism which [appears] . . . and [then] dies when it has run its course," the boar more 
strongly symbolizes a "natural law" that both precedes and supercedes the rigid laws of 
the gods, which are really the rigid laws of man (Prendergast 70). In short, Atalanta 
becomes a story about the disenchantment of the pantheistic world of ancient Greece. 
Swinburne's narrative constantly plays against the traces of the original versions 
of the myth woven into his poem, versions in which the boar hunt is merely the setting 
for an entire pre-ordained chain of events. Traditionally, Artemis is portrayed as the 
representative of the gods' order, controlling the course of events; because Oeneus's 
failure to pay tribute to her opposed that order, she must restore that order through 
retribution-specifically, the death of Oeneus's son, Meleager, is the tribute she 
demands. Thus, she creates the boar hunt as the occasion to enact that retribution: 
Oeneus's son, Meleager, meets and falls in love with Atalanta, the only female hunter in 
the party, and Meleager' s  love for Atalanta consequently causes a chain reaction of 
retributive deaths in the poem, leading up to his own. 1 3  Initially, Artemis purports to 
assert the "living powers" of her divinity over the world: she sends the boar to wreak 
havoc on Calydon. However, by the end of the poem, Artemis's power over the lives of 
her subjects is questionable, shaken by Althaea' s attempt to determine fate for herself 
(and express her desire for recognition) rather than leaving it only to the gods' will. 
13 Mark Siegchrist points out that the boar only "at first glance seems [ to be] the agent of her vengeance"; 
rather, Artemis really seems to use the boar to bring Atalanta and Mel eager together, thus providing "the 
occasion for . . .  destruction" so she can "stand back to watch it happen" (697). 
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Swinburne also portrays the deities of the pantheon as subject to, rather than in 
control of, the natural cycle that "remoulds and discreates" the world. Zeus, for example, 
"hath fear and custom under foot," and though his "will" controls "Much," it cannot 
control the natural cycle that determined how "each thing live its life" (Atalanta lines 
457-62). The very human qualities of tyranny attributed to Zeus cannot destroy the trace 
memory of an unsubjugated nature, 
the grace that remains, 
The fair beauty that cleaves 
To the life of the rains in the grasses, the life of the dews on the leaves. 
(3063-65) 
By contrast, Swinburne presents Althaea as a subject actively engaging the world, 
suggesting that the world is subject to human (rather than the gods') order. Meleager 
stands in opposition to both Artemis and Althaea, though, suggesting that either ordering 
principle is ultimately impossible: despite Meleager's romantic idealism-his belief that 
the natural world will present itself like "a child born with [the] clear sound and light" to 
guide him (line 365}-he fails to revive hope that one can (re)discover the mana of 
enchantment. Instead, Meleager eventually submits to a death which is like an "empty 
weary house," "Where no flesh is nor beauty'' (line 4095). Like Swinburne's favorite 
Blake character, Thel, Meleager envisions his death as a capitulation to the natural 
cycle, 14 "The source and end, the sower and the scythe" ( 40 I 0). And, as is the case wi_th 
Thel, Mel eager finds that his idealism was the "trickery which elevate[ d]" him "to the 
status of vehicle of divine substance" (Horkheimer and Adorno 5 1 )  or potential, for he 
14 See Riede, Study 101-02. 
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discovers at the end that his "flower of life / [Was] Disbranched and desecrated 
miserably'' ; death easily "minished all that god-like muscle and might," making his 
strength not only un-"godlike" but also "lesser than a man's" (4028-3 1 ). Meleager's 
death demonstrates how his attempt to position himself outside of customary ideology 
was merely artifice as well as demonstrates that Swinburne realizes that the aesthete's 
attempt to keep alive the hope of (re)enchanting the disenchanted world is just as 
artificial . 
Swinburne uses Greek myth to argue that "[ m ]an needs a new language" in which 
· one can demonstrate how relative, human, and artificial "truths have gone beyond those 
of the old order" established in myth (McGann, Swinburne 1 1 2). In doing so, I think that 
Swinburne is very careful to challenge his reader' s knowledge Greek myth, and thus his 
or her expectations about the "truths" explored in those myths. Contrary to the majority 
of previous critical readings, then, I contend that Swinburne uses Althaea's  speeches to 
challenge the easy fatalism of the educated reader. For example, Swinburne purposefully 
makes sure that Althaea's commentary on other mythic characters, such as her sister Leda 
and Leda's family, does not reflect the elements of the myths already familiar to his 
audience. When Althaea praises Leda's husband, Tyndareus, for his devotion to the gods 
and praises the integrity of Leda's daughters, Helen and Clytemnestra, wishing them 
· "good loves and lords," "a perfect life and blameless bed" (lines 423-25), Swinburne 
ensures that Althaea's language carries no foreshadowing of what the educated reader 
already knows happens to Leda and her hardly "blameless" family: Tyndareus, repeating 
Oeneus's error, forgets to sacrifice to Aphrodite, and thus Aphrodite supposedly curses 
both Helen and Clytemnestra to make marriages, wrecked by infidelity, that will bring 
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deadly consequences. Because Althaea' s language does not feature double entendres 
pointing to the calamities which befall her nieces, I believe he shatters the hubris of 
mythic foreknowledge. 
As a result, Althaea's speeches concerning prophecy, predestination, and the 
powers of the gods-more specifically, the prophecy ofMeleager's death-can be read 
as attempts to undermine those very concepts. Althaea questions the enchantment of her · 
world; for example, she refuses to praise Artemis "for all this harried land," suggesting 
that the natural occurrences of death and destruction signified by the boar are not 
supernatural "things . . .  to praise" (lines 1 63-69). Swinburne presents the Chorus as her 
opposition, reinforcing the notion that the world is enchanted by the gods. When so 
goaded by the Chorus, Althaea retreats into prophetic mode, repetitively describing the 
imagery of the fire and the brand that was foretold to be Meleager' s undoing; 15  but, since 
Althaea' s actions seems influenced by human voices rather than divine ones, Swinburne 
continues to suggest that it is the Chorus, not Artemis, manipulating Althaea by the very 
human power of suggestion to fulfill the "prophecy." As in classical drama, the authority 
of the Chorus is not above interrogation. 
It is important to note that Artemis herself never appears in the poem, even when 
called upon; in Swinburne's Calydon, she does not really exist. Though most readings of 
the poem, like Mark Siegchrist's, claim that Artemis is the poem's "pivotal figure" 
because all the characters are subject to her "expert manipulation of her victims' 
1 5  According to the myth, Althaea dreamed of giving birth to a burning brand instead of a human child 
during her pregnancy; upon Meleager's actual birtJ� the Fates appeared to her with a burning brand and 
"prophesied" (Swinburne's word) that Mel eager would live only as long as the brand burned. So Althaea 
extinguished the flame on the brand and tucked the brand away to save-or; as I would argue, maintain 
control over-Meleager's life. (See Swinburne's prologue to Atalanta, ''The Argumen�" pp. 243-44 in 
Collected Poems, vol. 4.) 
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psychology" (695, 697n4), I suggest instead that Artemis is pivotal only in her failure to 
display a palpable, definitive manifestation of her power. Artemis is not capable of 
manifestation in Swinburne' s poem because she is present only as the "phantasy to be 
found in the Platonic perspective of an absolute being to whom is transferred the quality 
ofbeing all-seeing," the determinant "gaze that circumscribes us" (Lacan, Concepts 75). 
And, because Artemis' s gaze is only ostensible, her ability to circumscribe all the events 
in the poem is questionable. Rather than portraying the gaze of Artemis as the frame 
limiting the actions of the plot, Swinburne presents it as a frame the characters 
themselves precariously superimpose on their actions to justify-to explain away, to give 
"meaning" to-the tangled web of accidental, subjective circumstances the events which 
comprise the plot. 16 The characters in the poem are manipulated by their own 
psychology-their compulsions either to fulfill (Althaea, Meleager) or to sublimate 
(Atalanta) their desires, to have their desires recognized by an/other-as an effect of their 
discourse. Artemis exists in the poem, albeit virtually, to suggest that there is no-thing 
"beyond the domain of discursive existence" (Zizek, Metastases 143). 
The contentious interplay of what is "natural" versus what is "unnatural"­
meaning, not only the dichotomous interplay between the "natural world" and human 
domination of it, but also the dichotomy separating "natural," meaning normative, human 
behavior and that behavior which falls outside the norm-is heightened by the purely 
virtual existence of the goddess in the poem. Artemis is comparable to Lacanian woman, 
the woman "who could fill out the lack in man, the ideal partner with whom the sexual 
1 6  Inasmuch as "the many mythic figures can all be brought to a common denominator, and reduced to the 
human subject," and myth, like magic, is "transform(edl into the pure truth and act(sJ as the very ground of 
the world that has become subject to it" (Horkheimer and Adorno 6-7, 9). 
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relationship would final ly be possible, . . .  who does not exist" (Zizek, Lacan 80). 
Swinburne continually emphasizes Artemis's chastity, specifically the vow of chastity 
Atalanta made to show her devotion to Artemis. Such continual references reinforce the 
impossibility of the sexual relationship, in the Lacanian sense that the sexual relationship 
neither fulfills human desires, nor does it allow for the unification of self and other. 
Atalanta is continually described as "unnatural"; as Lacan would say, Atalanta is 
"unnatural" because she allocates her desire not to human (sexual) expression but in her 
aim for "the beyond of ate, " which is "beyond the limits of the human" (Seminar 263). 
And, inasmuch as "[a]te concerns the Other, the field of the Other" here (Seminar 277}­
in this case, the Other being Artemis and the field of the Other being the virtual authority 
of her divine law, which is an illusory structure governing what is considered "natural"­
Atalanta can be read both the representative of the Other as well as what Zizek calls "The 
Other of the Other'' who, as I will argue below, is not deceived by the illusory structure, 
although she "holds and manipulates the threads of the deception proper to the symbolic 
order," maintaining the illusion of the enchanted world (Zizek, Lacan 8 1). 
The Chorus proclaims Atalanta to be "holier than all holy days or things" (line 
1 95). Arguably, in this description, the Chorus places Atalanta in opposition to Artemis 
herself, thus establishing Atalanta as "holier," and thus other than, the goddess. 
Described as having "no touch of love," as she is "Pure iron, fashioned for a sword" and 
thus incapable of human feeling (lines 189, 1 99-200);7 Atalanta is dehumanized: 
paradoxically, despite the ways in which she seems to oppose Artemis, she still is little 
17 Consider the rest of lines 199-200 not quoted above: " . . .  and man / She loves not; what should one such 
do with lover' This can be read two ways. On the surface level, this is another comment about Atalanta's 
chastity, but this also questions Atalanta's very hwnanity. Her sexual inexperience seems to indicate an 
inability to forge the more common bonds of empathy with others. 
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more than the sword which is a metonym for Artemis's power. Yet Atalanta's 
inhumanity is not an "immediate property" of her character, especially since Swinburne 
devotes very little time in the poem to developing Atalanta as a character; in the entire 
poem, Atalanta speaks only five times. Rather, Atalanta's inhumanity is established by 
the Calydonians' behavior toward her, as they treat her with suspicious awe and anxious 
consternation. This is a "performative effect of their symbolic ritual" (Zizek, Lacan 33) 
of appeasing an ambivalent-and illusory-goddess._ Atalanta recognizes the limitations 
ofbeing perceived as a metonymic representative of Artemis's will, admitting, 
for all my forest holiness, 
Fame, and this armed and iron maidenhood, 
[I] Pay thus much also . . . .  (964-66) 
Yet, at the same time, by claiming that she is no less "godlike" in "heart" and "spirit" 
than Artemis (994-96), she calls into question that which she metonymically represents. 
By momentarily projecting the illusory image of herself as a goddess, Atalanta implies 
that perhaps Artemis's goddesshood is just as illusory. 
Identifying with such tenuous divine power causes Atalanta to lead a life she finds 
"cold" and "strange" (line 971 ), though she claims a special, almost transcendent, 
relationship with an enchanted, animated nature as compensation for her lack of human 
expenence: 
Me the utmost pine and footless frost of woods 
That talk with many winds and gods, the hours 
Re-risen, and white divisions of the dawn, 
Springs thousand-tongued with the intermitting reed 
And streams that murmur of the mother snow­
Me these allure, and know me; but no man 
Knows, and my goddess only . . . .  (979-86) 
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Atalanta makes this speech to pacify the Calydonians, to reinforce their symbolic belief 
system as well as to convince them that her participation in the hunting party provides 
divine assurance of the hunt' s success. Her claim rings false, though, because her 
descriptions are rife with images of division and dissonance instead of images suggesting 
an undifferentiated relationship between human and nature. Atalanta's speech is not the 
field in which the transcendent qualities of the enchanted world are given full expression; 
instead, this speech is her attempt to convince herself of an illusory transcendence. 
Especially considering that she repeatedly uses the personal pronoun "me" as the locus 
for every "proof' of the animate world, her speech shows only how she is "separated 
from transcendence" ; ultimately, despite her intentions, it implies that transcendence is  
"unreal," "subjectively mediated" by Atalanta herself, not her goddess. 18 Atalanta seems 
a transcendent figure because of her "eloquence"-an eloquence beyond "the oaths / That 
bind the tongue of men . . .  " (l ines I 006-07)--but it is the kind of consciously scripted 
eloquence Adorno says is rife "with broken or veiled meaning" (Theory 78). In other 
words, her self-possession is undermined by the "thousand-tongued" voices that Atalanta 
discursively represents-the voices or several layers of myth imposed upon the world in 
attempts to explain the world and give it meaning.' Her monologue is like "myth turned 
against itself' inasmuch as her description of transcendent immediacy becomes the 
18 See Adorno, Theory 78. 
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catastrophic instant that destroys immediacy. 19 As her language "undoes" itself, it 
expresses the ruins and fragments of the catastrophe of meaning which speak to the 
mythic quality of humanity and its differential and alienated relationship to mana As the 
Chorus remarks in the commentary following Atalanta's monologue, human speech 
serves only to "divide and rend" human beings from the kind of immediacy represented 
by God (line 1202). 
Althaea' s  speeches simi larly express these kinds of"ruins and fragments" of a 
trace memory of wholeness and unity before the "fall" into subjective differentiation. 
Specifically, Althaea questions the role of the· "fallen" subject-how that subject 
perpetually intervenes in the disenchanted world in order to exercise some control over · 
it-and ponders her ability to express her own will . On one hand, Althaea seems to deny 
that she can exercise her own wil l :  
But all the gods will, all they do; and we 
Not all we would, yet somewhat; and one choice 
We have, to live and to do just deeds and die. ( 1 759-6 1 )  
The significance of  this passage hinges on the word "choice." Is the "one choice" to be 
mere agents of the gods' will, to commit deeds that are "just" only because the gods 
willed them so? Or, is the "one choice" to live according to one' s own will, to impose 
one's will on the world and, in doing so, commit deeds that are "just" because one 
subjectively determines them to be so? The Chorus interprets Althaea's statement to 
imply the latter treatment of "choice/' for they admonish her for the "Terrible words she 
19 I have adapted this from Adorno's contention that "the modern is myth turned against itself; the 
timelessness of myth becomes the catastrophic instant that destroys temporal continuity . . .  " (Theory 23). 
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communes with"; yet this is also the moment in which they remind her of the prophecy, 
reinvoking the treatment of '.'choice" which is no one's choice but the gods', saying she 
"murmurs as who talks in dreams with death" (lines 1762-64). The fragmented allusion 
of the prophecy of Meleager's death appears here as if the Chorus "want[s] to prevent the 
catastrophe by conjuring up its image" (Adorno, '/heory 33). Instead, though, when the 
Chorus conjures the image of Meleager's death, they effect, not prevent, the catastrophe 
of Mel eager's death. 
The choice Althaea makes is to kill her son, supposedly a "just" act of honor and 
duty that avenges her brothers' deaths at the hands of Meleager. More pointedly, though, 
it is an act that defies the gods themselves, an act in which she subjects the world to her 
ego: 
You strong gods, 
Give place unto me; I am as any of you, 
To give life and to take life . . . .  ( I  863-65) 
She exerts this control by murdering Mel eager to demonstrate "the might of [her] strong 
desire" (line 1963). Furthermore, Althaea resents Meleager for believing that the 
world-nature-is enchanted by the gods and thus possesses "a creative and radiant 
potentiality" (Prendergast 68) that was once, and could again be, actualized. In other 
words, Meleager does not share in Althaea' s emerging assumption that such potentiality 
would be a strictly human one that can be actualized through the individual ego. 
Mel eager believes that creative potential can be actualized through dedicating oneself to 
the gods in order to access nature immediately; he praises Atalanta, "a light lit at the 
hands of gods" (line 91 5), because he believes that she has accessed that potential 
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through her pious dedication to the gods' order. He even murders his uncles because they 
dishonor Atalanta and hence refuse to pay homage to the gods' emissary, to recognize 
Atalanta as the symbol of the potentiality granted by divine will, when they celebrated 
victory over the boar. As McGann points out, Mel eager is "high-minded" and "attracted" 
to the abstract, if not objective, ideal of "perfection" and perfectibility which he believes 
Atalanta represents (Swinburne 96); Atalanta contrasts with the concrete� "created . . . 
reality of life and value" represented by Althaea and his uncles (Coleman 1 8). By 
dishonoring Atalanta, Meleager' s uncles dishonor, by failing to recognize, his desire for a 
"plenipotentiary of immediacy" -or mana-amid an otherwise "mediated and objectified 
world" (Adorno, Theory 62). Such plenipotential immediacy is impossible in Althaea' s 
world view; by dedicating himself to his desire for it, then, Meleager is just as "strange" 
and "beyond the human" as Atalanta. 
I believe that Althaea is at variance with Meleager because she perceives that his 
desire for a plenipotentiary of immediacy has a "radically destructive character" in that it 
defies the "social body'' (Lacan, Seminar 283), or the polis. Adam Roberts has argued 
that the destruction of the social body of Calydon is "twofold": the polis is attacked from 
the outside (by the boar) and the resulting chaos "undermines its unity from_ the inside" 
(760). However, whereas Roberts reads Artemis as the force causing this destruction, I 
read Artemis as the place-holder for Mel eager's "radically destructive" desire. 
Consequently, Althaea's act of filicide can then be read, in part, as her choice to salvage 
individually what little unity is left in the polis by meting out justice: "Being just, I had 
slain their slayer atoningly" (line 1 640). Yet Althaea does not perceive that, because her 
act is rife with subjective differentiation in that she reifies her "fleeting individual 
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reactions" (Adorno, Theory 239) into "law," she similarly defies the social body. It is 
Meleager, not Althaea, who recognizes that the social body of Calydon is "foul / With the 
kinship of contaminated lives" (3082-83); the law of the polis can be "chalked up to 
[each individual ' s] guilty desires" and, as a result, "[i]t suits"-or, perhaps more aptly in 
this case,/osters-"domination" (Theory 239). Here, such guilt, "the context of social 
delusion" (Horkheimer and Adorno 4 1  ), revolves around ate-what Lacan calls "the 
relationship of the hero to the limit," or the "criminal desire" of the mother which is "the 
founding desire of the whole structure" (Seminar 286, 283). 
Ate, in this case, corresponds to what Zizek ca11s the "maternal superego." In the 
Lacanian schema, the maternal superego opposes the paternal ego-ideal which organizes 
social structure: the "primal father' symbol ically represents the authority/social order in 
which an individual situates him or herself as well as organizes the repression of desires 
which would otherwise undermine that social order, but the maternal superego represents 
resis�ance to this authority, the very desire that is otherwise repressed. In Swinburne's 
Calydon, the "primal father," Zeus, is merely a paternal metaphor ("the sole steersman of 
the helm of things" [line 7 1 5)) invoked to uphold divine order; when Meleager invokes 
him, though, Meleager only incites Althaea' s resistance to godly/paternalistic authority. 
Likewise, Oeneus is an ineffective king who is unable to enact or enforce any law that 
will influence the course of events. Because the paternal ordering principle represented 
by Zeus and Oeneus is ineffective and thus "d�ficient," the law of the polis '"regress[ es]'  
toward a ferocious maternal superego" which "disturbs" normativity (Zizek, Lacan 99). 
On one level, Artemis figures this regression because, as a chaste goddess who 
demands chastity from her followers, she prevents the "normal" sexual relationship upon 
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which human relationships are modeled. However, because Artemis is  physicatty absent 
from the poem, the maternal superego seems more fervently represented by Atalanta and 
Althaea. Atalanta cannot engage in a "normal" sexual relationship with Meleager� 
because she represents the impossibility of fulfilling human desire, she perpetually, 
ferociously, disruptively re-evokes those desires that the social order attempts to 
repress-inasmuch as desire always perpetuates and sustains itself. Atalanta violates the 
"rule" with her "perverse will" (lines 476, 469). "Unwomanlike," Atalanta disturbs 
normativity, since she "treads down use and wont / And the sweet common honor that 
[woman] hath" (477-78) under the paternal rule: 
Not fire nor iron and the wide-mouthed wars 
Are deadlier than her tips or braided hair. 
For of one comes poison, and a curse 
Falls from the other and burns the lives of men. ( 482-85) 
However, because Atalanta insists that, despite the social disruption she brings to 
Calydon, she still acts in accord with the "law given and clean command" (line 896)­
meaning, only within the established social order and only because she wishes to 
maintain that order-she represents the limit of ate that Althaea wi ll exceed. 
Ultimately, the polis is undermined because Althaea embodies the "(real) 
knowledge" of subjective, differentiating "agency that perturbs and hinders t�e 
[symbolic] rule of the Name-of-the-Father" upon which the polis depends (Zizek, lAcan 
27, 97). Althaea constantly dismisses Atalanta for being "beyond the human," but, "[a]s 
one made drunk with l iving" and "mad for joy" (line 19 1 5- 16) upon committing her act 
of filicide, Althaea is the one who is "beyond": 
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I am severed from myself, my name is gone, 
My name that was a healing, it is changed, 
My name is a consuming . . . .  {1 942-44) 
Althaea is "severed from herself' inasmuc_h as her prior expression of "self' was as the 
queen of Calydon, the representative of a whole social body; now, though, the Chorus­
the collective voice of the polis-decrees that, as "Her robes" are no longer "manifold" 
but too differentiated, "the days of her worship are done, / [and] Her praise is taken 
away" ( 1956-58). Her act of "justice" did not heal the social body; rather, the social body 
was expended ("consumed") in her desire to find a "locus of truth" outside of the field of 
the Other.20 The poem ends with the Chorus asking, 
Who shall contend with his lords 
Or cross them or do them wrong? 
Who shall bind them as with cords? 
Who shall tame them as with song? 
Who shall smite them as with swords? ( 41 1 1 - 1 5) 
The Chorus then answers their own questions by proclaiming that there is no one who 
can go beyond, no one who can exceed these limits, "for the hands of their kingdom are 
strong" (4 1 16); but, the poem itself contradicts the Chorus' answer. 
McGann has previously stated that the tragedy, though "formally" Meleager's, is 
really Althaea' s (Swinburne 95). However, whereas McGann finds Althaea tragic 
because her "life has been broken" by the limitations of fate (Swinburne 95), I believe 
20 As Lacan points ou� the Other (/e grandAutre) is the symbolic ordering principle (the "Lawn) which 
gives the subject its position. Here. thou� the subject-Althaea-wants to inhabit a position that is not 
determined by that ordering principle. (See Lacan. Concepts 1 29.) 
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Althaea is a tragic figure because she must actively renegotiate her relationship to the 
l imits that prevent her from achieving the goal of desire-all the whi le failing to achieve 
that goal-rather than passively accept those limitations as what Horkheimer and Adorno 
would call a "false absolute." 
"The gods are overthrown by the very system by which they are honored": 
The Politics of Serial Identification and Renegotiating the Limits in Erechtheus 
Perhaps the most obvious difference between Atalanta in Calydon and Erechtheus 
is in Swinburne's treatment of identity. As David Riede has noted, Erechtheus' s 
aesthetic importance "must be understood from its form, not its plot," since it is often 
difficult to distinguish major differences between individual characters; the characters, 
developed according to Swinburne's "system of correspondences" .in which "everything 
in the play eventually suggests everything else," seem fluidly interchangeable (Study 
1 1 6). Because the poetic form is of utmost importance, Swinburne chooses an extremely, 
but deceptively, simple plot: the Delphic Oracle has instructed Erechtheus and Praxithea, 
King and Queen of Athens, to sacrifice their daughter, Chthonia, to ensure Athens' 
victory in the war against Thrace. Erechtheus is reluctant though compelled to obey, but 
Chthonia obeys willingly, recasting blind obedience to the gods as a will ing choice to 
sacrifice herself for the greater good of Athens. Whereas Atalanta 's intensity comes 
from the complications of its plot, with each individualized character offering contiguous 
but distinct perspectives for Swinburne's multitudinous look into the mythopoeic, 
Erechtheus is intense because it is Swinburne' s attempt to complicate conventional 
modes of identification by intermixing multiple characters' perspective(s) in a mode of 
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plethoric simultaneity. Every character, every image, is an ideogram, or what Martin Jay 
would call a cipher of the "richly articulated surface of [the] world" it figuratively 
describes rather than literally explains ("Scopic" I 3). In this way, Swinburne establishes 
a negative dialectic-or amalgamation of identity and non-identity-of "likeness" 
between art's immanent "spirit" and a "later, derived 'material ' application" or 
representation of that spirit (Mitchell, /conology 32-33). As Adorno explains in Aesthetic 
Theory, the "spirit" of an artwork is that which becomes more than-exceeds-its 
appearance; spirit is what is implied, what can only be gestured at, via the 
"configuration" of art's signifying elements. Thus, for Swinburne, the image or symbol 
is "not to be held simply identical" with what it feigns to represent; instead, the image or 
symbol can resist being "fixated in immediate identity" with the unrepresentable (Theory 
86-87). In Erechtheus, Swinburne comes closer to approximating the "plenipotentiary of 
immediacy" denied to Meleager under the unforgiving absolutes in Atalanta. 
Erechtheus' s opening monologue establishes the mode of Swinburnian plethoric 
simultaneity that dominates the poem. In this, the only sizeable speech he makes in the 
entire poem, Erechtheus is established as the nexus of aesthetic representation and 
resistance, beginning with his claim to be interchangeably the son of Gaia, the son of 
Hephaestus, and the foster son of Athena. In doing so, Swinburne braids three narrative 
threads of the parentage ofErechtheus into one. With his considerable knowledge of 
classical literature and equally considerable translation skills, Swinburne would have 
been aware that the stories ofErechtheus and his grandfather Erechthonius were typically 
conflated in most of the classical accounts. According to Athenian foundation myths, the 
first Athenians were half-serpentine autochthons-meaning, they were parthogenetically 
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formed from the earth; Erechthonius, the second king of Athens, was one of these 
autochthonic beings. Another version of the myth claims that Erechthonius was born out 
of a failed union between Hephaestus and Athena: disgusted by Hephaestus's attempt to 
make love to her, Athena jumped from the bed before Hephaestus could impregnate her, 
and Erechthonius sprung from Hephaestus's spilled semen. Then there are the myths 
delineating Erechtheus' s human parentage21 though maintaining that he was actually 
raised as Athena's child. The allusions to Erechtheus being of parthenogenetic parentage 
while he, paradoxically, is also the son of a "strong cunning God" (line 7) present him as 
a Christ figure, though the inclusion of a simultaneous allusion to Phaeton recalls the 
ineffectual Christ figure of the Songs before Sunrise. Like Phaeton losing control of the 
fiery "four-yoked chariot" of his father, the sun-god Helios who both is and is not 
Apollo,22 Erechtheus feels he is losing control of his kingdom: He describes himself "the 
king / Who stand[s] . : . naked" before the earth, subject to a greater power which, like a 
"curse / . . .  fall[s] as fire upon us" (17- 1 8, 23-24), subsuming the narrative thread of 
Phaeton's disastrous end into his own, arguably to invoke the image of catastrophe to 
prevent it. The law of nature, "of life and death and all men's days" represented by the 
earth, is trumped by the "curse" of the imposing father figure (Hephaestus, Helios, the 
Judeo-Christian God) whose symbolic law denies one access to the earth-as-"mother of 
all men born" (Erechtheus I ,  1 9). The tyrannical imposition of the symbolic law, "God's 
21 The non-parthenogenic Erechtheus is said to be the son of Pandion (also one of the kings of Athe� 
sometimes also named as the father of Procne and Philomela) and a nymph, Zeuxippe. 
22 Initially, Helios was a separate deity from Apollo; however, in later incarnations of the Greek pantheon, 
especially those developed under the influence of the Romans, Helios became conflated with Apollo, and 
thus Apollo became the god representing the sun. 
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will," is exemplified in the gods' demand that Erechtheus sacrifice his daughter, Chthonia 
(line 78). 
The supposed agency of the Delphic Oracle issuing this charge is incorporated in 
the image of Helios. The image of Apollo/Helios, "a fire-souled king" (line 47), is 
grafted onto the image of Poseidon, whose edict is the "loud brood of the Thracian foam" 
imposing his will "on the sea-wind" of war "blown" toward Athens (lines 44, 56). In this 
passage, Poseidon plays a similar role to that of Apollo in the Oresteia, issuing an edict 
for murder to reinforce the primacy of what Lacan would call the "name of the father." 
In Aeschylus's play, Apollo calls for Orestes to ki1 1 his mother, Clytemnestra, for 
asserting a version of the maternal superego and kil ling her husband, Agamemnon; in 
Erechtheus, Poseidon issues a similar call for the death of Chthonia to reinforce his 
paternalism, punishing Erechtheus for waging war against the Thracians, led by 
Poseidon's son Eumolpus. Since Poseidon's edict is "A strange growth grafted on ou� 
natural soil, / A root of Thrace in Eleusinian earth" (48-49), the traces of the myths that 
claim Erechtheus was punished for causing the death of Eumolpus's son, Himmarados, 
during the previous war between Athens and Eleusis are evident here. Moreover, since 
Eumolpus is also the son of a god-ostensibly the agent of that god's will on earth-who 
is eventually killed (sacrificed). by Erechtheus as wen to "save" Athens, Eumolpus 
becomes another Christ figure. He exists in a negative dialectic with Erechtheus23-
especially because Swinburne establishes in Erechtheus's opening monologue that there 
23 My reading directly opposes David Riede's analysis that "tlie division between Athens and Thrace, 
between Erechtheus and Eumolpus, suggests a division between Erechtheus's mother, earth, and 
Eumolpus's father, the sea," providing a static binarism that foregrounds and maintains the poem's system 
of "metaphoric correspondences" (Study 1 17). Though I agree that Swinburne sustains the gender divisions 
in the poe� I otherwise find Riede's reading too literal, as it dwells on the maintenance of dichotomies and 
ignores the reconfigurations of identity formation so crucial to the poem. 
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is no "fixed /-identity'' in the world of this poem. In the negative dialectic, Adorno tells 
us, "the individual is not flatly for himself. In himself, he is his otherness and linked with 
others"; the individual ego, the "self' initially formed in contrast to an/other, must 
accommodate (rather than constrain) the other which opposes it and render the other as 
"something beyond contradiction" (Negative 16 1 ,  146). Identity here becomes a subtle, 
fluid, constant process of relating otherwise discrete qualities. One must follow "the 
accumulating ranges of pattern," the presentation of "motif and variation" (McGann, 
Swinburne 1 19) in a constellative mode which allows the borders separating individual 
subjects-individual egos-to bleed into one another. In this way, Swinburne allows the 
"fixed-/ identity [to] dissolv[e]" between Erechtheus and Erechthonius and between the 
various gods. As a result, the relationship between Erechtheus and Eumolpus, as fluid 
subjects only superficially establishing the poles of conflict in this poem, remains open to 
the kind of Adornian model of intersubjectivity that Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf 
say "is not immediately ascribable"; in this model, each subject or "self' opens itself "to 
what is not identical," potentially providing access to the other subject or "self' in the 
dialectic relationship (287). 
By blurring the boundaries establishing Erechtheus's identity as separate from 
Eumolpus' s, Swinburne also blurs the boundaries that make the gods' will dissimilar 
from the sons'. Erechtheus declares that 
what [the gods] will is more than our desire, 
And their desire is more than what we will. 
For no man's will and no desire of man's 
Shall stand as doth a God's will . . . .  (75-78) 
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But, for Erechtheus (as well as Eumolpus, by constellative association) the struggle 
between divine agency and human agency has become the struggle to establish 
"sovereignty over existence." Both Erechtheus and Eumolpus, like AJthaea in Atalanta, 
"pay for the increase of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise 
their power'' (Horkheimer and Adorno 9). The gods' will is "the projection onto nature 
of the subjective," in that these gods are "mirror images of [these] men who allow 
themselves to be frightened by natural phenomena" (Horkheimer and Adorno 6}­
particularly, in this  case, death. Man's desire is for a "freedom-toward-death," to fulfill 
desire by mastering it, by seeing one' s own death, reaching the impossible goal of 
satiating desire in death' s nothingness. However, the �uman expression of desire cannot 
assert such frightening "pure and insatiable vacuity" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1  ); thus, one 
substitutes a desired thing-here, Chthonia, whose impending death gestures at the death 
ofHimmarados palimpsestically traced in Swinburne's poem-for the real goal, and 
consequently, this substitution (of seeing another' s death rather than one's own) 
perpetuates desire itself 
As a Christ figure, Erechtheus is denied a death which is nothingness. Erechtheus 
dies in battle, but he is killed by Zeus rather than by another human being, such as 
Eumolpus. The battle is really Erechtheus's Calvary, where he is  always already 
forsaken by Zeus, whom Swinburne describes in Judeo-Christian terms as the "King of 
kings, holiest of holies, and mightiest of might, / Lord of the lords . . .  ,"24 who has 
preordained for Erechtheus "an end for the path of the fires of the sun"-a path which the 
24 Rev. 19. 16: "On [the Messiah's] robe and on his thigh he has a name inscribed, 'King of kings and Lord 
of lords."' 
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Chorus acknowledges will "Take off us [humans] thy burden, and give us not wholly to 
death" (780-82, 79 1 ). Not incidentally, the mention of the "holiest of holies" recalls an 
earlier reference in the poem to the "shrine of Pandrosus" (line 460), the earthly, 
metonymic sanctuary devoted to the martyred king incorporated into of the Temple of 
Athena Polias.25 With the phrase "holiest of holies," Swinburne plays on the biblical 
language of Hebrews 9. 1 - 10, in which Moses's "earthly sanctuary'' to God, the 
metonymic altar of God's power called the "Holy of Holies," is reinvoked to mark the 
advent of "the time [which] comes to set things right," or the time of a new covenant 
between God and humanity initiated b)' the death of Christ. In Erechtheus, the time to 
"set things right"-to establish a new relationship between humanity and the divine, the 
law of the polis and divine law-comes when the Athenians retrieve Erechtheus's body 
from the battlefield, "bear[ing] him slain of no man but a God, / Godljke . . .  "; "through 
him"-the supposed power represented in his lifeless body-they claim Athens is 
"Saved[,] and the whole clear land is purged . . .  " (I 5 88-9 1 ). By claiming that the gods, 
and not a human agent him or herself, holds such power over the entirety of death, either 
in caprice or by providential circumscription, the Athenians paradoxically wield "the 
discourse of full satisfaction" (Borch-Jacobsen 1 1 ) while becoming increasingly alienated 
from it. At this point, the Athenians' worship of their dead king's body as a site of power 
reinforces the very sense of alienation rife in Erechtheus' s initial speech questioning 
divine will. Moreover, it also reinforces the importance for the human agents in the 
poem to reinvent Athens as a "Dear city without [a] master or lord" (line 1 3  8)-without 
either a living human lord or even the pervasive presence of a divine one. 
25 See Pausanias, Description of Greece 1.26.5. 
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Consequently, most criticism on Erechtheus identifies Chthonia, not Erechtheus, 
as the more criticaHy important Christ figure in Swinburne' s poem because this "city 
without a master or lord" must be founded upon a feminine principle-what Roberts calls 
"a sort of super-fertility'' (766)-that both corresponds to and offsets the "name of the 
father" which has become counterproductive. From the "death" of Athens' paternalistic 
ruler comes its rebirth: as Margot Louis argues, "All Athenians will be the children of 
Chthonia" rather than Erechtheus, privileging Chthonia's proclamation of herself "for all 
the world / . . .  a saviour," although a savior who evokes the trace memory ofMother 
Nature before she was subjected to men, a Gaia/Hertha whose "womb / . . .  brought forth / 
For all this people freedom" (Gods 66; Erechtheus 939-40, 930-3 1). This is not the same 
disruptive feminine principle that Swinburne creates in the triangulation of Althaea/ 
Atalanta/Artemis in Atalanta in Calydon, though, because the extreme subjective 
differentiation that causes the tension within that triad is notably muted in the plethoric 
immediacy that appears in the presentation of Chthonia-who is (her mother) Praxithea­
who is Athena, all of whom are Athens, in Erechtheus. 26 In Atalanta, the triangulated 
female characters create the "arbitrary" and "' irrational ' maternal superego" which 
inhibits and denies pleasure, thus creating an "unresolved tension in intersubjective 
relations" (Zizek, Lacan 99); this repudiation of pleasure is suggested by the emphasis 
placed on Artemis' s and Atalanta's virginity as wel l as the emphasis placed on Althaea' s  
desire, desire that causes her to pursue not pleasure but "the violence that [her] desire 
institutes" (Guzynski 2 10). I contend, however, that the female characters in Erechtheus 
26 This is based, in part, on McGann 's prior assertion tliat, tbe characters' "identities tend to dissolve into 
other characters and contexts" so that "the characters and actions in Erechtheus seem to share [a) sort of 
radical vagueness . . .  : because everything is necessarily conceived and defined in tenns of something and 
everything else" (Swinburne 127). 
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are not forced to inhibit and deny pleasure by the same kind of maternal superego. 
Instead, as I will argue below, Chthonia and her mother, Praxithea, find a pleasure 
beyond the limits of either the maternal superego or the paternalistic prohibition, a 
pleasure that does not originate in the alienation between human law and the law of 
nature.27 
This is the pleasure of intimacy between human law and the law of nature first 
indicated by Erechtheus in his appeal to Gaia, describing his ideal Athens as a 
girdle of gate and temple and citadel 
Drawn round beneath thy bosom, and fast linked 
As to thine heart's root-this dear crown of thine. (84-86) 
' . Erechtheus cannot experience this kind of intimacy, but his desire for it is intensified in 
Chthonia's acceptance of her role as a human sacrifice. Because she can regard herself as 
a cipher for the possibilities of realizing a new kind of "dominion and freedom" for 
Athens (line 1095) which will not so distinctively alienate "[i]nexaustibility [and] 
unending renewal," she seems able to tap into what Horkheimer and Adorno call the 
"something of mana" left in the world ( 17). Thus Chthonia surrenders herself: 
I put on me the darkness thy shadow, my mother, and symbol, 0 Earth, of 
my name . . . .  
In thy likeness I come to thee darkling, a daughter whose dawn and her 
even are the same. (1 1 02-04) 
In Erotism, Georges Bataille asserts that the Christian "wish" is "to open the door to a 
completely unquestioning love" ( 1 1 8). By presenting Chthonia's death as a moment in 
27 See Marcuse 227. 
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which she simultaneously disco_vers and submits to a "completely unquestioning love" 
like that between mother and daughter, Swinburne renders Chthonia
,
s sacrifice as an 
attempt to fulfill a similar kind of Christian "wish." The element of mana Chthonia 
intuits here is like the hopeful Christian bel ief that the ''lost continuity" between 
humanity and nature can be rediscovered through "boundless and uncalculated love"; the 
boundless and uncalculated love she has for the Gaia is the same love she has for Athens, 
the city which is  "the fruit of [Gaia's] body" and whose citizens are Gaia's "children 
true-born" (line 1 1 57). Through her self-sacrifice, Chthonia hopes to transform the 
"vision of violence" of human sacrifice "into its opposite," a serene vision of unselfish 
love that cafl incite the "world of selfish discontinuity
,, 
to become instead a "realm of 
continuity afire with love" (Erotism 1 1 8). 
By identifying the "dawn" of human hope with the "shadow" of mythic fear in a 
negative dialectic, Chthonia seems to renegotiate the conventions, or l imits, of ritual 
sacrifice. The kind of Christ-like sacrifice Chthonia makes typically requires a 
selflessness; in other words, the sacrificing self is assumed to disregard her own self, her 
own fears and desires, in order to alleviate the fears and capitulate to the desires of others. 
However, Chthonia' s sacrifice becomes just as much about Chthonia' s desire as it is 
about her heroic gesture of regard for an other or others (Athens). Her death seems a 
conscious choice not to cede her desire: she fully accepts the nothingness of desire, 
refusing to see herself as a victim but instead as a pure subject assuming the death drive 
imposed upon her. That choice allows her a moment in which she paradoxically "seems 
permeated with intense pleasure" though she also "suffers immensely" (Zizek, La.can 65). 
Though in death she claims to experience a kind of "love" in which she can "Laugh 
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without word, filled with sweet light, and speak / Divine dumb things of the inward spirit 
and heart," she also laments that she will be left with only "dead thoughts of dead things" 
in a "sterile" grave-bed "with its void sad sheets" (lines 91 6-24). 
Regarding herself as the cipher of Athens' potential, she also experiences herself 
as the object of the ritual, striving for her own "radical self-annihilation"-which, like 
Zizek states, entails going "beyond mere physical destruction" and performing "the 
effacement of the very symbolic texture of' the continuity between "generation and 
corruption" her sacrifice is supposed to restore (Lacan 64). Like the promise of 
redemption and eternal life signified by Christ, she is the object by which "mankind tries 
to avoid the terms set to individual discontinuity, death, and invents a discontinuity 
unassailable by death-that is, the immortality of discontinuous beings" (Bataille, 
Erotism 1 1 9). And, because Chthonia subjectively chooses her self-annihilation while 
concurrently capitulating to her status .as ritual object, she exhibits the kind of ambiguity 
that Zizek attributes to thefemmefatale, in that "[w]e can never be sure if she enjoys or 
suffers, if she manipulates or is herself the victim of manipulation" (Lacan 65). At the 
same time, though, it is because Swinburne creates this lack of certainty regarding the 
palpable limits of her sacrificial death-her limit experience, so to speak-that Chthonia 
seems to achieve the dis-alienation that Erechtheus cannot. 
Praxithea shares in the intensity of traversing conventional limits and 
experiencing pleasure which is suffering; she engages in self-conscious manipulation of 
her given situation while concurrently being manipulated by the social conditions which 
place her in that very situation. There is a sense of elation in Praxithea' s willingness to 
give her "gift," "This flower of this my body, this sweet life, / . . . And give it death," 
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because Chthonia's  death "is more, / Much more is this than all we [are]" ( 1 032, 1 034-
39). On the surface, Praxithea claims that her daughter's  sacrifice is hers to make but, 
importantly, she does not ascribe to it the kinds of subjective reasons Althaea makes for 
her sacrifice of Meleager. Because she does not dwell on such subjectively differentiated 
reasons, she is able to articulate her position as a particular Athenian representing, and 
not striving beyond, the collective position of the polis. In the careful inclusion of the 
pronoun "we," Swinburne has Praxithea not only identify herself with Chthonia as the 
"flower of . . .  [her] body," but also with the entirety of Athens: 
See now, friends, 
My countrymen, my brothers, with what heart 
I give you this that of your hands again 
The Gods require for Athens; as / give 
So give ye . . . .  (1 069-72, emphases mine) 
In this way, Swinburne presents Praxithea as manipulating the gods' edict for sacrifice as 
retributive justice by making it into a call to strengthen the polis, though Praxithea-who 
is ideogrammatically all of Athens here-is still manipulated by the compulsion to make 
the sacrifice in the first place. Sacrificing Chthonia, whether undertaken merely to 
appease the gods or to foster a new sense of "a human society ruled . . .  by ethical 
responsibilities" (Murfin 210), is still an attempt to barter with the gods: Praxithea 
maintains, much more than she disrupts, the texture of the traditional symbolic network 
by using Chthonia as what Horkheimer and Adorno call "·a device of men by which the 
gods may be mastered" ( 49, emp�asis added). 
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The gods are still present here as very separate from-beyond-men, especially 
as the Athenians promise to worship Chthonia' s name after her death: "such grace / The 
Gods have dealt to no man" or woman, save Chthonia, who bears a "heavy sorrow" 
beyond human comprehension (I  085-86). The Chorus proclaims that Chthonia has 
"godhead in [her] blood" and, as sue� her "name / Shall be . . .  this city' s," worshipped 
next to "hers that called it Athens"-meaning, Athena's (1 087-9 1 ). The martyred 
Chthonia, then, still parallels her martyred father in that she seems more Cristo deo than 
Cristo uomo. Additionally, the Chorus remarks upon Chthonia' s death: 
her mouth was a fountain of song, 
And her heart as a citadel strong 
That guards the heart of the city. (1 1 95-97) 
By choosing to have the Chorus use words similar to those spoken by Erechtheus as he 
imagines the idealized, sanctified Athens in the poem's opening monologue, Swinburne 
demonstrates how Chthonia, via serial identification with Praxithea as well as 
Erechtheus, "sums up in herself both the female and male agents of redemption; she, 
perhaps, is the perfect [Swinbumian] hermaphrodite" (Louis, Gods 66). That being said, 
the presentation falls short of being utterly convincing until the figure of the divine, 
Athena, is transformed into a totem for "that ideal agnostic state" (Murfin 2 10), 
representing men striving, and sometimes suffering in their failure, to maintain 
community with others rather than causing men to suffer arbitrarily and for selfish 
reasons.28 
28 In Swinburne and His Gods, Margot Louis applies Ludwig Feuerbach 's Essence of Christianity (1854, 
trans. George Eliot [New York: Harper, 1957))-particuJarly Feuerbach's statement that "he who suffers 
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At first, Athena's appearance as the deus ex machina solidifying the nascent 
"agnostic state" of Athens seems idiosyncratic-especially considering that, in Atalanta, 
Artemis, who is presented much more discernibly as an instrumental artifice of 
manipulative divine power, never materially manifests herself in Calydon. However, 
Artemis remains a problematic presence in Calydon specifically because of her absence. 
As absence-which-is-presence, Artemis' s abstract or virtual "appearance" in Atalanta is 
comparable to what Adorno recognizes as the "imitation of fear"-the primal fear of the 
unknown29-in that Artemis "perpetuates the mythic spell" of fear against which the 
Calydonians simultaneously "rebel" yet to which they remain "subordinate". (Theory 47). 
If Artemis were to appear in Calydon, she would break the spell, reveal herself as artifice, 
and thus transfer her supposed control over "the incomprehensibil ity of death . . .  to 
wholly comprehensible real existence" (Horkheimer and Adorno 29). But this transfer of 
control is precisely what Athena accomplishes in the final action of Erechtheus: as 
McGann astutely suggests, "[t]his Pallas is  no longer an Olympian, but a Republican" 
(Swinburne 1 29). Like the Athena of Aeschylus' s Eumenides, Swinburne's refashioned 
goddess demonstrates how the human-centered republic of Athens "cannot progress by 
exterminating its old order" but by "absorb[ing] and us[ing]" the old order as part of the 
new (Grene and Lattimore, Aeschylus 3 1  ). 
for others, who lays down his life for the� acts divinely, is as a God to men"-to her reading of 
Erechtheus. 1 have loosely adapted from Louis's reading here. See Gods 68-69. 
29 In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno contend that hwnans create mythic stories of 
the gods because "(m]an imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown" (16); 
mythic constructs are offered to explain the unknown and thus alleviate some of the fear. Yet the arbitral)' 
quality of the gods in these myths paradoxically makes human beings fear the very gods constructed to 
alleviate fear. And, as Adorno notes in his Aesthetic Theory, "mythical fear diminish[es] with the 
awakening of subjectivity," though the "old images of terror'' persist because the subject, unable to free 
her/himself from them completely, "perpetuates the mythical spelr' of that fear "against which [ s/]he rebels 
and to which [ s/]he is subordinate" ( 4 7). 
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Though emphasizing that the transition of power occurs by her "command" and is 
meant to honor what "The Gods have stablished" (sic, lines 1 666, 1 668), Athena tells the 
Athenians: 
thine shall be 
The crown of all songs sung, of all deeds done 
Thine the full flower for all time; in thine hand 
Shall time be like a scepter . . .  
. . . thine eyes 
Shall.first in man 's flash lightning liberty, 
Thy tongue shallfirst say freedom. . . .  ( 168 1 -89, emphases added) 
In his pivotal reading of Erechtheus, Ross Murfin claims this is the moment in which 
republican citizenship is established: from this point forward, he argues, "[t]he only 
citizenship which would have virtue after the moment of man' s spiritual and social 
revolt" against the old order of divine caprice "would be man's natural citizenship within 
Nature" (2 10). In this case, such "natural citizenship" suggests that humans will accept 
their failure to exert control over the inevitable cycle of birth and death; the "scepter" of 
time may be in human hands, but only in the sense that human will, rather than divine 
circumscription, determines how women and men spend the time allotted to them. As 
Athena reminds them, "time and change" will remain "masters and lords of all men" even 
though time and change will seem to "be made / To thee that knowest no master and no 
lord / Servants" ( 1725-28}--echoing Chthonia's earlier reminder that, though she dies to 
purchase freedom for Athens, still "Day to day makes answer, first to last, and life to 
death," as she, like all else, was "Born for death's sake, die[s] for life's sake" (884-85). 
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Swinburne, while regressing back to the mythic mode in which spirit i s  recognized "only 
as immersed in nature, as, natural power,>' concomitantly envisions the mythic mode 
allowing for the exploration of"the sensual consciousness of the identity of the 
generar'-in this case, the polis as a communal whole-"and the particular''-meaning, 
each individual member comprising the communal whole-"as naturalized mediation" 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 89, 10 1). This mediation, of course, must occur in a world that 
he will always fail to re-enchant, though he finds hope in his failure nonetheless. In 
failure, Swinburne realizes that the renegotiation of disenchantment allows glimpses of 
the trace memories of a time in which the unalienated pleasure of unnaturalized 
immediacy was possible. 
Swinburne claimed that Erechtheus "is throughout . . .  imbued with awe and 
reverence towards the moral and religious law of nature (not of theology)" (Letters 
3 : 100).30 Notably, �e previously had made a similar claim for Atalanta, telling Lord 
Houghton that the natural "theology" of Atalanta was like that of"de Sade with a 
difference," as Sade "saw to the bottom of gods and men" (Letters 1 :  125).31  Within the 
Sadean nature outlined in the Blake essay as personifying a "criminal desire" that is 
indeed beyond the human, "no destruction seem[s] to her destructive enough . . . .  [I]t is by 
criminal things and deeds unnatural that nature works and moves and has her being, . . .  
labour[ing] in desire of death,, (Swinburne, Blake 1 57-58nl). Artemis and Althaea 
personify these same qualities in Atalanta. Like Madame Durand of Sade's Juliette, 
Artemis is the enchantress embodying the commanding law of nature that supposedly 
30 Letter to Edmund Gosse, 2 Jan. I 876. 
31 Letter to Lord Houghton; the original has no date, but Lang dates it 14 JuJy 1865. 
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refuses to be subjugated to men; yet, her power and authority-like the unsubjugated 
nature from which she draws that power and authority-proves to be illusory, imaginary, 
artificial . And Althaea' s expressions of desire, orchestrated within the development of 
the maternal superego, demonstrate how nature, always already dominated and 
conceptualized under the name of the father, remains part of the paternalistic social order 
that demands the "repressive organization of sexuality" and, consequently, subjugates 
pleasure (Marcuse 40). Quite paradoxically, nature is dominated and repressed, but it 
also can function as a virtual site for pursuing the traces of that repressed pleasure. That 
pursuit, moreover, becomes destructive inasmuch as "objects of desire become agents," 
and I would add also the recipients of, "punishment" (Bersani 97). Althaea-also like 
Sade' s Madame Durand-remains manipulated by the "name of the father'' because she 
fails to absorb the paternalistic order into any "new" order she wishes to establish. Like 
Artemis, who in many myths is often caught bathing by male admirers, Althaea remains a 
subject positioned within the prohibited rule of the name of the father, or the male 
(paternalistic) gaze. 
As the paternalistic gaze is  diffused and negatively identified with the feminized 
"super-fertility" that catalyzes the establishment of the "new order'' in Erechtheus, 
though, I believe that Swinburne proves himself as the "Sade[an] with a difference" much 
more so in that poem than he does in Atalanta. Whereas, as Horkheimer and Adorno 
point out, "the individualism which Sade proclaimed in combating the laws ends in the 
absolute rule of the generality" ( 1 1 7), the "general ity" of the Athenian polis in 
Erechtheus cannot be a universal which transcends its particulars. The plethoric 
immediacy established throughout (within the form of) the poem holds traces of the 
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dissonant, "excessive" condition of desire that cannot be otherwise incorporated into a 
static rule of generality. The exemplary "beacon" of republican citizenship will always 
remain in tension with the "darkness of change on the waters of time" (Erechtheus line 
1765). In Swinburne's  Athens, republicanism will not cease to express its struggle with 
itself. And the polis, as a structure which will always have to contend with the flux of 
change as well as its failure to become a perfect( ed) form of government, represents the 
Swinburnian work of art. The Athenian polis becomes a site between the constant 
collision of social and political representation and its powerlessness to represent every 
possible facet or particularity of the human condition-every particular experience of 
each member of the city-in itself. Similarly, then, the poem becomes the site of the 
constant collision between art's expressive powers of representation and its 
powerlessness, or failure, to salvage the immediacy of representation after the catastrophe 
of meaning. In other words, even an artwork that features serial identifications, fluid 
systems of perpetual correspondences, and the negative dialectic ultimately will fai l to 
represent thoroughly all possible meanings-though it _is compelled to strive continually 
toward that fullness of immediate representation, all the same. 
By comparing Atalanta and Erechtheus, one can trace the development of 
Swinburne' s aesthetic and notice some perhaps subtle but nonetheless important changes 
in the way he negotiates the failure of fantasy to fulfill desire. Since it was written at 
approximately the same time that Swinburne not only began the first draft of the Blake 
essay but also began writing the poems that would later comprise Poems and Ballads, 
First Series, Atalanta shares many similarities with these works. In his readings of 
Blake's poetry, Swinburne finds that aesthetic experience fails to allow one to transcend 
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the material world and its limitations; this failure to transcend is embodied in Meleager. 
As both Thomas Wymer and Ian Fletcher have suggested previously, Meleager is an 
aesthete. Wymer argues that Meleager represents an individualized "creative kind of 
law'' which regards "life as something not merely to be endured but to 'lighten and lift up 
higher'" or, in other words, life is the quest for transcendence (5); Fletcher contends that 
Meleager, whose death marks his failure to achieve transcendence, "realize[s] the price 
that a weak-bodied aesthete must pay'' (" Atalanta" 1 83) in a material world that cannot 
be transcended. Meleager represents the kind-of ego-weakness-in which the subject 
falsely' concludes that s/he is the same as the other, the object of desire, but suffers in 
her/his separation from the desired other-that Swinburne reads into Blake's  Urizen: just 
as Urizen cannot enact any kind of fulfilling reconciliation between self and other in his 
world, Meleager cannot find a similar kind of fulfilling reconciliation in Calydon. By 
asserting a kind of ego-strength that Meleager lacks and actively renegotiating the 
boundaries between self and other, Althaea attempts to provide an effective 
countermeasure to this ego-weakness, but she, too, fails in that the renegotiations break 
down very quickly due to her overt identification with Meleager as "other." Her failure is 
productive in that it suggests a new way of considering the material world which entails 
replacing divine order with a human one, but Althaea's limit experience does not seem to 
inspire the Calydonians to reconsider their world and the way they assign their world 
"meaning": the Calydonian Chorus has witnessed Althaea' s embrace of ate but has 
largely rejected it, just as the Troezenian Chorus rejects Phaedra' s  embrace of ate in 
Poems and Ballads ' "Phaedra." 
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Thus the potential for renegotiation of limits is introduced in both Atalanta and 
"Phaedra," although the audiences constructed in these poems (the Calydonians, the 
Troezenians) are not very willing to recognize and to embrace the tensions. In these 
earlier works, Swinburne occasionally seems to question his own process of 
(re)discovering the possibilities for substantively implementing the creative tensions 
generated by the ongoing dialectic between the imagination's potential for transforming 
material reality and the material reality that both grounds and antagonizes the 
imagination. For example, in "ltylus," though Procne's unrepresentable (beyond the 
discursive) song gestures at the lost, tension-less continuity between imagination and 
reality that perpetuates the tension which sparks creativity, Swinburne remains more 
focused on Philomela' s discomfiting place within a discursive tension she cannot 
transcend. Likewise, in "Anactoria," Swinburne valiantly struggles not only to 
circumscribe Sappho within the margins of materiality but also to circumscribe Anactoria 
as a completely imaginative or virtual presence antagonizing those margins, but ends his 
poem by resignedly admitting that there always remains a "Thick darkness" and 
"insuperable sea" (" Anactoria" line 304) that may confound the attempt to employ failure 
as a key factor of aesthetic production. 
However, after completing Songs before Sunrise 's exploration of how the failure 
inherent in political revolution create tensions that renew and revitalize the struggle to 
contend productively with the failure to fulfill human desires, Swinburne seems to have 
found a way to portray failure more effectively as a mode in which one can find 
satisfaction and even pleasure, rather than delaying the experience of satisfaction and 
pleasure for the advent of a perfect resolution that is actually impossible to achieve. In 
3 1 8  
Erechtheus, he portrays the Athenian polis as the site of perpetual struggle with failure, 
where the tensions between the desire to realize ultin:iately unreachable goals and the 
practice of perpetuating that desire can be productively and fluidly renegotiated and 
utilized. Athena is no· longer the agent imposing divine order on the Athenians but the 
signifier for the polis itself, a new human order which will strive to counteract ego­
weakness by accommodating all possibilities for subjective differentiation; in other 
words, the polis attempts to collectivize all possibilities of particularity and difference 
without imposing upon itself the false expectation of successfully achieving unity without 
dissonance. The polis will strive to "live / Beyond all human hap of mortal doom / 
Happy," yet retain the tension of the "Plight for continual comfort" as the catalyst for 
their striving (Erechtheus lines 1744-45). Just as Swinburne' s art is a rather Adomian 
site in which experimentation "takes shape as the testing of possibil ities"-tests that are 
undertaken not to achieve an end result but for the sake of the testing itself (Theory 37)­
Swinbume' s aesthetic polis i s  a site in which fantasies that fail to reconcile tensions take 
shape as the testing of possibilities for revaluating-for "revis(ion)ing"-and not actually 
reconciling or transcending, those tensions. 
3 1 9  
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